GOD
940.3
Tim
107243

00107243

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 31 October, 2019

The Times

HISTORY
OF
THE WAR

VOL. XI.

107243

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE.

GOD
940.3
T9m
107243
Lx/.68

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY "THE TIMES,"
PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE, LONDON.

1917.

CONTENTS OF VOL. XI.

PAGE

CHAPTER CLXVII.

BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE: SEPTEMBER, 1914 TO OCTOBER, 1916 ... ...

CHAPTER CLXVIII.

SCIENCE AND THE HEALTH OF ARMIES (II.) 41

CHAPTER CLXIX.

THE SHIPPING PROBLEM: AUGUST, 1914 TO FEBRUARY, 1917 77

CHAPTER CLXX.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (IV.) 117

CHAPTER CLXXI.

THE WORK OF THE MERCANTILE MARINE (II.) 157

CHAPTER CLXXII.

FISHERMEN AND THE WAR (II.) 177

CHAPTER CLXXIII.

THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1916: (I.) TRANSYLVANIA 197

CHAPTER CLXXIV.

ITALIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE CARSO, AUGUST TO DECEMBER, 1916: WAR WITH GERMANY 237

CHAPTER CLXXV.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (V.) 277

CHAPTER CLXXVI.

PERSIA AND THE WAR 317

CHAPTER CLXXVII.

THE END OF AMERICAN NEUTRALITY 357

CHAPTER CLXXVIII.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (VI.) 397

CHAPTER CLXXIX.

THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1916: (II.) TO FALL OF BUKAREST 433

CHAPTER CLXXX.

THE GERMAN PEACE CAMPAIGN OF DECEMBER, 1916 473

CHAPTER CLXVII.

BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE SEPTEMBER; 1914–OCTOBER, 1916.

BELGIUM AFTER THREE MONTHS OF WAR—REMAINING ELEMENTS OF BELGIAN NATIONALITY—ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN RULE—GOVERNOR-GENERAL VON DER GOLTZ—FIRST PROCLAMATIONS—UNLAWFUL DECREES—POLICE GOVERNMENT—SEIZURE OF HOSTAGES—RETURN OF REFUGEES AND GERMAN PROMISES—SUPPRESSION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY—GOVERNOR-GENERAL VON BISSING—PENALTIES FOR LOYALTY—THE BELGIAN FRONTIERS AND ESCAPES OF BELGIANS—THE EXECUTION OF EDITH CAVELL—GERMAN CENSORSHIP AND THE PRESS—FLEMINGS AND WALLOONS—THE GERMAN "LIBERATION OF THE FLEMINGS"—GHENT UNIVERSITY FIASCO—CONTROL OF BANKING FORCED CURRENCY—CONTRIBUTIONS AND REQUISITIONS—GERMAN SYSTEM OF PILLAGE—BEGINNING OF THE DEPORTATIONS—BELGIAN "MORAL"—PUNITIVE TAXATION—CARDINAL MERCIER'S PASTORAL LETTER—THE SPIRIT OF BELGIUM.

THE beginning of November, 1914, marked a new stage in Germany's violation of Belgium. The German armies had crossed the frontier on August 4, three months before, and ever since then they had been campaigning on Belgian soil. In August Liége fell, Louvain and Brussels were occupied, the Anglo-French forces were driven back into France in the battle of Mons-Charleroi, and the Belgian Army contained within the forts of Antwerp. Then there was a check in Belgium while the fate of France was decided on the Marne, and Belgian sorties from Antwerp held the German containing force from sending reinforcements to the southern battle. But in October, when the Germans had stemmed the Anglo-French counter-attack at the Aisne, they pushed on with the invasion of Belgium again. Antwerp fell, after a week's bombardment, on October 9, and the Provinces of East and West Flanders, which had so far escaped invasion behind the line of the Scheldt, were abandoned to the conqueror. The Germans pressed on to the sea, to the Yser, to Ypres. But on October 31 the Battles of Ypres and the Yser reached, and passed, their climax, and the Western Front became as stationary in its Belgian section as it had become in France a month before. A fragment of Belgium, not one-fiftieth part of the whole national territory, was definitely saved from German conquest; the rest of the country was as definitely in the Germans' power. And as the open manœuvring of the armies concentrated itself into the equilibrium of trench warfare, the greater part of the conquered territory passed out of the immediate zone of hostilities. The German invasion was over, and the German occupation had begun.

The occupied territory in November, 1914, was a wreck of the Belgium that had existed three months earlier. In August Belgium had been one of the most densely populated, industrious, highly organized, well-governed countries in Europe. All these factors had made its prosperity, but now all were gone. The Government had gone to Havre, in France; the National Bank had accepted the hospitality of the Bank of England, and, warned in time by the conduct of the invader at Liége and Hasselt, it had taken its notes, securities, and specie with it across the sea. Foreign trade was at a standstill, for the ports had passed into German hands and were

cut off, like the German ports, from the trade of the world. Internal communications were paralysed; such railways as were still in working order were monopolized by the German Army Command; but traffic was chiefly paralyzed by the German terror. During the three months of invasion, more than 21,000 houses had been burnt down in five alone of the nine provinces of Belgium, and a far greater number pillaged—more than 16,000, for instance, in the single Province of Brabant. Of the civilian population, between 5,000 and 6,000 men, women, and children had been massacred, some singly and some in batches, some by clean killing and some after lingering tortures, some in frenzy and some in cold blood, but all with the object of terrorization and with that result. Fleeing before the terror, many hundreds of thousands of Belgians, especially of the middle and upper classes, had taken refuge in Holland and the British Isles.

Yet something remained. The communal and municipal authorities, with their high traditions handed down from the Middle Ages, were still at their posts. By an emergency law of August 4 the King had delegated to them the Government's powers in the contingency of invasion, and they were protected to some extent by an article (Sect. iii., Art. 56) in the Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, in which it was agreed that their property should be treated as private property, and should not be liable to seizure by the Occupying Power. The judicial institutions of Belgium were also in being. The Germans had, indeed, commandeered the great Palais de Justice at Brussels, a few days after their entry into the city on August 20, and turned it into a *place d'armes*—contrary to the Convention of Geneva, for the building had already been occupied by a Red Cross Hospital, which the Germans dissolved.* But the courts still sat in the few rooms left to them, and the Brussels Bar, as well as the provincial Bars in the other Belgian cities, continued to plead. Another body which survived was the Church, though it had suffered cruelly during the invasion, for the fanatical Lutheran regiments, of which the invading army was mainly composed, singled out the priests and monks for ill-treatment. In the Dioceses of Liége, Namur, Tournai, and Malines at least 33 ecclesiastics were killed,† and in the whole of Belgium 49 altogether. But the malice of the Germans, combined with the fine conduct of the Belgian clergy, who had



YPRES.

* The intruders stole the hospital equipment, including a stock of fine wines, the gift of the Belgian legal profession. They also barbarously damaged the interior of the building—the marbles, wood-work, pictures, and upholstery.

† Mentioned by name in Cardinal Mercier's Pastoral Letter, Christmas, 1914.

THE PALAIS DE JUSTICE, BRUSSELS.
Inset: The Interior as German Barracks.

sacrificed themselves for their flocks and thrown themselves into the work of the Red Cross, bridged over the party difference between Liberal and Clerical, which had divided Belgium before the war, and made the Church a rallying point for the nation. The Belgians were fortunate, too, in their ecclesiastical leaders—the Bishops of Namur and Liége, and the Cardinal Archbishop of Malines—men strong in personal character and strong by their position as dignitaries of an international Church, to which more than half the population of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and many great neutral peoples, belonged. There were also private corporations, like the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce, which could keep watch on the economic condition of the country, though they could not retrieve the ruin which the invasion had caused, and which the occupation was to complete. And, lastly, there was the great body of workers in the industrial towns, who had been unable to emigrate wholesale like the people of other classes, and had not been mobilized in the Army, because only a small percentage of the able-bodied had been conscripted in Belgium before the new military law of 1913, while the invasion had spread too rapidly for the raising of volunteers.

These were the chief elements of Belgian nationality that remained in the occupied territory, and upon which German rule, as opposed to the mere terrorism of the invading Army Commands, was now imposed. The country in German hands was divided into three zones. The "Zone of Operations," in which the trenches lay and the fighting went on, was completely under martial law, but it was only a few miles broad. Behind it lay the "Etappen-Zone," or Zone of Depôts and Lines of Communication, on which the fighting line was based. This zone was also governed by the military authorities, but their government extended to civil functions, and the Belgian local authorities were allowed to subsist. The Etappen-Zone covered most of

FIELD-MARSHAL VON DER GOLTZ,
First German Governor-General in Belgium.

West and East Flanders. Lastly there was the "Zone of Occupation," extending over the rest of the territory, and this was given a semi-civil German administration under a Governor-General at Brussels.

In the Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the limits of "Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State" are partially defined. "The authority of the power of the State having passed *de facto* into the hands of the Occupant," it is laid down in Article 43, "the latter shall do all in his power to restore, and ensure as far as possible, public order and safety, respecting at the same time, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." By Article 45, "It is forbidden to force the inhabitants of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power." This Convention had been ratified by Germany, and in administering her "Zone of Occupation" in Belgium she was under obligation to abide by it.

For their first Governor-General in Belgium, the German Government selected Field-Marshal Baron von der Goltz Pasha, a soldier who had made his reputation in Turkey. He was appointed as early as August 26, and on September 5 he announced himself in a proclamation to the Belgians:

His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, after the occupation of the greater part of Belgian territory, has deigned to nominate me as Governor-General in Belgium. . . .

PILLAGE AT ANTWERP. [*From a German photograph.*

By His Majesty's command, a civil administration has been established under my Governor-Generalship. . . .

Every act of hostility on the part of the population against the German troops, every attempt to disturb their communications with Germany, or to embarrass or interrupt the working of the railways, telegraphs or telephones, will be punished very severely. Any resistance or revolt against the German Administration will be repressed without mercy.

It is the stern necessity of war that punishment for hostile acts must strike the innocent as well as the guilty. . . .

Belgian citizens who wish to attend peaceably to their business have nothing to fear from the German troops and authorities. As far as can be done, commerce must be started again, the factories set at work, and the harvests gathered in.

DINANT AS THE GERMAN GUNS LEFT IT.

The announcement was followed by an appeal: "Belgian citizens, I ask no one to renounce his patriotic sentiments. But I expect of you all a reasonable submission and an absolute obedience to the orders of my Government." Then came a decree: "The laws and decrees issued by the Governor-General for the Occupied Belgian Territory will be drawn up in the German language." These documents were published together as the first number of the *Gesetz-und Verordnungsblatt für die Okkupierten Gebiete Belgiens*," the official German title of the "Bulletin of Laws and Decrees for the Occupied Belgian Territory."

The régime thus inaugurated was not reassuring. The respect for patriotic sentiments and the revival of economic life had both a fair sound, but the doctrine that "the innocent must suffer for the guilty" was a direct repudiation of the Hague Convention cited above, which provides, in Article 50, that "no collective penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted on the population on account of the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible." And while emphasis was laid on the Governor-General's intention to police the country in the interests of the German Army, nothing was said about "respecting the laws in force in the country" or "defraying the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory to the same extent as the National Government," which were the duties of the Occupying Power under the Hague Convention of 1907 by the Articles defining its authority (Articles 43 and 48).

The expenses of administration were provided for later, by a decree of November 12,

in which it was announced that the existing taxes would continue to be levied, and that the administration would be paid for from the proceeds, as the Hague Convention prescribes. A decree of December 23 confirmed this expressly for the year 1915, though its correctness was marred by a supplementary decree of January 16, 1915, in which "German nationals, and nationals of States not at war with Germany," were granted "special facilities for the payment of communal, provincial or public taxes due from them in the Occupied Territory, or even the partial or total remission of the same." But "the laws in force in the country" were never acknowledged as binding by the Occupying Authorities. From November 8 onwards, for instance, the Belgian law making Greenwich time legal time in Belgium was set aside, and German time substituted for it, by a regulation of von Lüttwitz, the Military Governor of Brussels. This petty illegality, involving nothing worse than a confusion in the registration of births and deaths, was symptomatic of the German attitude, and the Governor-General usurped a legislative licence in the territory within his zone, which culminated in the decree of June 16, 1915:

Executive Acts with which a German public authority, or a person of German nationality whose acts bear a public character, has been empowered or has empowered others, can be applied in Belgium if they are legalized by the chief of the (civil) administration attached to the Governor-General.

By this decree Belgium was incorporated legislatively in the German Empire as unconditionally as it would have been by formal annexation. But this was the work of von Bissing, who succeeded von der Goltz at the beginning of December, 1914. Von Bissing's first act was to define his position, which his predecessor had never cleared up after his inaugural proclamation, in a decree dated December 3:

A TRAIN-LOAD OF LOOT FOR GERMANY.

DECREE

Abrogating the (Belgian) law of Aug. 4, 1914, on the delegation of powers in the contingency of an invasion of the national territory, and regulating the exercise of the powers which belong to the Provincial Governors and to the King of the Belgians, in virtue of the laws on the administration of the Provinces and Communes.

Art. 1.—The law of Aug. 4 is abrogated.

Art. 2.—All powers belonging to the Provincial Governors are exercised by the Military Governors of the German Empire. The presidents of the civil government attached to the (military) Governors deal, in their name, with the current business of provincial administration, and are responsible for the business of the Standing Committees (of the Provincial Councils) and for presiding over them. The powers belonging to the

King of the Belgians are exercised by me, in my capacity as Imperial Governor-General.

Art. 3.—The resolutions passed, since the law of Aug. 4 came into force, by the Standing Committees and Provincial and Communal Councils, will only be valid if they are ratified, retrospectively, by the authorities designated in Art. 2, in so far as these decisions would have had to be ratified by the Provincial Governors or by the King.

BARON VON BISSING,
Governor-General in Belgium.

Brussels, Dec. 3, 1914.

The substitution of German for Belgian authority in the occupied territory was proclaimed still more emphatically in a decree of January 4, 1915:

You are reminded that in the parts of Belgium subject to German government, as from the day when this government was established, only the regulations of the Governor-General and his subordinates have the force of law.

No decrees which the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Ministers of State have issued since this date, or may issue hereafter, have any binding force within the domain of German government in Belgium. I am determined to secure, by every means at my disposal, that the powers of government shall be exercised exclusively by the German authorities established in Belgium. I expect Belgian officials, in the true interests of their country, not to refuse to continue their services, especially as I shall not require of them any services in the direct interests of the German Army. . . .

The concluding pledge was falsified in the event, and the respect for the Hague Convention which it intimated was indeed inconsistent with the rest of the decree. In claiming to *supplant* the lawful government of the country instead of to *represent* it, von Bissing was contradicting the whole spirit in which the Convention was framed; the military element in his administration, dominant from the beginning, was bound to oust the civil more and more, and German authority in Belgium resolved itself into terrorism by "Special Military Tribunals." These tribunals were introduced with sinister regularity as the sanction of the administrative decrees. Condemnation "by a Military Tribunal" or

GENERAL VON BISSING,
Appointed German Governor-General in Belgium, December, 1914.



COURT-MARTIAL
On a man and boy charged with assisting Belgians to escape.

Armee - Oberkommando

LE 22 AOUT 1914.

Abteilung II b. Ira. N. 150.

Aux Autorités communales

DE LA

VILLE DE LIÉGE

Les habitants de la ville d'Andenne, après avoir protesté de leurs intentions pacifiques, ont fait une surprise traître sur nos troupes. C'est avec mon consentement que le Général en chef a fait brûler toute la localité et que cent personnes environ ont été fusillées.

Je porte ce fait à la connaissance de la Ville de Liége pour que les Liégeois se représentent le sort dont ils sont menacés, s'ils prenaient pareille attitude.

Ensuite, il a été trouvé dans un magasin d'armes à Huy des projectiles « dum-dum » dans le genre du spécimen joint à la présente lettre. Au cas que cela arrivât, on demandera rigoureusement compte chaque fois des personnes en question.

Le Général-Commandant en chef.
s) von BULOW.

PROCLAMATION

recording the shooting of about a hundred persons at Andenne for an alleged traitorous attack on German troops.

"according to Martial Law" was held over the Belgians' heads for being in possession of carrier pigeons after September 15 (Proclamation of September 13, 1914): infringing the German military censorship (Decree of October 13); evading the German supervision over Belgian branches of banks belonging to countries at war with Germany (November 26); dissuading their fellow-citizens from working for the German authorities (this offence, by a decree of November 19, was within the Military Tribunals' exclusive competence); issuing bank notes—"the attempt" being "punishable in itself" (December 22); infringing the—abrogation of the—right of assembly (January 17, 1915); buying French paper or specie above its nominal price (May 22); wearing, "even in an unprovocative manner," the colours of Belgium or any other country at war with Germany or her Allies (June 6).

The last-mentioned prohibition shows the "Police State" erected by Germany on the ruins of Belgian democracy in its naked unloveliness. Apart from its inconceivable triviality, it was a breach of von der Goltz's undertaking that "no one should be asked to renounce his patriotic sentiments." But the tyranny struck deeper than this. In November, 1914, the following was posted up, in German, French, and Flemish, in the streets of Brussels:—

NOTICE

On Oct. 28, 1914, a legally constituted Military Tribunal pronounced the following sentences:

1. The police-constable De Ryckere was condemned for having, in the legal exercise of his duties, attacked an

A GERMAN PATROL IN BELGIUM.

authorized agent of the German Authorities; for having in two instances intentionally inflicted bodily injury, with the aid of other persons; for having in one instance procured the escape of a prisoner; and for having attacked a German soldier; to

FIVE YEARS' IMPRISONMENT.

2. The police-constable SEGHERS was condemned for having, in the legal exercise of his duties, attacked an authorized agent of the German Authorities; for having intentionally inflicted bodily injury on this German agent; and for having procured the escape of a prisoner (all these offences constituting one charge); to

THREE YEARS' IMPRISONMENT.

The verdicts were confirmed on Oct. 31, 1914, by the Governor-General Baron von der Goltz.



GERMAN DEFENCES AT THE PALAIS DE JUSTICE, BRUSSELS.

The City of Brussels, not including its suburbs, has been punished for the assault committed by its police-constable DE RYCKERE upon a German soldier by an additional war contribution of

FIVE MILLION FRANCS.

BARON VON LÜTTWITZ, *General, Governor of Brussels.*

Brussels, Nov. 1, 1914.

The German agent whose misadventure the Military Tribunal and the Military Governor of Brussels so royally redressed, was one of those "police out of uniform" or spies in plain clothes whose business was to sweep the unwary into the Tribunal's net. It is sufficient to say that there were even more of them in Belgium after the German occupation than there were before the war, and that the streets, cafés, and trams were picketed by them as ubiquitously as in Germany itself.

This German police government in Belgium stands convicted of three main abuses on a general view:—

(i.) Its decrees, which often involved questions of life and death for those subject to them, were not properly accessible to the Belgian public. Only a few were placarded in the streets; the majority, including all those of more complicated contents, were merely published in the Governor-General's "Official Bulletin of Laws and Decrees," which had only a limited and official circulation, and even in this the exhaustive publication of them seems only to have been provided for by a decree of December 23, when the German Administration had been four months in activity. The definitive text, moreover, was drafted in German, so that in cases of doubtful phrasing the Belgians had to interpret a language not their own.

(ii.) Both offences and penalties were defined with a quite inequitable latitude. On September 17, 1914, for instance, the Governor-General gave notice that "anyone approaching German troops or advanced posts *in such a way as to present the appearance* of spying upon them, will be shot summarily." This was practically a licence to any German officer,

however subordinate, to shoot without investigation any Belgian civilian who crossed the path of the unit under his command. In the prescription of penalties, "a heavy fine," "a prolonged imprisonment," "penalties of imprisonment," or even "severe penalties" without further specification, were at least as common formulas as the exact term of imprisonment and the exact amount of fine, which modern legislation is always scrupulous in defining. Even the mode of trial was often no more explicit than "according to Martial law" or "by the laws of War." In other cases the "Military Tribunals" were expressly mentioned; but though every Belgian in the occupied territory was acutely aware of their existence, their constitution and procedure were never made public by the Governor-General by whom they were appointed, so that the "legally constituted" tribunal, which imposed eight years imprisonment and five million francs fine, according to the proclamation cited above, was really an arbitrary body working, behind closed doors, upon victims over whom it had no title but force to jurisdiction, like the German "Wehmgerichte" of the Middle Ages.

(iii.) The punishment of the innocent for the guilty, forbidden by Article 50 of the Hague Convention of 1907, concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, but threatened by von der Goltz in his inaugural proclamation of September 2, was regularly put into practice. The following are three proclamations by Baron von der Goltz himself:—

(*a*) It has happened recently, in regions not actually under occupation by German troops either in weak detachments or in force, that supply-columns and patrols have been ambuscaded by the inhabitants. I draw the attention of the public to the fact that a list has been kept of towns and communes in the neighbourhood of which such attacks have taken place, and that they must be prepared for punishment as soon as German troops come within reach of them.

BARON VON DER GOLTZ. *Field-Marshal, Governor-General of Belgium.*

Brussels, September 25, 1914.

(*b*) On the evening of September 25, the railway-track and telegraph-wires were destroyed on the line Lovenjoul-Vertryck. In consequence, the two places named were called to account on the morning of September 30, and had to give hostages. In future, the places nearest the spot where such acts have occurred—whether they are parties to them or not—will be punished without pity. To this end, hostages have been taken from all places near railways threatened by such attacks, and at the first attempt to destroy railway, telegraph or telephone lines, they will immediately be shot. Moreover, all troops guarding railways have been ordered to shoot everyone *approaching railway, telegraph or telephone lines in a suspicious manner.*

BARON VON DER GOLTZ, *Field-Marshal, Governor-General in Belgium.*

Brussels, October 1, 1914.

(*c*) A generalisation of (*b*), dated Brussels, October 5, declaring that the places affected "will be punished without pity, no matter whether they are guilty of these acts or not," and that the hostages taken "will immediately be shot at the first attempt at the destruction" of the objects afore-mentioned.

It may be added that these raids on German

TEACHING BELGIAN CHILDREN GERMAN SONGS.

communications, for which such ferocious collective penalties were prescribed by von der Goltz, were not the work of Belgian civilians in the occupied territory under his government, or of any Belgian civilians whatsoever, but of the Belgian Army, which was still holding out in Antwerp at these dates, and was performing entirely legitimate acts of war. The seizure of hostages, moreover, by which the collective punishment was applied, is not only a flagrant injustice in itself, but has been condemned as illegal by the modern authorities on International Law. Yet throughout the occupation as well as the invasion of Belgium the Germans seized hostages without scruple, and often inflicted on them the extreme penalty for acts for which from the nature of their position they could not be responsible themselves. The classic seizure of hostages in Belgium was by a certain Major Dieckmann in the Commune of Grivegnée, a suburb of Liége. In return for "permitting the houses in Grivegnée to be inhabited by the persons who lived in them formerly," he demanded from the Commune a panel of hostages to be held by him for twenty-four hours in turn. "Priests, burgomasters and other members of the administration have the first liability. From the panel submitted to me I shall designate the persons to serve as hostages from mid-day to mid-day. A hostage, if not replaced in good time, will be kept another twenty-four hours. After this further period, the hostage, if not replaced, incurs the penalty of death."

These were the general characteristics of von der Goltz's and von Bissing's régime. They were the heads of a "Police-State," and they revealed the purpose of their government in the objects to which they applied themselves, and in the organs they created to carry them out.

A GERMAN SCHOOL CLASS IN BELGIUM.
A typical advertisement of the blessings of German rule.

The first object of the German authorities was to procure the return of the refugees, whose absence not only embarrassed them in their attempt to carry on the government of the country which they had usurped, but was a standing indictment of the barbarity with which they had conducted their invasion. They were particularly anxious to get back the population of Antwerp, which had fled *en masse* across the neighbouring Dutch frontier, and had been given hospitality by the people of Holland; and accordingly they let it be

ANTWERP: CIVILIANS COLLECTED FOR DEPORTATION AND THEIR GUARD.

known, through the Netherlands Legation at Brussels and the Netherlands Consul-General at Antwerp, that they intended to restore "normal conditions" in Belgium, and therefore invited the refugees to return. This overture was taken up by the local Dutch authorities in the frontier districts, who were overwhelmed with the difficulty of providing for the refugees, and believed that their return would be to the refugees' own advantage, as it would have been if the German intentions had been sincere. On the advice of their Dutch hosts, many of the refugees accepted the German invitation and returned to their homes. Special assurances were given to members of the Belgian *Garde Civique*. On October 9, the day on which Antwerp capitulated, General von Beseler, who commanded the besieging army, assured the Belgian delegates negotiating with him that "Civic Guards who had been disarmed would not be treated as prisoners of war," and Lieutenant-General von Schütz, who was appointed German Commandant of Antwerp on the same date, pledged himself explicitly that "there was nothing to prevent the return of the inhabitants to their homes. None of them would be molested," and that "members of the *Garde Civique*, if they had been disarmed, could return in complete security."

On October 16 the same pledge was given in writing by the German Military authorities at Antwerp to General van Terwisga, in command of the Dutch Armies in the field, with the addition that "the rumour to the effect that young Belgians would be taken to Germany was entirely without foundation." But the most solemn pledges of all were given to Cardinal Mercier, who, since the Royal Government had retired to Havre, had become the recognized spokesman, in the occupied territory, of the Belgian nation.

Cardinal Mercier received from Baron von Huene, who had succeeded General von Schütz as Governor of Antwerp, a written undertaking that "Young men need have no fear of being carried off to Germany, either to be enrolled in the army or to be subjected to forced labour." As soon as Baron von der Goltz arrived at Brussels as Governor-General, Cardinal Mercier asked him to ratify this pledge and to extend it to the whole territory under his administration. "The Governor-General retained my petition," the Cardinal records,* "in order to consider it at his leisure. The following day he was good enough to come in person to Malines to express his

* Protest against the deportations, drawn up by Cardinal Mercier in the name of the Belgian Episcopate, and dated November 7, 1916.

RUINED HOUSES IN ANTWERP.

approval, and, in the presence of two aides-de-camp and of my private secretary, to confirm the promise that the liberty of Belgian citizens would be respected."

On the strength of these pledges a considerable number of Belgian refugees, especially from Holland, recrossed the frontier into the occupied territory. But those who hung back were not encouraged to follow this example by the fashion in which the pledges were observed. The guarantee against deportation, it is true, was not violated openly and on a large scale for nearly two years, but the promise of "normal conditions" and "freedom from molestation" was a dead letter from the beginning. By the end of 1914 the refugees still abroad were no longer open to enticement, and von Bissing, in a decree of January 15, announced a resort to forcible measures.

Belgians subject to direct taxation during the year 1914, who since the beginning of the war have voluntarily left their domicile and have resided more than two months outside Belgium, are to pay a special additional tax, assessed at ten times the total of the taxation aforesaid, unless they return to Belgium before March 1, 1915. Until proof to the contrary, every person is considered as resident outside Belgium who has not remained or does not remain at his domicile in Belgium.

This was the first article of the Decree, and it was further provided that half the proceeds of the fine were to go towards the administrative expenses of the occupied territory, "according to Articles 48 and 49 of the Hague Convention concerning War on Land," and half to the commune in which the particular refugee was formerly domiciled. "The tax is payable on April 15 at latest, and recoverable by distraint after the expiry of that date."

But this arbitrary spoliation, crushing though it was, did not bring many more

REFUGEES RETURN TO THEIR RUINED HOME.



A WALL DIRECTORY.
How refugees to Holland made their whereabouts known to their friends.

refugees within von Bissing's fold. The German *régime* in the occupied territory was already so onerous that those beyond the reach of the Governor-General's arm were content to save their persons from it at the price of their goods.

The suppression of personal liberty was the next concern of the German Administration.

CARDINAL MERCIER,
Archbishop of Malines.

The Belgians under it—the returned refugees and those who had never left their homes—were systematically isolated from one another and from the rest of the world. On January 17, 1915, von Bissing signed a sweeping decree in restriction of the right of assembly :—

Art. I.—1. Open-air meetings are forbidden.

2. Political meetings within doors, in which political questions are to be dealt with and discussed, are equally forbidden.

3. For any other public or private meeting, previous authorization is required, which must be applied for at least five days in advance. The grant of such authorization is within the province of the local military commandant, or, failing him, of the (civil) head of the arrondissement.

4. Public meetings with a religious object, as well as private meetings of a purely religious, social, scientific, professional or artistic character, are exempted from the penalties laid down in Article III. For such meetings no authorization is required.

5. In the event of the conditions laid down in this article being infringed, all those attending the said meetings as well as the promoters, organizers and executive committees, will be held responsible.

Art. II.—All clubs and societies of a political tendency, or designed for the discussion of political objects, are closed. The formation of new clubs or societies of this character is forbidden. The officers, founders and members of such societies will be liable to penalties.

Art. III.—Infringements of this decree will be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than 5,000 francs.

Infringements are subject to the jurisdiction of the Military Courts.

BARON VON BISSING, *Colonel-General,*
Governor-General in Belgium.

Brussels, January 17, 1915.

This general assault upon the right of assembly was reinforced by restrictive measures in detail. Civilians might not travel from one place to another in the occupied territory without a special passport, and all the expense and delay that obtaining a passport entailed. They could hardly travel by train, for the railways were commandeered, and sometimes entirely monopolized, by the German Army. But motor cars, too, were forbidden to civilians, and then bicycles were placed under the ban as well. And while people were thus prevented from meeting each other in person, equal care was taken that they should not communicate from a distance. Telephones and carrier-pigeons particularly exercised the Governor-General, and drew from him, on December 22, 1914, an elaborate "Recapitulatory Notice," in the following terms :—

It is necessary to recall attention to the subjoined regulations :—

A.—The right to possess and use wireless installations belongs exclusively to the German troops. Anyone in Belgium possessing any kind of wireless installation or having knowledge of such, must immediately give notice of the same to the German authorities.

B.—All telephone and telegraph installations in Belgium are also for the exclusive use of the German authorities and the German troops, as well as the functionaries of communes, canals and those railways which have received, for certain sections of line, an express written permission from the Governor-General or the military railway authorities. Whoever possesses any telephone or telegraph installation in working order, or has knowledge of any, must immediately give notice of the same to the nearest military authority.

The only exceptions allowed are telegraph installations for domestic use, which work exclusively within the interior of a single house, and are not connected up with any wires outside the house.

C.—The right of flying pigeons belongs exclusively to the German troops and authorities. All other owners of pigeons must conform strictly to the following rules :—

1. Owners of pigeons of every kind are bound to keep their pigeons shut up in the pigeon-cotes until further orders. . . . No distinction is made between carrier-pigeons and others. Anyone letting pigeons loose is punished by imprisonment for not more than three months or a fine of not more than 3,000 francs.

2. Every owner of pigeons is bound to furnish the local German military commandant, or, in places without a garrison, the Belgian communal authorities, with a list for every pigeon-cote, indicating the colour and the marks on the rings (number, year, etc.) of each pigeon separately. The Belgian authorities are to hold these lists constantly at the disposal of the German military commissions of verification. The keys of the pigeon-cote must be constantly at the disposition of the verifiers. If pigeons happen to die, the owner must keep their rings intact. . . .

5. The transport of pigeons, including their transport from one pigeon-cote to another, is wholly forbidden. All traffic in or exchange of live pigeons is likewise forbidden. Only the transport of dead pigeons is authorized in the street or to the market. Anyone found carrying a live pigeon outside the pigeon-cote will be punished with imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than 10,000 francs. . . .

CARDINAL MERCIER'S PROTEST
Read in the presece of a German Guard.

8. Infringements of this regulation, in so far as heavier penalties are not prescribed, will be punished by imprisonment for not more than one month or a fine of not more than 2,000 francs. If occasion arises, an inquiry on suspicion of espionage will also be opened. . . .

BARON VON BISSING,
Governor-General in Belgium.

December 22, 1914.

This decree might have been thought to be exhaustive, and, indeed, the Governor-General seems to have found, after two years' experience, that mere supervision could no further go, for he ordered successively "the total destruction of all pigeon-cotes in Flanders," and the as ertainment of the "juridical status" (*état civil*) of all pigeons in other parts of the country. Finally, in October, 1916, he forbade any further issue of pigeon rings.

These regulations affected all Belgians within von Bissing's territory, but members of the *Garde Civique* and other men of military age who had not been called upon to serve in the Belgian Army, were placed under special restraints, just as they had been treated

to special promises to induce them to put themselves in the Germans' power. The following decree was signed on December 30, 1914, by Colonel von Leipzig, (civil) head of the arrondissement of Brussels :—

All Belgians liable to military service in the years 1912-5, who, for whatever reason, were never called to the colours before the war, are forbidden to go beyond a radius of five kilometres from their residence without having received a written authorization from the competent military authority. Men liable to service who have left their domicile without the aforementioned authorization and are absent at the roll-call will be severely punished. The Burgomasters, who are bound in the first instance to keep men liable to military service under control, will likewise be responsible.

The men restricted by this measure were not soldiers by any possible interpretation. They had not only not been mobilized by the Belgian Government since the war; they had never been called up for training before it. They were merely men whom the Belgian Government might have trained as soldiers if it had wished. The Burgomasters, moreover, had no special control over them and could not, therefore, in justice be made responsible for their actions. But this decree was only a corollary to one already signed by von Bissing himself, to this effect :—

All Belgian laws and decrees concerning the Army ("milice") and the Garde Civique are suspended.

Infringements of what is prescribed in the said laws and decrees, committed before the publication of the present decree, remain unpunished, and involve no prejudicial consequences for the party committing them.

No verification of the observance of the said laws and decrees is required for, among other things, the celebration of a marriage, the application for and delivery of a passport or patent, or for appointment to a public, provincial or communal office.

The present decree in no way modifies the measures that have been or will be taken by the Governor-General relative to the supervision of former members of the Army and the Garde Civique, or relative to the recruitment of the (Belgian) Army.

BARON VON BISSING, *General of Cavalry, Governor-General in Belgium.*

Brussels, December 12, 1914.

Belgians, in fact, who had performed any kind of military or semi-military service, and also those who had not, if they happened to be of military age, were, on the one hand, absolved by the German Administration from their duties towards the Belgian State and indemnified for the breach of these duties (both actions being entirely beyond the com-



MAP SHOWING THE TERRITORY OCCUPIED BY THE GERMANS.



VON BISSING (marked x) INSPECTING BARBED WIRE FENCE ON THE DUTCH FRONTIER.

petence of the Occupying Power), while, on the other hand, they were placed under special police restrictions on account of the very status of which they were being divested by force. But they were not merely placed under restrictions. At Ath, for example, they had to present themselves every morning at the German barracks and perform fatigue-duties for the garrison. The Germans amused themselves by picking out the most cultivated of these men for the most humiliating tasks—filling cellars with coal, cleaning out latrines, and carrying dust-bins through the streets. This seemed to them a clever method of sapping the Belgian national spirit.

But while carrying out these measures of internal police, von Bissing did not neglect to secure his frontiers. On the south his territory marched with the territory also under German occupation in France, and here he provided himself with a "scientific frontier" by annexing a salient of French territory to his own.

In future (he decreed on January 3, 1915) the Belgian laws concerning customs and taxation will be applicable in that portion of the French district of Givet-Fumay which has been joined to my Government. (The new frontier towards French territory follows, from Fumay, the valleys of the Meuse and the Semoy to the Belgian frontier, south-east of Hautes-Rivières.)

East of him he had the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, also under forcible occupation, and a portion of Prussia, where he could safely leave the police work to the local authorities' zeal. His least comfortable frontier was on the north, where he bordered on the free, neutral country of Holland. Von Bissing never forgot the welcome which the Belgians had received in Dutch territory in the days of their deepest despair, when Antwerp fell, and he took particular pains to make this frontier impenetrable.

From the Meuse to the sea a fence of electrified barbed wire was gradually erected between Belgium and Holland. Pickets of German Landsturmers were established along it at intervals; they were linked with one another by telephone and telegraph, and, to assist them in keeping watch, all undergrowth, trees and buildings on the Belgian side, within a certain distance of the wires, were levelled with the ground. Behind this, again, a wider frontier-zone was marked out, and no passport admitted into this zone any Belgian not already resident in it. Placards were posted throughout the occupied territory announcing that anyone



PROCLAMATION

Le Tribunal du Conseil de Guerre Impérial Allemand siégeant à Bruxelles a prononcé les condamnations suivantes :

Sont condamnés à mort pour trahison en bande organisée :

Edith CAVELL, Institutrice à Bruxelles.
Philippe BANCQ, Architecte à Bruxelles.
Jeanne de BELLEVILLE, de Mentignies.
Louise THUILIEZ, Professeur à Lille.
Louis SEVERIN, Pharmacien à Bruxelles.
Albert LIBIEZ, Avocat à Mons.

Pour le même motif, ont été condamnés à quinze ans de travaux forcés :

Hermann CAPIAU, Ingénieur à Wasmes. - Ada BODART, à Bruxelles. - Georges DERVEAU, Pharmacien à Pâturages. - Mary de CROY, à Belligmies.

Dans sa même séance, le Conseil de Guerre a prononcé contre dix-sept autres accusés de trahison envers les Armées Impériales, des condamnations de travaux forcés et de prison variant entre deux ans et huit ans.

En ce qui concerne BANCQ et Edith CAVELL, le jugement a déjà reçu pleine exécution.

Le Général Gouverneur de Bruxelles porte ces faits à la connaissance du public pour qu'ils servent d'avertissement.

Bruxelles, le 12 Octobre 1915

Le Gouverneur de la Ville,
Général VON BISSING

[*By permission from "Scraps of Paper."*

PROCLAMATION

Announcing that Edith Cavell had been shot.

found within the frontier-zone at night would be shot without warning.

But these moral and physical shackles were forged to be broken. The young men of Belgium were put on their honour to serve their country by von Bissing's spurious absolution of them from their service; they were stimulated to set foot in a free land by the barrier so laboriously built up to keep them from it. During the whole period of the German occupation they braved the crossing of the frontier, singly or in small parties, at the risk of their lives. Some were shot by the guards or electrocuted in struggling through the wires; but many got through to Holland and on to England and Havre, and in due course to the trenches on the Yser—von Bissing's fourth frontier—only this time they were not on the German side.

In making their escape these young Belgians had not only the sympathy of their compatriots under the German yoke, but their active assistance, though the consequences were as dangerous to these helpers as to the men themselves. The crime of "conducting soldiers to the enemy," as defined by Paragraph 90 of the German Penal Code, was punishable, under Paragraph 58 of the German Military Code, with death; and, by Paragraph 160, the penalty applied, under a state of war, to foreigners as well as German subjects. The Belgians and other citizens of Allied countries who performed this "War Treason," as the German official idiom described it, were quite aware of what they would suffer if they were discovered; but they no more hesitated to risk their lives than the young men whose escape they made possible. The most famous of these patriotic organizations was that of

YOUNG BELGIANS REPORTING THEMSELVES TO THE GERMAN AUTHORITIES.

which Edith Cavell was a member, and it was for the part she took in it that she was put to death. The story of Edith Cavell's secret trial and hurried execution has been recorded already*, and here we will only reproduce the characteristic proclamation in which von Bissing announced the accomplished fact—with the object (as stated by Herr Zimmermann, then German Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs) of "frightening those who may presume on their sex to take part in enterprises punishable with death." Von Bissing's proclamation read as follows:

PROCLAMATION

The Tribunal of the Imperial German Council of War sitting in Brussels has pronounced the following sentences:—

Condemned to Death for conspiring together to commit Treason:—

Edith Cavell, Teacher, of Brussels;
Philippe Baucq, Architect, of Brussels;
Jeanne de Belleville, of Montignies;
Louise Thuiliez, Professor at Lille;
Louis Severin, Chemist, of Brussels;
Albert Libiez, Lawyer, of Mons;

For the same offence the following have been condemned to 15 years' hard labour:—

Hermann Capiau, Engineer, of Wasmes;
Ada Bodart, of Brussels;
George Derveau, Chemist, of Pâturages;
Mary de Croy, of Bellignies.

At the same sitting, the Council of War condemned 17 others charged with treason against the Imperial Armies to sentences of penal servitude and imprisonment varying from two to eight years.

The sentences passed on Bancq and Edith Cavell have already been executed.

The Governor-General of Brussels brings these facts to the knowledge of the Public that they may serve as a warning.

GENERAL VON BISSING,
The Governor of the City.

Brussels, October 12, 1915.

These executions (and they occurred intermittently during the whole period of the German Occupation, though the case of Edith Cavell was more notorious than the rest in the outer world) were the culmination of the German police campaign against the rights of the individual. But social institutions as well as individuals were marked out for repression, and special attention was paid to the Press and the Banks. In these less personal departments of the German police régime, the negative aim of repressing Belgian liberties passed over into the intensive exploitation of Belgian resources for the German conduct of the war.

The Censorship in the occupied territory was established by a comprehensive decree of October 13, 1914:—

1. All printed matter, as well as all other reproductions of written matter or of pictures, with or without letterpress, or of musical compositions with a text or commentaries (in print), obtained by mechanical or chemical processes and intended for distribution, must be submitted to he Censorship of the Imperial German Governor-Generalship (Civil Administration).

Whoever produces or distributes printed matter of the kinds specified in Clause 1, without the Censor's permission, will be punished according to Martial Law. The printed matter will be confiscated, and the plates and *clichés* intended for reproduction will be rendered unfit for use.

WOULD-BE TRAVELLERS TO HOLLAND APPLYING FOR PERMITS.

* Vol. VI., Chapter CVII.



[By permission of "Land & Water."

KREUZLAND, KREUZLAND ÜBER ALLES.
"Where are our Fathers?"
From the Cartoon by Louis Raemaekers.



[By permission of "Land & Water."

"KULTUR" HAS PASSED HERE.
From the Cartoon by Louis Raemaekers.

The posting, exhibition or display of any printed matter prohibited by the present decree, in places where the public is able to take knowledge of it, is considered equivalent to distribution.

2. Theatrical presentations, recitations of all kinds, whether spoken or sung, and luminous projections, whether by cinematograph or other means, may not be organized until the pieces, recitations and projections aforesaid have been passed by the Censor.

Anyone organizing theatrical presentations, recitations or luminous projections without the Censor's permission, and anyone taking part in any way in such presentations, recitations or projections, will be punished according to Martial Law. The plates and films will be confiscated.

This decree enters into force immediately.

BARON VON DER GOLTZ, *Field-Marshal, Governor-General in Belgium.*

Brussels, October 13, 1914.

Von der Goltz's intention was to feed the Belgians exclusively on news of German official manufacture. The Germans themselves had been treated in this way by their rulers from the beginning of the war, and a systematic misrepresentation of the course the war was taking might have been as effective for disheartening Belgium as it appears to have been for encouraging Germany. But in this, as in other departments of the police *régime* in the occupied territory, decrees only aroused the will to resist them. To begin with, the leading Belgian newspapers all suspended publication within the German zone, and either transferred their offices to London and le Havre, or withheld further issues altogether until better times. And news sheets appeared in their place which were most unwelcome to the German Civil Administration. The most noteworthy of these was *La Libre Belgique*, which was printed in the occupied territory in defiance of the Censor, and was edited with great spirit and wit. The German authorities were sensitive beyond expectation to its stings, and made ludicrously earnest efforts to run its authors to earth. Large rewards were offered, inoffensive people—including girls and boys and priests—were arrested on suspicion, and in many cases condemned; but *La Libre Belgique* continued to appear, and the Germans never knew whether they had merely missed the culprits altogether, or caught them only to see their work pass on into other equally courageous hands. There were also organizations for distributing uncensored news through the occupied territory, as widespread as those for smuggling out the young men across the frontier. Copies of *The Times* and other Entente and neutral journals were imported, transmitted from hand to hand, and copied in manuscript by a regular underground post. And in this struggle of wills the Belgians won. The German Administration despaired in the end of damming the leaks, and authorized several Dutch newspapers to publish and circulate an edition for the Occupied Belgian Territory (Dutch and Flemish being practically the same language). The papers thus privileged were naturally such as had shown themselves not unfriendly to Germany; their Belgian edition was under the Governor-General's Censorship; and the power to withdraw the privilege granted gave the Governor-General a considerable influence over their selection of news and their editorial tone. Nevertheless, the admission of these neutral journals into the occupied territory was, on the Germans' part, a genuine confession of defeat.

Von Bissing was also baffled in his attempt to manipulate the Press in Belgium for a positive political aim—the destruction of Belgian unity, by setting Fleming against Walloon.

Belgium, like Switzerland, Great Britain and other of the most firmly-founded national States in Western Europe, has more than one national language. If you drew an imaginary line across Belgium, West and East, from the French frontier just south of Ypres to the Dutch frontier on the Meuse, just north of Liége, you would find that most Belgians living north of it spoke Flemish as their mother-tongue, and most of those living south of it Walloon. The two languages are entirely different; Flemish is a Teutonic dialect, practically the same as Dutch, while Walloon is Romance, and is related to the neighbouring dialects in France. But this difference of language has not the least political significance. The linguistic boundary has never in history been a political frontier; it was not even followed by the modern provincial demarcations, any more than the Border between England and Scotland follows the boundary between the English and Gaelic languages. The difference of language was so little felt as an administrative difficulty that the provinces cut across the boundary on old traditional lines. Indeed, none of the important divisions within the Belgian people coincided with the division between Fleming and Walloon. There was the party division between Liberal and Clerical, but the two parties were very evenly balanced all over the country. There was the economic division between Industry and Agriculture,

TRENCH DUG BY THE GERMANS THROUGH A FLEMISH COAST VILLAGE.

but this did not go by language either. Of the industrial centres in Belgium, Charleroi and Namur and Liége lay in the Walloon area, Ghent and Antwerp and the Campine in the Flemish. The Walloon province of Luxembourg was noted for its peasant proprietors, the plains of Flanders for their breed of horses and their intensive market-garden cultivation. The Belgians were little conscious of their linguistic differences, because they had never persecuted each other on account of them. Brussels, the national capital, was common ground between the two linguistic areas; the National Government seated at Brussels employed in its official transactions, not the Walloon dialect any more than the Flemish, but standard French, and this since the foundation of the kingdom, and for reasons of obvious utility—French, unlike these local dialects, being a language of general currency. For the same reason the educated people in all parts of the country were in the habit of using French in business and speaking it among themselves. But it had never occurred to any Belgian authority to impose French where it was not voluntarily adopted. No Belgian Government had legislated against the use of Flemish in communal administration or in education. The harmonious subsistence of the two languages side by side showed that Belgium was a tolerant, enlightened, democratic country, but this was nothing uncommon for Western Europe.

To the German mind, however, it was so uncommon as to be beyond belief. The Germans had never known how to get on with populations of another language, as the French got on with the Alsatians, the English and the Lowlanders with the Welsh and the Gaels, or the Flemings and Walloons with one another. The Germans' only idea of living in the same community with Alsatians or Danes or Poles was to turn them into Germans by force; to make them speak German and do things in German ways; to prohibit their mother-tongue in their local government and their schools. And in following this policy the Germans had always failed; they had aroused an antagonistic national feeling in the populations they had tried to overbear, just as they were now rousing the spirit of the Belgians in the occupied territory. Prussia, with its diversity of languages, had never, like Belgium, Switzerland, or Great Britain, become a united nation. It

had remained a Police-State, in which the Government tried to impose the language of one part of the population on the rest, and only succeeded in producing a morbid consciousness of linguistic differences among them all. Under the influence of this failure at home, the German Administrators of Belgium fastened upon the difference between Fleming and Walloon as a weak. spot in the Belgian organism. They pictured the Flemings as an oppressed race in suppressed rebellion against the domination of the Walloons, as the Poles and Alsatians were against the Germans themselves. They knew how their own subject populations prayed for a liberator, and hastened to pose, themselves, as liberators of the "Flemish Nationality." They dreamed, as the goal of their intrigue, of an autonomous Flemish principality, carved out of the dead body of Belgium by Germany, as the patroness of all Teutons, at the expressed desire of the Flemings, and with the applause of the neutral world.

The first step was to create an "atmosphere," for neither the Flemings nor the neutrals had found their own way to the proper point of view. The Flemings had fought shoulder to shoulder with the "dominant" Walloons for the preservation of Belgium, and were still fighting in the trenches along the Yser; while neutrals were far from perceiving the liberators of the Flemish nation in the violators of Belgian neutrality. But the Germans were convinced, from their own experience, that a "Flemish Problem" must be there, and that they had only to rub the wound to set it smarting.

"The *Political Department* at Brussels," wrote Professor von Bissing, of Munich, the son of the Governor-General,* "has logically dependent upon it the *Flemish Bureau* and the *Press Bureau*. The present Governor-General devotes special attention to Press matters. Beyond supplying information to German newspapers and following the foreign newspapers, collaboration with the native Press (with the assistance of the *Flemish Bureau*) also falls within the *Press Bureau's* province. A number of Belgian journals . . . appear daily, and are in enjoyment, under certain fixed conditions, of all the liberties that are possible. . . ."

One of the journals mentioned in Professor von Bissing's list was the *Vlaamsche Post* of Ghent, and this was the organ selected and subsidized by the Governor-General to be the mouthpiece of his "Flamandising" policy. The *Vlaamsche Post* started a campaign for

* *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, April, 1915.



THE GENTLE GERMAN: SHOOTING THE CANARY OF A LOOTED HOUSE.



THE OCCUPATION OF GHENT: ARRIVAL OF THE GERMANS.

Flemish autonomy. Its articles were repeated word for word in the other papers promoted by the German Administration in Belgium, and were echoed with variations in the German Press and in the pro-German papers in Holland The newspaper campaign was supported by a deluge of pamphlets in Belgium, Germany and the neutral countries. In Belgium these anonymous effusions were deposited during the night at people's front doors.

This literary propaganda was given substance by administrative measures. The official use of the French language in Flemish-speaking districts was forbidden, and at Ostend, Bruges and other places the local German authorities went so far as to order all shop signs or advertisements in French to be removed. Care was taken in German decrees and proclamations to disguise the names of Belgian cities (even those which both in philology and in population were purely Romance) in good "Teutonic" forms—"Namen" for Namur, "Doornyk" for Tournai, "Lüttich" for Liége, and so on. Passing from pedantry to persecution, the Germans removed "Walloon" functionaries in "Flemish territory" from their posts, and forbade the use of French in schools. At a higher-grade school at Hasselt, for instance, in the Province of Limburg, the teachers were not only forbidden to give lessons in French, but might not even talk French to their pupils out of school, with the result that the parents, anxious that their children should be familiar with both the national languages, removed them from the school altogether and had them taught privately at home. But so little had the Germans learnt from their educational failures in Prussian Poland that they designed, as the masterpiece of their Flemish policy, the foundation of a "Flemish University" at Ghent.

After eighteen months of intensive Press preparation, the Flemish University was opened with a flourish of trumpets on October 21, 1916. The German Administration announced that the restrictions on railway travelling would be waived in favour of all true Flemings who wished to attend the ceremony. They were gratified by the flood of applications, not only from the Flemish districts, but from all the occupied territory, and von Bissing found his route congested when he journeyed to Ghent on the appointed day. He only met one party going in the opposite direction—they were 2,000 Flemings from Ghent itself who

were being deported to forced labour in Germany under the decree of October 3, and who had been packed off before their national festival by the over-zealous local German authorities. But when von Bissing alighted at Ghent station and proceeded towards his university buildings, his fellow-travellers melted away. They had availed themselves of the German Railway Bureau's generosity, not to hear their Governor-General's inaugural speech, but to visit their Belgian friends them unsaid. His subordinates, searching for an artist to design a commemorative medal, could not find a Fleming in Ghent who would execute the commission, and the school children, who had been given a special holiday in honour of their national liberation, appeared at school as if nothing unusual were happening. They were turned back at the door by German gendarmes, but they had made their protest.

"The organization," continued von Bissing,



GERMAN "KULTUR" IN BELGIUM:
A performance of Goethe's "Iphigenie" in the open-air theatre of the Citadel of Namur.

Von Bissing delivered his discourse to a select German audience, including the Bavarian Minister of Education and representatives of the Federal States and of the Imperial Chancellor.

"To secure the re-opening of the University," the Governor-General is reported to have said, "I appealed in Germany to a Commission appointed to assist my Civil Administration. Working hand in hand with the Flemings and well counselled by German and Dutch friends, this Commission has settled the appointments and created the organization for our new educational institution, without departing far from the former Belgian organization. Thus Germans and Flemings have found themselves working together, in mutual confidence and perfect understanding."

At the moment these words were issuing from the Governor-General's lips, incidents were occurring that must have made him wish "and especially the organization of the technical faculties, will be completed in the course of next year." But 1917 had hardly begun before the Flemish University of Ghent was closed. The contingent of genuine students, 54 at the beginning, dwindled with each month, and there was little edification in a body of "Flemish" professors of whom the majority were Dutch. "The God of War," declaimed von Bissing in his peroration, "has held Flanders at the font with his sword drawn. May the God of Peace be kind to her during the long centuries to come."

Von Bissing's oratory betrayed the German vision of an "Autonomous Flanders" under permanent German tutelage, when the "tem-

A FOOD QUEUE OF IMPOVERISHED BELGIANS.

porary " German occupation of Belgium should be brought to an end by the signing of peace. But he burst his own bubble by drawing a retort from the Flemings themselves.

Prominent Flemings explained, in indignant letters to the neutral Press, that the real Flemish movement was of a purely cultural and social character. It existed to enrich the life of Belgium by re-creating for her a literature in the Flemish language; preserving for her the monuments of Flemish art and architecture (which German weapons had been destroying at Louvain and Malines and Termonde and Ypres); reviving for her the romantic traditions of the Flemish Middle Ages; and improving the conditions of life of her Flemish peasants and workmen at the present day. The Teutonic origin of their language no more beguiled them into suffering German violence gladly than it beguiled the Dutch or the English or the Danes.

"It requires no extraordinary perspicacity," wrote M. van Caulewaert, Editor of the *Vrij Belgie*, a Belgian newspaper in the Flemish language which had emigrated to The Hague, "to understand that the German Government is attempting to make use of the Flemish Movement exclusively for the two objects which I shall enumerate—to sow dissensions between Belgians and to find a pretext for continuing, after the war, to interfere in our internal politics. But these two objects blend into a single aim—to turn Belgium into a permanent acquisition of the German Empire. We know the German idolatry of self and gospel of national egotism; and we also know enough of the sorrowful history of the Danish people—related to the German people, like ourselves, by race—to keep us on our guard."



GERMANS IN OCCUPATION OF A BELGIAN CHÂTEAU.

A Landsturm Regiment, under command of Herr Naumann-Hofer, a Radical Reichstag Deputy, at the looted Château of M. Davignon, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"What do you think of the Belgians who have gone with the Germans?" the Belgian socialist, Camille Huysmans, was asked by a representative of the Danish paper *Politiken*, in allusion to the editors of the *Vlaamsche Post* and the lonely professors at Ghent. "I think," M. Huysmans answered, "that they will be wise to get themselves naturalized in Germany." Such was the Flemish retort to the German project for Flanders after the war.

These were some of the ramifications of German Press policy in the occupied territory.

RETURN OF A FORAGING PARTY.

The control of banking was also a much studied department of police, and this merged into a systematic appropriation of the country's material resources.

By a decree of September 18, 1914, von der Goltz ordered all banks or branches of banks in the occupied territory, of which the central management was in countries at war with Germany, to wind up their affairs immediately, "the remaining cash balance to be deposited for the duration of the war in a place hereinafter to be designated." A German Commissary-General was appointed to superintend the execution of this decree, with power to scrutinize and modify the whole conduct of the banks' affairs. "The costs of control will be charged in proportion to their funds upon the banks superintended." By a further decree of November 30 the Commissary-General was authorized to extend his control by delegating it to assistants—"the cost of this likewise to be charged upon the enterprises under surveillance"—and these assistant commissaries were to be "given notice in good time of each Board Meeting or General Assembly."

In the meantime all banks in the occupied territory whatsoever had been forbidden to make payments to England, Ireland and France, by a decree of November 3, which was extended on the 28th, "by way of reprisals," to Russia and Finland. It was notified, however, that "this prohibition does not extend to payments intended for the benefit of German nationals." "All legal and contractual consequences," the decree continued, "which might be involved in the non-execution of contracts made with persons domiciled in the countries designated, are considered null and void. The debtor may clear himself by consigning the sums owing from him to his creditor's account at the *Treasury of the German Civil Administration.*

Whoever infringes, or attempts to infringe, the regulations of Article 1 will be punished according to Martial Law."

On December 22 the monopoly of issuing bank-notes was transferred, by von Bissing, from the *National Bank of Belgium*, to which, under Belgian law, it legitimately belonged, to the *Société Générale de Belgique*, and another commissary, though this time one of Belgian nationality, was appointed to the new Department of Issue. In a notice appended to this decree, von Bissing assumed the part of the "honest broker." He complained bitterly that the *National Bank* had transferred its assets to England, had refused to remit them to the occupied territory when requested (by von Bissing) to do so, and had been so unpatriotic as to lend the same to the Belgian Government at Havre, "a procedure on the part of the *National Bank of Belgium* and the Belgian Ministry of Finance which was contrary to law and statute." "For all these reasons," the Governor-General continued, "I find myself obliged to withdraw from the *National Bank of Belgium* the privilege of issuing bank-notes, and to depose the Governor and Commissary appointed by the Belgian Government." It is superfluous to point out on which side the illegality lay.

"My Civil Government," von Bissing concluded, "in cooperation with the *Société Générale*, will also inquire into the measures to be taken in order to restore the General Savings Bank and its depositors to possession of their property at present unlawfully detained at the Bank of England." The only measure under this head which is revealed by a perusal of the "Bulletin of Laws and Decrees" is the appointment, as member of the General and Executive Councils of the Belgian Savings Bank, of a certain Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, by a decree of von Bissing's dated January 16, 1915. Before the war Dr. Schacht was "publicity" director of the Dresdner Bank in Berlin. The knowledge that their savings had been consigned, in default, to this Teutonic gentleman's care, must have done much to console the depositors for the removal of them beyond the sea.

But the "cooperation" between the German Civil Government and the *Société Générale* was not destined to endure, for two years later, on September 3, 1916, we find von Bissing address-

BELGIAN WOMEN SACK-MAKING FOR THE GERMANS IN A FACTORY AT BRUSSELS.

BELGIAN WOMEN LABOURERS AT THE MARIEMONT-BASCOUN COAL MINES WORKING UNDER GERMAN GUARDS.

ing an ultimatum to the latter in the following terms :—

I have to inform you that I must consider our negotiations broken off if you refuse to submit, on your own responsibility, a proposition for the transfer to Germany of your balance in paper-marks. I refuse your demand to communicate with le Havre, and I give you till Monday, September 4, 1916, midnight (German time), to inform me in precise terms whether you are disposed to transfer your balance in paper-marks to Germany. . . .

If you refuse to send your balance in paper-marks to the German banks, then you are conducting your affairs in a manner contrary to German interests, and in this case I have received a mandate to place your Bank under sequestration. If you oppose sequestration by passive resistance, there will be no course left for me but to wind up the Bank by force. . . .

During the course of to-morrow you have time to weigh the heavy consequences of such measures for your Bank and for your country. I order you to call your General Council to-morrow, so that you may be in a position to forward me a declaration binding upon them before the expiration of the time-limit. . . .

The profession of banking in the occupied territory under von Bissing's stewardship had

CIVILIANS IMPRISONED FOR TRIVIAL OFFENCES EMPLOYED IN ROAD-MAKING FOR THE GERMANS.

GERMAN SOLDIERS TILLING THE LAND IN BELGIUM.

become a form of "working for the King of Prussia." A cruder act of financial tyranny was the imposition of the German mark. On October 3, 1914, the following decree was published by von der Goltz :—

German money (coin or paper) must be accepted as tender in the Occupied Belgian Territory, at the rate, until further notice of 1 Mark as the equivalent of a minimum of 1.25 Francs.

Inasmuch as the German mark had only been worth 1.15 Belgian francs before the war, and steadily depreciated on the international money market as the war continued, this forced currency at an inflated value was a comprehensive confiscation of private property, which infringed the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1907 under Article 46. On November 15, 1914, von der Goltz had occasion to decree that this compulsory rate of exchange might not be repudiated by private agreement, and on May 22, 1915, von Bissing took the complementary step of threatening "anyone buying, or attempting to buy, French gold, silver, nickel or paper at a price in excess of the nominal value" with "imprisonment for not more than a year and a fine of not more than 10,000 francs." But all these measures of spoliation, though effective, were indirect, and were far from contenting the Occupying Power.

The Hague Convention of 1907, concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, is explicit on the subject of War Contributions. In Article 49 it is laid down that "if, in addition to the taxes" previously payable to the State, "the Occupant levies other money contributions in the occupied territory, they shall only be applied to the needs of the Army or of the administration of the territory in question." But this Convention, to which the German Government was pledged, was irreconcileable with their designs upon Belgian resources, and it became evident that von Bissing meditated a notable violation of it when he published (once more in excess of his legitimate powers) the following decree :

Concerning the Summoning of the Provincial Councils in Special Session.

Art. 1.—The Provincial Councils of the Belgian Provinces are summoned by these presents in special session for Saturday, December 19, 1914, midday (German time) . . .

Art. 3.—. . . The session will be opened and closed in the name of the Imperial German Governor-General.

Art. 4.—The session will not last more than one day. The sitting will be behind closed doors.

The sole subject of discussion, of which the assembly is bound to take exclusive cognizance, is : "Ways and means of meeting the war contribution charged upon the Belgian population."

Art. 5.—The proceedings are valid without regard to the number of members present.

BARON VON BISSING,
Governor-General in Belgium.

Brussels, December 8, 1914.

The sequel to the decree was an order :

A War Contribution, amounting to 40,000,000 francs, to be paid in monthly instalments over the course of a year, is imposed on the population of Belgium.

The payment of these sums devolves upon the Nine Provinces, which are held collectively responsible for the discharge of it.

The two first instalments are to be paid up, at latest, on January 15, 1915, and the following instalments on the 10th, at latest, of each following month, to the Field Army Treasury of the Imperial Governor-Generalship at Brussels.

In case the Provinces have to resort to the issue of

bonds in order to obtain the funds necessary, the form and terms of these bonds will be settled by the Imperial Commissary-General for the Banks in Belgium.

BARON VON BISSING,
Governor-General in Belgium.

Brussels, December 10, 1914.

Month by month from the date of the order this crushing toll was paid. It was iniquitous both in amount and in assessment—in amount because it was infinitely in excess of what was required for the administration of the country and the maintenance of the occupying army, even if the expenses of administration had not been covered already, as they were covered, by the ordinary revenues of the Belgian Exchequer, which the Germans continued to raise. It was iniquitous in its assessment because, to begin with, an important part of West Flanders, one of the Provinces saddled with collective responsibility, was not in German hands, and therefore not amenable to German exactions. But spoliation under this head had at any rate its definite limits. A specific sum was demanded within a specific time; if the Provincial authorities could raise it, the country was quit. It was incomparably less onerous than requisitions in kind, which the German administration inflicted in detail till it had stripped Belgium bare.

PIGS FOR GERMANY REARED IN BELGIUM.

Requisitions, as well as war contributions, are dealt with in the Hague Convention of 1907, under Article 52, and their limits are defined in a corresponding sense.

Requisitions in kind and services, it is set forth, shall not be demanded from local authorities or inhabitants except for the needs of the Army of Occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country.

Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied.

Contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in ready money; if not, a receipt shall be given, and the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible.

To this, too, Germany was pledged, and again her pledge was incompatible with her intentions. It is impossible to reconcile the Convention with the principle laid down by the German Headquarters Staff on August 27, 1914:

The Landsturm will be called out to secure the lines of communication and for the supervision of Belgium. The country, placed under German administration, will have to provide for military requirements of all kinds, *in order to afford relief to German territory.*

The application of this principle was the *chef d'œuvre* of German organization in the occupied territory. Germany appropriated, without compensation, the total material resources of the country, and this was done by methodical steps.

The first step was to prohibit exports—the export of "horses, cattle, pigs, sheep and all kinds of foodstuffs," for instance, by a decree of September 30, 1914, and of "all kinds of fodder" by a decree of December 27. "Disobedience," it was announced, "will be punished by confiscation."*

* The opposite policy was adopted in the case of articles of which the Central Empires possessed a surplus. For example, on December 10, 1914, von Bissing signed a decree forbidding the import of salt into the occupied territory from countries at war with Germany, thus giving a monopoly of import to the German and Austrian salt-producers.

The second step was to take a census of all that the country contained. Returns of agricultural produce were demanded by von der Goltz in a decree of November 1, 1914: "Produce not notified within a term of 10 days will be confiscated. The public is reminded, by the present notice, of the prohibition upon exports already in force." On December 11 the same order was extended to "benzine, petrol, glycerine, oils and fats of all kinds, raw rubber and rubber waste, pneumatic automobile tyres," and other commodities. "The military authority is to decide whether the goods notified shall be bought or left free for commerce and private use. In case of omission to notify, the goods will be confiscated to the profit of the State, and the offender punished by the military authority." On January 25, 1915, again, both order and penalty were applied to a comprehensive list of metals, this time unambiguously "with a view to eventual purchase."

But the third step had already been taken in a decree of October 26, 1914. The first article of this decree was an enumeration of materials and commodities of every conceivable kind, which was afterwards largely augmented by decrees of November 15 and December 20.* By the second article the export of all these commodities was placed under the control of the Commissary at Brussels of the Berlin Ministry of War, under sanction of confiscation. Finally, Article III. enacted that:—

> The Commissary of the Ministry of War may decide that stocks of any of the commodities enumerated in Art. 1 are to be ceded in full property either to the German Empire or to a third party, in return for their money value. *The value of the commodities will be settled definitely by a commission appointed by the Ministry of War at Berlin.*

Thus the German principle of Requisitions amounted to this, that Germany placed an embargo on the total wealth of the occupied territory, made an inventory of it at leisure, and then compelled the private owners of it to part with anything that the German Government or private German firms (the "third parties" provided for) had a mind to take, in return for whatever compensation, in whatever form and at whatever date, the German Ministry of War saw fit to assign. And this requisitioning was merely a supplement to the indiscriminate pillage of the three months of invasion, and to the direct contribution in money which was wrung out of the country, month by month, so long as the occupation endured.

REQUISITIONED CATTLE.

These general Requisitioning Decrees were acted upon energetically. Every timber merchant, for example, in the occupied territory was served with the following notice:—

> Whatever stock you hold, either on your own account or on other people's, of five to nine centimetre pine joists, of the maximum breadth and not less than four metres in length, or of pine planks, likewise of the maximum breadth and not less than four metres in

* And by constant subsequent decrees—*e.g.*, on October 7, 1916 (compounds of sulphur); on August 10 and October 17, 1916 (rubber); on April 22 and September 30, 1916 (steel).

length by approximately 2½ centimetres thickness, are seized or requisitioned by the German Army Department, and will shortly be exported to Germany.

You are responsible for the preservation, warranty, and insurance of the goods. *The price will be fixed later by the Ministry of War at Berlin.*

There were certain things in Belgium which the Germans coveted particularly. Quantities of horses, for instance, of the famous Belgian breed were stolen during the invasion, and in October, 1914, a special Commission was sent by the Ministry of Agriculture at Berlin to lay hands on the rest. This Commission toured the occupied territory methodically and held compulsory inspections of horses from place to place. The following proclamation is a specimen of their work :—

General Depôt for Horses.

The Commission for the purchase of horses will sit on Monday, November 3, at 3 o'clock (4 o'clock German time), at the Grand' Place, Thuillies.

All harness and saddle horses, as well as yearling foals, must be brought before the Commission.

Harness horses, must, if possible, be provided with their working harness. Purchases will be paid for in ready money and without rebate.

THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE CENTRAL DEPÔT FOR HORSES.

For the German Governor-Generalship.

Any persons neglecting to bring their horses before the Commission will be liable to have their stock requisitioned without compensation.

The horses so seized were transported to Germany and sold at auction to the German farmers under the Ministry of Agriculture's auspices. The German newspapers in the winter of 1914–5 were full of advertisements of such sales. Another object of German covetousness was the standing timber, especially walnut,

REQUISITIONED METAL.

which was felled wherever found, whether it was the property of the State, of the Communes, or of private individuals. Leather was also much sought after, and, later on, again, it was found that the rails and rolling-stock of the Belgian light railways (chemins de fer vicinaux) served excellently for bringing up ammunition to the German artillery on the western front. This network of light railways had been laid in Belgium during recent years at a great capital outlay, and was an integral factor in the country's economic life. It brought the products of intensive agriculture to the urban markets and enabled the workmen to reach the mines and factories from the villages in a wide radius round. But the Germans did not hesitate to dismantle these railways in one section of the occupied territory after another. An even more deadly form of spoliation was the seizure

GERMAN SOLDIERS COLLECTING OLD METAL FOR MUNITION WORKS.

[By permission of "Land and Water.

HUSBANDS AND FATHERS.

Belgian workmen were forcibly deported to Germany.

From the Cartoon by Louis Raemaekers.

[By permission of "Land and Water."

THE CRUCIFIXION OF BELGIUM.

"We are willing to make peace, so that you may enjoy still more the blessings of our Kultur."

From the Cartoon by Louis Raemaekers.

of machinery, which was simply removed from private factories in Belgium and sent by rail to Germany to be set up in factories there. Textile machinery was especially raided, much of it being extremely costly and also impossible to replace within any calculable period; so that the industry of the country was crippled, and the industry of Germany correspondingly strengthened, by an act of sheer robbery, not only for the duration of the war, but for the period of reconstruction to follow.

These seizures were robbery in the precise sense of the word. The Hague Convention prescribes that "contributions in kind shall as far as possible be paid for in ready money; if not, a receipt shall be given, and the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible." Payment in ready money was indeed fraudulently promised in many of the German decrees and proclamations under which the seizures were made. But when the goods were in the Germans' hands, the owners were invariably paid in vouchers only, and these only for a fraction of the real value of the "requisitioned" object. Owners of horses, for instance, were given vouchers for half, a third, or a quarter of the current price; owners of trees were given vouchers for 10 francs for timber worth 100 to 150 francs in the market. Owners of machinery were often given no vouchers at all.

These various branches of robbery were consolidated into one system by von Bissing in the following proclamation, dated January 13, 1915:—

In pursuance of my proclamation of the 9th inst. I have ordered that, from January 15, 1915, onwards, in the part of Belgium under my Government, requisitions without payment in ready money shall not, as a rule, be made.

If, in exceptional cases, payment in ready money is impossible and the requisition nevertheless indispensable in the interests of the (military) service, a formal requisition voucher will be given. As far as possible, printed forms made out as below will be used for this purpose:—

Requisition Voucher.

The undersigned declares hereby that X., at ——, on the ——, 191–, has, upon requisition, delivered to the German Army goods to the value of ——————.

(Sum in words).

Specification of goods delivered.

(Stamp.) (Date.)

(Signature, rank and unit.)

Payable at the Treasury of the Military Government of the Province

——— at———

You are expressly reminded that *only those vouchers will be honoured which shall have been given after January* 14, 1915.

For Brussels, special regulations are in force.

This order does not apply to the wholesale stocks of goods detained by the Military Administration at Antwerp and various other places. For these, special measures will be taken.

This proclamation, in which von Bissing professed to regulate the payment of requisitions in ready money, simply confirmed the robbery already practised. The price of his promise of cash payment in future was the repudiation of payment of any kind for goods seized in the past—not only during the three months of invasion, but during the first two months and a half of peaceful occupation under his own and von der Goltz's government. And even this shadowy promise for the future was only extended to a fraction of the property threatened, for the great bulk of the available resources of the occupied territory was concentrated in the stocks at Antwerp and other places which were specially excepted from the provisions of the decree.

On March 18, 1915, the Acting President of the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce addressed a report on the seizure of these stocks to the Inter-Communal Committee of the City, in which the following table of Requisitions was worked out, up to date:—

Material.	Value in francs of goods requisitioned.	Price.	Payment.
Grain	18,000,000	Settled ..	Made
Linseed	2,450,000	Settled at 25 per cent. loss	Made
Oil-cakes	5,000,000 (whole stock)	Satisfactory	Made in part
Nitrates	4,000,000 (whole stock)	Not settled	Not made
Animal and Vegetable Oils	6,000,000 (whole stock)	Not settled	Made in part
Petrol and Mineral Oils	3,000,000	Settled for the most part	Made for the most part
Wool	6,000,000	Not settled	Not made
Cotton	1,300,000	Not settled	Not made
Rubber	10,000,000	Not settled	Not made
Foreign Leather	20,000,000	Not settled	Not made
Hair	1,150,000	Not settled	Not made
Ivory (luxuries)	785,000	Not settled	Not made
Wood	500,000	Settled for the most part	Made for the most part
Cocoa	2,000,000	Not settled	Not made
Coffee	275,000	Not settled	Not made
Rice	2,000,000	Settled ..	Not made
Wines	1,100,000	Partly settled	Partly made

The total came to 85,000,000 francs, of which only 20,000,000 francs had been paid; and of the 65,000,000 francs still owing, 60,000,000 represented the value of goods for which the price had not yet been settled by the Ministry of War at Berlin. These were the figures when Antwerp had not yet been six months in German hands.

The President of the Chamber of Commerce further pointed out in his Report that the figures in question only concerned stocks of raw materials, and did not touch the requisitions,

from Belgian industrial concerns, of raw materials, plant, and manufactured products, nor again the requisitions of manufactured products from the warehouses of the great importing and exporting firms. Since Antwerp was one of the most important centres of distribution for the European Continent, the goods in bond there were of great bulk and diversity—"matches, type-writers, children's toys, motor-cars, ingots of metal, bales of cotton, wool and jute, colonial and tropical products." These goods were carried off wholesale to Germany. And when the Germans did not find it convenient to transport them for the moment, they placed them, until further notice, under embargo. The stocks thus held up and withdrawn from trade and industry were in some cases far larger than those actually taken. By the table, for instance, the Germans had contented themselves with requisitioning 275,000 francs worth of coffee, but they had placed the total stock in Antwerp under embargo, and the value of this was 60,000,000 francs.

But that was not the limit of German exploitation. Having drained Belgium of her material wealth, the Occupying Power laid hands on her human labour, and this second field of spoliation was deliberately approached through the first. In stripping Belgium of her resources, the Germans brought about the paralysis of her economic life. Her factories had to shut down, her workmen were thrown out of employment, and unemployment gave the pretext for deportation.

The history of the Belgian Deportations—the infamous decree of October 3, 1916, the steps by which the Occupying Authorities calculatingly prepared for it, and the inhuman fashion in which they carried it out—are beyond the province of the present chapter. It shall only be stated here that in the Deportations the Germans found the limit—not of their violence and injustice, nor of their physical power, for they could deport the Belgians' bodies as easily as their goods—but the limit of their will-power over the wills of other men.

From beginning to end of the German Occupation, the will of the Belgian people was never broken. On the contrary, it recovered from the shock of the first treacherous onslaught, and hardened under the pressure of the police-régime which von der Goltz and von Bissing imposed. Every class and profession, every corporation and institution, found its leader, often its martyr, to uplift its spirit. The King and Queen, driven from the Belgian capital, but never from Belgian soil, were an inspiration to the whole nation on both sides of the Yser. Brussels gave her Burgomaster Max. By September 26, 1914, Max was deported to a Silesian fortress—his coolness, courtesy, and unflinching fortitude in office were too damaging to German prestige—but in five weeks he had set the communes and municipalities a standard which they sustained for years. The Bar gave Théodor, the senior counsel to the Brussels Court of Appeal. M. Théodor was deported to Germany without trial, and was only released after seven months imprisonment, by the intervention of the King of Spain. His health was broken, but he had made a protest against the usurpation of judicial powers which the German Administration could not live down. The Church gave Mercier, who upheld a freedom of speech which the German censorship could not countervail, and published indictments which no Governor-General could answer. The working-class gave the strikers who refused to work for the German Army at Malines and Luttre and Sweveghem, and the exiles who sang their national hymns in the trains that were carrying them to Germany. This national will could never be bent to German service, or brought to acknowledge the title of the Occupying Power. Two spiritual forces were face to face, and the issue between them was expressed, again and again, in the utterances of their protagonists.

Thus spake von der Goltz:—

> The German Empire, Austria-Hungary and Turkey are not to be considered, as regards the Occupied Territory of Belgium, as foreign or enemy powers. . . .
>
> Anyone, therefore, who attempts to hinder by constraint, threats, persuasion, or other means, in the performance of work destined for the German Authorities, any persons willing to perform such work, or any contractors commissioned by the German Authorities to perform such work, will be punished with imprisonment.
>
> The Military Tribunals are alone empowered to take cognizance of misdemeanours under this head. . . .
>
> BARON VON DER GOLTZ, *Field-Marshal, Governor-General in Belgium.*
>
> Brussels, November 4, 1914.

Thus, again, spake von Bissing:—

> The Chief of the Arrondissement of Malines has informed me that his proclamation of May 25 (1915) has not induced a sufficient number of skilled workmen to return to work at the Arsenal. . . . I am, therefore, obliged to punish the town of Malines and its neighbourhood, by stopping all means of communication until a sufficient number of workmen at the Arsenal have returned to work again.

I, therefore, decree that:

If by Wednesday, June 2, at 10.0 a.m. (German time), 500 of the workmen formerly employed at the Arsenal . . . do not present themselves for work, the following restrictions upon communication will come into force on June 3, at 6.0 a.m.:

(A) The Railway Authorities will prevent any passengers travelling from the following stations. . . . All civilians will be forbidden, under threat of punishment, to set foot in the stations in question.

(B) All vehicular traffic, bicycle, and motor traffic or traffic on waterways and light-railways, including through traffic, will be forbidden in the following area. . . . The rails of the light-railways will be taken up at the boundaries of the area thus delimited. . . .

(D) The Passport Office will be closed.

With regard to this matter, I hereby give notice that I shall repress, by every means in my power, such conspiracies, which can only disturb the good understanding existing up to the present moment between the said officials and the population.

I shall hold the communal authorities responsible in the first place for the increase of such tendencies, and I further give notice that the people themselves will be to blame if the liberty hitherto accorded them in the widest fashion has to be taken from them and replaced by restrictive measures rendered necessary by their own fault.

(Signed)
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL COUNT VON WESTARP,
The Commander of the Depôt.

Ghent, June 10, 1915.

STRIPPING BELGIUM OF HER TIMBER.

If the economic life of Malines and the neighbourhood, which I have taken special pains to foster, should suffer gravely from the measures aforesaid, the fault and the responsibility will lie with the workers at the Arsenal, in being so short-sighted as to let themselves be influenced by agitators.

The Governor-Generals were, however, constitutionalists compared with the commandants in the "Etappen-Zone" under purely military rule. Here is a proclamation of June 10, 1915, by von Westarp, Etappen-Kommandant of the great Flemish city of Ghent:—

By order of his Excellency the Inspector of the Depôt, I bring the following to the notice of the communes.

The attitude of certain factories which, under the pretext of patriotism and relying upon The Hague Convention, have refused to work for the German Army, proves that amongst the population there are tendencies aiming at the creation of difficulties for the officials of the German Army.

But von Westarp was surpassed by his colleague, Hopfer, at Tournai. Hopfer had called on the Municipality to furnish him with a list of unemployed, to be deported to Germany and made to work in German service there, and the Municipality had courteously but firmly refused "to provide arms," as it expressed it, "for use against its own children." To this municipal resolution General Hopfer made the following reply:—

Tournai, October 23, 1916.

No. 17404.
Mob. Et. K.S. des IBIK.

PUNITIVE TAXATION.

(*Ref.* Your letter of October 20th, 1916. No. 7458.)

In permitting itself, through the medium of Municipal Resolutions, to oppose the orders of the German Military Authorities in the occupied territory, the City is guilty

DEPORTATION OF BELGIAN WORKMEN.

of an unexampled arrogance and of a complete misunderstanding of the situation created by the state of war.

The "clear and simple situation" is in reality the following :—

The Military Authorities order the City to obey. Otherwise the City must bear the heavy consequences, as I have pointed out in my previous explanations.

The General Commanding the Army has inflicted on the City—on account of its refusal, up to date, to furnish the lists demanded—a punitive contribution of 200,000 marks, which must be paid within the next six days, beginning with to-day. The General also adds that until such time as all the lists demanded are in his hands, for every day in arrear, beginning with December 31st, 1916, a sum of 20,000 marks will be paid by the City.

(Signed)
HOPFER, *Major-General,*
Etappen-Kommandant.

Thus the Germans did their worst, but the Belgians knew how to defeat them. At Malines, for instance, not a single workman returned to the Arsenal, and after 10 days von Bissing had to remove his interdict, because the suspension of traffic was preventing his own garrisons in the neighbourhood from receiving their supplies, and the Landsturmers were unwilling to go short in order that Belgian workmen might be "brought to reason." Von Bissing covered his retreat with a lie and a threat :—

As a sufficient number of workmen have now presented themselves at the railway workshops at Malines, the measures of coercion decreed by my proclamation of May 30 last will be discontinued from midnight on the night of June 11–12. I reserve to myself discretion for instantaneously restoring these measures to force if the number should diminish again to such an extent as to impede, in the shops, the work necessary for the maintenance of traffic on the Belgian railways.

But the truth was known all over the occupied territory within a week, and was emphasized by another victory for the workmen at Sweveghem, near Courtrai, where they were being treated to the same tactics, because they refused to make barbed wire for the German trenches on the Western Front. Von Bissing actually cut off communications at Sweveghem on the same day that he allowed traffic to be resumed again at Malines, and the Burgomaster of the Commune was compelled to sign a proclamation in the following terms :—

First-Lieutenant von der Knesebeck, the Etappen-Kommandant, constrains the Burgomaster of Sweveghem to urge the workmen at the wire factory of M. Bakaert to go on with their work, and to explain to them that a matter vital to the Commune is at stake. The workmen may rest assured that, after the war, they will incur no responsibility for having continued their work in the wire factory, considering that they have been forced to do so by the German military authority. If there should be any responsibility, I take it entirely upon myself. If work is started again, all punishments will cease.

TH. TROYE,
Burgomaster.

But the workmen read between the Burgomaster's lines, and the only responsibility which weighed with them was one which neither he nor the Etappen-Kommandant could take off their shoulders. For them the "vital matter at stake" was to do their duty as citizens of Belgium, and they maintained their resistance till they beat the Governor-General as signally as their comrades in the railway shops at Malines.

The Germans were discomfited in little things and big. A little thing was the prohibition against wearing, "even in an unprovocative manner," the colours of Belgium and her Allies, which produced a festival of ivy leaves—Belgium's national tree. The ivy leaves were sold in the streets ; they were worn in hats and button-holes ; the horses had them on their harness ; and the Germans had to shut their eyes. A proclamation against ivy leaves would have been too embarrassing a document for von Bissing's "Bulletin of Laws and Decrees."

A big thing was the victory of Cardinal Mercier, in his Pastoral Letter of Christmas, 1914. In this address to the clergy of his diocese, the Cardinal made a precise, documented statement of some of the crimes of the German Invasion, condemned them in restrained and unanswerable words, and bade his fellow-countrymen take courage in the magnificent sacrifice which their country had made, and the hopes of restoration which the future held in store.

As soon as a copy of this Pastoral came under the German authorities' eyes, they arrested the diocesan printer of the Archbishopric of Malines and condemned him to a fine of 500 marks, or imprisonment for 30 days. Perquisitions were made for published copies at Malines, Antwerp, Brussels, and even in the villages ; the curés were forbidden to read the letter from the pulpit, and several were arrested for refusing to pledge themselves not to do so. On Saturday, January 2, 1915, an official summons reached the Cardinal to appear before the Governor-General the same morning. On Sunday, January 3, the Governor-General forbade him, by telegram, to go to Antwerp, where he was to have celebrated a service in the Cathedral. On Monday, January 4, a German officer handed him a memorandum from the Governor-General, in which von Bissing put on record, among other things, that the permission formerly granted to Cardinal Mercier to visit his fellow-bishops in Belgium,

was now withdrawn. Von Bissing's last move was a *communiqué*, launched from his *Press Bureau*, to the effect that "Cardinal Mercier's pastoral letter had been subjected to no restrictions," and this the Cardinal answered by a circular letter in Latin to his clergy, dated January 10, in which he exposed von Bissing's *communiqué* as "contrary to the truth."

The following proclamation, posted in Alost and other towns of the Occupied Zone, shows how the Germans sought, at all costs, to silence Mercier's voice :—

The Burgomaster is to inform the curés of the commune that they may not read Cardinal Mercier's Pastoral Letter aloud, inasmuch as it may neither be printed nor put in circulation. The leaflet in which the Cardinal testifies that he has not withdrawn anything in his Pastoral Letter is to be destroyed. The Kommandantur is under orders to inflict severe penalties in the case of any infringement of this proclamation.

THE GERMAN KOMMANDANTUR.

Alost, January 23, 1915.

The Germans were right. It was worth their while to strip off the mask and expose their own methods in Belgium for the lie and tyranny that they were, if they could by any means prevent Cardinal Mercier from revealing to his countrymen and the world the Belgian people's unconquered soul. The Germans were beaten, and at every crisis in the history of the Occupation the Cardinal made his voice heard as courageously as in the last days of 1914; but perhaps nothing he subsequently said or wrote expressed so powerfully as the following sentences in that first Pastoral letter the spirit against which German methods could not prevail :—

The rights of conscience are sovereign. It would have been unworthy of us to take refuge in a mere show of resistance.

We do not regret our first enthusiasm; we are proud of it. Writing, in a tragic hour, a solemn page of our national history, we have desired that page to be sincere and glorious.

We shall know how to endure, as long as endurance is necessary. . . .

Trial, in the hands of the Divine Omnipotence, is a two-edged sword. If you rebel against it, it will wound you to death; if you bow your head and accept it, it will hallow you. . . .

Let us earn our liberation. Let us hasten it by our courage, even more than by the prayers of our lips. . . .

The Power which has invaded our soil and momentarily occupies the greater part of it, is not a legitimate authority. Therefore, in the secret of your heart, you owe it neither esteem, nor attachment, nor obedience.

The only legitimate Power in Belgium is that which belongs to our King, to His Government, and to the Representatives of the Nation. The King is the only authority we acknowledge. He alone has a right to the affection of our hearts, and to our loyalty

By permission of "Land and Water."

THE PROMISE.

From the Cartoon by Louis Raemaekers.

The British Government has repeatedly assured Belgium that we shall never sheath the sword until she has recovered all and more than all that she has sacrificed.

CHAPTER CLXVIII.

SCIENCE AND THE HEALTH OF ARMIES (II).

GERM-KILLERS—THE SEARCH FOR THE IDEAL ANTISEPTIC—THE BLOOD STREAM—DAKIN'S SOLUTION—METHOD OF TREATMENT—MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMITTEE'S WORK—DISCOVERY OF "FLAVINE"—ITS IMPORTANCE—THE FIGHT AGAINST "SPOTTED FEVER"—IDENTIFICATION OF THE GERMS—PREPARATION OF A SERUM—REMARKABLE RESULTS—THE REDUCTION OF MORTALITY—THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DYSENTERY—"BISMUTH-EMETINE"—TYPHOID FEVER—TYPHUS IN SERBIA—EPIDEMIC JAUNDICE—JAPANESE RESEARCH—NEW VIEWS OF MEDICINE.

IN an earlier chapter* an account has been given of the wonderful strides which were made during the early months of the war in the recognition and treatment of disease. It was shown that the chief enemy in those days was blood poisoning in wounds, of which indeed there was a great epidemic extending over the whole European continent, and it was explained in what manner that epidemic was brought under control. Again, the work accomplished against preventable diseases like typhoid fever was described and an account was given of the very successful mission under Lieut.-Colonel Leiper to find out the cause of Bilharzia in Egypt.

These early efforts, as was indicated, saved the Army from any serious harm by disease; they laid the foundations for future work; they were an inspiration and an encouragement to the host of toilers in this most important and difficult field. It is unnecessary to refer again to the vital character of the information which they furnished, but if a clear idea of later developments is to be gained some indication must be given of the directions in which that information was faulty.

In the first place it was soon evident that, though the epidemic of blood poisoning in wounds had been controlled, it had not been mastered. Valuable lives were still being lost in spite of all precautions, and none of the methods devised had attained to the ideal which every surgeon saw clearly in front of him.

Thanks to the researches of Sir Almroth Wright, many misconceptions with regard to the cleansing and healing of wounds had been swept away. The old method of treating a wound was to apply to it some more or less powerful germ killer and hope that by this means inflammation would be prevented. Sir Almroth Wright pointed out the simple fact that the germ-killing substances in general use were as damaging to the tissues of the patient as they were to the invading microbes.

The importance of this fact is at once evident when it is borne in mind that in the last issue it is the flesh and blood of the wounded man which protect him against the germs of blood poisoning. In his tissues are qualities of resistance and antagonism to disease germs which when exercised freely afford a high degree of safety. But an interference with these powers of protection which does not at the same time completely destroy the invaders makes the second case of the wounded man worse than the first.

It was thus possible to show that antiseptics, as used in the beginning of the war, were inefficient because they inflicted damage upon the resisting powers of the patients and because they did not penetrate into the recesses of the wounds where the germs lurked. This statement was of a revolutionary character and was hotly assailed, but no successful attempt was

* Vol. VI., Chapter XCVII.



ANÆSTHETISING A WOUNDED SOLDIER IN THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL AT NEUILLY.

[French official photograph.

made to refute it. Attempts to find better antiseptics were, however, made on every hand.

The work on the healing of wounds thus begun was continued with zeal, and at a later date a number of important conclusions became possible. It was pointed out, in the first place, that the great work of Metchnikoff must be given its due share of consideration. Metchnikoff had shown how certain of the white corpuscles in the blood are in reality "warrior cells" which, at the coming of danger, go out in battalions to repel and destroy the invading microbes. This "battle of the blood" had been for many years one of the wonders of medicine, and the truth of Metchnikoff's views had been proven to the hilt. Again and again observers had seen that strange marshalling of the fighting forces in answer to what was called a "chemiotactic influence," a subtle call transmitted along all the blood-ways of the body. They had watched the hastening of the white armies by a million paths to the scene of battle. They had seen these fearless defenders cast themselves bodily upon the enemy and by the enemy be stricken in their tens of thousands. Finally, they had observed the coming of victory when the white warrior cells, the phagocytes, were able to swallow up and digest the bodies of their foes.

The warrior cells came, travelling, in the blood stream. For a time Metchnikoff's work focused attention so completely upon the warrior cells that the properties of the blood stream were neglected. For a considerable period before the war, however, this had been remedied and attention had been re-directed to the importance of the blood stream. It was now, during the war, demonstrated again that the efficiency of the work of the warrior cells depended in great measure upon the state of the blood fluid or serum.

In other words, there were qualities in a man's blood serum which were of equal importance to him with the fighting capacity of his warrior cells. The chief of these qualities was called the "anti-tryptic power"—that is to say, the power of antagonizing the action of a ferment called trypsin. When the hostile germ began its attack it found itself in circumstances inimical to its safety and well-being. It found itself in a wound flooded with blood serum having a high "anti-tryptic power"—a power acting directly against its tendency to grow and multiply, and it found also a host of warrior cells moving in this anti-tryptic serum to attack it.

But, curiously enough, the body of each warrior cell contained a quantity of the ferment trypsin. So long as the warrior cell lived this trypsin was fighting on the side of the patient, for by means of it the warrior cell was able to digest the germs it had swallowed. But if the warrior cell died, then the trypsin escaped out into the blood serum, where it came in contact with the anti-tryptic power to which reference has been made. Trypsin and anti-tryptic power cancelled one another. The blood serum was deteriorated as a fighting force, for its anti-tryptic power—or, in other words, its anti-bacterial power—was lowered.

From the point of view of the invading germs, therefore, anything tending to kill white warrior cells was of the utmost help. By this means not one but two enemies were disposed of; the warrior cell itself was killed, and the dead body of the warrior cell helped, because of its store of trypsin, to weaken the fighting anti-tryptic quality of the blood serum.

This fact was evidently of vital importance. This mysterious, small "laboratory" fact meant, clearly enough, the lives or the deaths of fighting men, the value of whom to their country was very great. Any agents which hindered these protective forces of nature was an agent hindering the healing of wounds and the recovery of wounded soldiers. It was thus an agent hindering the march of armies and giving help to the enemy.

This was the essence of the indictment of antiseptics. It could be and was shown that the vast majority of the antiseptics in use killed white warrior cells more easily than they killed germs. Thus, though they might kill some of the germs, they also created a favourable "atmosphere" for germ growth, and so for blood poisoning. Worse still, by coagulating the lymph and serum on the surface of the wound they actually made a covering for the germs under which, in a blood serum, robbed of its anti-tryptic power, they could breed and flourish.

The immediate result of these investigations was a reaction against antiseptics of the old order—carbolic acid, iodine, and others. Instead surgeons began to devote themselves to considering in what way they could encourage and promote the rapid flow of blood serum, or "lymph," from wounds, so that the hostile germs would be continually bathed in fresh,

[French official photograph.

OPEN-AIR HOSPITAL IN A WOOD IN FRANCE

active serum, with undiminished anti-tryptic power.

Clearly the best way to achieve this end was to open up all wounds thoroughly so as to expose the microbes as much as possible, and to drain them thoroughly so as to carry away all diminished blood serum and all dead warrior cells, and replace them by the outflowing fresh serum and cells. It was suggested that the liberal use of very dilute salt water ("normal saline solution") along with citrate of soda greatly helped this work by preventing coagulation of the serum in the wound, and by promoting a free oozing of serum from the wound walls.

This new surgical technique was, of course, a vast improvement upon the old technique, for it was founded upon definite scientific principles applied after careful research. Very soon the effects of it became evident in the reduced casualties from blood poisoning and in the increased attention paid to the subject by all surgeons and scientific workers. Nevertheless, all effort to kill the germs *in situ* was not abandoned. It was felt that while every effort should be made to give the powers of nature, the white warrior cells and the anti-tryptic power of the blood, free play, at the same time every effort should also be made to devise means of killing the germs without harming the white warrior cells. In other words, there began at once the search for the ideal antiseptic.

It had been laid down, as the result of the early work, that the ideal antiseptic when found must conform to certain definite terms. These terms were:

(1) Great potency against all germs in the presence of blood serum.

(2) No harmful effect on the white warrior cells.

(3) Absence of irritant action on living tissues in general, so that it might be applied to delicate surfaces such as mucous membranes.

(4) A suitable stimulant action on repairing tissues so that healing be encouraged.

(5) Non-poisonous to any tissue of the body. Thus, even if strychnine was the most potent antiseptic known, its effects on the nervous system would absolutely preclude its use.

These five terms were, it will be seen, of a most exacting kind and investigators might well pause to consider whether it was possible to satisfy them. The need, however, was great, for the wounds of war were all poisoned wounds,

and every day saved from the time occupied by healing represented an added efficiency in fighting force.

The first serious attempt to produce an ideal antiseptic has already been mentioned. The substance was hypochlorite of soda, and it was presented by Dr. Dakin under the title of Dakin's Solution, and also independently by Professor Lorrain Smith and his co-workers. The further developments of Dakin's Solution deserve to be recorded, for they were of great importance both from the medical and the military point of view.

Dakin's Solution originally consisted of 140 grammes of dry carbonate of soda dissolved in 10 litres of water to which 200 grammes of chloride of lime and 40 grammes of boric acid had been added. This solution was very favourably reported upon and many surgeons began to use it. Finally the distinguished



AN OPERATION BY JAPANESE SURGEONS IN FRANCE.

French surgeon, Dr. Alexis Carrèll, began a series of cases on the solution at his hospital at Compiègne, near the French front line. Carrell, however, adopted a modification of the original solution introduced by Daufresne, which contained no boric acid and a smaller proportion of hypochlorite.



DR. ALEXIS CARRELL,
Inventor of the new method of sterilizing wounds.

Carrell's success depended to a great extent upon his technique, but there was no question that the antiseptic was also of great value, even if it did not, as we shall presently see, satisfy all the five terms of the ideal antiseptic.

Carrell based his system upon very early treatment of wounds. He advised that at the advanced dressing station just behind the lines the skin surrounding all wounds should be treated with tincture of iodine as an early measure. If the wound was small or narrow an injection into the course of it of Dakin's Solution was recommended; if wide and freely open it could be packed with swabs soaked in the solution, but the value of these procedures was problematical.

At the Casualty Clearing Station the patient was anæsthetised and his wound thoroughly treated. Bullets and pieces of shell were removed. The solution was then injected into the wound and the cavity of the wound completely filled with it. Some remarkable apparatus was used in irrigating the wound. This consisted of a number of indiarubber tubes arranged in connexion with a single supply tube, like the teeth to the stem of a comb, and perforated with many small holes. The tubes were introduced into the cavity of the wound so as to allow the solution to be well sprayed into it; they were kept in position by means of strips of gauze. The antiseptic solution was introduced into the wound every two hours by the nurse, who by releasing a stop-cock allowed just sufficient solution to fill the wound full.

The solution was found to be non-irritating, and thus it fulfilled one at least of the terms of the ideal antiseptic. It was also possessed of great powers of dissolving away dead tissue and so of cleaning the wound. Further, it certainly destroyed the poison thrown out by the germs, and thus reduced the chances of damage to the affected man.

No doubt could be felt that this hypochlorite solution marked a great stride in antiseptic treatment. Indeed, the proof was given in the fact that, after wounds had been treated by it for relatively short periods, it was found possible to stitch them up. The character of this advance is understood when it is remembered that in the early days of the war, in the days of the Marne and Ypres, it would have been criminal folly to stitch up any wound, no matter how clean it might look.

PATHOLOGICAL MUSEUM OF THE BLAND-SUTTON INSTITUTE.

There was a saying in those days that surgical needles and sutures should be abolished from the British Army as a greater danger than the shells and bayonets of the enemy.

This stitching up of newly cleansed wounds naturally aroused a great deal of interest, and many surgeons investigated the matter. The eminent Belgian surgeon, Dr. Depage, stated that the transformation which occurred in his results, thanks to the new method, was very impressive, that immediate complications be-

In virulent infections the number of microbes counted at the beginning of treatment was often very great, and frequently the "bacterial chart" would show oscillations about this period. But the tendency of the chart was always downwards; there was "a descent of the bacterial curve." The curve, as a rule, arrived at zero after from five to 25 days of treatment, the rate depending naturally upon the depth and character of the wound. When the bacterial chart arrived at zero the wound was



[Official photograph.

SERBIAN DRESSING STATION IN A MONASTERY.

came more and more rare, and that suppurations disappeared completely. Efforts were made to test the results obtained by examining to see whether any germs remained alive in the wounds after they had been cleaned by the solution. A method was adopted by which the number of microbes present in a wound during the stages of its evolution towards healing were counted; it was thus possible to make comparisons between cases treated by means of Dakin's Solution and cases treated by other means. Thus what were called "bacterial charts" could be drawn up which, at a glance, showed the course of the cleansing of the wound of germs, just as a temperature chart shows the course of a fever.

stitched up. Dr. Depage reported upon the results of 137 wounds stitched up after complete cleansing as follows:

(*a.*) Complete success, 112. In these cases healing was perfect on the whole extent of the wound and no inflammation of any kind was observed.

(*b.*) Partial success, 23. In these cases some slight inflammation occurred.

(*c.*) Failures, 2. Both these cases were stitched up rather soon, but quickly recovered on being re-treated.

As these cases included wounds of soft tissues, wounds of bones and joints and amputation stumps, the results were good. Reports from other surgeons, notably Drs. Dohally and Dumas, Professors Poyel, Tuffier and Chutre,

confirmed them. Indeed, it was stated that under the Carrell treatment a soldier's stay in hospital was very appreciably shortened, and that men were able to be discharged in from four to six weeks who would have required no less than from three to six months' treatment under former methods. Professor Chutre stated that he was forced to do one amputation where formerly 20 had been necessary and where there had been 10 deaths there wa now only one.

The importance of this does not need to be emphasized. Clearly the loss by death or from permanent or partial disability increased the economic and military value of every individual. Decrease in earning power was in proportion to the permanent disability sustained, and the machinist or skilled mechanic who suffered the loss of an arm became doubly a loss to his community, first by reason of the pension to which he was entitled, and secondly by the diminution of his productive capacity. The employment of the Carrell method and Dakin Solution shortened convalescence and minimized pain; it appreciably reduced the cost of hospital maintenance and the strain imposed on doctors and nurses.

Excellent and valuable as these results were, they did not save the Dakin solution from criticism by bacteriologists, who applied to it the rigorous tests laid down in respect of the "ideal antiseptic." Notwithstanding its undoubted bactericidal powers, Dakin's Solution did not entirely satisfy these requirements. It was very poisonous to germs, but it was also poisonous to the white warrior cells; in fact, its value lay probably more in its power to destroy the toxines thrown out by the germs of blood poisoning than in its power to kill the germs themselves.

Investigation therefore proceeded, and efforts were redoubled to discover a substance which should prove a still nearer approach to the ideal. These efforts were directed along lines which the work of Ehrlich had made familiar to medical science. Briefly what was aimed at was a substance having a "selective affinity" for germs. Just as the sportsman condemns the unsportsmanlike practice of "firing into the brown" and demands that each "gun" shall select his bird and account for it cleanly, so the workers in this field provisionally condemned the method of using any antiseptic which injured the patient as well as the microbes.

OPERATING THEATRE OF LORD TREDEGAR'S YACHT "LIBERTY," CONVERTED INTO A HOSPITAL SHIP.



WHERE CROSS AND CRESCENT WORK SIDE BY SIDE.
Arrival of a Red Crescent train in Cairo.

They desired to possess a method which would enable them to single out their microbe from its human surroundings and dispose of it with speed and certainty. They demanded, in short, a sighted rifle to replace the blunderbuss of earlier days.

The quest was difficult, but not perhaps so hopeless as may at first sight appear. The thing had been done already. It was Ehrlich's object to discover a substance capable of destroying the germ of syphilis, the *Spirochaete pallida*, without in any way harming the tissues of the infected individual. So well did he achieve his object that salvarsan, "606," came to be universally recognised as a sighted rifle of very great accuracy. In almost every case the bullet could be relied upon to find its intended billet.

Remarkable as this was, it was not the full measure of the accuracy which had already been obtained by the use of the drugs of the aniline dye series of which salvarsan is a member. This accuracy had actually been increased and developed so that it was possible to "hit" not only a particular germ but even a small part of a particular germ. An allied parasite, the trypanosome of sleeping sickness, for example, is a small animal cell having two nuclei or "nerve spots" in it. One of the nuclei is situated in the body of the trypanosome and the other is situated in its tail and is thus known as the "caudal nucleus."

As the result of investigation it was found that a particular drug was able to attack the tail nucleus without in any other way affecting the activity or virulent character of the trypanosome. All that happened was that trypanosomes exposed to this drug lost their tail nuclei. The experiment was carried out by inoculating a mouse with the parasites and treating it with minute doses of the drug. A most remarkable fact was that when re-inoculated into other mice which had not been treated with the drug the parasites remained without the tail nucleus. In other words, a process of germ-evolution had been carried out.

Here, then, was an indication of the extraordinary degree of accuracy it was possible to obtain if only the right drug could be found for the purpose in hand. The purpose in hand was the destruction of the various bacteria which are found in most ordinary war-wounds, notably the so-called *cocci*—the *streptococcus*, the *staphylococcus*, and also the *bacillus coli communis* and other forms.

The work was carried out at the Bland-



STREPTOCOCCI IN PUS.



STAPHYLOCOCCI IN PUS.

Sutton Institute of Pathology of the Middlesex Hospital by Dr. C. H. Browning, Director of the Institute, and his assistants, Drs. Kennaway and Thornton and Miss Gulbransen, and their report was presented to the Medical Research Committee under the National Insurance Act.

This work began with a clear recognition of the defects of other antiseptics. In the first place Dr. Browning satisfied himself that one of the reasons why ordinary antiseptics failed was that they entered into combination with materials in the blood in the same manner in which iron enters into combination to form rust. Let it be supposed that a piece of iron of a certain strength is required for a purpose, but that in process of performing that purpose half the iron is rusted away, it is obvious that the purpose will not be efficiently performed. More than half the ordinary antiseptics were "rusted away" by means of the materials in the blood and tissues which combined with them and rendered them inert.

In the second place it was found that the ordinary antiseptics destroyed the life of the cells of the patient's body and prevented or inhibited the attacking power of the white warrior cells, thus, as has been explained, depriving the patient of one of his most important weapons in combating local infection.

Thirdly, the antiseptics, by destroying the patient's tissues, produced layers of dead material which acted as screens to the germs lying under them and protected these germs, thus affording them every chance of growth and action. Finally, the antiseptics were deficient in penetrating power, and so did not reach the deep-seated microbes in wounds.

The first step was to test all the best known antiseptics—and this will give some idea of the vast amount of careful and detailed work accomplished—according to a definite plan. The series tested included carbolic acid, mercury perchloride ("corrosive sublimate"), iodine, Dakin's Solution and Daufresne's modification of Dakin's Solution, and chlorine water. The three points specially investigated were the effects of these antiseptics on the work of the white warrior cells, their effect upon the body tissues of the patient, and the difference, if any, of their action upon germs in water and in blood serum.

In regard to carbolic acid it was found that it acted as well in blood serum as in water, but that while 1 part in 250 dilution was required to kill cocci, 1 part in 500 dilution prevented the action of the white warrior cells. That is to say that long before the strength necessary to kill the germs had been reached the beneficial action of the warrior cells had been interfered with.

In the case of iodine matters were even worse, for while iodine killed *cocci* in strength 1 part in 10,000 dilution if the *cocci* were in water, it would not kill them at this strength if they were in blood serum, *i.e.*, if they were in their natural surroundings. In that case a strength of 1 part in 700 was necessary. On the other hand, iodine prevented the action of the white warrior cells in strengths of 1 part in 3,500. Here, again, long before the antiseptic was strong enough to do the *cocci* any harm, it had thrown the patient's own mechanism of defence out of working order.

"Corrosive sublimate," or perchloride of

mercury, was next tested, it being a prime favourite with surgeons. This substance killed *cocci* in strengths of 1 part in 1,000,000 in water; but in blood serum strengths of 1 part in 10,000 were required, the potency of the antiseptic falling actually 100 times on account of loss by combination with materials in the blood. Corrosive sublimate prevented the action of the white warrior cells at strengths of 1 part in 7,000 dilution. This antiseptic, therefore, killed *cocci* in blood at a less strength than that at which it prevented warrior cell activity, and so approached nearer to the ideal antiseptic than either carbolic acid or iodine. The difference between concentration of 1 part in 10,000, at which it killed *cocci*, and 1 part in 7,000, at which it interfered with warrior cell action, was not very great, and also it was a powerful poison for all the tissues.

The results, with the modification of Dakin's Solution referred to, in Carrell's work were that while it killed *cocci* in strengths of 1 part in 4,000 in water, as reckoned by its content in "available" chlorine, strengths of 1 part in 1,000 were required in blood serum. On the other hand, warrior cell activity was prevented at strengths of 1 part in 4,000.

The immense importance of this work does not need to be emphasized. Here was proof that all the best known and most valued antiseptics actually defeated the work of the warrior cells of the blood before they began to accomplish their own work—the destruction of the germs. Yet, in spite of this, there could be little doubt that one of these antiseptics, Dakin's Solution, was a valuable help to surgery. How much more valuable would not the help be of a substance free from detrimental action upon the warrior cells.





THE BLAND-SUTTON INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY: EXTERIOR AND BACTERIOLOGICAL LABORATORY.

132—3

The ground having been cleared, efforts were now directed to testing a series of aniline dyes which, in a general way, were known to possess antiseptic powers. It is not necessary to detain the reader with details of this work. Various substances, among them "malachite green," "crystal violet" and "brilliant green," were investigated, and then finally Dr. Browning arrived at "flavine."

The results of the tests of this remarkable substance showed at once that a new sphere had been entered. In the first place flavine proved to be exactly a hundred times more powerful as a destroyer of *cocci* in blood serum than in water. This was in marked contradistinction to the action of "corrosive sublimate," which was a hundred times less powerful in blood serum than in water. Again, flavine killed *cocci* in serum in strengths of 1 part in 200,000, while it did not interfere with the action of the white warrior cells until strengths of 1 part in 500 had been reached. That is to say, that *cocci* were killed by this drug 400 times as easily as warrior cells were affected, or in other words that you had to multiply the lethal dose for *cocci* by 400 before you could make any adverse impression upon the patient's own mechanism of defence. Flavine was also by far the most potent antiseptic known against *bacillus coli*, an important organism which causes suppuration, especially in connexion with the bowel; suppurative appendicitis is a condition in which *bacillus coli* is responsible for most of the evil.

Thus of all the antiseptics examined flavine was far and away the best. It had great antiseptic power combined with practically no toxic power toward the warrior cells, and it was entirely free from irritating qualities so far as the patient's tissues were concerned. The next step was to put it to the test of actual use in wound surgery.

The results happily bore out the scientific data in a very complete manner, and under clinical test it was evident that the claims made on its behalf had been substantiated. It proved entirely non-irritating to patients' tissues, and there were no general or local ill-effects from its use. On the other hand, wounds healed up with surprising rapidity when it was used.

In one case a wound of the hand had been under medical care for two weeks. The third finger of the hand was at least twice its normal size; it was livid, the skin was shiny, and there were two open sores upon it. It seemed certain that the finger must be lost. An operation was performed, and flavine applied to the finger. The result was that within 14 days there was no trace of suppuration, and the finger had resumed its normal size. In another case, also a hand wound, treatment had been continued for three weeks. The hand was as thick as it was broad, and there was a sore in the palm. Flavine was syringed in and boric fomentations used, and in three days the hand resumed its normal size.

A case of gunshot wound of the arm was operated on in France, an amputation being performed. The "stump" became heavily infected, but after treatment by flavine for one week the wound became clean. A re-amputation was then performed, and this healed up healthily without any inflammation. In another case a leg had been removed, and the stump had become very dirty. Treatment with "eusol"—*i.e.*, one of the hypochlorite solutions—was carried out for three weeks without definite result. After four days' treatment with flavine the wound had entirely ceased to give trouble, and it quickly healed up.

In shrapnel wounds a clean surface might always be expected in four or five days. The absence of any deterrent effect from the drug on the process of healing and repair of the tissues was also revealed in every instance. Thus flavine actually satisfied all the tests of the ideal antiseptic; it had (1) great potency against germs in the presence of blood serum; (2) no deleterious effects on the white warrior cells; (3) no irritant action on living tissues in general, so that it could be applied to delicate surfaces such as mucous membranes; (4) a suitable stimulating effect on the repair of the tissues; and (5) no poisonous effect upon any special tissue. It was, in short, the weapon of precision which had been so eagerly sought.

While this great work was going on, other work had been begun in connexion with one of the deadliest diseases known to medicine—cerebro-spinal fever, popularly called "spotted fever." "Spotted fever" is the dread of armies, for it tends to break out whenever large bodies of men are congregated together. Soon after the great recruiting campaign began in England in the first period of the war, and the new formations were sent out to be trained, this scourge made its appearance. Cases were reported from all parts of the country. Many deaths occurred. The utmost anxiety prevailed, the more so because, in the public mind, the disease was

CHEMOTHERAPEUTIC LABORATORY.



BLAND-SUTTON INSTITUTE: CHEMICAL LABORATORY.

regarded as being very infectious. Its sudden onset, the extreme severity of the symptoms, the dramatic character of some of these symptoms—instantaneous blindness and deafness, for example—caused it to be regarded with lively terror.

Very soon it became evident that a serious epidemic was to be feared unless instant measures were taken to cope with the trouble. Unhappily, knowledge of the disease was fragmentary and unsatisfactory, and no cure worth the name of cure was known to medical science. Beyond the fact that an organism could be found in the fluid surrounding the brain and spinal cord, and that this fluid was usually greatly increased in amount so that pressure was exerted on the brain, there was no authentic information. The battle began with the enemy strongly entrenched and powerfully protected. The defending forces lacked almost everything which, in this war, makes for victory. Yet the assaults of the enemy were so severe that counter-attack was absolutely necessary.

Time was short, and the work to be accomplished apparently very great. Happily, in this case as in so many other cases, Sir Alfred Keogh, the Director-General of the Army Medical Services, saw the right thing to do, and did it at once with all his might. He decided upon a great mass attack upon the stronghold of the enemy, and he resolved to enlist in this attack the very best brains which the scientific



SEROLOGICAL LABORATORY.

world was able to offer him. In January, 1915, he invited the Medical Research Committee to assist him, and a plan of campaign was immediately drawn up.

It was manifest in the first place that, as knowledge of the character of the disease was faulty and inaccurate, it was necessary not only to provide for the immediate application in

preventive work of what was certainly known, but also to arrange for organized research work to improve knowledge and make further administrative action possible.

The Medical Research Committee therefore appointed Dr. Mervyn Gordon, assistant pathologist to St. Bartholomew's Hospital, who had formerly done the chief work in England in connexion with the disease, to be their bacteriologist, and they further supplied him with expert help. They placed him face to face with his problem and they left him to solve it on behalf of the War Office and the country as best he might. Dr. Gordon was gazetted Lt.-Colonel on his appointment.



MENINGOCOCCI,
From a case of cerebro-spinal meningitis.

In point of fact a great declaration of war upon one of the most dangerous and implacable of the foes of armies had been made. The enemy, as has been pointed out, was well entrenched; the attacking force lacked almost everything except support and a good courage. So the war began. Colonel Gordon, like a wise general, sat down and put the facts he had already gathered about this enemy on paper before him. One thing was certain. Extensive bacteriological observations made during previous outbreaks of the disease had shown that no matter in what country it appeared it was invariably associated with the presence of one particular germ, the so-called *meningococcus* of Weichselbaum. This *meningococcus* had come to be regarded as the cause of the disease.

Another point, about which some definite information existed, was that previous outbreaks had seemed to indicate that the chief mode of the spread of the disease was by healthy "carriers," who carried the germ in their noses and throats but did not themselves show any symptoms. These carriers were exceedingly liable to infect other people. It was thought that the average time of "carrying" the germ in this way was about three or four weeks.

Possessed of this rather slender information, Colonel Gordon came to the conclusion that his first duty was to isolate every case as it arose, to segregate, etc., all "contacts," *i.e.*, people who might have been in contact with the cases before they actually took ill, and who might therefore be harbouring the infection, and to make careful examinations of all the bacteria present in the noses and throats of these "contacts."

The aim was to check the disease without disturbing the organization of the troops more than might be absolutely necessary, for those were the fierce days of 1915 when England was calling for men to defend her at Neuve Chapelle, on the second battlefield of Ypres, at Festubert and at Loos. It was decided that all those who were found to be free from the *meningococcus* were to be returned to duty with the smallest possible delay; those, on the other hand, who were found to harbour in their nasopharynx any micro-organism indistinguishable from the *meningococcus* were to be kept in isolation until such time as they were free from it.

It was not perhaps a dramatic plan of campaign; but it was an eminently common-sense one. The methods were old—isolation, segregation, bacteriological examination. No "brilliant new method" was included in the scheme. But what was included in the scheme was a determination that it should be carried out with vigorous thoroughness and that it should expand with expanding knowledge. The question of preventive inoculation was considered, only to be put aside. There was not enough knowledge available to justify the proceeding.

The next step was to issue as orders these first lines of attack, and a War Office memorandum was accordingly sent out giving full instructions to the medical officers in charge of the troops. It was insisted that the orders be most strictly followed, and it was soon found that where they were strictly followed it was possible to release 70 per cent. of the "contacts" within twenty-four hours and the majority of the rest within a further interval of from two to four days. This, as will be seen, was a great

step, for it gave security without any serious interference with military training.

It was necessary, however, to have certain facilities. In the first place a practical method of identifying the *meningococcus*, then a series of laboratories within easy access of the various military camps all over the country, finally bacteriologists to work in the laboratories who were capable of identifying the *meningococcus*, and laboratory assistants to help them.

This meant, of course, a big organisation. It meant that a "G.H.Q." was essential, a General Head-Quarters which should form an administrative centre and also a research centre; it meant, too, that the needs of the "front" must be met by local stations; these must again be supplemented by one or two laboratories capable of being rushed at short notice to a storm centre.

A Central Cerebro-Spinal Laboratory was accordingly equipped at the Royal Army Medical College, and 37 district laboratories were started or co-opted at points throughout the country where it had been decided at the War Office that they were likely to be of most service. The central laboratory supplied the district laboratories with the necessary material for examining cases—for example, swabs—and also with the necessary "media" for growing cultures of the bacteria. By this means the materials were able to be obtained with greater speed and also economy was effected in their preparation.

The Central Laboratory, or G.H.Q., however, was by no means intended to be a distributing station only. It was also to serve as a training school for new workers, a kind of cadet establishment. Advice was rendered, and courses of instruction in the disease were given to officers of the Royal Army Medical Corps sent for the purpose. Further, non-commissioned officers and men of the Royal Army Medical Corps were also trained at the Central Laboratory in the making of media, swabs, and other appliances.

Finally, the Central Laboratory had its Intelligence Department, or Research Department, where knowledge about the enemy was gathered and investigations into his modes of attack were carried out. The district laboratories were formed on a plan elaborated at the War Office by Colonel Horrocks and Surgeon-Colonel Reece. The laboratories were placed in carefully and specially chosen sites, though if accommodation was already available it was made use of.

The *personnel* of the Central Laboratory was a matter of anxious care, for upon this



THE MOTOR LABORATORY.

clearly depended in great measure the success of the campaign. Major Hine was placed in charge of the media and supply department and the training of laboratory assistants. He also assisted in the training of officers, and he was in charge of the Motor Laboratory which waited to be sent to places of special pressure. Further, he looked after the accounts. Other workers were Mr. E. C. Murray, Lieutenant Tulloch, Captain R. R. Armstrong, Captain Davies, and Captain Martin Flack. In the hands of Colonel Gordon, as Commander-in-Chief, remained the direction of the whole effort and also the carrying out of special research work.

The campaign was now opened. Means had been found to isolate every case of the disease, to segregate every "contact," and to examine the bacteria present in the nose and throat of every contact in order to determine whether or not he harboured the *meningococcus*. The next step was to study and, if possible, improve the methods of identifying the *meningococcus*, and distinguishing it from the many other similar *cocci* which inhabit the nose and throat, but which are not the cause of "spotted fever."



APPARATUS FOR THE PREPARATION OF CULTURE MEDIUM FOR THE GROWTH OF MENINGOCOCCI.

It was known that one peculiarity of the *meningococcus* was that it would not grow upon a culture medium called "Nasgar" if the temperature was kept at 23° centigrade. This however, was a somewhat difficult method to apply, and so another test was taken into consideration. This was known as the "agglutination test." The agglutination test depends on the fact that if a man has become infected with a disease his blood at once develops an antidote to that disease. If the antidote is strong enough the man recovers, if not he dies. The antidote has the power to kill the bacteria of the disease. Thus if a drop of blood of a patient suffering from "spotted fever" is brought into contact with some of the germs of the disease, the *meningococci*, those germs will be killed. On the other hand, if a drop of the blood of a healthy man which contains, of course, no antidote, is added to them the germs will not be affected. The destruction of the germs by the antidote is spoken of as "bacteriolysis." The antidote serum has the property of causing the germs to gather into clumps. This is known as agglutination.

Clearly this method of agglutination forms a double test. On the one hand, it will tell whether or not a patient has got a particular disease—does his blood agglutinate the bacteria of that disease? On the other hand, it will distinguish the bacteria of one disease from the bacteria of all other diseases, for only the bacteria of the actual disease under consideration will be agglutinated by the blood of a man affected by the disease. All other bacteria will remain unaffected.

Upon a property akin to this power to agglutinate had been founded the treatment by sera—notably the treatment of diphtheria by anti-diphtheria serum; in this case the poisons of the diphtheria bacilli are acted on by the antoxic serum and neutralized. An attempt had also been made to use a serum against the *meningococcus* of "spotted fever"—that is to say, to use some of the antidote developed in the blood of an infected person or animal in order to kill the infection in the blood of some other infected person or animal. But while the serum or blood antidote against diphtheria had proved

an unqualified success, the serum or blood antidote against "spotted fever" was most unreliable and unsatisfactory.

It was the first business of the Central Laboratory to ask why the *anti-meningococcus* serum had failed. The question was re-stated, some available serum being brought into contact with *meningococci* from the epidemic. The serum entirely failed to destroy the *meningococci* as it would have destroyed them had it possessed antidotal powers to their poisons. The obvious inference was that the animal from which this serum had been obtained had not been infected with the same kind of *meningococcus* as that with which the soldiers in this epidemic were infected.

This at once opened up the question whether there might not be several types of the *meningococcal* germ, each capable of producing the disease, but each sharply differentiated from the others. The intelligence department of the Central Laboratory became exceedingly busy with this idea at once, as busy as the intelligence department of a great army in its work of identifying enemy units.

But it was not only the intelligence department which became busy. No matter how many types of *meningococci* there might be, the immediate necessity was a serum powerful as an antidote against the type found in this epidemic. The first thing, therefore, which it was needful to do was to prepare such a serum.



THE AGGLUTINATION TEST

For ascertaining the presence or absence of meningococci in suspected cases. Tubes 1 and 3 positive (tube 3 has been shaken to show the flocculi of agglutinated cocci), Tube 2 negative result.

The preparation of a serum is no easy or rapid work. In order to carry it out an animal has to be slowly "immunized" or rendered insusceptible to the particular germs against which the serum is to act—that is to say, an animal has to be given very minute doses of the disease poison from tim to time until its blood develops a great quantity of antidote to the poison and it can tolerate huge doses without trouble. (A comparable process is that by which a man accustoms himself to the use of tobacco and opium. A few drops of laudanum will kill a novice at opium-taking; de Quincey, on the other hand, was able to swallow half-a-pint of the drug at a time.)

It was usually considered necessary to devote a month or six weeks to the immunizing of an animal from which a serum was to be obtained. But the needs of the soldiers in the "spotted fever" epidemic were far too urgent to allow of this long delay. A quicker method of serum preparation must be found, an "intensive" method, capable of giving results in a short space of time.

Happily some work had already been performed on this subject. It had been found that if a rabbit was "saturated" with "spotted fever" poison it did not necessarily succumb at once. If the "saturation" was carefully controlled the rabbit recovered, and its blood very quickly gained an antidotal power. A series of experiments was therefore planned for the purpose of proving this statement, upon the accuracy of which clearly many lives might depend.

Major Hine found that serum with a high antidotal or agglutinating power could be obtained in eight days by giving a young rabbit three doses of 1,000,000,000 killed *meningococci* into a vein at intervals of an hour on the first day. Thus at once a plentiful supply of serum which could be prepared by means of the germs actually found in the patients' bodies became available. There was no longer the fear that the

serum might be powerful only against some form of germ which was not present in the epidemic and powerless against the form which was present. The new serum was "made to measure," if the expression may be used; it was bound to fit, though whether it would actually be able to effect cures remained to be proved.

The intelligence department of the Central Laboratory met with very considerable success in its early efforts to identify the types of enemy which were being encountered. No one unacquainted with bacteriological methods can have any idea of the amount of patience and care needed for this work—detective work of the very subtlest kind. These doctors were not looking, be it remembered, for a new germ; they were looking for differences between germs



THE INTERIOR OF THE MOTOR LABORATORY,
Fitted with incubators, sterilizers, microscope, blowpipe, chemicals, tools, &c.

which appeared under the microscope to be exactly the same, which acted in the same manner and which produced the same disease.

It is often difficult enough to distinguish between members of the same family. How much more difficult to distinguish between minute particles of living matter requiring the highest powers of the microscope for their detection! Yet the task was undertaken in the full assurance that, given energy and patience, it could be accomplished. Modern bacteriology had placed many clues in the hands of these detectives of disease.

The first step was to determine whether certain *cocci* which looked exactly like the *meningococci* and which had been found in the throats and noses of suspected "carriers" of "spotted fever" were or were not identical with the *meningococci* of the outbreak. A first investigation was carried out upon six separate *cocci*. Of these four were typical *meningococci* (*meningococcus I., II., III.*, and *IV.*) taken from recent cases of "spotted fever." The fifth was a *coccus* indistinguishable from the *meningococcus* in shape and method of growing. It came from the throat of an officer who was suspected of being a "carrier." The sixth *coccus* came from the throat of a soldier who suffered from an inflammation of his throat at that time prevalent in a certain regiment. It was also indistinguishable from the true *meningococcus*.

The first step was to prepare a serum by treating a rabbit with one of the four *meningococci* from the declared cases of "spotted fever." This was done, the rabbit being given a number of doses of *meningococcus No. I.* until its blood had produced a powerful antidote. In this antidote-containing rabbit serum a few of each of the four *meningococci* from the declared cases of "spotted fever" were now placed. The rabbit serum, of course, at once agglutinated the *meningococcus No. I.* by means of which its antidotal power had been developed. But it also destroyed, and with equal facility, *meningococci Nos. II., III.*, and *IV.* The presumption was, of course, that *meningococci I., II., III.*, and *IV.* were germs of identical type or strain, and that what was an antidote for any one of them was an antidote for all.

Next the *cocci* from the throat of the officer suspected of being a "carrier" were placed in the serum. They were affected to a certain extent, but not so much as the *meningococci* had been. In order to determine whether they were being affected by the antidote agglutinin itself, or only—as frequently occurs—by some other substance in the serum, the serum in which they had been placed was now used again, some *meningococci* from the "spotted fever" cases being put into it. This serum which had been used to test the *cocci* from the officer's throat was then found to be just as powerful as ever against the *meningococci* from the "spotted fever" cases. In other words, it had not lost any of its specific power as a result of dealing with the *cocci* from the officer's throat (which would have occurred had these been identical with the true *meningococci* of "spotted fever.") That is to say, in the case of the *cocci* from the officer's throat the key had not fitted the lock and so none of the goods had been stolen. The goods were all there when a key which did fit the lock was used.

In the sixth case—the *coccus* from the throat of the soldier—exactly the same thing happened as had happened in the fifth case. None of the special antidote was used up. It was, therefore, a fair conclusion that while all the four *meningococci* (Nos. I., II., III. and IV.) were identical, the two *cocci* which appeared exactly like the *meningococci* belonged, in fact, to a different family and category.

But there was a second conclusion to be drawn, and one of very great practical importance. As has already been stated, there was an "*anti-meningococcal serum*" on the market at the time when this work began. That serum had been prepared from *meningococci* taken from "spotted fever" cases in an earlier epidemic. Presumably it was potent against these *meningococci* from which it had been prepared. But it was not potent against the *meningococci* of this outbreak. Therefore at least two separate types of true *meningococci* existed, each type being able to cause the disease "spotted fever."

The next step, therefore, was to collect a large number of *true meningococci* from a large number of different cases in different parts of the country and to compare them so as to find out whether in this particular outbreak all were of the same breed or not. Thirty-two different "strains" of *meningococci* were accordingly obtained, and a rabbit was prepared in the usual way against one of the 32 strains. Then one by one each of the 32 strains was tested by means of the serum of the prepared rabbit.

The result was that the antidote containing

PREPARATIONS FOR VACCINATION AGAINST TYPHOID IN FRANCE.

rabbit serum prepared by means of one of the 32 strains of *meningococci* was found to destroy 19 out of the 32 strains. The remaining 13 strains were not destroyed, and did not use up any of the antidote. Accordingly the 19 *meningococci* were grouped together and classed as Type I.

Next, another rabbit was prepared with one of the remaining 13 strains of *meningococci* which were not affected by the antidote-containing serum of the first rabbit. Each of the 32 strains of *meningococci* was tested by means of the serum of this second rabbit, with the result that eight of them were destroyed, and the remaining 24 were not affected. The eight strains of *meningococci* which were destroyed by this second serum were grouped together and classed as Type II.

There thus remained five strains of *meningococci* out of the original 32 which had not been affected by either the first or second antidote-containing serum. A third rabbit was accordingly prepared in the same way by means of one of these five remaining strains of *meningococci*, and all the 32 strains were tested in the resulting serum. It was found that only four strains of *meningococci* were destroyed by this third serum. These four strains belonged to the still unclassified group of five strains which had been unaffected by the first and second antidote-containing sera. They were therefore classified as Type III.

That left one strain only unclassified. A fourth rabbit was prepared with this one strain, and the whole 32 strains were tested by means of the serum which resulted. Only one strain was destroyed—the strain by means of which the rabbit had been prepared. This strain was therefore classed as Type IV.

Thus of the 32 *meningococci* investigated there were found to be 19 of Type I., 8 of Type II., 4 of Type III., and 1 of Type IV. Here, then, was the answer to the question why the serum which was on the market at the beginning of the epidemic was useless. It was useless because it was a serum containing the antidote to a type met with only seldom in this epidemic. In order to be of any use a serum must clearly contain the exact antidote of the type of *meningococcus* actually present in the case treated by it.

This was a discovery of enormous importance and of revolutionary character. It meant that a new epoch in the diagnosis and treatment of this terrible disease had been opened. The old days of groping in darkness, of bitter disap-



INOCULATING FRENCH SOLDIERS TO THE MUSIC OF A GRAMOPHONE.

pointment with serum treatment in one case and lively hope in another (depending on whether the serum used matched the type of germ present), were past for ever. Exact knowledge ushered in the period of exact methods of attack. Already the intelligence department of the Central Laboratory had justified itself by getting into close touch with the enemy.

The first investigation, to which reference has been made, had shown that some suspected carriers had *cocci* in their throats which did not react to one type of serum prepared by means of some true *meningococci*. This investigation was now carried a stage farther, and all the *meningococcus-like* organisms which had been secured from suspected carriers were examined by means of the four separate types of sera. Each serum related to one special type of germ. The result was that while several of these *cocci* were incriminated as belonging to one or other of the four types, the majority were acquitted.

Here, then, was a simple and a rapid method of dealing with any case which might arise. As soon as the man was suspected of being a carrier of the disease a swab must be taken from his throat and all the germs in his throat grown on culture media. These germs must then be tested by means of the four "type sera." If they happened to be destroyed by any one of these sera then they would be classed as belonging to the type to which the serum that destroyed them belonged; if they did not happen to be destroyed by any one of these type sera, then the patient could be acquitted forthwith.

This knowledge was rapidly disseminated from G.H.Q. to the various fronts. By the financial assistance of the Medical Research Committee outfits containing specimens of each of the four types of *meningococci* and also samples of each of the four type sera were dispatched with full directions how to use them to the district laboratories. It was urged that the exact type of *meningococcus* present in cases, carriers and contacts, should be determined in every instance. Sera for treatment of each of the types were also prepared and sent out.

The main issue had now been settled—that there were four types of this *meningococcus*. But it remained to settle some lesser questions upon which the full success of the work depended. The first of these related to the distri-



[French official photograph.

LIEUTENANT BEUXIN, ANALYST TO THE FRENCH ARMY, EXAMINING GERMAN PROJECTILES.

bution of the types throughout the country. It was found that the *meningococci* coming from military cases during 1915 were chiefly specimens of Type I. at first, but that, as the outbreak progressed, Type II. became more abundant. When the disease declined during the summer of 1915 several specimens of Type III. were met with, and the solitary specimen of Type IV. which was found also dated from the late stages of this 1915 outbreak. It was also noted that when the disease returned in the last months of 1915 first of all Type I. reappeared, to be shortly succeeded by Type II., which then became the predominant type. The epidemic of 1916, however, was remarkable for an increase in the number of cases due to Type IV. A relatively large number of cases of Type II. were met with in the London district.

The next question was: Does more than one type of *meningococcus* occur in the fluid surrounding the brain in any one case of "spotted fever"? The answer was obtained by collecting a number of cases and testing the bacteria found in them by means of the type sera. In every instance in which the brain fluid was examined in this way one type of *meningococcus* and one type only was discovered.

This important discovery settled the difficulty of "mixed" infections and gave the doctor treating "spotted fever" the assurance that in any one case he had but one type of germ to fight against. It was soon followed by the discovery that the type found in the brain fluid was also always the same as the type found in the nose and throat of the same patient.

This, again, was of the highest importance, because it had come to be recognized that this disease, "spotted fever," begins when the germ makes its way from throat or nose through the skull to the brain fluid. Here was confirmation of that view. Moreover, when suspicion rested upon a case it was now only necessary to examine a swab from the throat—a much easier matter than drawing fluid off from brain and spinal cord. On the result of the examination of the throat swab a diagnosis could be made forthwith and treatment begun, thus saving valuable time and affording the patient a much better chance.

Further, the fact that the *meningococcus* was found to be always present in the naso-pharyngeal secretion at the beginning of an attack, and that it was constantly of the same type as the *meningococcus* in the brain fluid, indicated unmistakably that every case of "spotted fever" was in reality an instance of a carrier developing the disease. The fact that if the germs obtained from any case were inoculated into animals, these animals invariably became infected with the same type as that injected into them, and never harboured any other type, was convincing proof that in this disease "*type breeds true*," or, in other words, that while Types I., II., III., and IV. produce much the same symptoms in the people they infect, they are nevertheless entirely distinct and different organisms which

never in any circumstances "change into" other forms, but which always maintain their own characteristics.

This work furnished, as will be seen, weapons against the disease which were bound to prove successful if used with courage and care. Not a moment was lost in bringing the full force of the new knowledge to bear upon the disease. The following example shows, indeed, how thoroughly and even unsparingly the knowledge was applied.

An outbreak of the fever was notified from a large garrison town in the spring of 1916. Captain Armstrong, at that time attached to the Central Laboratory, was sent down to assist in the identification of carriers. He took immediate and what might at one time have been regarded as drastic steps. He proceeded to swab not only the immediate contacts—*i.e.*, persons who had been in contact with victims of the disease during the incubation period—but also a very large section of the entire garrison who, so far as could be ascertained, had not been in direct contact with the actual cases. "In this way," runs the report of Colonel Gordon to the Medical Research Committee, "he and his assistants examined the naso-pharynx of some 10,000 men, the vast majority of whom had been in no direct contact with the cases. As the result of this extensive swabbing, Captain Armstrong provisionally isolated 410 men as being carriers of an organism closely resembling the *meningococcus*. At this point Captain Armstrong was unavoidably detached for duty elsewhere, and Lieutenant W. J. Tulloch, R.A.M.C., attached to the Central Laboratory, was sent down in the motor laboratory to investigate . . . the *cocci* present in the naso-pharynx of the men provisionally placed in isolation by Captain Armstrong." Of these 410 men, 86 had become free of suspicious organisms by the time of Lieutenant Tulloch's first visit and were discharged. All of the remaining 324 yielded *meningococcus-like* organisms. When these organisms were tested by means of sera Types I., II., and IV. (the types found present in this outbreak) no less than 103 showed no specific effect, *i.e.*, they were not affected by the sera. The men carrying these unaffected organisms were accordingly set free. The remaining 221 *cocci* showed definitely positive results, and it was found possible in the case of 193 of these to relegate them to their exact type forthwith. The results were as follows:

Specimens examined, 193; Type I., 30; Type II., 72; Type IV., 71.

The report concluded: "Evidence of the efficacy of Captain Armstrong's work is afforded by the fact that in spite of the large number of men examined in this infected garrison, no single instance came to notice of a man passed by him as a negative either developing the disease or transmitting it to another."

PASTEUR INSTITUTE AT ALGIERS.
Preparation of Serum.

A routine procedure was now established in all cases of outbreak. When information of a suspected case of "spotted fever" was received, and if the case was already in hospital, details as to his unit were ascertained at once by telephone. If the unit was in the London area, the immediate contacts were segregated by telephone pending investigation of the case. If it appeared in the least degree probable that the case was one of cerebro-spinal fever, a quantity of fluid was at once drawn off from the fluid surrounding the brain and spinal cord. A quantity at once, *i.e.*, rubbed over a layer of medium in a glass dish so as to convey the germs on the swab to the medium for hatching and growth; the "plates" were carried in heated water-jacketed tins supplied for the purpose. Actual cases of the disease were treated in special wards; positive carriers were sent to isolation wards at another military hospital.

The treatment of actual cases was carried out under the care of Captain A. C. E. Gray, and by means of the new polyvalent serum called the "Millbank-Lister Institute Serum."



PASTEUR INSTITUTE AT ALGIERS.
Triturating the Vaccine.

of serum was then injected into this brain fluid—what is known as a polyvalent serum being used, *i.e.*, a mixture of the four sera for Types I., II., III., and IV., so that no matter which type of germ was present, it would be attacked at once while bacteriological investigation was going on. A naso-pharyngeal swab was also taken.

The "hospital contacts" were determined by various considerations. If the case had been admitted but a few hours it was thought sufficient to swab the patients in the two or three beds on either side, and in the four or five beds opposite, together with the nurses and orderlies; but if the case had been longer in the wards, a more complete examination was carried out. Regimental contacts were dealt with in the same way. All swabs were "plated"

The patient got his first dose of this serum when the fluid was drawn from his spine. A second dose and a third at intervals of 24 hours were given as soon as he reached the special wards, and this irrespective of the amount of improvement which had taken place. Generally speaking, a case of average severity required from four to six doses, very severe cases from six to ten doses, while cases which failed to improve before ten doses of serum had been given usually proved fatal. The injections were continued until the patient's temperature had been normal for at least two days.

It was found that if treatment was begun before the seventh day of the disease the mortality was about 13 per cent., whereas if it was begun on the third day, or earlier, the mortality

was only 9 per cent. The vast importance of early diagnosis was thus made evident, and the careful work accomplished to enable early diagnosis to be made justified to the full.

These mortality percentages—13 and 9—are seen in their true light when they are compared with the mortality percentages from this disease which prevailed before the Millbank-Lister serum was available. In those days the mortality percentage varied from 40 to 60 per cent., the course of the disease was much more protracted, the symptoms much more severe, and the complications and after troubles more frequent.



PASTEUR INSTITUTE AT ALGIERS.
Filling phials with Vaccine.

This reduction of mortality from 60 per cent., the worst of the old figures, to 9 per cent., the best of the new ones, represented one of the greatest triumphs in the medical history of the war; it represented sheer achievement, for the victory had been won step by step against what seemed like overwhelming odds. The immediate fruits of the victory were very many lives, and these fruits would continue to be gathered indefinitely until this fell plague was finally stamped out. To put the matter in concrete form a single figure may be given: out of the 33 military cases which were treated by serum in the London district alone in 1916 only three died.

Two parts of this three-fold problem had now been solved. A method of examining and segregating contacts had been devised and what amounted to a cure of the disease—if given early enough—had been found. In order to complete the work it was necessary to devise some means of curing carriers and rendering them safe.

The carrier problem had for long been one of the most perplexing of all medical problems. It was known, for example, that many an epidemic of typhoid fever owed its origin to a carrier, yet it was almost impossible to cure many of these carriers. Again, there were diphtheria carriers who were a danger to all with whom they came into contact. These also constituted a serious difficulty. Finally, the "spotted fever" carrier promised, if he was allowed to go his way uncured and unsupervised, to be the author of fresh epidemics and outbreaks.

This was no idle threat, as the following cases, histories of which were presented to the Medical Research Committee, show:

"Sapper B. returned from France on April 9, 1916, and had been complaining of headache and pains in the back and legs while in the trenches a few days previously. There

was no evidence that he had had any meningitis. Two days after his arrival one of his children was taken ill and removed to a general hospital with symptoms of cerebro-spinal meningitis. Next day another child was taken ill, and removed to an isolation hospital, where

PASTEUR INSTITUTE AT ALGIERS.
Closing phials of Vaccine.

he died of the disease. The father was now isolated, and found to be a carrier of Type II. *meningococcus*. A few days after removal the first child was discharged after what was termed an 'abortive' attack of cerebro-spinal meningitis. He was then fetched by his sister. Up till then the sister had been quite well. She did not subsequently see her father at close quarters, but on the following Sunday she was taken ill in the morning and died within 24 hours. A swab from the child having the 'abortive' attack showed the presence of Type II. *meningococcus* in the naso-pharynx. *There had been no cerebro-spinal fever in the borough for eighteen months until these cases occurred.*"

An even more striking case was the following: "The patient developed the disease at . . . Military Hospital after he had been there for two months on account of an accident. Of the four positive contacts three were of the same type as the case. Two of these were in the beds on either side of the case, and the other was the staff nurse of the ward. All the available evidence went to show that the nurse was a chronic carrier, and inquiry revealed the fact that she had started nursing in the ward within two months, and had been nursing several cases of meningitis a year before, and had not been swabbed subsequently. It seemed probable that the case was infected by this staff nurse." The nurse remained a carrier. The one positive contact who harboured a *meningococcus* of a different type could, of course, be excluded from the group. He was perhaps a carrier on his own account, for in all outbreaks it was found that the carriers greatly outnumbered the cases.

Many efforts were made to treat the carriers, and these included an iodine and menthol spray for the nose and throat, "eusol," chlorine water, and "chloramine." It might have been expected that any of these efforts would succeed, for the *meningococcus* is one of the least resistant of all bacteria to disinfectants. Unhappily it was found that the results of treatment were disappointing, not to say discouraging. On the assumption that the reason for this was the failure of the douches and sprays to reach the lodging-places of the germs, it was decided to attempt a new method of administration—the breathing of a steam-laden atmosphere into which the drug had been introduced in the form of fine droplets floating as a cloud, mist or nebula. The drug selected for use was "chloramine," as it had proved the most efficacious, and a small "inhalation chamber" was secured for the work.

This chamber was a room of 1,050 cubic feet capacity, kindly put at the disposal of the investigators by Sir David Bruce, Commandant of the Royal Army Medical College. A Lingner Spray was employed. It was found that when 5 per cent. of chloramine was being sprayed the atmosphere was too pungent for the comfort of those in the chamber, "but with 2 per cent. the atmosphere could, during the spring months, be tolerated easily for five minutes, and by some for 20 minutes or longer. The atmosphere during these tests became so dense that it was not possible to see across the room, but this steam-laden air when inhaled through the nostrils caused a not uncomfortable flow of secretion, and the chloramine impinging on the mucous membrane of the naso-pharynx produced a pleasant tingling sensation."

Observations were first made on two carriers,

THE LINGNER ATOMIZER.

and it was found that if they breathed deeply and steadily the *meningococcus* was temporarily destroyed in their naso-pharyngeal secretion within five minutes. In one of the carriers, however, the *meningococcus* reappeared. Both then had a further treatment, and both were rid of the *meningococcus* as a result of it.

This was so satisfactory that it was decided to subject thirteen chronic and troublesome carriers, who had been under treatment for periods varying from three to 17 months, to the inhalations. In the event, 10 of the chronic carriers were cured, the longest period occupied in treatment being 13 days, and the shortest four. Inhalations were carried out daily for 15 to 20 minutes. Three cases did not clear up, but of these, two were too nervous to inhale properly, and the third could not tolerate the drug. It was concluded, therefore, that in chloramine given by means of a steam spray in an inhalation chamber a means was available of getting rid once and for all of chronic carriers of "spotted fever." This final discovery may be said to have ended the campaign as a whole.

While the campaign against "spotted fever" was being pressed forward, another campaign against another disease which, if less fatal, was no less threatening, was in progress. This disease was dysentery, brought into Great Britain from the Eastern Mediterranean in the bodies of a large number of soldiers. These soldiers had had the disease themselves, and had so far recovered from it as to look and feel fairly well; but there was, nevertheless, good reason to regard them as carriers. Unhappily, when the rush of men from the East began there was no existing organization staffed and equipped for the diagnosis of dysentery. The diagnosis of dysentery depends upon the finding of the so-called *Entamœba histolytica*. This is a small protozoon or animalcule which inhabits the bowel, in which it moves about. So long as it remains in the bowel the patient is a danger to himself and others.

The military authorities quickly realized that active steps must be taken to deal with these dysentery carriers, who were arriving in great numbers. It was evidently necessary to obtain specialist help at once; but unfortu-



THE FALMOUTH ATOMIZER.

nately the number of persons available in England who were competent to make the requisite examinations and to produce records of scientific value was very small in relation to the sudden call for this particular knowledge and skill.

The Army authorities therefore called to their assistance the Medical Research Committee, just as they had done in the case of "spotted fever," and immediate steps were taken to plan out a campaign.

The difficulties to be faced were very formidable. The amœba which causes the dysentery is very difficult to find and also difficult to recognize. It was easy to see that if those who were deputed to search for it proved incompetent much more harm than good would result. Men who were in fact infected would be passed as healthy, and on being liberated from supervision would almost certainly act as spreaders of the disease.

The first step, then, was to collect together all the competent investigators whose work could be relied upon, and to set them to train other people to carry on the work. This, as will be seen, was a step similar to that taken by Colonel Gordon in the case of "spotted fever." It was a necessary preliminary to a mass attack on the disease. The people selected for training were not doctors—doctors were too scarce at the time, but they were students of science who had already acquired aptitude in microscopic work. The majority were zoologists, botanists and bacteriologists. None, however, had had any training in protozoology. Yet they were all eager to acquire proficiency and thus as a class of learners were very much above the average.

The instruction was given at the Wellcome Bureau. Each day a number of suspected specimens from various hospitals arrived at the Bureau for protozoological examination. The examinations were all made by experts and the findings recorded. Then each member of the class also examined the specimen. Thus it was possible for the learners to become acquainted with all the difficulties and puzzles, and mistakes did not escape detection.

The Medical Research Committee placed the direction of the work in the hands of Mr. Clifford Dobell, lecturer in protistology in the Imperial College of Science, and it was under his care that the workers referred to were trained. A study of the records of cases available at the beginning of the work, indeed, convinced Mr. Dobell that the very first, and most important, step was to make sure that every examiner for the amœba of dysentery was competent to do his or her work. Only by securing that the detectives knew their business



LABORATORY IN THE SANATORIUM AT BLIGNY FOR THE TREATMENT OF CONSUMPTION.
Microscopic examination of patients' sputa.



BACTERIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.
Looking for cholera bacillus.

could it be secured that the amœba would not in any instance escape detection. Indeed it was stated definitely at the time in a report that "examinations made by persons—however skilled they may be in other matters—who have not served their apprenticeship to the actual work itself, possess no scientific value whatsoever, and that for the average worker a practical training of not less than four to six weeks is, even under the most favourable conditions, requisite. The errors committed by an examiner with little or no previous experience are such as I could not have believed possible, if I had not actually encountered them; and in cases where the health of the patient is at stake it is, I believe, almost better that no examination at all should be made than that it should be made by an incompetent or inexperienced person."

This definite statement had an immediate effect. It disposed of the idea that casual examinations meant anything at all, and it proved that this question of the dysentery carrier was a much bigger question than had been supposed—and probably a much more urgent question.

But not only was it necessary to have competent examiners; it was also necessary to have frequent examinations. As soon as the work of examination was begun in earnest at the laboratory to which the military hospitals sent their specimens, it was found that in many instances one specimen would prove negative—*i.e.*, no amœbæ would be found in it; yet another specimen taken from the same patient at a later date would contain the amœbæ, perhaps in large numbers. The following table shows this very clearly (the cases were untreated when examined):

NUMBER OF EXAMINATIONS.

Case.	Amœbæ found.	Amœbæ not found.	Total.
A	5	17	22
B	12	1	13
C	1	22	23
D	6	15	21
E	22	21	43

That is to say, that in five cases 122 examinations were made, and at these examinations amœbæ were found only 46 times. Yet all of these patients were infected, and had any one of them been allowed to go free disaster might conceivably have followed. In the case of patients undergoing treatment by "emetine," a drug prepared from ipecacuanha, examinations were nearly always negative, yet it was found that as soon as treatment stopped the amœbæ reappeared in very many of these cases. It was therefore concluded that at the time of this treatment negative examinations

had no value whatsoever, and should be discontinued. When they became valuable was after treatment—as a test of the effects of treatment. It was reported:

"In more than 50 per cent. of uncured cases the return has taken place (*i.e.*, the effects of



ENTAMŒBA HISTOLYTICA.

treatment have disappeared) by the end of the first week. By the sixteenth day after treatment more than 90 per cent. have returned to normal"—that is to say, show the amœbæ as before—"but in some cases as many as 20 days may possibly elapse before the effects of treatment disappear. Consequently, the value of a negative examination made during the first three weeks after treatment increases with the increase of the interval of time intervening between it and the end of treatment."

It does not need to be pointed out that this discovery was also of very great value. In the first place the praises of emetine as a "cure" of amœbic dysentery had been loudly sung, and an impression was abroad that if a patient had a few doses of this drug he was all right and might be dismissed. That false and dangerous view was refuted and disproved, and thus a great calamity undoubtedly prevented. Again the way was opened up for a thorough test of the drug and for work upon other drugs which might give better results. Meantime some rules were laid down for the guidance of medical officers handling these cases, one of which was that untreated cases should be subjected to six examinations on six separate days at least before being pronounced free from amœbæ. (This was a minimum; a greater number of examinations was not at first possible owing to pressure of work and time.) As regards treated cases, no negative examination made during or just after treatment was to be accepted. Six examinations in all were to be made, the first three or four days after treatment, the next a week later, the next four in the following week.

The next work was to investigate and deal with the problem of treatment. By treatment was meant only those methods which aimed at ridding a patient of his infection—in other words, at disinfecting him of his amœbæ. (It should be noted that other amœbæ than the *Entamœba histolytica* were found. The *Entamœba histolytica* was, however, the cause of dysentery.) The infected person was very seldom ill; he was a "carrier"—he might not even have "had dysentery" at all. Amœbæ were found almost as frequently in wounded men as in old dysentery cases. "Cure," therefore, meant always, and only, complete riddance from the *Entamœba histolytica*, and "relapse" meant that some specimen from the patient had been found to contain the amœba—even one amœba!

As a beginning, the old-established drug emetine was put to test. About this drug all kinds of favourable reports had been made; unhappily all the reports were based upon an insufficient number of examinations, and also upon examinations made while treatment was being carried on. These reports were therefore of little, if of any, practical value. It was necessary to begin all over again. This was done, and the following conclusions were formulated:

(1) Emetine injected hypodermically in small quantities (less than 10 grains in total amount) very rarely rids a carrier of *Entamœba histolytica*.

(2) Full courses of the drug (10–12 grains or more) are successful in about one-third only of the cases treated.

(3) Retreatment—with equal or larger amounts of the drug—of patients who have already received full courses of treatment offers little hope of success.

Happily at the time when this distinctly unfavourable report upon emetine was being worked out another drug was becoming known. This was known as "bismuth emetine." This drug owed its origin to the remarkable work of Dr. H. H. Dale. It gave most excellent results, as the following table shows:

Cases treated with bismuth emetine	24
Certain cures	14
Uncertain cures	9
Result uncertain	1
Certainly not cured	0

The tests made were exceedingly searching. Several of these cases were subjected to a very large number of examinations, one of them 30, another 34, another 51, the period of examination extending over 132, 107 and 67 days respectively. Yet in the words of the investigator "the results so far have been uniformly successful." Two of the cured cases had received large doses of the old emetine unsuccessfully. The new drug was found to be just as effective against acute dysentery as against the "carrier" type. Large doses were found to be necessary—not less than 36 to 40 grains in daily doses of 3 to 4 grains.

Thus were three remarkable triumphs achieved during the year 1916—the discovery of an ideal antiseptic, flavine; the tracking down of the four different germs which cause "spotted fever" (cerebro-spinal meningitis), and the preparation of a serum against each of them with resulting drop in death-rate from 40-60 per cent. to 9 per cent.; and, finally, the discovery of a drug capable in the great majority of cases of curing the dysentery carrier. The work upon flavine was largely individual, depending upon Dr. Browning's own extensive, indeed unrivalled, knowledge of the chemistry of the aniline drugs; the other two works were examples of the "method of mass attack" which Sir Alfred Keogh, with the assistance of the Medical Research Committee, introduced during the war. It was his idea, when a great disease problem presented, to fling against it every available force and so conquer it once and for all; physicians, surgeons, bacteriologists, physicists, pathologists, chemists were all enlisted in these campaigns. The success of these campaigns furnished the justification of the method employed.

It would not be possible to bring this chapter to a close without a reference to the result of the great campaign against typhoid fever, the lines of which have already, in an earlier chapter, been dealt with. Typhoid fever, as was then pointed out, has ever been the supreme dread of armies. In the Boer War there were 20,000 casualties as a result of it, and twice as many



A TOXICOLOGICAL LABORATORY IN A FIELD-HOSPITAL ON THE SOMME.

IN A PARIS DISPENSARY.
The Laboratory.

victims as there were victims to enemy shot and shell. The same thing held good of almost every other war in history.

In this war, with its millions of soldiers, there were not 2,000 cases of the fever, and on February 13, 1917, Sir Alfred Keogh was able to tell an audience in London that only five cases of the disease were to be found in the British Army. Sir Douglas Haig also testified to the fact that the forces under his command were free from preventable disease. That these miraculous results—for they cannot be regarded as anything else—were due to the policy of inoculation adopted at the beginning of the war no man could doubt.

Another notable scientific triumph was the

DRESSING A WOUNDED MAN IN A SHELTER.

ridding of Serbia of typhus fever. Reference has already been made to the beginning of the gallant struggle made against this most deadly disease. The struggle was entirely successful, and its success fully bore out the idea that lice were the means of transmitting this disease.

A SERBIAN WELL.

The devoted band of scientific workers who went out to fight the plague worked upon this idea. They made it their business to prevent spread by preventing the transit of lice from infected to uninfected persons and so destroying the means of spread so far as possible. Before Serbia was finally invaded the great epidemic had been conquered.

One further piece of scientific work remains to be dealt with—the discovery of the cause of the so-called Weil's disease, or epidemic jaundice. This disease broke out among the troops in the East and also in France, and for a time its true character was not guessed. The disease had first been described by Weil in 1886. It was characterized by jaundice, fever, and hæmorrhages, and it was apparently of an infectious character. The disease broke out in Eastern Japan in 1914, and 178 patients were reported. The Japanese outbreak led to some important bacteriological work and two investigators, Inada and Ito, reported the discovery of a spirochæte in the liver of a guinea pig which had been injected with the blood of a patient who was suffering from epidemic jaundice. In 1915 these authors came to the conclusion that this spirochæte was the cause



TROUSERS AS IMPROVIZED FILTER IN MESOPOTAMIA.

of Weil's disease, and later they found that the blood of patients recovering from the disease contained antidotes against the spirochæte they had discovered. This latter piece of information showed that the spirochæte was, in fact, the cause of the disease, and that recovery took place only when an antidote had been produced by the blood. Further, the investigators were able to show that when they



AMERICAN DOCTORS INOCULATING SERBIAN SOLDIERS AT USKUB.

injected the blood of patients with Weil's disease into guinea pigs the animals developed the disease and showed spirochætes in their livers and blood. It was found possible to pass the infection from animal to animal and in one strain they reached actually 50 generations.

It was at one time supposed that the mode of infection in this disease was by the mouth But Ito and Ohi were able to communicate the disease to animals by applying material infected by the spirochætes to uninjured skin. That led to the idea that possibly infection occurred through the skin. In support of this rather interesting view it was found that the disease was frequent in men working in a certain part



TYPHOID BACILLI SHOWING FLAGELLÆ.



SPIROCHÆTE ICHTERO-HÆMORRHAGICA

of a coal mine, and that when the accumulated water was pumped out of the mine there was no further case in that part of the mine. There were more cases in wet than in dry mines, and men working on the surface did not contract the disease.

The cases which broke out in France were at first supposed to be ordinary jaundice. But when two fatal cases of very deep jaundice were noted near one another the matter was regarded as suggestive and investigations were made by Captains Stokes and Ryle, R.A.M.C. (*Journal* of the Royal Army Medical Corps). These investigations led to the finding of the spirochæte in the blood of the patients and so to the confirming of the work of the Japanese investigators.

These spirochætes were not unlike the famous *spirochæte pallida*, the germ of syphilis. They were actively mobile and lashed about vigorously under the microscope. The screwing movements of the syphilis germ were not seen, but the movements from side to side of one end which Inada described were seen. The spirochætes could only be seen by refracted light, and this gave them a peculiar appearance, rather resembling a string of brilliants.

Efforts were at once made to treat cases of the disease in animals with salvarsan (" 606 "). But unhappily this drug, which had proved so potent against the very similar spirochæte of syphilis, was useless against the spirochæte of jaundice, the so-called *spirochæte ichtero-hæmorrhagica*. The work of devising some lethal weapon against the new microbe was, therefore, begun, and efforts were made to solve the riddle. Meanwhile, further knowledge of the character and habit of the spirochæte was being gained. The idea that it could penetrate the skin and so gain access to the blood was becoming accepted—some workers with the spirochæte had unhappily become victims to it. Further, good grounds for supposing that the germ was an inhabitant—possibly a normal inhabitant—of the body of the rat had been found. The rats presumably infected the trenches which they inhabited in great numbers. The soldiers then touched the infected places, and thus the germ was able to gain an entrance to their bodies.

Here, again, the wonderful new detective work of the scientist traced a deadly germ, and convicted it as the cause of a disease. If no cure was forthcoming at once, means of prevention were made available by the new knowledge obtained. Trenches from which cases had come were dealt with in a very

BRITISH SICK AND WOUNDED ON BOARD SHIP.

thorough manner, and every effort made to keep down the rats inhabiting them. In this way the epidemic was checked.

In earlier chapters dealing with the health of armies, efforts have been made to point out how enormous was the influence exercised upon the men by these devoted efforts to preserve their health. No more need be said upon that subject. But it must be pointed out that this scientific work. begun by the Army for the Army, had a vast effect upon the attitude of the civil population to research It inaugurated a new conception of medicine; it introduced new methods of attacking and resisting disease; the sure knowledge that by mass attack upon these lines any disease could be mastered and stamped out gained currency. All manner of workers began to demand that Army methods should be applied to the problems of home life—the syphilis problem and the problem of consumption. In the case of syphilis a beginning was indeed made forthwith, partly as a result of the findings of the Royal Commission, and partly as a result of public pressure. Thus the services of the Royal Army Medical Corps were not only for the war —they were for all time. In the Medical Research Committee the British people had an assurance that the good work would be carried on in peace as in war, until one by one the fortresses of disease should be assaulted and forced to surrender.

CHAPTER CLXIX.

THE SHIPPING PROBLEM: AUGUST, 1914–FEBRUARY, 1917.

EFFECT OF WAR ON SHIPPING UNFORESEEN—TIMID POLICIES—FIRST STEPS IN REQUISITIONING—RISE IN FREIGHTS—EXCESS PROFITS—CAUSES of TONNAGE SCARCITY—PORT CONGESTION—CONTROL OF THE FROZEN MEAT INDUSTRY—LICENSING OF VOYAGES—IMPORTANT COMMITTEES—ASQUITH GOVERNMENT HESITATIONS—RESTRICTION OF IMPORTS—SHIPPING PROFITS—COAL FOR FRANCE AND ITALY—MR. LLOYD GEORGE APPOINTS A SHIPPING CONTROLLER—SIR JOSEPH MACLAY'S TASK—FIRST REFORMS—THE LOAD LINE—STANDARDIZED SHIPS—THE EMPLOYERS' FEDERATION—EXPEDITING CONSTRUCTION—POOLING OF LABOUR—SHIPBUILDING ABROAD—WOODEN SHIPS——CANADA—SECOND-HAND SHIPS—AUSTRALIAN PURCHASES—SHIPPING FUSIONS—NEUTRAL SHIPPING—INTER-ALLIED CHARTERING EXECUTIVE—INSURANCE.

WHEN war broke out no owner could possibly have foreseen the full extent of the changes which were to be brought about in the British mercantile marine within 30 months. Such academic discussions as there had been in the years of peace as to the probable effect on British shipping of a war with Germany had been confined practically to the expectation that a few British merchant ships would be sunk by German cruisers before the British Navy was fully able to assert its complete mastery over the enemy fleet. British owners had reason enough to know that the fighting spirit was abroad in Germany in the aggressive extension of the German shipping services, encouraged and subsidized by the State, but they sometimes thought that Germany would achieve best what she wanted by an active trade war. In any case, they argued in the British business style so prevalent before the Great War that foreign politics were no concern of theirs but of the statesmen, who, presumably, were awake.

Thus scarcely a merchant ship had ever been modelled with military purposes in view. One owner, perhaps, with the South African campaign in mind, had favoured a particular type of ship, partly owing to its suitability for carrying men and horses, but one among many hundreds was a negligible fraction. Yet the owner who had been gifted with marvellous foresight would have seen scores of merchant ships transporting millions of men across the waters and laden with horses and guns and equipment and coal and stores. He would have seen, as more and more vessels were gradually requisitioned by the State, freights rise to levels such as could never have been visioned in his wildest dreams. He would have seen, it is true, the German cruiser menace dealt with quickly by the British Navy, but he would have seen a more insidious form of warfare instituted, because the enemy, in practising it, put aside all considerations for the safety of civilians, whether belonging to belligerent or neutral nations, and gloated while the victims drowned.

As the expert manager of shipping foresaw so little, the ordinary business man could have had small inkling of what was coming. He did not foresee that the Army would have to absorb millions of men, putting a heavy strain on industry, and that the scarcity of labour

[Elliott & Fry, photo.
LORD INCHCAPE, G.C.M.G.,
Chairman of the P. & O. Company.

at the docks and on the railways would bring about great congestion and consequently most serious delays to shipping. He did not foresee that many imports, including even food supplies, would have to be prohibited and drastic restrictions be placed on others because of the scarcity of tonnage.

The statesman, too, could have had little idea of how events would shape themselves. It was understood that in the early days of the war a general scheme of requisitioning was submitted to the Admiralty, but was vetoed. Thenceforward for nearly two and a half years such statesmanship as was shown towards what became known as the shipping problem was fumbling and amateurish. At the Board of Trade was a President who, by heredity and early business experience, should have been steeped in shipping lore, and the country should have been infinitely the gainer by that circumstance. Yet Mr. Walter Runciman, with good intentions, industrious and self-confident, entirely failed throughout to cope with the issues raised. There was little sign of any leading on the part of the Board of Trade, but there were so many committees formed—so many cooks each with his finger in the pie—that it was difficult to say whose was really the responsibility for the chaos into which shipping was allowed to drift. All that was done to relieve the situation was done in each instance only after there had been strong public agitations. Steps were pointed out to Mr. Asquith's Government which it refused to take or ignored. It was only after the formation of Mr. Lloyd George's Government in December, 1916, that it became clear that a firm grip had at last been secured on the shipping problem. The measures taken were very late, but obviously this was a case in which they were better late than never.

It was a fortunate circumstance that just before the war there was more shipping afloat than was actually required for the world's needs. So great was the surplus that schemes were actually mooted for laying up tonnage. When, therefore, the Admiralty first began to requisition vessels for war purposes, many owners accepted the terms with alacrity, and some were known to be delighted that their ships were requisitioned at rates substantially above those previously ruling in the market. These terms were agreed upon between the Admiralty and a number of committees formed of the owners of the different classes of tonnage, over all of which Lord Inchcape, G.C.M.G., Chairman of the P. & O. Company, presided. They provided scales of hire for liners of varying speed, cross-Channel steamers, oil-tank vessels, large and small cargo steamers, and colliers. "The shipowners," wrote Lord Inchcape to Lord Mersey, the President of the Admiralty Transport Arbitration Board which had been set up, "have responded loyally to the demands of the country, and have placed all their resources ungrudgingly at the service of the Government in this national emergency. The shipowners' foresight and enterprise have placed at the disposal of the Government a splendid fleet of transports which have for years been run without anything in the shape of Government aid." And he added, "but, inasmuch as the rates and conditions agreed upon were in all cases arrived at by a process of give and take, and by an honest determination to arrive at a fair and friendly settlement, I venture to express the hope that the Admiralty will not regard them as in any sense a maximum which is capable of reduction, and at the same time I trust that the shipowners will not look upon them as a minimum on which increases

may be built, as any dispute of this kind on either side would inevitably lead to a re-opening of all the questions and considerations which led up to our recommendations." Some of the rates in the course of time were modified, but the terms then agreed upon formed the basis on which practically the whole of the British mercantile marine had, by the beginning of 1917, come under requisition to the Government.

The rates scheduled were based on the gross tonnage, whereas rates of charter in the market are usually based on deadweight carrying capacity. A representative rate for cargo steamers under the agreement with the Government was about 11s. per gross ton per month, equivalent to about 7s. on the deadweight. Before the war, owners had been earning about 5s., and in the first few weeks after the outbreak of hostilities vessels were actually chartered at 3s.; so the terms seemed satisfactory enough. But a new factor was soon introduced, namely, a sharp rise in working expenses caused by increases in wage charges, great advances in the cost of coals, which became more and more accentuated, and dearer stores of all descriptions.

Within a few months owners were regarding the requisitioning terms which had become known as the Blue Book rates as almost absurdly low, although there was never any doubt of the rates leaving a substantial surplus over working costs in respect of existing tonnage. The Government felt compelled to explain with what care the vessels of individual owners were requisitioned, the plan being to take, as far as possible, the same proportion from each fleet, so that no undue "hardship" was inflicted on particular owners by excessive demands. This attitude was adopted so assiduously that in February, 1916, the Director of Transports considered it appropriate to address a letter to owners in an apologetic strain, suggesting certain reflections for their consideration, which he hoped would reconcile them to having their ships employed in Government service. The following extracts are illuminating, as indicating the ideas which prevailed at that time:

An owner, who has at the moment done more than the average of service may reflect that the result may be a freedom from requisitioning at a later date which may fully, or more than fully, compensate him. He will doubtless also reflect that, in any event, the help he has been asked to give can scarcely be considered an excessive contribution to the naval and military requirements of the war, in view of the extent to which



COALING LINERS.

his profit, in respect of his free vessels, has been increased directly by war conditions, and by the inevitable restrictions of tonnage resulting from requisitioning. It is hoped that if all owners bear these considerations in mind they will very rarely find it necessary to make representations to the department (which will have already considered the employment of the vessels and the owner's share of service) to cancel requisitions that may have been served to them.

The phrasing of the letter shows that there was every desire to treat owners very gently and generously.

Foreign owners did not foresee any more than most British owners what was coming. This was proved by the fact that in the autumn of 1914 a few British owners were able to charter neutral vessels at extremely low rates, the neutral owners in some cases stipulating that their vessels should be chartered for not less than twelve months. Those British owners who had sufficient foresight to enter into these transactions were able to make very large profits on the transactions.

Since the beginning of the war the requisitioning of vessels had been the main influence in causing a scarcity of shipping for commerce. The fast and large liner was required to be fitted out as an armed merchant cruiser, a transport, or a hospital ship. Colliers were required to accompany the Fleet and cargo ships to carry supplies for the armies, and to bring commodities over which the Government took control, such as sugar and, later, wheat.

By the end of 1914 the withdrawal of tonnage was affecting freights. The grain freight from Argentina rose from 12s. 6d. per ton at the end of July, 1914, to 50s., as compared with 37s. 6d. per ton, which was the highest point reached during the "boom" year of 1912. The freight, however, was to advance far further throughout 1915 and 1916. By the end of 1915 the Argentine freight advanced to 130s., and during 1916 to 183s. 6d., representing as compared with the low rate of 1914 an increase of 171s. In normal years 25s. would have been regarded as a very satisfactory rate, so that compared even with this the highest freight touched in 1916 represented a sevenfold increase. Early in 1917 the position was taken closely in hand, and rates were brought down to a rather lower basis. A large proportion of these abnormally high freights went, of course, to the Government in the form of excess profit taxation; indeed, there is reason to believe that this policy stimulated the rise. For instance, on September 20, 1915, the day before the announcement by Mr.



SHIPPING COAL AT GRIMSBY.

COAL TIPS AT SWANSEA.



TIPPING A COAL TRUCK.

McKenna, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, of an excess profit tax of 50 per cent., the Argentine rate was 57s. 6d. a ton. Within a month it had risen to 70s., and by the end of that year to 120s. Other rates also moved in the same direction, showing the influence of the taxation. On the same day of 1915 the rate for wheat from the Atlantic ports of the United States to the West of England was 9s. a quarter; by October 20 it had risen to 12s., and by the end of the year to 16s. It subsequently advanced to 20s., the highest point reached in 1916. On September 20, 1915, the rate for coals from Cardiff to the West of Italy was 32s. as compared with about 7s. 6d. a ton before the war; within a month it had advanced to 42s. 6d., and by the end of the year to 65s., subsequently rising to 100s. The excess profit taxation gave owners an opportunity of arguing that the rise in the rate was comparatively harmless, since the bulk of the profits went to the Government. Yet the amount remaining to them was very substantial indeed. There was also an impression prevailing that the Government did not look altogether unfavourably on these high freights, because they meant such large contributions to the Exchequer. But if high freights were really regarded as a convenient means of taxation, the system was undoubtedly an unfair one to many classes of the population. By a real system of control there is no doubt that it could have been avoided, and the money paid by consumers in respect of high freights, part of which was retained by shipowners, would have been available for direct contribution to the State.

The chief causes of the short supply of shipping available for commerce may now be recounted. The outstanding reason was the requisitioning of a very large proportion of tonnage for Government services; and, in this connexion, first the Dardanelles Campaign and then the Salonika Expedition threw a very heavy burden on the mercantile marine. The imperious demands of the fighting departments had naturally to be met—sometimes at very short notice—and as the war progressed ship after ship had to be withdrawn from commerce, producing great disturbance in particular trades. Precisely what proportion was requisitioned from time to time was not exactly stated, but indications were given on various occasions, and especially in Parliament in February, 1917.

LOADING WHEAT IN AUSTRALIA.

On February 13, Lord Curzon, a member of the War Cabinet, indicated that the bulk of British shipping was so requisitioned. On the following day Sir Leo Chiozza Money, Parliamentary Secretary to the Shipping Controller, pointed out that it was not true to say that three-quarters of our shipping was engaged in the services of the Army and Navy, since the vessels so employed were occupied in many commercial services as well as those of the nation. The 75 per cent. which had been described as being engaged in naval or military service for ourselves and our Allies referred to miscellaneous services, and, in addition, some of the major services of the population were included in the 75 per cent. The carrying of ore, and of wheat and sugar, the most essential supplies for the people, alone accounted for 12 per cent. of the tonnage which had been described as employed in national service.

Since so large a proportion of shipping was in direct Government service obviously much depended upon the use which was made of it. There was from the beginning of the war a great deal of criticism of the Government Departments concerned, on the ground that the most efficient use was not being made of the tonnage requisitioned, and on December 23, 1915, Mr. Balfour, then First Lord of the Admiralty, did not dispute that there was waste, but he maintained that it was unavoidable. He reasoned that the Admiralty Transport Department was a department and nothing but a department for obtaining for the Army, and for the Navy in a secondary degree, but primarily and mostly for the Army, the shipping necessary for the conveyance of troops and supplies. "The Army," he continued, "say we want such and such ships, or rather they say we want so many thousand men conveyed from such and such a place to another place. We want for the supply of those troops so many tons conveyed, so many horses conveyed, and so many hospital ships provided, and all the Admiralty Transport Department has to do—and it is no light matter, it is very difficult and responsible work—is to provide that tonnage and provide it as far as it can with fairness to the shipping trade—a very difficult operation—and with as little inconvenience to those who are engaged in carrying on the shipping industry as may be. . . . The Director of Transports is perpetually urging upon those who use the tonnage that it should be utilized economically

and that transports should be unloaded with speed and returned as soon as possible. It is the Army and the Admiralty, regarded as fighting departments, which requisition; it is the Army and Navy that manage the loading and unloading of transport at home and abroad. It is not fair or just to throw upon a department which has no power to deal with this question any responsibility for such wastage as may have occurred." He continued:

The Department of the Admiralty is not and cannot be made responsible for the fact that a particular transport is kept three weeks when she might perhaps have been kept only for a week. The result is very serious, but it is not the fault of the Admiralty or the Board of Trade, and I have not yet discovered a thoroughly satisfactory method of dealing with it. Something is being done, however, but it can only be done through the people responsible for the military operations. If a General says, "I am very sorry that this or that ship should be detained, but detained she must be in the military interests of the expedition," what am I to say? What is the Secretary for War, or the Transport Department, or the Board of Trade, to say? They cannot say anything except, "Please be as economical with the tonnage as you can, because it is of national importance that as much as possible should be available for the general purposes of the country."

I hope the House will see that I have been perfectly candid and that I have shown where, in my opinion, the shoe pinches. If you can suggest a method of dealing with the situation which gets over the difficulty I shall be most happy to consider it. I do not think it can be dealt with by central control here. All that can be done is to press upon those who have to conduct these military operations the extreme desirability of saving the tonnage in the general interests.

The position was not left until the end of the war entirely in this distinctly unsatisfactory state, as will be shown later.

Another primary cause of the short supply of tonnage was the very serious delay at all ports owing to congestion. When ships were delayed for months in port, either waiting for berths or alongside the docks while discharge proceeded very slowly, whereas in ordinary times they would have been able to discharge and load again within a few days, it was obvious that the carrying capacity was terribly curtailed. The public probably never had any real perception of the extent to which the short supply was due to these delays, and even shipowners who did understand what they meant encountered the greatest difficulty in getting any measures adopted to effect an improvement. The difficulty was due mainly to the withdrawal of very large numbers of dock workers and railway men for the Army, and also quite noticeably to Customs regulations introduced for the purpose of preventing goods from reaching the enemy. Lack of organization

[French Official photograph.

UNLOADING DRIED COD FROM NEWFOUNDLAND AT FÉCAMP.

in shipping large quantities of commodities controlled by the Government was also a factor.

Then the substitution of long voyages for short distance passages was also a factor. For instance, whereas the bulk of our sugar supplies before the war merely had to be brought across the North Sea from Germany, directly this source of supply ceased sugar had to be brought from the East and West Indies and Central America. Then the locking up of so large a proportion of the German Mercantile Marine in home and neutral ports had left more work for neutral vessels to do. New demands, moreover, were made upon shipping. Thus, there was a formidable fleet of ships allocated



FLOATING ELEVATOR.

to bring foodstuffs for the Belgian population organized by the Commission for Relief in Belgium. There were also, as is well known, large shipments of munitions from the United States to England and the other European ports of the Allies, and there were shipments of supplies from the United States to Vladivostok, for Russian account; while the detention owing to ice of many vessels during the winter of 1914–15 at Archangel should have been avoided. The closing of the Panama Canal in consequence of a "slide" from the end of September, 1915, until the middle of the following March, came at a critical time and by prolonging voyages accentuated the short supply. All the time the sinking of ships by the enemy continued, increasing periodically in numbers for a time as fresh campaigns were started. Some figures given by Lord Curzon in the House of Lords on February 13 are interesting. He stated that in July, 1914, there were 3,890 vessels of over 1,600 tons gross, with a total of 16,850,000. On January 31, 1917, the total number was 3,540 and the total tonnage just under 16,000,000. Thus, in 30 months of the war the net loss of this class of vessel from all causes in the British Mercantile Marine amounted to only from 5 to 6 per cent. of the gross tonnage. The figures would have been more valuable if a line had not been drawn at 1,600 tons, because a large number of vessels of smaller tonnage are very useful.

The German submarine campaign could have been encountered with equanimity if the shipyards of the country had been freely available to undertake mercantile work. Owing, however, to very large demands made upon the shipbuilding resources of the country by the Admiralty, the output of merchant tonnage was reduced to very small proportions. Even the normal wastage of tonnage due to ordinary marine perils could not be made good.

Just as the main cause of the scarcity of shipping was due to Government requisitioning, so was the extraordinary rise in freights. Directly the Government began to requisition shipping in the early days of the war, rates for free tonnage advanced. As more and more tonnage was removed from the market, the competition for what was left increased until any free vessels could get practically any freight. When vessels engaged in regular trades were requisitioned, their owners went into the market and chartered "tramp" steamers to take their place—a process which was quite the most effective method of forcing up freights, and was humorously described as the "snowball system." For every vessel required by the Government two were disturbed. The most unfortunate effect of the Government's policy was the benefit it conferred on neutral shipping. The more British vessels were requisitioned, the higher the freights which neutrals could demand. Yet the latter would have been well satisfied in the early months of the war with rates of hire for long periods which later came to be regarded as ridiculously low. Even if large numbers had not been chartered by the British Government at these low rates, it was obvious that, with all British shipping under the control of the Government, rates for neutral vessels would never have risen to such extraordinary levels. In normal times owners had experience of the depressing effect on freights of diverting ships into a particular trade. So what had been done in a comparatively small way by private owners as an ordinary incident of business could have been done on a large scale by a Government authority backed by vast resources.

Although for nearly two and a half years no bold policy was adopted, measure after measure was introduced and committee after committee created. The problem was never dealt with as a whole but piecemeal: all was patch-work. Some of the steps, taken generally after the need for some improvement had become obvious to the merest layman, may now be described. The first decision, which represented one of the few spontaneous acts of the Government, was to requisition the services of a number of shipowners to assist the Transport Department of the Admiralty. Their duties were understood to be to advise the officials as to the suitability of tonnage for particular work and to acquire vessels, as far as possible, in proportion to the size of the fleets belonging to the different ownerships. From time to time the services of other owners were enlisted for this department, which at the outbreak of war was quite a small one. No doubt, although owners were merely acting in an advisory capacity to the Transport Department, their services were yet of great value.

One of the most successful measures adopted throughout the war was carried out at the instigation of owners themselves, and provided for the requisitioning of the whole of the insulated spaces in British steamships trading

between Australia and New Zealand and England. This was put into effect by an Order in Council issued in April, 1916, and was followed in May by a similar order applicable to the insulated steamers in the South American trade. It was plain to owners that, unless such measures were adopted, there would be no limit to the rise in freights for the carriage of frozen and chilled meat. There was plenty of meat overseas, and the supply in England was regulated solely by the amount of freights, and it was known that foreign firms were prepared to pay almost any price for tonnage. The Board of Trade approved the scheme and rates were agreed upon amounting to only about 1¼d. a lb. as compared with 1d. per lb. before the war. The following account of the measures taken was given in the annual report of Messrs. W. Weddel & Co. for 1915:

The importance of frozen meat in connexion with the conduct of the great war was made abundantly manifest in the course of 1914; but it was not until the beginning of 1915 that the British Government took the steps necessary to secure what was practically complete control of the industry at all stages. The requisitioning of the output of the freezing works of Australia and New Zealand, by agreement with the Australasian Governments, on terms more or less acceptable to the producers, secured the main supplies produced within the British Empire; while the simple expedient of commandeering the British refrigerated mercantile marine effectually secured control of foreign supplies—primarily of South America, and indirectly of North America and all outside sources. These important steps, far-reaching in their consequences, were taken with a view to guaranteeing the necessary supplies not only for the British Army and general public, but also for the French Army, and, latterly, for the Italian. They involved fundamental changes in the methods of carrying on a vast trade which has been built up painstakingly during the past 30 years. In order to attain the objects of the Board of Trade and the War Office, existing contracts were left unfilled or unceremoniously cancelled; steamers were diverted on short notice from their intended routes; the established modes of buying and of selling were entirely altered; freedom of contract ceased to exist; and at every stage the industry became regulated and controlled at the will of the authorities, untrammelled by any ordinary considerations of loss or profit.

In the spring of 1915 a further measure of control was introduced in a request that all owners should keep the Admiralty informed of the movements of all their ships. Early in that summer a scheme was instituted on behalf of the Indian Government for buying and importing Indian wheat. The freight arrangements were put in the hands of a well-known broker, who was successful in retaining the rates upon a comparatively low basis. Little more was done until the following November, when three committees were appointed by the Government. The first committee was for dealing with the congestion at the ports, which had then become a very



FILLING SACKS WITH WHEAT FROM FLOATING ELEVATOR.

[French Official Photograph.

DISCHARGING FLOUR FROM AMERICA.

JACK'S FLOUR SUPPLY.

serious matter. Its duties were described in the official announcement as follows:

The Prime Minister has appointed a Committee to inquire into difficulties and congestion arising from time to time at harbours, ports, and docks (including dock-sheds and warehouses) in the United Kingdom; to regulate the work and traffic thereat; to coordinate the requirements of all interests concerned so as to avoid so far as possible interference with the normal flow of trade; to decide all questions relating to the difficulties and congestion aforesaid that may be referred to them; and to give directions to all executive bodies at the harbours, ports, and docks for carrying their decisions into effect.

Lord Inchcape was chairman, and the following were members of the Board: Mr. Graeme Thomson and Major T. H. Hawkins (Admiralty), Brigadier-General the Hon. A. R. Montagu Stuart Wortley (War Office); Sir Frederick Bolton, Mr. J. G. Broodbank, Sir Sam Fay, Sir Edward Hain and Sir A. Norman Hill, and the secretary was Sir Frederick Dumayne, Board of Trade.

The committee was thus representative of the Admiralty, the War Office, shipping companies, dock companies and the railways. It soon set to work to deal, among other things, with a great loss and delay resulting from the various formalities which had to be observed before goods could be exported, owing to the lack of Customs Officers at the docks with any discretionary powers. It had frequently happened that vessels had to sail with a large amount of empty space, leaving hundreds of tons of cargo in the sheds marked "Not passed by Customs." A special form of Shipping Note was introduced, which was found considerably to facilitate shipments.

The second committee was for the licensing of ships, the principle being that, as ships were

[French Official Photograph.

SPANISH SAILING VESSELS BRINGING ORANGES.

urgently required in British trade, the voyages of British ships between foreign ports should be subject to scrutiny. The desire not to interfere until absolutely necessary with ships trading abroad had been reasonable since, before the war, Great Britain had acted as carrier for the world, and the profits earned by such trading were especially useful during the war as an assistance to foreign exchange questions. The committee was able to relieve the situation by refusing licences for voyages to ports known to be seriously congested. The chairman of this committee was Mr. (afterwards Sir) Maurice Hill, who in January, 1917, was appointed a judge in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court, in the place of Mr. Justice Bargrave Deane, resigned, and it included Mr. F. W. Lewis, deputy chairman of Furness, Withy & Co., as vice-chairman, Mr. H. A. Sanderson (the president of the International Mercantile Marine Co., and chairman of the Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.), Mr. Scholefield, a shipowner of Newcastle, Mr. Purdie of Glasgow, and Mr. Burton Chadwick of Liver-

pool. This committee proved a workmanlike body and steadily earned an excellent reputation for dealing expeditiously with applications. The principle of ship licensing was developed further in March, 1916, when it was made applicable to all ships of over 500 tons gross trading to and from the United Kingdom. This committee was now able to assist in the relief of the congestion at British ports by refusing licences to ports where it was known ships could not be dealt with quickly, in the same way as had already been done in the case of foreign ports.

The third committee was made responsible for the requisitioning of ships for the carriage of foodstuffs. It was presided over by Mr. J. H. Whitley, M.P., and included the three owners who had been advising the Transport Department of the Admiralty—namely, Mr. T. Royden, deputy-chairman of the Cunard Company, Mr. E. G. Glover, previously known as a member of the firm of Glover Bros., ship and insurance brokers, and Mr. R. D. Holt, M.P., the Liverpool owner. The policy of the committee was to direct owners to load their vessels in trades where tonnage was especially wanted, leaving them to accept the full market rates. Thus a number of vessels were released from Admiralty service on condition that they loaded wheat in North America. There were still signs, however, of confusion and the lack of any firm grip on the situation.

For instance, on November 3, 1915, the Board of Trade informed owners that, with a view to encouraging imports of wheat, vessels loading in North America not later than December 15 should be exempt from requisition (a well-known bait) on arrival at a United Kingdom port. They were to be free to start on another voyage, which need not necessarily be a North Atlantic voyage, after discharge of cargo. One effect of this attractive offer had, however, not been foreseen. Owners who could not take advantage of it as their trade was not in the North Atlantic also applied for the exemption of their vessels because they considered that these were being equally well employed elsewhere.

No doubt there would have been distinct difficulty in drawing a line, so within two days the privilege was cancelled. The issue and withdrawal of this order followed very closely upon the issue and withdrawal by the Board of Trade, "after further consideration and discussion," of a far-reaching clause which it had been proposed to have inserted in bills of lading, but which had quickly been seen by merchants and brokers to be quite unworkable. These two little incidents naturally confirmed the opinion which was then being very strongly expressed by many business men, that the authorities were still only groping, and were still intent on patching wherever a particularly blatant evil became exposed, instead of dealing with the problem as a whole. What, it was felt, was obviously needed was not a multiplicity of committees co-equal in authority and overlapping each other, but one supreme central expert authority who, while availing himself of the best advice, would be able to know what he could and could not do.

The Times consistently urged the pressing need for more effective control. On January 17, 1916, its Shipping Correspondent wrote:

MR. F. W. LEWIS,
Deputy Chairman of Furness, Withy & Co.

Before the war, there was in one direction work for, say, 100 ships to do, and, since wastage during peace was comparatively unimportant, it mattered little to the nation whether these 100 ships were in the hands of one or of ten owners. But now, though there is still work for 100 ships, there are, say, only 60 ships to do it. It is vitally important that every ton measurement of space shall be put to the most effective use for the benefit of the whole nation. The point is, therefore, whether the most efficient work will be got out of all these ships if they are still in the hands of 10 British owners, each with his own ideas, and each intent on

doing the best he can for himself, or, if they are controlled by one supreme authority. No competent shipping manager can have any doubt on the matter.

The supreme expert authority would be able to take a comprehensive view of the work which our imaginary 100 ships used to perform, and would admit that it was useless to expect the 60 ships now left to do the whole of it. Consequently, the authority would have to decide which trades were essential to the country, and which, in view of the circumstances, could best be spared. The supreme authority would discover all sorts of anomalies in the present conditions. Inquiry, for instance, might be made, whether it was in the best interests of the country that great volumes of space in British ships should now be used for transporting cheap American motor-cars from New York to Australia. Many other questions might with advantage be examined. There is only one authority which could exercise such a beneficent influence, and that is an expert shipping authority appointed by the Government. There is only one way in which such authority could be exercised, and that is by hiring all ships to the State for the period of the war.



UNLOADING FROZEN MEAT.

The particular rate of hire then advocated was one based on the cost price of the ship.

The State (it was pointed out) can afford to treat the shipowner very generously. It could afford to pay the owner a handsome percentage of the original cost of the ships, after some allowance for depreciation, and, in addition, it could afford, in order to encourage the owner to continue to give his best attention to the management of the ships, a commission on the profits. The owners would be asked to manage their ships, just as at present; but when the Admiralty wanted a ship there would be none of the forcing up of freights which is the immediate effect of the present system of requisitioning.

No owner would "suffer" through having his ship withdrawn for Admiralty work, except possibly from the loss of his commission on management, since all would be paid on the same generous scale, whatever work their ships were doing. The supreme authority would interfere as little as possible with the management of the ships, but the one aim always before it would be the use of the ships in the best interest of the country. It would hold a watching brief for the nation. Instead of officials of the Transport Department of the Admiralty the President and officials of the Board of Trade, the Indian and Colonial Governments, the Advisory Committee to the Transport Department of the Admiralty, the Ship Licensing Committee, and the Committee for Requisitioning Ships for the Carriage of Foodstuffs, and various other bodies all overlapping each other and bringing about no real improvement, there would be one supreme authority with which the control of British shipping in the best interests of the nation for the period of the war would rest.

On the following day it was pointed out:

Owners manage their own ships according to their individual ideas, and not solely with the aim of putting them to the best possible use in the service of the State. Sailings are maintained, although the particular trades may be very quiet; while in other trades there are not nearly sufficient vessels. Obviously, only a supreme authority would be able to see all the trades in their proper perspective, and could provide that ships should be allotted to the routes in which they were most urgently needed.

Again, on January 19 it was pointed out that "high shipping authorities are convinced that the gain in efficiency from a central control, such as has been described in *The Times* during the past few days, would be very substantial indeed."

The agitation could not be ignored, but Mr. Runciman, the then President of the Board of Trade, still hesitated to take drastic measures. In the House of Commons on January 19 he said:

> There is a serious shortage of the world's tonnage as compared with the world's requirements. We went fully into the question of commandeering the whole of British tonnage in order to regulate freights, and came to the conclusion (a conclusion which is, I believe, confirmed by all the experts who have studied the question) that this particular remedy would only aggravate the shortage of tonnage available for the United Kingdom and the Allies.



AUSTRALIAN MEAT IN COLD STORAGE.

By January 27 the Government had, however, come to the conclusion that some form of centralized control was required, and the then President of the Board of Trade announced that, in order that tonnage should be allocated to the best advantage of the Allied Governments, the Government was to be assisted by a small body consisting of Lord Faringdon, Mr. Thomas Royden, and Mr. F. W. Lewis, presided over by Lord Curzon, who had accepted the invitation of the Prime Minister to undertake this duty. It was added that "all the expert committees dealing with these complex and many-sided shipping problems are in the closest touch with each other so that full cooperation is assured." Although the functions of this body were never more closely defined, the general assumption was that it was to exercise a general sort of supervision over the whole of British shipping, and that the appointment of the committee was intended to be a reply to the demand for closer control. The composition of the committee was criticized on the ground that Lord Curzon, the Chairman, had no direct knowledge of shipping, that Mr. Royden and Mr. Lewis, whose ability no one doubted, were already advisers of the Government on shipping, and that the experience of Lord Faringdon, then better known as Sir Alexander Henderson, Chairman of the Great Central Railway Company, had been gained mainly in railway management and finance. Consequently there was no addition to the councils of the Government of any fresh force recognized as a leader of the shipping industry. It was not until the end of the year, on December 4, 1916, that Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister, appointed Sir Kenneth Anderson, K.C.M.G., one of the managers of the Orient Line, to be a member of the "Shipping Control Committee."

On January 27, 1916, the President of the Board of Trade also announced that the Govern-

ment had decided to cut down some of the imports less essential for national existence, which then occupied space in vessels arriving in port or prevented vessels being used for more urgent purposes. Paper, paper pulp and grass for making of paper were the first subjects for the operation of this policy because, it was stated, of their great bulk and influence on tonnage. Mr. Runciman explained that he had been in conference with the paper-makers and newspaper proprietors and had had the benefit of their views. In order to conserve the internal sources of the raw material of paper, the export from this country of rags and waste-paper was prohibited. On February 16, 1916, the appointment of a Royal Commission was announced, with Sir Thomas Whittaker as chairman, to grant licences for the importation of paper and paper-making materials, the intention being to cut down the supplies by one-third. In continuation of this policy the importation of a large number of other articles and materials of a bulky nature was shortly afterwards prohibited except under licence, including raw tobacco, of which there were very large stocks in this country; many building materials; furniture woods and veneers; and some fruits. Special Commissions were appointed to deal with each trade. Further very drastic restrictions on imports were announced by Mr. Lloyd George as Prime Minister on February 23, 1917. These proposals involved the prohibition of imports of certain fruits, foreign teas, coffee and cocoa, rum, and a number of manufactured articles, and a reduction of paper and paper-making materials by a half, and a very formidable curtailment of many other commodities.

The policy of limiting imports to necessities was obviously a right one, for whatever system was adopted of controlling tonnage it was clear that there were not sufficient ships to carry on the commerce of the country on the same scale as in pre-war times. The main cause of the scarcity of tonnage for ordinary commerce was the large amount of shipping directly in Government service. The public which had to suffer by the restriction of trade was justified in urging that the utmost efficiency should be secured from the vessels removed from commerce. A number of extraordinary cases of the ineffectual use of requisitioned vessels had been quoted, indicating what appeared to the commercial mind flagrant instances of waste. Still, nobody doubted the strain thrown on the Transport Department of the Admiralty, and there was every desire to give it full credit for the highly important and successful part it had taken in arranging for the transport of enormous numbers of men and supplies overseas. While the restrictions of imports were being put into operation in 1916, freights were still rising, and the profits of shipping companies, as publicly announced, were, as a rule, very large indeed. These



[Actual Photographs.

TORPEDOED WITHOUT WARNING: THE END OF AN UNARMED SHIP.



HOME WITH HONOUR:
A battered steamer making for port.

profits, not unnaturally, created a good deal of unrest, especially among labour. Shipowners generally came in for some very sharp criticism, which in all cases was not quite justified. A number of owners had in the early days of the war made it quite clear that they did not want to make extraordinary profits out of the war; by enterprise and good management they had established successful businesses yielding satisfactory returns, and the idea of benefiting from the national misfortune was repugnant to them. It cannot, however, be said that this was the attitude adopted in all quarters. The arguments in justification of high profits were, usually, that the returns in some of the years preceding the war had been poor, and that there was no agitation on the part of the public when shipowners had been unable to make both ends meet. Then it was argued that shipowners were quite helpless—

that the extraordinary freights were forced upon them by merchants out-bidding each other for tonnage; in other words, that there was no gainsaying the law of supply and demand. It was even advanced, further, that high freights were actually a benefit, since they acted as a restraint on imports, only those commodities which could bear high rates being imported. There was, of course, a limit to be put to this argument, for, if it was merely a question of high freight, many "luxuries" could bear much higher rates than what were regarded as the necessaries of the poorer classes. Finally, there was always the argument at the back that high freights were a convenient means of taxing the people every time they bought bread, since so large a proportion of the excess profits went to the State. On September 21, 1915, this excess profit taxation had been fixed at 50 per cent., and in the following April it was raised to 60 per cent. The weakness of this argument of high taxation was, however, that the larger the amount that went to the State the larger the amount which was retained by the shipowners themselves. Thus it happened that within a very short time of the first imposition of the excess profit taxation freights rose to such an extent that the 50 per cent. then allowed to be retained by owners exceeded the whole 100 per cent. before the tax was introduced. It was to be regretted that during the war shipowners did undoubtedly earn a bad name as "profiteers." All did not deserve it, but all were tarred with the same brush. The public had no means of discriminating, and any owner who was inclined to take up an independent line was thought by his fellow-owners to be rendering a dis-service to the shipping industry. It was common for British owners, quite effectively, to point to the even larger profits which were earned by neutrals, but they shut their eyes to the fact that under the British system, or, rather, lack of system, the neutral was benefiting far more than the British owner. The enormous strengthening of the neutral owner's position was indeed one of the serious and permanent results of the shipping muddle. This was proved again and again by the fact that neutrals were able to pay far higher prices for new tonnage than British owners. They paid enormous prices for ships in the United States, and even placed orders in the British Empire, as in British Columbia and in the Allied country, Japan.

A BUSY TIME AT THE BONDED WAREHOUSES.

[Official Photograph.

DOCKERS IN KHAKI UNLOADING FROZEN MEAT AT LIVERPOOL.

In order to assist in the relief of congestion at the ports Transport Workers' Battalions were formed.

It was a pity that the criticism to which owners were exposed was not always taken in good part. An angry outburst by Sir Walter Runciman, in February, 1916, at the annual meeting of the Moor Line (Ltd.), which had disclosed very large profits, portrayed a spirit which was not very helpful in solving a problem that had even then become of extreme importance to this country and her Allies. In the course of his speech Sir Walter said:

> There is a comic as well as a serious side to some of the denunciation to which we are subjected, which is always exhilarating when the irrepressible, self-styled "expert" of shipping matters, with his head whirling with abstract notions, abandons himself with tragic solemnity to the task of teaching successful, well-informed men who, notwithstanding their human failings, are at all events a national asset, how they should carry on an industry that the self-styled "experts" may have lamentably failed to make a success of. This class of person has a mania for imparting knowledge they do not in any degree understand. Let it be understood that I am speaking of types; some of them are superlatively ignorant of every commercial instinct. Their assurance stuns the imagination, and their pitiful panaceas indicate the mind of a quack. They are like unto a tub when, filled to overflowing, all at once the bottom falls out.

Shipowners were occasionally apt to overlook the fact that the rise in freights had reached such proportions that every single person in the country was vitally affected, and that a policy of *laisser faire* could not be condoned.

At about this time there was a very strong feeling on the subject of the high prices ruling for coal in France and Italy. With a large proportion of the French coalfields in the hands of the German Army, France became, to a very considerable extent, dependent upon British supplies. The position in Italy was even more serious, because Italy, having no coalfields of her own, was absolutely dependent upon Great Britain, except for a little which she was able to get, by means of British ships, from the United States. It has already been shown that the coal freight from Cardiff to Genoa had risen from about 7s. 6d. before the war to 100s. in March, 1916, so that fabulous prices had to be paid by consumers in Italy. For some time arrangements had been made for supplying the essential services of the Italian Government with coals, but this special arrangement did not affect many industries and private consumers. In May, 1916, a scheme was devised for reducing the selling price of coal in France. This involved the fixing of the prices at which coal was

sold at the pit's mouth, the middlemen's charges and the freights, so that the whole chain of transactions from the selling of the coal until it reached the consumer was intended to be controlled. The new prices and freights came into operation on June 1, 1916. The prices for coal represented reductions of from 40 to 50 per cent. below those ruling at the time for prompt delivery, and the freights reductions somewhat similar. The commission of the exporters was fixed at 5 per cent. in addition to the f.o.b price, with a maximum of 1s. per ton. The elaboration of this scheme involved a great deal of work on the part of Mr. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade, and it was significant that shortly afterwards he had a serious breakdown and had to rest for two months. It cannot be said that Mr. Asquith's Government was quick to act in this serious matter of the cost of coal in France and Italy, and more might, at any rate, have been done earlier in explaining the position. An important fact was that a large proportion of the coal shipping trade with the Continent was done by neutrals, and that the problem of neutral shipping was distinct from that of the British mercantile marine. The shipping difficulties of Italy were also more serious than those of France, owing to the greater length of voyage and the larger type of ship employed, but in the autumn a similar scheme was prepared for Italian ports. Unfortunately, owing partly, it must be admitted, to the submarine campaign, neither of these schemes worked entirely smoothly. It was reported that French firms, in order to secure tonnage, had paid higher freights than those provided for in the limitation scheme. The attitude seemed to be that it was better to pay heavily for the coals than not to get them at all. Early in 1917 the situation was again tackled, and the limitation freights were considerably advanced.



THE BEGINNINGS OF A SHIPYARD: THE SITE AND A TEMPORARY WHARF.

With the formation of Mr. Lloyd George's Government in December, 1916, a new Ministry was created, that of shipping, and a Shipping Controller appointed, a position the need of which had been so consistently urged.* The choice fell upon Sir Joseph Maclay, a successful Glasgow owner who was comparatively little known to the English public. His function was, in a sentence, to ensure that all British shipping was used to the best possible advantage of the nation. Sir Joseph Maclay was admitted in shipping circles to know at least as much about the efficient management of cargo steamers as any owner in the United Kingdom. He had a

* See Vol. XI., p. 359.

THE BEGINNINGS OF A SHIPYARD:
Part of the Site.

reputation of being an extremely hard worker, and the appointment was generally regarded as a good one. His powers had to be defined, and it was understood that by the middle of February, 1917, his functions had been satisfactorily arranged. By his own wish he was not a member of the House of Commons, having explained that he considered he could do his work better outside. He was, however, represented there by Sir Leo Chiozza Money, Parlia-





THE OLD SLIPS. INSET: AN EXCAVATOR.

mentary Secretary to the Ministry of Shipping Control. Replying in the House of Commons on February 13 to a question as to whether the Controller exercised authority over ships employed in Government service, the Parliamentary Secretary said:

They are used with our knowledge, and, as it were, if I may call it with our consent. Of course, it is a matter of goodwill between the different departments, and that goodwill, I am happy to say, exists and will continue to exist, and, as long as it does exist, there cannot be any real difficulty with regard to what I may call the connecting link between the Ministry of Shipping on the one hand and the Admiralty on the other. The Minister of Shipping knows that certain ships are being used, for example, as colliers, and he has power, and indeed authority, to satisfy himself that those colliers are being properly used, but there, of course, his authority ends. The Admiralty alone can in actual employment use these colliers.

Regarding the functions of the Controller, the Parliamentary Secretary said:

Of course, as the House is aware, when the Ministry of Shipping was formed, my right hon. friend found existing a considerable number of bodies—committees, and so on—which had been framed and very properly framed by the late Government in order to deal with different phases of this great problem. All these threads are being drawn together under the Ministry of Shipping, and I hope it will be true to say that in a very short space of time we shall have drawn them together, and that we shall then be able to grapple with a proper organization. We have been handicapped in this matter, because we have been worse housed, if that is possible, than any other Ministry of the Government. We are not so fortunate as to possess a gilded hotel. Nevertheless, we do hope now that we shall take up our residence in a modest and unassuming building which is not inappropriately situated, where water used to run in St. James's Park.

On February 21 Sir Edward Carson, now First Lord of the Admiralty, announced that the whole of the Transport Department, except so far as it was concerned with naval transport and the duty of naval transport to the Army, had been entirely taken over by the Shipping Controller. The Advisory Committee to the Transport Department had resigned shortly after the appointment of the Shipping Controller.

There were soon signs that the Controller was losing no time in getting to work and ensuring that all possible use was made of the available tonnage. One little scheme, indicative of the attention being given to the problem, which was announced just a fortnight after his appointment, provided that all owners of what are known as shelter-deck steamers should, where it was practicable, utilize the shelter-deck for cargo and get the load-line re-assigned. It had always been open to owners to have this change made, and some had done so in peace and others earlier in the war. It was estimated that if the change were made in all shelter-deck steamers the carrying capacity of the British Mercantile Marine would be increased by some 250,000 tons, but there were some obvious cases in which nothing was to be gained by the alteration. What the Controller did after consultation with the surveyors of the Board of Trade and the registration societies was to make compulsory the use of these spaces, not in all cases, but in every appropriate case. It had been held that, subject to any necessary alterations in the structure of the ships being carried out to the satisfaction of the surveyors, the change could, as a rule, be made with absolute safety. If an owner thought the change inadvisable for technical reasons his case would be considered on its merits. This particular change was due largely to the elimination of some of the lighter cargoes. When in peace time vessels were carrying comparatively light cargoes the raising of the load-line would not have enabled them to carry a ton more cargo, which was prescribed only by the cubic capacity of the ship. Another little innovation was the granting of permission to owners that, as an exceptional war measure, they might load vessels in the River Plate down to what is known as the Indian summer mark, provided that when the ships reached northern latitudes, between October and March inclusive, their winter marks were immersed. As the quantities of grain shipped from South America normally amount to some millions of tons annually and this change represented an addition of about 6 per cent. to the carrying capacity of ships, it was distinctly important. Attention was also immediately concentrated on improving the conditions at the ports where shipping was again being held up by congestion, caused especially by railway troubles, and the policy which had already been adopted under the old régime for substituting shorter voyages for longer voyages, where this was possible, was carried out still further. Many more ships were requisitioned to be employed in trades where they were most urgently needed, so that in February, 1917, the position approximated to a general requisition.

But one of the most important of the Shipping Controller's plans was the laying down of a large programme of standardized cargo ships. The possibilities of building a large number of standard ships in this country seems to have found its genesis in an article which appeared in *The Times* of February 25 showing what was being done in the United States. This was followed up by a number of other articles.

It was then pointed out that there would obviously be economy of money in manufacturing the parts for ships on a large scale. The following advertisement from an American newspaper was quoted :—

Stock cargo steamships, 7,200 tons d.w. capacity. Classification 100 A1. Br. Lloyd's. Scotch boilers, Triple expansion engines. Speed 10½ knots, 11½ knots on oil fuel.

We have recently purchased 7,500 tons of steel ship plates and shapes, with options for more, and with deliveries to assure completion and delivery of 1,720 d.w. steamship in the last quarter of 1916; one more ship in 14 months and one in 16 months, and one of our stock cargo steamships about each month hereafter.

One or more of our stock cargo steamships are now for sale to the highest responsible bidders. Prospective purchasers of cargo steamships are invited to submit written proposals for the purchase of one or more of our stock cargo steamships. Offers of purchase from responsible bidders will be filed in the order received, and, subject to prior sale, will be acted upon in that order. Sales will be closed at terms and times to be fixed by our Board of Directors.



WITH DECKS AWASH A STEAMER STRUGGLES BACK TO PORT AFTER STRIKING A MINE.

On February 28, 1916, an article developing the idea of standardization was published in *The Times*, which, as an indication of the conditions then prevailing and of what happened nearly a year later, may be reproduced as follows :

It is generally admitted that nothing will so relieve the present serious position as new construction. Yet builders and owners are finding it very difficult to come to terms. There are even still serious difficulties, owing to the rise in costs, in the way of the completion of mercantile tonnage contracted for and started before the war, and these difficulties are indicative of those which hinder the making of new contracts. In some cases the builders stipulate for very wide prices, offering to accept less if costs prove to be less than the maximum they name, and they will guarantee no dates for delivery. The owners are chary of placing orders when everything is so uncertain, and the result is an unsatisfactory deadlock.

This is where the intervention of the State would be of advantage. Having arranged, by some means, for the completion of tonnage now unfinished, the State could itself place orders for new construction. The first point in favour of a State programme is that for both sentimental and financial reasons the men are reluctant to handle any but Government work. The second reason is that by standardization the work could be greatly expedited. There would obviously be difficulties, if the matter were left to private enterprise, in getting owners to agree to a standard specification which would not exist in the case of a Government committee including representatives of owners, naval architects, shipbuilders, and engine-builders.

Generally the hull of a ship can be built at the present time more rapidly than the engines and boilers to go into it. The great bulk of the work on the hull must be done in the yard where it is being built, but it should be perfectly practicable to expedite work on the engines by increased subdivision and standardisation. For instance, time might be saved by sending the engines across from the East Coast or any other centre to the Clyde, while the boilers might be built in the Midlands. But vessels built under such arrangements would have to conform to the same specifications and their parts be made interchangeable.

The present proposal is for the State to arrange to

THE GERMAN SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN AGAINST MERCHANTMEN: THE END OF THE "DIOMED."

build 100 or whatever number of ships may be determined. They should probably be of one or, possibly, two types. If it were resolved to build more types they should be built in blocks.

It is proposed that these vessels when built should be allotted to owners in proportion to the number of ships they have lost through enemy acts. The State would take the profits and the owner to whom the ships were entrusted would be paid management commission on them. At the conclusion of the war the vessels would be sold by auction, and if the short supply of tonnage proves then to be as great as now seems probable, there would be very little chance of any loss falling on the State.

The type of ship recommended is a cargo steamer about 8,000 tons deadweight, serviceable for many trades. The exact details of measurement and speed would be determined by the committee, which should be prepared to sacrifice ruthlessly all luxuries and even conveniences which add to the labour and time required for construction. It is questionable, for example, whether in the present circumstances electric light should be installed. This and other conveniences could be added without great expense when the vessels came into the possession of their ultimate owners.

Such is the scheme broadly outlined. It is a matter for deliberate consideration whether, if some such plan be not adopted, this country is not running a serious risk of finding itself unable to carry not only the cargoes it ought to be able to carry, but even the bare necessities for the successful prosecution of the war, and at the end of the war of finding its mercantile marine at the mercy of the German interned ships and of the neutral fleets

Replying to a question in the House of Commons on March 7, 1916, Mr. Runciman said that his attention had been called to the question of standardization and that it was having his careful consideration, a stereotyped form of reply to which, unfortunately, the public had become well accustomed in connexion with the shipping problem.

In June, 1916, however, the standardization scheme received strong support in the formation of a Standard Ship Building Company to work at Chepstow, River Wye. This company was very powerfully backed, as appears from the fact that the capital was subscribed by, among others, such companies as the P. & O. and British India, the New Zealand Shipping, Orient Steam Navigation, Federal Steam Navigation, Furness, Withy & Company, Shire Line (Turnbull, Martin & Co.), A. Weir & Company, Harris & Dixon (Ltd.), Trinder, Anderson & Company, Bethell, Gwyn & Company, and Birt, Potter and Hughes (Ltd.). The Chairman was Mr. James Caird, head of Turnbull, Martin & Company, and the Vice-Chairman Mr. John Silley, Managing Director of R. & H. Green and Silley Weir (Ltd.), one of the oldest and most famous shipbuilding and ship repairing companies in the country. Unfortunately, the scheme was much handicapped by the difficulty of securing sufficient skilled labour. On August 15, however, the company took over the engineering firm of Messrs. Edward Finch & Co. (Ltd.), which was originally formed to build Brunel's bridge over the Wye, and a new company was formed, entitled Edward Finch & Co. (1916) (Limited). In spite of labour difficulties three slipways were prepared in this yard, and, early in 1917, two 3,300 ton cargo steamers were being built there. It was hoped that by the end of the year five new steamers would be put into the water from this yard, in addition to 18 smaller vessels, all of which were urgently needed. The first four slips for building steamers up to 10,000 tons in the Standard Company's new yard were being prepared. A special feature of the scheme was the planning of a garden city, and a considerable progress was being made early in 1917 with the construction of cottages under licence from the Ministry of Munitions. It was known that the Directors felt much indebted to the assistance given not only by this Ministry but also by the Admiralty and the Board of Trade. Every assistance in forwarding the scheme was also rendered by the Great Western Railway Company.

Towards the end of 1916 it was understood that the P. & O. Company had had plans drafted for a number of standard cargo vessels to be built in various yards, and Mr. John Latta, a well-known owner, was urging in *The Times* Government construction. Then, shortly after the new Ministry of Shipping had been created, it was announced that the Shipping Controller had himself in view a large programme of standard cargo vessels to be built for account of the State. It became known that they were to be single-deck steamers designed for purely cargo-carrying purposes, and that one batch of them would be 400 ft. in length, 52 ft. in beam, with a depth of 31 ft., and a deadweight carrying capacity of about 8,200 tons. They were to be distinctly utilitarian in character, having practically no superstructure, and with nothing in their construction that was not absolutely necessary for their efficient handling and for the carrying of general or bulk cargoes. The fact that they were to be standardized in design would facilitate the obtaining of materials, as well as increase the speed of construction, and some of the firms with whom contracts had been placed estimated that, given adequate supplies of material and a sufficiency of steadily working labour, the vessels could be completed within six or seven months. Standardization was to be

applied, not only to the hulls, but also to the propelling machinery, and, as far as possible, to all the auxiliaries and parts. The reciprocating engines decided upon were of a type which had proved thoroughly trustworthy and could be turned out to pattern by any marine engineering firm, the arrangements being such that any particular set of engines need not necessarily be reserved for any particular hull. If a hull was ready anywhere, and a set of engines ready somewhere else, these might be brought together to form one ship, so that the delays caused by hulls being ahead of engines, or engines ahead of hulls, would be very largely avoided.

In his preliminary work the Shipping Controller was greatly assisted by the co-operation of the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation, and it was a fortunate coincidence that, just about the time when he was appointed, the headquarters of the Federation were being removed to London. Until then the Federation had joint offices at Glasgow and Newcastle, with joint secretaries, one in each city, but the great increase in the amount of business which had to be done in London made it necessary for the co-ordination of the work of the Federation that it should have one headquarters office and that this should be in the Metropolis. On December 28 the announcement was made that Sir Joseph Maclay had appointed a committee to advise him on all matters connected with the acceleration of merchant ships under construction and nearing completion, and the general administration of a new merchant shipbuilding programme should be undertaken by him. The composition of the committee was as follows :— Mr. George J. Carter, (of Messrs. Cammell, Laird & Co., Ltd.), President of the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation (Chairman); Mr. W. S. Abell (Chief Surveyor to Lloyd's Register of Shipping); Mr. F. N. Henderson (of Messrs. D. & W. Henderson & Co., Ltd.); Mr. James Marr (of Messrs. J. L. Thompson & Sons, Ltd.); Mr. Summers Hunter (of the North-Eastern Marine Engineering Co., Ltd.); Mr. C. J. O Sanders (of the Marine Department, Board of Trade); and Mr. W. Rowan Thomson (of Messrs. D. Rowan & Co., Ltd.), President of the North-West (Clyde) Engineering Trades' Em-



A LINER PASSING THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL.



FRUIT FROM GREECE AT NEWCASTLE.

ployers' Association. Mr. A. R. Duncan, secretary to the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation, was appointed secretary.

By appointing the President of the Employers' Federation as Chairman of his Advisory Committee and its new secretary as his secretary, Sir Joseph Maclay at once enlisted in his service all the machinery of the Federation and all its capacity of getting into touch, on the shortest possible notice, with every department of the industry. On February 11 the statement was made that the Shipping Controller had appointed Mr. A. Wilkie, M.P., secretary of the Shipwrights' Society, and Mr. John Hill, secretary of the Boilermakers' Society, to advise his department on labour questions. It must be admitted that in some quarters there was some little apprehension, both amongst shipowners and builders, regarding the probable effects of the policy of standardization on the future of their particular industries. These critics failed to give full recognition to the fact that this policy was essentially a war policy, prompted by the extreme importance of producing the largest number of cargo vessels within the shortest possible time. Even in peace time certain builders had steadily concentrated on particular types, but, if time had been no object, no one would have advocated many of the yards bringing all their work to a common level. No doubt the best results were to be achieved by individuality. Owners settled upon particular types and, from the point of view of commercial competition, there was no real reason why they should share their experience, knowledge, and judgment with their competitors. In the critical times through which the country was passing all such considerations, however, needed to be jettisoned. That is one of the reasons why a large programme of new construction could only be carried out by the Government. No one could doubt that the Committee which Sir Joseph Maclay formed to advise him was an extremely able and representative one. Further, no shipowner could doubt that the ships which were planned would be extremely useful for carrying bulk cargo, even after the end of the war. They were of a type thoroughly suitable for carrying coal, the principal export of the country, and for bringing home grain from North and South America, the Black Sea and India.

Coupled with this Government programme of new ship construction was a scheme for expediting the large number of vessels already in course of completion. A feature of the quarterly shipbuilding returns issued by Lloyd's Register

AUCTION SALE OF THE PRIZE SHIP "PRINZ ADALBERT."
This ex-Hamburg-Amerika liner, of 6,000 tons, was sold at the Baltic Exchange on January 17, 1917, for £152,000.

was the large amount of shipping under construction and the very small amount actually launched. Vessels in various stages of construction were left untouched for months, mainly owing to the fact that labour had been diverted to naval work. A certain amount of delay was also caused by difficulties of finance. Material intended for merchant ships had been requisitioned for naval work, and consequently builders informed owners that they could not complete the ships on the terms contracted for either before the war or in the early months of hostilities. Gradually, however, these difficulties were overcome, partly owing to the good offices of the Board of Trade. Owners paid very large sums for the expedition of their ships and the Government intimated that such ships should be allowed, as far as possible, to take advantage of the full market rates. They should not, except in the case of extreme national urgency, be requisitioned at the Blue-Book rates. Special difficulties cropped up in the case of the refrigerated steamers, partly owing to the exceptional cost of such vessels and partly owing to the fact that, when completed, they would like all the other meat ships, be requisitioned by the Government. Still, even in these exceptional, but important, instances an agreement was finally concluded.

In the House of Commons on November 15, 1916, Mr. Runciman stated that the shipyards of the country could, in a normal year, with all labour available and all engine works operating at full-time, put very nearly 2,000,000 gross tons of shipping into the water. The country had then only lost 2,250,000 tons by all risks since the war began, and all the depredations on shipping could have been far more than made good if the shipyards and engine works were producing their maximum. Unfortunately, they were not doing so. By the middle of 1915 the production of new tonnage in Great Britain had reached a minimum. In the quarter ending June 30, 1915, only the trivial amount of 80,000 tons gross had been completed. A very large number of engineers, fitters, and mechanics had been recalled from the Colours and a number of men were drawn out of some of the yards which were making munitions. It was hoped that by the end of 1916 the six months' output would approach 500,000 tons, a very large advance on what was expected at the end of the summer, but it was pointed out that the country would have to go on with

increasing rapidity if it was to hold its own. Mr. Runciman then stated that arrangements had been made with shipbuilders on the Wear to provide for the pooling of the whole of their skilled labour, so that they could concentrate their attention on some of the vessels nearest completion, taking them one after the other. It was hoped to extend the system by negotiation on the Tyne, the Clyde, and similar ports. "By mobilizing our labour in that way," he said, "we shall get most even with the shortage which at present exists." That the gravity of the situation was realized appears from the following passage :—

> We shall have to take a plunge in this matter, and my own view is that the most urgent thing at this moment is the construction of merchant vessels. If there is to be a comparative shortage for a time—I hope only for a short time—in some of those branches of the Army, these men will be put to their best use for turning out vessels and engines which will add to the merchant vessels of ourselves and Allies.

The underlying principle of this pooling scheme was that of treating all shipyards and engineering shops in one district as one large establishment, within which men and materials might be handled and utilised as they would be by a single firm. On December 23—after the formation of the new Government—*The Times* announced that at the instance of the Marine Department of the Board of Trade a similar voluntary scheme to that reached on the Wear had been concluded on the Tyne with thorough goodwill on the part of masters and men. The following statement on this question of new construction, made in the course of a speech by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Shipping Control in the House of Commons on February 13, sheds light on the position at the beginning of 1917 :

> A very large amount of tonnage is already under construction, and I should like in this connexion, in the absence of my right honourable friend, the ex-President of the Board of Trade—and I am sure my right honourable friend the Shipping Controller would like me to do so—to pay a tribute to the work he did in that connexion before he left office. That is to say, we found a considerable amount of new construction proceeding. The larger that amount the smaller, of course, our immediate programme. We are accelerating every suitable vessel by every means in our power, and we are retarding the construction of any vessel which does not, in our opinion.

THE MARBLE HALL AT THE BALTIC EXCHANGE.

well serve the national interests at this time. For example, your passenger liner is put back, while your tramp is put forward. If we have been able to accelerate the acceleration which was already in progress when we came into office, it is because my right honourable friend the Shipping Controller has nothing else to think of, whereas my right honourable friend the Member for Dewsbury (Mr. Runciman) had many other things to think of as well. Surely, therefore, there is something to be said for the formation of a Ministry of Shipping, if it has to be said. Now, with regard to new construction, it is true to say that a considerable programme is now actually in progress. A very large amount of tonnage has actually been ordered.

That short statement puts clearly one aspect of the case for the formation of a Shipping Ministry, with nothing else to concentrate on but shipping, which had been so consistently urged. Shipping, hitherto, had been one of the many public services which the Board of Trade had attempted to supervise, but it had long been obvious that the best results could not possibly be secured without undivided expert attention. That the permanent officials of the Board of Trade had in their respective spheres done much good work was well recognized.

While merchant shipbuilding in the country had naturally fallen to very small proportions, the shipbuilding industry abroad had received an enormous impetus, especially in the United States. According to an official statement issued by the Bureau of Navigation at Washington, the output, for the first nine months of 1916, of ocean steel merchant tonnage by the American shipyards exceeded by 30,000 tons the British production. There were built in American shipyards in 1916, 1,163 merchant vessels of 520,847 tons gross, which were officially numbered for American shipowners, and accordingly at the end of that year were either in trade or were about to engage in trade. There were also built 50 vessels of 39,392 tons gross for foreign owners, making a total output of 1,213 vessels of 560,239 tons gross for the 12 months. This production compared with 614,216 tons gross built during the 12 months ended June, 1908, but the output for that year was mainly for the Great Lakes, whereas most of the tonnage for 1916 was built for the ocean foreign trade. Excepting in 1908, the output of 1916 had not been exceeded since the fiscal year 1855, when 583,450 tons gross were built, all being of wood except seven iron vessels of 1,891 tons gross. The very large total for 1916 compared with 1,216 vessels of only 215,602 tons built in 1915.

PRESSING WOOL IN AUSTRALIA FOR EXPORT.



DISCHARGING MAIZE INTO LIGHTERS.

An interesting feature of construction in North America was the revival of wooden shipbuilding. Letters asking for information were sent by the United States Bureau of Navigation to 145 builders of wooden vessels, and replies received from the principal builders showed that on December 1, 1916, there were building, or under contract to be built, 116 vessels of 156,615 tons gross, thus averaging 1,350 tons each. Only vessels of 500 tons gross were taken into account. Of the total number, 67, of 109,775 tons, were to be fitted with engines, and the majority of these were being built at the ports on the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico coasts and on Puget Sound and Colombia River. A number of wooden vessels were also being built in Canada, some of them for West Indian trade. The revival of wooden shipbuilding was attributed entirely to the war and the consequent demand for tonnage of all descriptions, the high prices of steel and iron, and the difficulty of securing metal at many centres where wood was available. Wooden ships can be built capable of being driven by oil at 7 or 8 knots, and there is no question, as the maritime history of Great Britain has shown, of their great strength. Many wooden ships have remained seaworthy for 100 years. This movement in the United States contained a speculative element, for owners were evidently calculating on the maintenance of high freights for a sufficiently long period to cover the cost of construction. The position of wooden tonnage when conditions again became normal at the end of the war could only then be conjectured.

Ship construction in Canada showed at one time an anomalous state of affairs. It was pointed out in *The Times* that large cargo steamers of 8,800 tons and 7,000 tons deadweight were building at Vancouver and Montreal respectively, all for Norwegian account. In a telegraphed reply published on November 28, Mr. Alfred Wallace, Chairman of the Wallace Shipyards (Ltd.), Vancouver, defended the action of Canadian builders in accepting such orders, pointing out that his company would much prefer to build steamers for British rather than for foreign account. It had offered contracts to several British owners at prices lower than the contracts to the Norwegians and had invariably been refused on account of the high price and long delivery. One London firm had replied that it could do better at home. The cost of material on the Pacific Coast was excessive, owing to railway freight and the high cost of and scarcity of labour. The Pacific yards of the United States were, he added, full, mainly for Norwegian account. British owners would not pay Pacific Coast prices. By taking Norwegian orders money was brought into

Canada, assisting the national finances; yards were equipped to compete with American builders when conditions were again normal; a permanent industry on the Canadian Pacific Coast was created; business was brought under the British flag; and yards were provided which were equipped for naval construction and



A GIANT CRANE.

repairs. Commenting on this statement, *The Times* remarked that "Mr. Wallace will, we think, agree that the publicity given to this question will have served its purpose well if it results in the whole of the shipyards of the Empire being thoroughly mobilized for the purpose of replenishing the British mercantile marine, which has already been seriously depleted. That there should be such a complete mobilization, in spite of any difficulties of high making costs, there can be no doubt." On January 30 it was intimated in *The Times* that Wallace Shipyards (Ltd.) was again prepared to accept contracts from British owners for steamers of from 7,500 to 8,000 tons deadweight to be built according to buyers' specifications. The company, it was stated, could undertake to deliver a steamer of this type in September, and one each month thereafter. It was notable, further, that in the House of Lords on February 13, 1917, Lord Curzon declared that the Government was using every effort to build new ships, and not merely new ships at home, where a large programme was on the slips, but to secure extra shipping by arrangements with the Dominions and Dependencies and with Allied States.

The enormous increase in ship construction in the United States was recognized early in 1916 by the creation of an American Committee of Lloyd's Register, with headquarters in New York, for the purpose of supervizing building and carrying out periodical surveys. The Committee was a powerful one representative of shipping companies and insurance institutions in the United States.

In Japan also the yards were fully employed, and very high prices were paid. The Japanese industry was handicapped by the difficulty of securing steel. Shipments from England had to be prohibited owing to the insistent demands of the munition works for supplies, naturally causing disappointment in Japan, and, in view largely of the high freights, steel products of the United States cost very heavy prices to be laid down in Japan. Here, again, as in Canada and the United States, neutrals were able to outbid British firms. As an indication of the prices which were paid, a cargo steamer ready for sea was bought by Norwegians in September 1916, for £200,000, which was equivalent to £40 a ton on the deadweight. Before the war such a steamer could have been built in Great Britain for £6 or £7 a ton. For another new Japanese steamer of 5,100 tons deadweight £190,000 was paid, equivalent to about £37 a ton. Yet another striking example was that of a steamer built in Japan for delivery in the autumn of 1916 at a contract price of about £100,000, which before delivery was re-sold for £375,000, showing a profit to the original buyer of £275,000, and representing a price of £35 a ton. In connexion with the output of the Japanese yards, the statement of Lord Curzon on February 13 respecting buying for this country in oversea yards has already been quoted.

With freights at enormous levels and prices for new ships prodigious, it was natural that fabulous prices should also be paid for second-hand vessels. Neutral ships could always command higher prices than British because they were free from the risk of requisition by the British Government. Gradually, however, one neutral nation after another placed restrictions on the transfers of ships outside the country, so that the market became rather limited. The great bulk of the British sales were carried out by private treaty, but a number of vessels were sold at auction. Among these were

the prize vessels and these auctions naturally created great interest. As an indication of the upward trend, the ex-Norddeutscher Lloyd liner, Schlesien, of 5,500 tons, which was sold by Messrs. Kellock's at a prize auction in January, 1915, for £65,200, was subsequently resold eight months later for £120,000. Many examples of the enormous prices might be cited. As an instance, the prize steamer, Polkerris, of 943 tons gross, built at Rostock in 1889, was sold on the Baltic Exchange in February, 1916, for £26,000, equivalent to more than £27 10s. per ton gross. As the German steamer Adolf she was captured soon after the outbreak of war and was taken into Gibraltar. There she was offered at auction, but as £2,050, the highest offer made, was thought by the authorities to be too low, she was withdrawn from the sale and was then employed in British Government service. Right down to nearly the end of 1916 very high prices continued to be paid. Thus, on November 22 of that year, for the old iron prize steamer Nicolaos, of 2,047 tons deadweight, the high price of £29,250 was bid at auction on the Baltic Exchange, representing more than £14 a ton. The steamer was built 39 years before, the boiler was reported to have been new 22 years before, and it was understood that some thousands of pounds would have to be expended on her on account of a Lloyd's survey which was due, and for renewals. Before the war £2 a ton, or a total of about £4,000, might, perhaps, have been paid for her for breaking-up purposes. This sale was by order of the Admiralty, for the vessel was seized at Alexandria while under Greek managership, and was condemned on account of Turkish interest. The auctioneer made a special point of the fact that she was built of iron, "since an iron steamer her age would be better than a steel steamer of the same age."

At various periods just before the introductions of new Budgets the shipping sale market became very quiet. The market became particularly inactive at the end of 1916 and early in 1917 on a statement by the Prime Minister with reference to the "nationalization" of shipping. On January 30 four good British steamers out of five which were offered at auction at the Baltic Exchange failed to find buyers. If they had been put up for auction a few months previously undoubtedly all would have been sold for very handsome prices. The fifth was sold for a price certainly not equal to some of those paid in 1915. In the middle of February the Shipping Controller announced that all sales of British ships were not to be completed without his sanction. Negotiations for the purchase of British ships

UNLOADING TIMBER.

PRINCE'S LANDING STAGE, LIVERPOOL.

THE DOCK OFFICES, LIVERPOOL.

by British subjects might proceed, subject to the approval of the Controller being obtained before the purchase was finally effected. All negotiations respecting non-British ships were to be suspended for the time being.

Of all the purchases which were effected during the war one completed on behalf of the Commonwealth Government in June, 1916, created most interest. The difficulty of obtaining tonnage to transport the products of Australia to the ports of the United Kingdom and those of the Allied countries had long been apparent, and it was stated on behalf of the Commonwealth Government that the high rates of freights which, except where controlled by Admiralty requisition or Admiralty influence, threatened to become prohibitive, made action necessary. It was well known that Mr. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, encountered difficulties in arranging for ships to transport the Australian wheat crop when he arrived in this country in March, 1916, and his troubles became greater during his visit owing, in a large degree, to the Imperial Government's shipping policy. The price of Australian wheat in this country was under the influence of the price of the Canadian varieties, although it was always able to command a premium of a few shillings a quarter. One of the Government's numerous committees set itself to beat down the North Atlantic freight, which it did most effectively by directing a large number of vessels into the North Atlantic trade. The price of Australian wheat landed in this country fell in accordance with the fall in North American wheat, but the Australian freight did not, with the result that after allowing for all transport charges, etc., the price quoted was perilously near the point at which the cost of growing the wheat in Australia would not have been covered. The home shipping authorities having thus, in the interests of the public at home, incidentally "queered" the Australian Government's market, it might have seemed that their obvious course was to meet them in some way. There was no indication of their having done so. Mr. Hughes was told that ships were employed

to greater advantage than in bringing wheat from Australia, which was then probably true. But it was unreasonable to expect the Commonwealth Government to stand by and see its crop rot, while enormous supplies were being drawn from the United States, and it was false economy to refuse Mr. Hughes the loan of ships and drive him to seize them practically by force. Undaunted by the rebuff, Mr. Hughes set to work very quietly to buy 15 ships, the announcement of the purchase not being made until after he had actually sailed from England on his return to Australia. Ten of the 15 vessels were bought from Messrs. Burrell's Strath Line. All were good, serviceable and modern cargo steamers, with an average deadweight capacity of between 7,000 and 8,000 tons. It was understood that for the larger vessels about £140,000 was paid, representing, on a deadweight of about 7,500 tons, a value of about £19 a ton. Before the war the value of such ships as were bought might perhaps have been estimated at an average price of about £4 per ton. It was stated that the primary intention of the scheme was the transport of Australia's products to the world's markets, but that the vessels would, of course, be run and managed in a similar manner to those owned by private companies, and would be required to show a reasonable profit. This policy was subsequently indicated by the fact that after discharging cargoes in Great Britain some were sent across the North Atlantic to load general cargoes of United States manufactures. By being transferred from the home registry to that of Australia, the earnings of the ships were no longer subject to the Imperial income-tax and excess profit taxation and so should prove a good investment for the Australian Government. The scheme was naturally not liked by British owners, and the purchase caused considerable disturbance in the Australian trade. However, in the autumn the strong line adopted by Mr. Hughes was vindicated to some extent, at any rate, in an announcement by Mr. Runciman that a large purchase of Australian wheat had been made and that a number of steamers had been requisitioned to proceed to load wheat in Australia at Blue-Book rates.

During 1916 a number of important shipping fusions were carried out. At the end of June a provisional agreement was entered into for an



TRAVELLING CRANES IN A LONDON DOCK.



[French official photograph.

SPANISH WINE FOR THE FRENCH ARMY.

[Official photograph.

SUPPLIES FOR THE BRITISH ARMY IN FRANCE.

amalgamation between the P. and O. Company and the New Zealand Shipping Company, which owned the Federal Line. The P. and O. had in the early months of the war absorbed the British India, and as the New Zealand and Federal Companies had worked in close agreement with the British India in the Australian trade, this further arrangement seemed natural enough. It was understood that the directors of the companies had in view, when carrying out this arrangement, the expectation of attacks on British trades from German companies after the war. Immediately before the outbreak of war the German lines had announced their intention of entering into the direct trade with New Zealand, and discussions with British owners were actually stopped by the war. The amalgamation of the P. & O. and New Zealand Companies meant that the combined fleets of the companies amounted to 228 steamers, of 1,386,589 tons gross.



A SHIP-LOAD OF STEEL FROM THE UNITED STATES.

Towards the end of August, 1916, a brief announcement was made that Furness, Withy & Company (Ltd.) had acquired a preponderating interest in the Prince Line (Ltd.). Little was disclosed as to this transaction, but the view generally accepted in shipping circles was that the managing interest of Mr. James Knott, the founder of the Line, was acquired, together with shares by private negotiation, and that a large number of shares in the Prince Line were also purchased in the open market. The Prince Line consisted of 37 steamers of a very useful type. At about the same time an agreement was carried through for the sale of the London and Northern Steamship Company to Messrs. Pyman, Watson and Co., of South Wales. The fleet consisted of 16 very useful steamers of 54,000 tons gross, and the price paid for the business, all the assets, and the managing interest amounted to rather over £2,000,000. In the middle of October arrangements were completed whereby Sir John Ellerman, Chairman of the Ellerman Lines, acquired the whole of the shares of Messrs. Thos. Wilson, Sons & Co. (Ltd.), the Wilson fleet consisting of nearly 80 steamers of about 200,000 tons. As explaining this transaction the announcement was made that it had been evident for some time to those concerned in the management of the Wilson Line that definite steps would have to be taken to provide for the future of the business, which was an extremely important one for the Port of Hull. A large number of the Wilson ships had been lost during the war, and it was essential that the various lines served by the company should be efficiently carried on after peace was concluded.

In the autumn of 1916 an agreement was completed between the Anchor Line (Henderson Bros., Ltd.) and the Donaldson Line (Ltd.) for

a fusion of the interests of the two companies in the passenger and cargo service between Glasgow and Canada. A new company was formed with the title of the Anchor-Donaldson Line, with Sir Alfred Booth as chairman. The Cunard Company already held a controlling interest in the Anchor Line and had acquired the shipping interests of the Canadian Northern Company, so that this latest arrangement meant

MR. EDWARD F. NICHOLLS,
Chairman of the Institute of London Underwriters, 1915–1917.

a linking up of the Cunard, Anchor, Canadian Northern, and Donaldson Lines. The two other big groups representing the passenger interests in the Canadian trade then consisted of the Canadian Pacific and Allan Lines and of the White Star and Dominion Companies. The desirability of effecting consolidations among British companies could be appreciated. Before the war there was far too little cohesion among the British lines, which were consequently at a disadvantage in facing the solid front presented by the German companies. Sales of shipping made, however, in order primarily that owners might retire from business with large fortunes, were in a different category. By the disposals of fleets or single ships owners were able to escape taxation, and it had to be remembered that ownerships which had bought ships at enormous prices during the war would not be in the most advantageous position to meet competition after the war. Those ownerships which would be most favourably circumstanced would be those which had written down their fleets to very low levels.

Stress was repeatedly laid by British owners on the difficulty of dealing with neutral shipping, but even this problem proved by no means insoluble. Early in the war it was being pointed out in *The Times* that Great Britain was very far from being at the mercy of neutral owners. A large amount of neutral tonnage had always found employment in British trade, and other markets were very few. Practically the only bulk cargo available for neutral vessels from Europe was British coal. Neutral vessels were accustomed to bunker in England; and to some authorities the question of supplying such bunkers to neutrals seemed to resolve itself into a simple business proposition. British miners were exempted from military service because of the importance of the coal industry to the country, and it was obviously reasonable that the first call on supplies should be for British industries, British ships, and neutral ships which were engaged in British trade. In official quarters there was at first great reluctance to exercise even the smallest discrimination in this matter, but gradually the principle came to be fully recognized that all the facilities of British ports and shipyards must be reserved for those who were employing their ships to the advantage of the British Empire.

It must be remembered that trading with British ports was extremely profitable to neutral vessels. There was for a long time absolutely no restriction on rates, the first effort in this direction being the limitations schemes covering the shipment of coal supplies to France and Italy. British merchants recklessly outbid each other for tonnage, caring little or nothing what they paid, since they could always rely on passing on the cost of the high freights to the consumer. Some responsibility in this matter undoubtedly rested with the British representatives of neutral ownerships, who, actuated by ordinary business considerations, not unnaturally did their best to secure the highest rates for their foreign clients. The evil of this bidding had long been felt and early in 1917 the Board of Trade took the matter in hand. By an Order in Council published on January 12 official permission was required to be obtained before

any neutral ship could be chartered, and even before the purchase of any goods from abroad exceeding 1,000 tons in weight could be completed. An Inter-Allied Chartering Executive was formed, with the object of ensuring that all charters of foreign vessels by private firms were in the best interests of the allied nations. An office was opened close to the Baltic Exchange in charge of two well-known brokers, and the system adopted was found to work very smoothly. Shipbrokers immediately showed some alarm at the restriction imposed, but it was soon apparent that their interests were protected. The Executive acted as a channel through which the chartering of vessels to bring grain for account of the Royal Commission was effected. Important services were rendered in this connexion by Messrs. Furness, Withy & Co., who, it was stated, received no profit, direct or indirect, in respect of their work. Early in January an offer was made by the British Government for the use of Greek shipping during the war and for six months afterwards. The terms provided for a rate of hire of 30 shillings per ton deadweight per month, as compared with about seven shillings paid by the British Government for British vessels, and for acceptance of the war insurance of the Greek vessels by the British Government.

In the same month the limitation rates to France and Italy were revised, and it then became clear that something would have to be done for improving the insurance facilities for neutrals. Most neutral nations had their own war insurance schemes, of varying scope, but a very large amount of insurance since the outbreak of war had been placed in the London market The rates on British ships and their cargoes had always been subject to the British influence of the Government insurance schemes but there was not the same influence at work respecting neutral vessels. The services of British underwriters throughout the war had

UNDERWRITERS' ROOM AT LLOYD'S.

been extremely valuable, but naturally rates in the open market were the subject of individual judgment and were governed by considerations of profit and loss. On February 7, 1917, *The Times* announced that a new scheme of war insurance for neutral vessels was to be put in operation at once, applicable to neutral vessels engaged in carrying essential cargoes, such as foodstuffs, munitions, materials for munitions and coal to allied ports. It was operated by a number of leading companies. The rates represented a very considerable reduction on those hitherto current, and the scheme provided for the fixing of the values to be insured. These were on a very high basis, rising from £25 per gross ton for steamers built between 1875 and 1881 to £40 a ton for vessels built in 1911 and later.

An enormous amount of business was effected during the war in the Marine Insurance market, and by the beginning of 1916 the congestion and delays at Lloyd's had become so serious that it was obvious that measures would have to be adopted to improve the conditions. As from March 1, 1916, a separate office with a staff of women clerks was inaugurated, the plan being that the policies should be stamped with the names of the various syndicates instead of being signed by hand as hitherto. More than 50 women clerks were at once installed, and it was found that the pressure of 'work on' underwriters and brokers was immediately relieved. It had frequently happened under the old system that policies had been passing from hand to hand for several weeks. Under the new plan policies were available on the same day or the next. While the amount of business was greatly increased the staffs of the offices naturally became more and more reduced. In many ways underwriters were able greatly to assist commerce and incidentally they helped to carry out the Government's regulations, published from time to time, respecting oversea trading. The strain imposed on underwriters during the war was heavy, but they had the satisfaction of knowing that the pre-eminence of London as the insurance market of the world was accentuated.

This chapter will have shown that, difficult though the position had become early in 1917, the whole shipping problem was then being closely tackled in a way that had never been attempted before. Measures were being actively adopted to ensure that more efficient and effective use was made of the tonnage available for naval, military and commercial purposes, construction was being expedited, and more advantage was being taken of the extensive insurance facilities of the country. The evils of the old lax methods were not to be eradicated in a day, but there were at last ample signs that no thought, skill and energy would be spared to keep the situation well under control.

CHAPTER CLXX.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (IV.)

POSITION ON AUGUST 22—GERMAN "MORAL"—FIGHTING OF AUGUST 24—WILTS AND WORCESTERS AT THIÉPVAL—FRENCH GAINS—GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACKS—ALLIED OFFENSIVE OF SEPT. 3-6—FEINTS ON THE ANCRE—THE MAIN ATTACK—THE FALL OF GUILLEMONT—THE FRENCH OPERATIONS—GENERAL MICHELER'S ARMY—SEPTEMBER 9—THE IRISH AT GINCHY—HEAVY GERMAN LOSSES—FRENCH SUCCESSES ON SEPTEMBER 12—THIÉPVAL AND THE "WUNDERWERK"—SEPTEMBER 14—FRANCO-BRITISH COOPERATION AND PREPARATIONS—POSITION ON SEPTEMBER 15.

THE events of the Battle of the Somme up to the evening of August 22 have been already related in Chapters CLI., CLIV. and CLXV. We had made considerable progress, but the country had still to be reached over which manœuvre battles might be fought unhindered by entrenchments prepared months beforehand, and where the Allies might fairly hope that the superior *moral* of their troops would ensure the defeat of the enemy. As early as July 30 the Germans had begun to appreciate the dangers which would arise if their lines were pierced between the Ancre and the Somme. An Order of the Day of that date, signed by the German General in command, had run as follows:

> Within a short space of time we must be prepared for violent attacks on the part of the enemy. The decisive battle of the war is now being fought on the fields of the Somme. It must be impressed on every officer and man up at the front line that the fate of our country is at stake in this struggle. By ceaseless vigilance and self-sacrificing courage the enemy must be prevented from gaining another inch of ground. His attacks must break against a wall of German breasts.

The German General was right; the glorious retreat from Mons and the fighting on the Marne had shown that in open country the British and French Armies were superior to his troops.

A letter written by a prisoner of the German XIIIth Corps shows how the battle of the Somme was regarded by the German rank and file, and the straits to which the foe was reduced. "We are, indeed, no longer men, but as it were half-living creatures." Other prisoners confirmed the statement and showed that previous battles compared with that on the Somme were "child's play." One slightly wounded German, who before the war had been manager in the grill-room of a well-known London hotel, and who had fought against the Russians on the Eastern Front, observed: "I suppose they will send me back to England under circumstances very different from those in which I left London more than two years ago. Well, I am quite ready for the change—anything to be out of the awful hell in which I have lived here." "Here" was Delville Wood. "At first," he remarked, "I was confident that we must win—everybody thought so. But we had not reckoned on your fleet, which I know has got us by the throat. . . . We cannot win. Neither," he added, with affected hopefulness, "I think, can you and your Allies. It is true that it is we, and not you, who are now on the defensive; but we are far from being exhausted, and I think that before long you will have to make terms with us. If you don't, and it's going to be a fight to the finish, then all I can say is God help everybody!" These statements, which might be supported by many others, showed how greatly the *moral* of the Germans had been affected. On the other

Official photograph.

BRINGING BACK A CAPTURED GUN FROM HIGH WOOD.

hand, our soldiers were full of confidence and elated by their successes.

At 9 p.m., on August 22, a desperate effort was made by the enemy to recover the trenches wrested from him south of Thiépval. The waves of German infantry reached and entered them in places, but their success was short-lived. Counter-attacks promptly disposed of all who had penetrated, or drove the survivors back. A second assault at 1 a.m., on the night of the 22nd-23rd, was equally futile. Our artillery and infantry fire wrought terrible execution among the charging lines which were lit up by the light of their own flares. Both attempts resulted in heavy losses to the enemy, without any gain.

While these operations were in progress the German artillery kept up a severe fire against High Wood and Bazentin-le-Petit. The German aeroplanes in the evening had shown unwonted activity They had been engaged by our airmen, and at least four machines destroyed. Others were driven down badly damaged, or pursued to their aerodromes, while ours suffered no casualties. An aerial reconnaissance was completely successful, and

[Official photograph.

A TRENCH NEAR THIÉPVAL.

bombing raids were carried out by us against sundry points of importance.

During the 23rd we resumed the offensive south of Thiépval and secured 200 yards of German trench, straightening our line and improving our position in this region. The counter-battery work of our guns was this day very effective. The enemy's artillery in three different areas was silenced, and it was reported that a score of direct hits had been made. Our gunners had some time since overtaken and were now outclassing in accuracy the enemy's, and the German ammunition showed signs of deterioration, as the percentage of blind shells discharged by the hostile artillery was steadily rising. "Duds," as our men

[Official photograph.

A GERMAN "DUD" LANDS IN A TRENCH NEAR THIÉPVAL.

called them, were, however, not always a disadvantage when they came from our own guns. One of our officers, when ascending the parapet of a German trench, felt a shell from a British gun drop immediately behind him. Fortunately it did not explode, but the shock of impact on the ground lifted him over the parapet on to a German, whom he speedily took prisoner!

As the sun was sinking, the sky, which for four days had been bright and cloudless, became overcast, and a steady rain commenced to fall. At 8.45 p.m. the German batteries concentrated their fire on the ground gained by us between Guillemont Station and the quarry, the capture of which has been already recounted. When the gun-fire lifted, a body of infantry advanced with the greatest determination and reached the British parapet. A sharp and fierce struggle ensued, and then, as was usual in hand-to-hand combats, the enemy broke, leaving behind him many dead and wounded.

At 12 30 a.m. on Thursday, August 24, the German artillery repeated the bombardment, but no infantry assault materialized. In the course of the same day, on the battlefield of Loos, a German raid was repulsed by us near the celebrated Hohenzollern Redoubt, and north-west of La Bassée some of our troops successfully entered the enemy's trenches.

Meanwhile, north of the Somme the German guns had violently bombarded the French front lines and communication trenches north

and south of Maurepas, while south of the river, after intense artillery preparation, the enemy had launched attacks against the troops of our Allies in and south-east of Soyécourt Wood. They were all repulsed. Adjutant Dorme on the 23rd brought down his fifth and sixth German aeroplanes. The former fell in the direction of Moislains, north-east of Péronne, the latter in the region of Marche-le-Pot, north-west of Chaulnes. Four other enemy machines were severely damaged by French

THE SITE OF THIÉPVAL. [Official photograph.

machine-gun fire, and another was destroyed near Roye.

The events of the 23rd, above described, naturally did not figure in the German *communiqué* of the 24th. That veracious document deserves to be quoted:

> North of the Somme yesterday the fresh efforts of the enemy during the evening and night failed.
>
> The British attacks were again directed against the salient between Thiépval and Pozières and our positions at Guillemont.
>
> At Maurepas, especially to the south of that village, strong enemy forces were repulsed after fighting which was at some points severe.

On Thursday, August 24, the weather again turned fine, and the aerial supremacy of the Allies was once more pronounced. What our command of the air, coupled as it was with so marked a superiority of our artillery, meant to the enemy, and how it affected his *moral* may be gathered from the diary kept by, and found on the person of, a prisoner of the German 125th Regiment captured about this date.* "During the day," he wrote, "one hardly dares to be seen in the trench owing to the British aeroplanes, which fly so low that it is a wonder they do not come and pull us out of our trenches." Forgetful of the glowing pictures painted by his superiors of the exploits of German airmen, he indulged in some bitter reflections. "Nothing is to be seen," he grumbled, "of our German hero airmen, and yet their ratio is supposed to be 81 to 29! The fact that the British are one thousand times more daring is, however, never mentioned. One can hardly calculate how much additional loss of life and strain on the nerves this costs us. I often feel doubtful," he added, "regarding the final issue of our good cause when such bad fighters are here to champion it."

The weather conditions being so favourable, it was decided by the Allied Commanders to make three new thrusts into the German lines, one on the left towards Thiépval, the second in the centre at Delville Wood, and the third on the right in the Maurepas region. The advance between Authuille Wood and Mouquet Farm on Thiépval was entrusted by Sir

* *Morning Post*, August 28.

[Official photograph.

THE WILTSHIRE MEN GOING TO THE FRONT.

Hubert Gough to the Wilts and Worcesters. In the reduction of the position still retained by the enemy on the upper eastern fringes of Delville Wood, units of the Rifle Brigade were to take part. The French were to capture the last ruins in Maurepas, to which the Germans were clinging, and to extend their line northwards to the Clery-Combles railway, southwards to Hill 121. Opposing the Wilts and Worcesters were detachments of the Prussian Guard; while the 5th Bavarian Reserve Division and the 1st Division of the Prussian Guard, commanded by the Kaiser's second son, Prince Eitel Friedrich, confronted the troops of our gallant Allies. To save the Thiépval salient, to prevent the British from Delville Wood reaching the summit of the ridge over which ran the Longueval-Flers-Ligny-Tilloy-Bapaume road, to check any eastward movement along the ridge on Ginchy and Combles and to stop the forward movement of the French through Maurepas on Combles, the Germans had concentrated every available battery and man. Their guns, though in numbers inferior to those of the Allies, were numerous. The front of battle was the 8-mile line which ran from Authuille to Maurepas.

Between the Wilts and Worcesters and the village of Thiépval, hidden by the tree-crowned ridge, lay a long trench which had been named by the enemy after their idol, Hindenburg. Into this, protected by a maze



[Official photograph.

MEN OF THE WILTSHIRE REGIMENT ADVANCING TO THE ATTACK.

WORCESTERS RESTING IN A HARVEST FIELD. [Official Photograph.

of trenches, there ran back, at its western end, a perfectly straight trench. Another trench the "Koenigstrasse," itself joined by another, commemorated the recovery of Lemberg. Where the Koenigstrasse met the Lemberg trench there were strong redoubts. Our troops, ensconced behind their parapets, had to cross 300 yards of sloping, open ground. Towards the right a glimpse could be obtained of the ruins of Mouquet Farm. Away on the left was the shattered wood of Authuille.

Under the blazing autumnal sun officers and men were posted in the trenches, smoking pipes and cigarettes, and watching the huge shells bursting from time to time above their heads. The novelty of the shells had worn off, and they attracted little attention. "Worse than the rats are these infernal flies," a lieutenant was heard to say, as he tried to puff them off with tobacco smoke. A breeze blowing from left to right slightly mitigated the stifling heat. Nothing betrayed to the foe that an assault in this area was imminent. He for his part was grimly silent. Now and then, however, a head cautiously thrust above the parapet, and rapidly withdrawn, showed that the Hindenburg trench was still tenanted. But for the rush through the air and explosion of an occasional shell, there was nothing which showed visibly the preparations for the struggle about to begin.

The hours passed by, and the sun was reaching the western horizon, when suddenly the whole scene was transformed with lightning-like rapidity. In a moment, volley after volley of heavy shells was poured forth from our batteries against the devoted sector to be assaulted. The noise from the guns was deafening, and was echoed by that of the exploding shells as they burst on the German lines, throwing up into the air clouds of smoke mingled with earth from the parapets which they struck. Blown slowly eastward by the light breeze which rent the mist here and there asunder, there were revealed masses of timbers and the shattered bodies of the German soldiers who had held their front trenches thrown up into the air. Ever and anon a projectile would reach a shell store and blow it up with a mighty crash, accompanied by flames which lit up the neighbourhood like lurid lightning.

"Magnificent, splendid," was the cry of a French officer who saw the display. "How grand are your guns." Above the rushing shells and beyond the smoke of their explosions flew our aeroplanes watching and signalling back the effect of our gun-fire. Regardless of the bursting shrapnel fired at them by the anti-aircraft guns, the white puffs of which could be seen surrounding our gallant airmen, the latter swept backwards and forwards as

they calmly carried out their observation duties.

Ten minutes was the time allowed for the intensive bombardment of the Hindenburg, Koenigstrasse, and Lemberg trenches. By this time the German artillery, roused to a perception of what was about to happen, had got to work, and was pounding our front line trenches and placing barrages in front and behind them. The order was now given to the Wilts and Worcesters, and wave after wave of them dashed forward. On approaching the Hindenburg trench a gap of some 50 yards separated Worcesters from Wilts. Into this gap pressed groups of Prussian Guards, and a fierce bombing and bayonet struggle took place. The Prussians were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. One of the Wilts officers—an expert shot—snatched up a rifle and shot five of the enemy bombers dead. A sergeant of the same regiment ran along the top of the parapet of the trench bombing the Germans in it. Some of the Prussians issued from their dug-outs and, refusing to surrender, put up a plucky but unavailing fight. On the left the maze of trenches was cleared, snipers and Lewis guns silencing the machine gunners, and the redoubts at the junction of the Koenigstrasse and Lemberg trenches were rushed. Altogether it was, in the characteristic language of the soldiers engaged, "a very fine and a very pretty show." We had penetrated to a depth of 300 yards on a front of a little under half a mile, and were within 650 yards of the southern outskirts of Thiépval itself. Over 200 prisoners had been taken. How many of the Prussian Guard lay dead and wounded in the torn and twisted ground captured was not ascertained. Our losses, on the other hand, were relatively insignificant. "We evacuated portions of our advanced trench north of Ovillers, which were completely destroyed," was the comment of the German Higher Command on this action. To cover this admission of defeat, it was stated in the German *communiqué* of the 25th that "repeated Anglo-French attacks were delivered simultaneously yesterday evening on our (the German) entire front from Thiépval to the Somme," and that between "Thiépval and the Foureaux (High) Wood the enemy attacks collapsed with great loss."

In the "sector Longueval-Delville Wood," the German *communiqué* admitted that the Germans had suffered a reverse, which was a mild expression for what had really happened. The enemy garrison holding the northern and eastern fringes of the wood and the adjacent orchards was disposed in three lines of trenches, all strengthened with redoubts and provided

WORCESTERS GOING TO THE FRONT. [Official photograph.

[Official Photograph.

HEAVY WORK ON A MUDDY ROAD.

with dug-outs. The foremost trench was well within the wood, and to reach it broken tree-trunks and craters had to be crossed. The second trench was on the edge of the wood—shallow and lightly held. It served only as a support to the first. The third was very formidable. Though the Germans had not had time to construct their deep dug-outs for the infantry, they had connected with trenches a number of dug-outs formerly occupied by the gunners of the batteries which, in the early stages of the Battle of the Somme, had fired over Delville Wood at our troops advancing up the ridges. At the extreme eastern angle of the wood was a strong redoubt garrisoned by some 50 men. Unlike the Prussian Guard at Thiépval, the Germans anticipated an attack in this quarter. Before the time fixed for it, our troops were subjected to a very heavy bombardment of 8 in. and 5.9 in. shells. This did not, however, succeed in deterring us from delivering the blow. It was preceded by a hurricane of shells of all calibres which churned up the edges of the wood and wrecked the German positions in the open. When the guns were supposed to have done their work, the British left their trenches, and advanced against the enemy's position. On the left or

[Official photograph.

LONDON GUNNERS LOADING A HEAVY GUN.

western side of the wood progress was delayed, when the open country was reached, by an enfilading machine gun. An officer with a small group of his men hastily built a barricade which received the stream of bullets, and our troops on the right coming up soon put it out of action. Then the advance continued some 500 yards along and on both sides of the Longueval-Flers-Bapaume road to the summit of the ridge, whence they looked down on the village of Flers, our machine guns greatly assisting the operation. It was reckoned that we had sprinkled the ground north of the wood with no less than 999,500 bullets on that day, an expenditure of ammunition which five years before would have been regarded as impossible and foolish.

GERMAN PRISONERS, GRAVE AND GAY.

The attack on the left had met with little resistance. On the right, in the direction of Ginchy, the fight went on after sunset, and well into the next day, until the redoubt at the north-eastern angle of the wood and the other posts of the enemy were in our possession. Thus the way from this point to Combles *viâ* Ginchy was opened. Of the nature of the fighting a vivid idea is given by an officer's letter. It is, moreover, valuable as showing the actual arrangement of the four companies of the battalion, which may be regarded as typical of the method usually employed by our infantry on such occasions.

We have just finished our "act" in a part of the so-called "Great Push," and, as perhaps you already guess, I am still alive! I will tell you a little about it.

For the last fortnight we have been working day and night in preparation for an offensive of our own. I and my two platoons were to be in the fourth line, two companies going over first, then one company, and then mine in reserve to come in for all the shelling and dig communications up to the front line. There was to be a bombardment, and at 5.45 we were to go over.

At 3 p.m. we were all in our places; all knew exactly their own job, and all waited for the minutes to go by. Quarter to four came at last, and our heavies started. Immediately the German lines became a mass of earth, bits of trees being tossed about in the air like the foam on giant waves—in fact, it looked for all the world like a heavy sea, only the waves were of earth. When the last 10 minutes came, intense fire was started. The ground rocked and swayed in the frightful din and force of explosions, and every one was deaf and dazed by the roar.

Finally, after what seemed years of waiting, 5.45 came, and I stood up and watched the two first companies go over, all strolling perfectly in line, all calmly smoking, while the few German survivors ran out like men demented, with hands up, yelling for mercy with the usual cry of "Kamerad, Kamerad!" Then the Huns started to barrage our old front line in which I and my two platoons were crouching. Shells fell all round us. Two or three times I was completely deafened, saw yellow

HAND-TO-HAND FIGHTING.

and red, got knocked down by the concussion, and still didn't get hit.

My time came, and we went on to do our job of digging, right in the middle of all the shelling. I got the men started and then just waited to get blown to bits. I saw shells falling amongst small groups of men, and sometimes German prisoners; sometimes our men were simply scattering to pieces in the air. Then a curious thing happened. All of a sudden rapid rifle fire and machine-gun fire opened into us, and I gave the order to drop tools, fix bayonets, and get into position to meet an attack, or, if necessary, to attack. I thought our front line had been broken, but couldn't be certain what had happened, for everything was smoke and flying earth with trees falling and being blown skywards.

I gave the order to crawl forward towards the firing, and then I saw that about 30 Germans with a machine-gun had, after surrendering, taken up their arms again, and were firing at us. I felt something burn my neck, but took no notice. We crawled steadily forward and then started throwing bombs. Again I felt something burn my back and I shot the German who had fired at me. About three minutes later the Germans surrendered to me, and although I was going to order my men to kill them all for their treachery, I thought better of it, got hold of their captain, and got some information out of him in French, and then sent them back under escort.

[Official photograph.

A TRENCH COUNCIL: TWO GENERALS AND THEIR STAFFS AT THE FRONT.

Two companies of the enemy, from the direction of Ginchy, counter-attacked during the night (24th-25th), but were driven back by machine-gun fire. The Lewis gun was proving invaluable. For example, the Germans had a machine gun concealed in a crater. It held up the advance at this point until a Lewis gun was pushed over the crater's edge and wiped out the gun team.* In addition to our successes in the Thiépval and Delville Wood regions, our airmen had engaged and driven down damaged a number of enemy aeroplanes, and several trains had been hit on the German lines of communication.

While Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops were slowly debouching from Delville Wood on Flers and Ginchy, the French, after a two-days' bombardment of terrific intensity, attacked on August 24, at 5 p.m., the Germans who still lurked in part of Maurepas and the trenches north and south of the village. The left wing of the assaulting infantry, assisted by a British demonstration south of Guillemont, swarmed over the Maurepas-Ginchy road and penetrated to the north of the Clery-Combles railway. In the centre the Germans were cleared from the ruins still defended by them in Maurepas and from two lines of trenches in the open ground beyond. South-east of Maurepas our Allies got astride of Hill 121. The First Division of the Prussian Guard had,

* The Lewis gun can be fired from the shoulder—*i.e.*, it is a one-man weapon. The Maxim cannot be so employed.



THE FRENCH ATTACK ON MAUREPAS: PASSING A BARBED-WIRE FENCE.

under the eyes of Prince Eitel Friedrich, suffered a bloody reverse. Eight field guns, 10 machine-guns, and some 600 prisoners had been captured, and the French line had been advanced 200 yards on a front of a mile and a quarter. At 8 p.m. the French dug themselves in and awaited counter-attacks. One came during the night. As the western side of Hill 121 commanded Maurepas, it was natural that the Germans should make every effort to recover it. The enemy's masses advanced boldly, but under the shell and machine-gun fire were unable to attain their object. Reluctantly the German Higher Command had to content itself by circulating another false statement: "The village of Maurepas," it admitted, "is at present in French hands, but between Maurepas and the Somme the French attack met with no success." Hill 121 *is* between Maurepas and the Somme.

So cowed was the enemy by his experiences on the 24th that, apart from some fighting in the neighbourhood of Delville Wood, no attempt was made to recover the lost positions till late on the 25th, when at 7 p.m. the German batteries bombarded the British first-line trenches along the greater portion of our front south of the Ancre until early in the morning of Saturday, August 26, and at 7.45 p.m. the Prussian Guards were thrown in two waves at the Wilts and Worcesters. The attack was pressed with determination, but repulsed with heavy loss to the foe. We, on the other hand, made further progress to the east of Mouquet Farm, and also along the Courcelette-Thiépval road. At the right extremity of our line the British trenches west of Guillemont, between the Quarries and the Montauban-Guillemont road, were ineffectually attacked. At 10 p.m. a German reconnaissance in the direction of Hill 121 was dispersed. The British counter-batteries that day, the 25th, destroyed or damaged many of the enemy's positions, and the French artillery, as usual, had been active with good effect.

On Saturday, August 26, the fighting continued round Mouquet Farm, and in the evening we captured 200 yards of German trench north of Bazentin-le-Petit, and a machine-gun. The weather had again become bad, and the Allied operations were consequently hindered. A heavy storm overtook eight of our aeroplanes, and five machines did not return to their aerodrome.

On Sunday, August 27, there was considerable artillery activity on both sides, and we gained some ground north-west of Ginchy. This period of relative rest was, according to the German *communiqués*, one of constant fighting, in which, according to their own account, the Germans were successful. Thus the *communiqué* of August 27 was to the following effect:

North of the Somme, yesterday morning and during the night, the British, after strong artillery preparations, made repeated attacks south of Thiépval and north-west of Pozières, which were repulsed partially, after bitter hand-to-hand fights. We captured one officer and 60 men.

Advances north of Bazentin-le-Petit and grenade fighting at the Foureaux Wood were also unsuccessful for the enemy.

In the Maurepas-Clery sector the French, after a violent artillery fire and the use of flame throwers, brought up strong forces to an unsuccessful attack. North of Clery we repulsed parties which had penetrated there.

South of the Somme grenade attacks west of Vermandovillers were repulsed.

On Monday, August 28, in spite of the vile weather, we gained a little ground eastward of Delville Wood, and some minor enterprises near Mouquet Farm were successful. Our long-range guns hit troops and wagons in different places between Miraumont and Bapaume. The next day, Tuesday, August 29, in the

afternoon a heavy storm burst, but nevertheless we continued to gain ground between the western outskirts of Guillemont and Ginchy. Between Delville Wood and High Wood hostile defences were captured, and south-east of Thiépval further progress was made and a machine-gun captured. An attack by the enemy near Pozières windmill was dispersed, and during the night of the 29th-30th, West Australians and men from New South Wales went at a run over the slippery clay and entered Mouquet Farm, and trenches north-east of it. There was some close hand-to-hand fighting, after which our men returned to their own lines. The bad weather continued on the 30th, and the only incident of note was our capture of a small salient south of Martinpuich, taking prisoners 4 officers and 120 men. In the evening the rain ceased.

The importance of the British gains in High Wood and Delville Wood was too well understood by the German leaders for them to resign themselves patiently to the loss of that sector, the key to the crest of the main ridge. On Wednesday, August 30, every gun that could be brought to bear on the British lines between Bazentin-le-Petit and Longueval, poured out shells throughout the day, and towards evening an attack was launched on our trenches in the vicinity of High Wood. Caught by machine-gun, trench-mortar, and artillery fire, the enemy's troops hesitated, and then drew back into their shelters, leaving behind them heaps of killed and wounded. Even fresh troops could not stand such punishment. That the spirit of many of the Germans on the battlefield was shaken may be gathered from a German regimental order dated the next day, which was subsequently secured by us.

I must state with the greatest regret that the regiment during this change of position, had to take notice of the sad fact that the men of four of the companies, inspired by shameful cowardice, left their companies on their own initiative and did not move into line. To the hesitating and fainthearted in the regiment I would say the following: "What the Englishman can do the German can do also, or if, on the other hand, the Englishman really is a better and superior being, he would be quite justified in his aims as regards this war, namely, the extermination of the German. There is a further point to be noted. This is the first time we have been in the line on the Somme, and, what is more, we are there at a time when things are more calm. The English regiments opposing us, as has been established, have been in the firing line for the second, and in some cases even for the third time. Heads up and play the man."

In another order, bearing the date of September 18, which was found in a captured dugout, there was the following passage:

Proofs are multiplying of men leaving the position without permission or reporting, and hiding at the rear. It is our duty, each at his post, to deal with this fact with energy and success.

The next day, Thursday, August 31, after an intense bombardment, no less than five attacks were made on a front of some 3,000 yards between High Wood and Ginchy. Four times the British, in their muddy, waterlogged trenches, beat off the Germans, but



THE FRENCH ATTACK ON MAUREPAS: CROSSING A DESERTED TRENCH.

their fifth charge was more successful. On the north-west of Delville Wood we were obliged to give ground, and our advanced posts

A LOOK-OUT.

[Official photographs.

NEAR DELVILLE WOOD: BRINGING UP STONE FOR REPAIR OF TRENCHES.

beyond the north-east of this point were forced some distance back. At one part a few of the enemy penetrated into the wreckage. All, with the exception of 21, who were taken prisoners, were promptly killed.

The time had now come for a further advance against the German lines from Ginchy to Clery-sur-Somme, and, south of the Somme, from Barleux to Chilly. While the preparations for it were in progress, the British and French, except at one or two points along the front of battle, desisted from any infantry offensive. But on the night of Friday, September 1, we recovered the trenches north-west of Delville Wood taken from us by the enemy the day before. On September 2, the only infantry action consisted of some bombing encounters.

During both days the British, French, and German artillery was active, and on Saturday the enemy's guns discharged large numbers of gas shells at our positions. South of Estrées the Germans recovered some trenches lost by them to our Allies on August 31.

There were also a considerable number of aerial combats. On September 1 a British airman encountered a squadron of twelve Rolands. It dived in amongst them, firing a drum of ammunition from its machine gun, and broke up their formation. Then the British pilot swiftly placed himself beneath the nearest enemy machine, and another drum was discharged at it from below. The Roland, badly damaged, plunged to earth,

A WATER-LOGGED TRENCH.

south-east of Bapaume. Another company of hostile machines flew to avenge their comrade. The British aeroplane attacked one of the enemy's, which went down and landed in a



[Official photograph.

A STORM-TOSSED AEROPLANE LANDS UPSIDE DOWN.
In this accident, however, no one was hurt, nor was the machine badly damaged.

gap between two woods. After battling with the rest and expending all his ammunition, the lieutenant in charge of the British machine returned safely to his base. The same evening another lieutenant, single-handed, attacked a German group of eight aeroplanes in the air over Bapaume. One was sent spinning downwards to its destruction. On September 1 the French aeronauts accounted for four German machines, Adjutant Dorme bringing his "bag" up to eight, by emptying at close quarters his machine gun into a German aeroplane above Combles. It came crashing to the ground east of the village. On the other hand, the Germans claimed to have put out of action on Saturday six of the Allied aeroplanes.

Be that as it may, it is certain that on Saturday four more German aeroplanes were badly damaged in encounters with the French, and that, to distract the German commanders, numerous British and French bombarding squadrons crossed the German lines and dropped bombs. A naval aeroplane in the afternoon bombarded the shipbuilding yards at Hoboken, near Antwerp. The French squadrons once more visited the railway station of Metz-Sablons, throwing 86 120 mm. bombs on the buildings and railway trenches, and 60 bombs of the same size on military establishments north of Metz. Two hundred and ten bombs were allotted to the stations of Maizières-les-Metz, Conflans, Sedan, and Autun-le-Roman, and to the cantonments and depôts at Guiscard, Ham, Monchy-Lagache, Nesle, and Athies. These raids were a fitting prelude to the great battle which was to be joined the next day, Sunday, September 3, between the Ancre and the region south of Chaulnes.

Up the roads leading to the hostile fronts streamed countless motor-lorries carrying ammunition and supplies. The main and light railways were full of trains. Concealment of our intentions from the Germans was impossible. They were aware that we were about to attack, and made their arrangements to meet us. Reinforcements from the Eastern and from other sections of the Western front were being brought by train or motors or were marching to the line Bapaume-Roye. In anticipation of the coming onslaught the German artillery on Saturday and throughout the night of September 2–3 hurled myriads of projectiles on spots, like the Trônes Wood, where they suspected that the British or French were concentrating the troops about to take part in a struggle which might prove to be decisive. Most, if not all, of the Prussian Guard had been brought up, and so dangerous did the German Higher Command consider the position to be that in the Guillemont region alone they massed the whole of the 2nd Bavarian Corps, and the 11th and 56th Divisions.

The first step of the new Allied offensive

[Official photograph.

MACHINE GUNNERS PREPARED FOR AN ATTACK UNDER COVER OF POISON-GAS.

was taken during Sunday, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, September 3, 4, 5 and 6. It was preceded by a bombardment even more severe than any which had preceded it. Feint attacks were also made on both sides of the Ancre and near Thiépval. Throughout the night of September 2-3 an almost continuous zone of fire seemed to stretch for 30 miles south of the Ancre. The horizon, to watchers in the background, appeared to be ablaze. When day broke the German lines were seen everywhere blotted out by the fumes from exploding shells, amid which could here and there be seen thrown up into the air the masses of timber, brick, and the various materials used by the Germans in constructing their defences. From behind the lines squadrons of aeroplanes rose and engaged one another above the dull and gas-laden atmosphere.

Dawn was breaking when the momentary cessation of our guns far off on the left beyond Thiépval indicated that Sir Hubert Gough's troops were advancing against the Germans north and south of the Ancre. As in the battle of July 1, Sir Douglas Haig had hoped by a demonstration against the northern face of the Thiépval salient to deceive the enemy's leaders as to his intentions. The position to be assaulted was indeed formidable. From the river-bed the ground rose on the left to the ridge, in a crease of which lies Beaumont Hamel, on the right to the Thiépval plateau. Under Beaumont Hamel were huge caves filled with the German reserves, many of whom had also shelter in the trenches and dug-outs on the slopes of the Ancre Valley.

The destructive bombardment had wrecked the German parapets, filled in their trenches, blocked up the entrances to their dug-outs, and converted the ground to be traversed into a collection of pits formed by the craters of the exploding shells. The British north of the Ancre speedily crashed through the first and second German lines, sweeping away all opposition. But on the right, south of the Ancre, the attack was held up by shell fire, and soon the troops north of the river were enfiladed by machine-gun fire and artillery fire and counter-attacked. As the day wore on it was seen that no advantage would be gained by their remaining in the conquered area. They were slowly withdrawn, and the bombardment was once more renewed.

Almost simultaneously with the attack in this region, the Anzacs assaulted the southern face of the Thiépval salient at Mouquet Farm, now a waste of battered rubbish lying among broken tree-trunks. They were opposed by the Reserve Regiment of the 1st Division of the Prussian Guard. The struggle was of the most stubborn and bloody description. Through shrapnel and machine-gun fire the Anzac soldiers came to grips with the Kaiser's picked troops. Into one of the roomy under-

ground villas a party of our men descended. It was apparently untenanted, and the Anzacs were leisurely appropriating some of the cigars left by the late occupants when a number of Germans entered and called upon them to surrender. "Surrender be d——d!" was the reply. "Surrender yourselves!" Bombs were flung at and by the intruders, and in the smoke-filled cavern the combatants swayed to and fro for several minutes. Finally the surviving Anzacs got the upper hand and emerged into the open, driving before them a few wounded and cowed prisoners. The result of the Mouquet Farm action was that at the end of it our troops were well beyond the ruins and on the high ground to the north-west, and were holding the position won. There they were ineffectually counter-attacked on the next day.

The actions on both banks of the Ancre and at Mouquet Farm in the early hours of September 3 were, as mentioned, feints on the part of the British. It was at noon that the main attacks of the British and French were delivered north and south of the Somme. The position held by Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops, who were facing east, ran from the east of Delville Wood southward to near Guillemont Station, and thence by the quarry at the western edge of Guillemont to near the head of the ravine which runs westward from Angle Wood. Sir Henry's immediate objectives were Ginchy, Guillemont, and the German trenches from Guillemont through Wedge Wood—a small patch of trees—to the redoubt of Falfemont Farm which faced Angle Wood. Behind Falfemont Farm and east of Ginchy and Guillemont lay on high ground a long, narrow wood, Leuze Wood, the northern end of which was known as Bouleaux Wood. Here among the as yet untouched trees the German reserves were hidden. From the lower end of Leuze Wood a narrow spur 500 yards long extends south-westwards. Wedge Wood was in the valley on the Guillemont side, Falfemont Farm at the end of the spur. Beyond and below Leuze Wood in a deep wooded valley was Combles. To facilitate the French movements from Maurepas towards the heights east of Combles, Sir Henry Rawlinson at 9 a.m. had launched an attack against Falfemont Farm. Our troops reached the farm, but could not hold it. This strong outpost of the enemy was not taken till the morning of September 5.

While the Germans were clinging desperately to Falfemont Farm, the Irish, Londoners and

HEAVY FRENCH ARTILLERY AND MOTOR LORRIES ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT.

North Countrymen, at noon on Sunday, assaulted Guillemont and the fortified areas north and south of the ruined village, in which the only thoroughfare now discernible was the slightly depressed highway running through the centre of the shapeless heaps of masonry to Leuze Wood and Combles. This highway was crossed 500 yards east of Guillemont by a sunken road connecting Ginchy with Wedge Wood, and along the sunken road were rows of deep dug-outs, especially on the south-western and southern sides of the village. One wrecked and battered barn, all of Guillemont that remained, served to guide the British to their objective. Every other edifice in the village had long before been pounded into shapeless fragments, or resolved into dust. Expecting the attack, the German artillery had discharged at our front lines in the morning, among other projectiles, a large number of gas shells.

The garrison of Guillemont consisted of Prussian Guards and Hanoverians. They had been driven into their subterranean refuges by the storm of shells which preceded the British advance. Some of the defenders who ventured to show their heads were blinded by the smoke, dust and fumes. In such a murky atmosphere the periscope was useless. Nothing could be seen, and little heard but ear-splitting explosions. Then, accompanied by a wild burst of cheering and the shrill wailing of the war-pipes, waves of Irishmen burst over the northern section of Guillemont. The first, second, and third lines of the enemy were passed and the sunken road beyond reached in one rush. To the right of the Irish, Londoners and North Countrymen moved coolly forward at the heels of the advancing barrage of shells. The combination of Celtic and English troops was irresistible.



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS AROUND GUILLEMONT AND GINCHY.

[Official photograph.

THE RUINED STATION AT GUILLEMONT

Prussians and Hanoverians who had emerged from their holes and were firing at the backs of the Irish were taken in flank by platoons of an English battalion engaged in methodically rounding up the enemy in the quarry and southern section of Guillemont. A hollow road leading south-west from Guillemont was cleared of the Germans. There 150 corpses were afterwards counted and numbers of prisoners taken. The quarry north of it gave considerable trouble, as the defenders kept below ground until the assailants had passed, after which they emerged and fired at the backs of the British pressing eastwards. A detachment was speedily directed to storm the quarry, and soon cries of "Kamerad!" and "Mercy!" told that the task had been accomplished. Meanwhile from Guillemont station our men had swept round the northern edge of the village, and from Arrow Head copse to the south other British troops had pushed up to meet them. At last the village which had so long resisted us was taken, and, undeterred by machine-gun fire from Ginchy, Wedge Wood and Falfemont Farm, Irish and English pressed on, cleared out the Germans from their refuges along the sunken road, and dug themselves in. The German 73rd, 76th and 164th Regiments had ceased to exist. The headlong flight of some Hanoverians was bitterly commented on by a Prussian officer who, however, had permitted himself to be taken prisoner: "They run well," he said to his captors, "they will be in Berlin before I am in England!" Of the prisoners, some forced into the open by sulphur bombs were weeping. Six out of 43 occupants of a dug-out on the Ginchy-Wedge Wood road sobbed as they crawled into the presence of a bombing party, and begged for quarter. An officer—spectacled and elderly—went on his knees before a British sergeant. Many Germans offered watches and trinkets in the hope of saving their lives. But it was explained to them that British soldiers were not thieves.

The capture of Guillemont was succeeded by the seizure of Ginchy, and the systematic bombardment of Leuze Wood, but in the afternoon and evening the Germans counter-attacked at Ginchy and Guillemont. They succeeded in recovering the former, but were repulsed with terrible loss at Guillemont. Meanwhile north of Delville Wood and away to the north-west of it in High Wood we had gained ground. Rain again fell in the evening and impeded the advance.

The next day, Monday, September 4, Sir Henry Rawlinson's offensive was resumed. Through the night and the morning of the 4th the bombardment, now chiefly directed against Ginchy, Leuze and Wedge Woods and Falfemont Farm, had continued. The rain ceased

and the sun shone on the battlefield. Ginchy was assaulted, and at 3 p.m. our troops from the sunken road charged into Wedge Wood, and carried it and the trench beyond it. Falfemont Farm—or rather its site—was also attacked from the north and south and momentarily taken. Suddenly a solid line of Prussian Guards emerged from Leuze Wood and charged over the high ground towards Wedge Wood and the farm which lay on the slope of the ridge opposite Angle Wood. As the oncoming infantry reached the edge of the ravine it was swept by shrapnel and riddled by machine-gun fire. After a desperate struggle Wedge Wood remained in our possession, but Falfemont Farm was reoccupied by the enemy. Meanwhile parties of our men from the sunken road had penetrated into Leuze Wood, and many hardly fought combats had taken place in the ruins of Ginchy.

On the morning of Tuesday, September 5, Falfemont Farm was taken, but the Germans were still entrenched in the greater part of Ginchy, where attack and counter-attack had succeeded one another in rapid succession. By the evening of the same day we held Leuze Wood firmly, and it was completely cleared of the Germans the next day. We had by then advanced on a front of two miles to an average depth of nearly one mile. We had disposed of thousands of the enemy, including large numbers of prisoners, and many machine-guns. Seldom had the tenacity of the British soldier been exhibited to greater advantage than in this four days' battle.

The battle of the Somme during this period was equally memorable in the annals of our gallant Ally. North of the river at noon on September 3, when the British were advancing against Guillemont, General Fayolle, after a tremendous bombardment, flung his infantry at the German trenches from the northern environs of Maurepas, to the western outskirts of Clery-sur-Somme (a length of 3¾ miles). The 2nd Bavarian Corps, stimulated by Hindenburg's recent visit, barred the way, but the onset of the *poilus* was irresistible. They drove the enemy up the eastern side of the Combles Valley almost to the northern edge of Combles; they stormed Le Forest and carried the German trenches between it and Clery-sur-Somme. They also in places crossed the Combles-Clery-sur-Somme road. The latter village was taken, and a German counter-attack south of Le Forest was caught under the fire of French batteries and completely dispersed. Two thousand unwounded prisoners, 14 guns, and 50 machine-guns were captured in this most successful action. During the night the French gains were consolidated, and the next day the advance was continued. The French forward movement east of Le Forest outflanked the Hôpital Farm and occupied the crest of the ridge to the west of the Bois Marrières. Several sorties from Combles were broken by machine-gun fire and by artillery barrages. Five hundred more prisoners and 10 machine-guns were brought in by the victors. During the night torrential rain hindered the operations, and the enemy took advantage of the lull to attempt a counter-attack. Debouching from the wood of Anderlu, north of Le Forest, he endeavoured to pierce the new French line between Combles and Le Forest; but the artillery and machine-guns soon stopped it. On Tuesday, September 5, the French reached the western border of Anderlu Wood, captured the Hôpital Farm and the Rainette Wood, entered the Marrières Wood, north-east of Clery-sur-Somme, and occupied the end of the ridge across which runs the road from Clery to Bouchavesnes. South of the Somme, Omiécourt, at the edge of the river bank, was taken and the southern brought into line with the northern sector. The Colonial troops carried the village at the point of the bayonet in 40 minutes. The remnant of the enemy's garrison endeavoured to escape but were stopped at the level crossing of the Bapaume-Péronne light railway and forced to surrender. By this time 24 heavy and 8 field guns, 2 bomb mortars, 2 trench guns, a depôt of 150 mm. shells, a captive balloon, and numerous machine-guns had been wrested from the Germans. During Wednesday, September 6, nothing of importance occurred on the French front north of the Somme, but in the night of the 6th–7th, violent counter-attacks were made on the French garrison in the trenches at Hôpital Farm. They were all stopped by artillery barrages.

Thus, by the evening of September 6, Sir Henry Rawlinson's right wing ran from the western edge of Ginchy through Leuze Wood to the edge of the ridge overlooking Combles, and the extremity of General Fayolle's left wing was across the Combles Valley, in the woods just south of the village. Thence the French line went south-westwards through



CAPTURE OF FALFEMONT FARM.



THE GROUND OVER WHICH THE FRENCH ADVANCED.

the wood of Anderlu by Hôpital Farm into the wood of Marrières. Thence it turned southwards and touched the Somme just east of Clery-sur-Somme. The reduction of Combles and the advance on Sailly-Sallisel would not long be delayed. Through Clery-sur-Somme the French Commander was also in a position to aim a blow at Mt. St. Quentin, the northern key to Péronne, and the Péronne-Bapaume highway.

While Sir Henry Rawlinson and General Fayolle were moving on Combles, the French Somme, the French south-west of Barleux carried three trenches and advanced over a mile to the outskirts of Berny and Deniécourt. Farther south they secured Soyécourt, capturing a battalion, and also progressed farther in Vermandovillers, where there were sanguinary encounters in and around the church.

At 2 p.m. the new French Army, under General Micheler, came into action, but it was not till approaching 5 p.m. that a breach was made in the German lines slightly north of Chilly. Through it poured the victorious

AFTER THE CAPTURE OF GUILLEMONT: THE RETURN OF THE IRISH BRIGADE.

south of the Somme had not been idle. On Monday, September 4, Fayolle's right wing, in conjunction with a new French Army, deployed south of Vermandovillers, and delivered battle between Barleux and Chilly, a village south of Lihons, along a front of over 12 miles. Barleux, attacked since July, again and again had held out, and at the opening of the battle the French line ran from the west of Barleux south-westwards to Belloy-en-Santerre, then to the west of Soyécourt and through the north-western portion of Vermandovillers by the Soyécourt-Lihons road to the district west of Chilly. After a very severe bombardment analogous to those which had been such a feature of the recent fighting north of the French infantry, and by 5 p.m. the enemy had retired to his second position, leaving behind him 1,200 prisoners and several guns and machine-guns. The whole of Chilly was abandoned to the French, who also seized Hill 86 and entered the western fringes of Chaulnes Wood. South of Chilly the French heavy artillery caught and dispersed enemy troops moving along the Liaucourt-Fouches road. During the day 2,700 prisoners had been captured south of the Somme, and the French had made an appreciable advance towards the Péronne-Roye high road. Six counter-attacks delivered by troops hurried up from the Roye region were beaten off, chiefly by shell fire, and the French were left to consolidate during the

night their new positions, which turned out very wet. Several assaults in the neighbourhood of Belloy were repulsed, and 100 more prisoners secured.

Tuesday, September 5, was another successful day for our Allies in the operations south of the Somme. Massed charges of the Germans occurred at numerous points, notably between Barleux and Belloy and between Belloy and Soyécourt. They were made in vain, and the French, after inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, retained their hold on the ground they had captured. East of Soyécourt our Allies, driving the enemy before them, reached the north-western and southern borders of Deniécourt Park, which, with its chateau, had been strongly fortified, and between Soyécourt and Chilly they carried a salient and numerous works south of Vermandovillers. The total prisoners taken had now risen to 4,047, including 55 officers. Counter-attacks in the Berny-en-Santerre and Deniécourt regions were smashed by barrages.

On Wednesday, the 6th, in the afternoon, the right wing of General Fayolle's Army stormed German trenches south-east of Belloy, carried most of the village of Berny-en-Santerre and advanced as far as the southern projection of the park. The French were now across the Barleux-Chaulnes road, and their guns were able to dominate Barleux from the south as well as from the north. The northern portion of Vermandovillers was completely cleared of the enemy as far as the Vermandovillers-Estrées road, and the Etoile Wood was captured. South of Vermandovillers the troops of Micheler's Army expelled the Germans from the long plateau north of the Chilly-Hallu road and attacked the enemy trenches on the eastern slopes at the foot of which ran the Chaulnes-Roye railway. Round the junction of the Amiens-St. Quentin and Roye - Chaulnes-Péronne railways the struggle raged till 6 p.m. The entrenchments here were particularly strong, but the French succeeded in storming them. At sunset our Allies were within a few hundred yards of Chaulnes station. Their artillery had crushed a sugar factory with munition depôts north of it, and east of Chilly the troops of a Saxon Division, hurried up from the Aisne front, had met with a bloody reverse. Later the Germans debouched from Horgny, and attacked again and again between Barleux and Berny: but artillery barrages



LIGHT RAILWAY BEHIND THE FRENCH LINES.

prevented them from reaching the French lines. In the day's fighting 400 and more prisoners had been captured.

During the night of the 6th-7th 16 French bombarding aeroplanes dropped heavy bombs on Villecourt, a village on the Somme, between Péronne and Ham, on Athies, through which passes the Péronne-Ham highroad, and on Roisel, a station between Péronne and Cambrai, and the enemy vainly attacked the French between Berny and Chaulnes. Four times his artillery deluged the French positions south of Vermandovillers with high explosive and shrapnel shell, and after each bombardment the Germans in masses advanced to recover the ground lost by them in the course of the preceding days. At no point, however, were they successful. Two hundred more prisoners were captured, and on the 7th our Allies carried some more trenches east of Deniécourt.

Thus, between September 4 and 7, Generals Fayolle and Micheler south of the Somme had cut the Roye-Péronne railway, loosened the hold of the Germans on Chaulnes, and driven a wedge into the enemy's zone of fortifications between Chaulnes and Barleux. North of the Somme the French from Clery had moved nearer to Mont St. Quentin, which defended Péronne from an attack down the Bapaume-Péronne road and the guns on which protected the fortified village of Barleux. The left wing of General Fayolle now extended northwards from the east of Clery to the southern environs of Combles.

GENERAL FAYOLLE AND HIS CHIEF OF THE STAFF.

Across the Combles valley the right wing of Sir Henry Rawlinson on September 7 stretched from Falfemont Farm by the wood of Leuze to the western outskirts of Ginchy. Generals Fayolle and Micheler now suspended their offensive, while Sir Henry Rawlinson made preparations for the storming of Ginchy and the expulsion of the Germans between Ginchy and the Bois des Bouleaux, the long strip of woodland running north-eastwards out of the wood of Leuze. These preparations were made on the 7th and 8th, during which there was fighting—on the 8th—round Mouquet Farm, in High Wood and at Vermandovillers, where the French advanced and captured 50 prisoners.

In beautiful but misty weather Sir Henry Rawlinson struck his blow on Saturday, September 9, in the presence of the British Premier, Mr. Asquith, who had been spending some days in the Somme area. The troops detailed for the operation were drawn from Ireland and England. The line of battle ran from the north-east of Pozières by High Wood and Ginchy to Leuze Wood.

After the usual intense preliminary bombardment the troops at 4.45 p.m. went forward over their parapets. On the southern side of the Pozières-Bapaume road towards Martinpuich they carried a series of trenches and captured 62 unwounded prisoners. Soon after 9 p.m. the victors beat off a counter-attack, inflicting heavy losses. The attack in High Wood was also successful, our men advancing 300 yards on a 600 yards front. It was, however, the assaults on Ginchy and the ground from Ginchy to Leuze Wood which were the crowning triumph of the day.

Ginchy and the area south-east of it were defended by fresh troops, the 19th Bavarian Division supplying the garrison of the village, and troops of the 185th Division lining the trenches from Ginchy to the north-western end of Leuze Wood. At 4.45 p.m. the Irish

A PATROL IN CHAULNES WOOD.

made for Ginchy. The ruins—especially those of a farm near the centre of the village—bristled with machine-guns. This attack was graphically described by an officer who took part in it. He wrote:

We were in reserve. The front line was some 500 or 600 yards higher up the slope nearer Ginchy. We knew that a big attack was coming off that day, but did not think we should be called upon to take part. Accordingly, we settled down for the day, and most of the men slept. I felt quite at home, as I sat in the bottom of the deep trench, reading the papers I had received the previous day from home. I went through *The Times*, and was much interested in its *Japanese Supplement*, for the memories it brought back of many happy days in Dai Nippon were vivid ones.

It was about four o'clock in the afternoon when we first learned that we should have to take part in the attack on Ginchy. We were ordered to move up into the front line to reinforce; none of us knew for a certainty whether we were going over the top or not, but everything seemed to point that way. Our shells bursting in the village of Ginchy made it belch forth smoke like a volcano. The Hun shells were bursting on the slope in front of us. The noise was deafening. I turned to my servant O'Brien, who has always been a cheery, optimistic soul, and said, "Well, O'Brien, how do you think we'll fare?" and his answer was for once not encouraging. "We'll never come out alive, sir," was his answer. Happily we both came out alive.

It was at this moment, just as we were debouching on to the scragged front line of trench, that we beheld a scene which stirred and thrilled us to the depths of our souls. The great charge of the Irish had begun, and we had come up in the nick of time. Mere words must fail to convey anything like a true picture of the scene, but it is burned into the memory of all those who were there and saw it. Between the outer fringe of Ginchy and the front line of our own trenches is No Man's Land, a wilderness of pits so close together that you could ride astraddle the partitions between any two of them. As you look half right, obliquely down along No Man's Land, you behold a great host of yellow-coated men rise out of the earth and surge forward and upward in a torrent—not in extended order, as you might expect, but in one mass. There seems to be no end to them. Just when you think the flood is subsiding, another wave comes surging up the bend towards Ginchy. We joined in on the left. There was no time for us any more than the others to get into extended order. We formed another stream converging on the others at the summit.

By this time we were all wildly excited. Our shouts and yells alone must have struck terror into the Huns, who were firing their machine-guns down the slope. But there was no wavering in the Irish host. We couldn't run. We advanced at a steady walking pace, stumbling here and there, but going ever onward and upward. That numbing dread had now left me completely. Like the others I was intoxicated with the glory of it all. I can remember shouting and bawling to the men of my platoon, who were only too eager to go on.

The Hun barrage had now been opened in earnest, and shells were falling here, there, and everywhere in No Man's Land. They were mostly dropping on our right, but they were coming nearer and nearer, as if a screen were being drawn across our front. I knew that it was a case of "Now or never," and stumbled on feverishly. We managed to get through the barrage in the nick of time, for it closed behind us, and after that we had no shells to fear in front of us.

I mention merely as an interesting fact in psychology how in a crisis of this sort one's mental faculties are sharpened. Instinct told us when the shells were coming gradually closer to crouch down in the holes until they had passed. Acquired knowledge, on the other hand—the knowledge instilled into one by lectures and books (of which I have only read one—namely, Haking's "Company Training")—told us that it was safer in the long run to push ahead before the enemy got our range, and it was acquired knowledge that won.

And here another observation I should like to make by the way. I remember reading somewhere—I think it was in a book by Winston Churchill—that of the Battle of Omdurman the writer could recollect nothing in the way of noise. He had an acute visual recollection of all that went on about him, but his aural recollection was *nil*: he could only recall the scene as if it were a cinematograph picture. Curiously this was my own experience at Ginchy. The din must have been deafening (I learned afterwards that it could be heard miles away), yet I have only a confused remembrance of it.

How long we were in crossing No Man's Land I don't know. It could not have been more than five minutes, yet it seemed much longer. We were now well up to the Boche. We had to clamber over all manner of obstacles—fallen trees, beams, great mounds of brick and rubble—in fact, over the ruins of Ginchy. It seems like a nightmare to me now. I remember seeing comrades falling round me. My sense of hearing returned to me, for I became conscious of a new sound—namely, the pop, pop, pop, pop of machine-guns, and the continuous crackling of rifle fire. By this time all units were mixed up, but they were all Irishmen. They were cheering and cheering like mad. There was a machine-gun playing on us near by, and we all made for it.

At this moment we caught our first sight of the Huns. They were in a trench of sorts, which ran in and out among the ruins. Some of them had their hands up. Others were kneeling and holding their arms out to us. Still others were running up and down the trench distractedly as if they didn't know which way to go, but as we got closer they went down on their knees, too. To the everlasting good name of the Irish soldiery, not one of these Huns, some of whom had been engaged in slaughtering our men up to the very last moment, was killed. I did not see a single instance of a prisoner being shot or bayoneted. When you remember that our men were worked up to a frenzy of excitement, this crowning act of mercy to their foes is surely to their eternal credit. They could feel pity even in their rage.



TRANSPORTING A HEAVY FRENCH GUN. [*French official photograph.*

By this time we had penetrated the German front line, and were on the first flat ground where the village once stood surrounded by a wood of fairly high trees. There was no holding the men back. They rushed through Ginchy, driving the Huns before them. The Hun dead were lying everywhere, some of them having been frightfully mangled by our shell fire. We dug in by linking up the shell craters, and though the men were tired (some wanted to smoke and others to make tea) they worked with a will, and before long we had got a pretty decent trench outlined.

I heard that when Captain ——'s company rushed a trench to our right, round the corner of the wood, a German officer surrendered in great style. He stood to attention, gave a clinking salute, and said in perfect English, "Sir, myself, this other officer and 10 men are your prisoners." Captain —— said, "Right you are, old chap!" and they shook hands, the prisoners being led away immediately. So you see there are certain amenities of battlefields. I believe our prisoners were all Bavarians, who are better mannered from all accounts than the Prussians. They could thank their stars they had Irish chivalry to deal with.

The trench (between ours and the wood) was stacked with German dead. It was full of *débris*, bombs, shovels, and what-not, and torn books, magazines, and newspapers. I came across a copy of Schiller's "Wallenstein."

Our men are very good to the German wounded. An Irishman's heart melts very soon. In fact, kindness and compassion for the wounded, our own and the enemy's, is about the only decent thing I have seen in war. It is not at all uncommon to see a British and German soldier side by side in the same shell-hole, nursing each other as best they can and placidly smoking cigarettes. A poor wounded Hun who hobbled into our trench in the morning, his face badly mutilated by a bullet—he whimpered and moaned as piteously as a child—was bound up by one of our officers, who took off his coat and set to work in earnest. Another Boche, whose legs were hit, was carried in by our men and put into a shell-hole for safety, where he lay awaiting the stretcher-bearers when we left. It is with a sense of pride that I can write this of our soldiers.

The first advance of the Irish carried them to the main road running through the centre of the village. The soldiers on the left reached it in eight minutes, those on the right were held up by machine-gun fire. A trench mortar was hurriedly brought forward, and the Germans forced to evacuate the emplacement. Another trench mortar silenced the mitrailleuses in the ruins of the farm above mentioned. At 5.30 p.m. a second rush carried the Irish out into the open. They pushed up the Ginchy-Morval road about 800 yards to the farther edge of the plateau. Thence they looked down on Morval. To the right of Ginchy the English troops had been no less successful. They had seized over 1,000 yards of trenches from a point just south of the Guillemont-Morval tramway to the south-west corner of Bouleaux Wood. Over 500 prisoners were taken on that and the succeeding days, and

A SHELL-HOLE AS COVER FOR A FIELD-GUN.

COLLECTING THE WOUNDED NEAR GINCHY AFTER THE BATTLE.

the total of prisoners captured since July 1 was raised to over 17,000. The French, who on Saturday carried a small wood and part of a trench east of Belloy, made fresh progress east of Deniécourt, and repulsed an attack north of Berny. Since September 3 in the region south of the Somme they had secured 7,600 German privates and some 100 officers.

As a result of the efforts of Sir Henry Rawlinson's Army, and particularly of the Irish troops from Connaught, Leinster and Munster, of the Rifle Regiments and the regiments from Warwickshire, Kent, Devonshire, Gloucestershire, Surrey, Cornwall, and from Wales and Scotland, the British line, from September 3 to September 9 had been pushed forward on a front of 6,000 yards to a depth varying from 300 to 3,000 yards. The enemy had lost all his observation posts on the main ridge with the exception of those in High Wood and north and north-east of Ginchy. He was being forced more and more to rely on reports from aeroplanes and captive balloons for the direction of his still very powerful artillery. We, on the other hand, had now a clear view of Courcelette, Martinpuich, Flers, Lesboeufs, Morval and Combles, the knots as it were in the next chain of defences between the British and the Bapaume-Péronne highway. By our victorious offensive through Ginchy and the Leuze Wood we dominated Combles and, consequently, were in a position materially to assist the left of General Fayolle in its projected advance on both sides of the Bapaume-Péronne road towards Sailly-Sallisel. From the eastern edge of the wood of Leuze to that important highway was but a distance of two miles and a half, and batteries established in the wood would be able to enfilade the German guns in the Bois St. Pierre Vaast seeking to impede the movement of Fayolle on Sailly-Sallisel, while from Ginchy a direct thrust at the last named village-fortress might be made through Morval by Sir Henry Rawlinson. Gradually the enemy was being pushed into the low-lying ground in the apex of the triangle Albert-Bapaume-Péronne, the western side of which was formed by the Amiens-Cambrai, the eastern by the Ham-Arras chaussée. The base of the triangle, almost to the gates of Péronne, was already in the possession of the Allies, and

they were on the ridge above Martinpuich half-way up the western side.

Perceiving the imminent danger he was running of having his main line of communication with Péronne cut by Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops debouching through Ginchy, the enemy, about noon on Sunday, September 10, attacked north of the village and was bloodily repulsed. A second attempt later in the day was equally unsuccessful. Small detachments of German infantry made ineffectual efforts to recover the trenches lost near Mouquet Farm in the vicinity of Pozières. Over 350 more prisoners and 3 machine-guns captured during the last 24 hours were brought in by our men.

[Official photograph.

PREPARATIONS FOR REMOVING A CAPTURED HOWITZER.

While General Baron von Marschall and General von Kirchbach were vainly striving to relax the grip of the British on the ridges between Thiépval and Combles, south of the Somme, General von Quast during the night of September 9–10 launched several attacks in the sector Barleux-Belloy. The *flammenwerfer* were once more employed, and the enemy managed to enter one of the French trenches. He was speedily ejected by a vigorous counter-attack, and four of his machine-guns were captured. To the south-west of Berny, to the east of Deniécourt, and to the south of Vermandovillers, German bombers advanced against the French lines, which had been previously subjected to severe shelling. Fierce hand-to-hand struggles ensued. Finally the Germans were thrown back all along the front, leaving behind a large number of dead. On Sunday, the 10th, two more attacks were made south-west of Berny. Both failed completely. During the night of the 10th–11th the enemy, undeterred by his heavy losses, delivered a series of charges south of the Somme. From Berny to the region Chaulnes-Chilly, no less than five attacks, in which the bombers were accompanied by bearers of *flammenwerfer*, were made. The French artillery and mitrailleuses scattered and thinned the advancing masses, the survivors of whom sullenly retreated to their own trenches. Meanwhile the French airmen had not been inactive. On the preceding Saturday, Adjutant Dorme had brought down his ninth aeroplane, which fell at Beaulencourt, south of Bapaume. Four other German machines were damaged—one in the region of La Maisonnette, the others to the north and east of Péronne. On Saturday night a squadron dropped 480 bombs on the stations and enemy depôts in the region of Chauny, south-east of Ham, an important point on the railway in the Oise Valley, and another squadron of 18 machines bombed military establishments at Ham on the Somme and between Ham and Péronne.

On Monday, September 11, the ascent of 16 German balloons north of Ginchy gave visible evidence that the Germans were no longer able to direct their guns from posts on the ground at this point. The day passed almost uneventfully save for the furious artillery duels. Our heavy guns caused two large conflagrations in an ammunition depôt at Grandcourt on the Ancre, north-east of Thiépval. During the night our trenches between Mouquet Farm and Delville Wood were heavily shelled. The battle-field round Guillemont and Ginchy was a gruesome sight. German corpses lay thickly



A WAGON IN DIFFICULTIES.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE AT THE FRONT, [Official photograph.
With (from left to right) M. Thomas, Sir Douglas Haig and General Joffre.

about the roads and craters. In one place straight rows of dead men clad in "field-grey" showed where a massed counter-attack had been caught by our machine-guns. The twisted iron frame of a goods wagon, the foundations of the railway station, and the concrete base of an observation post were now the sole indications that Guillemont had ever existed. South of the Somme the French with grenades beat off a German attack east of Belloy, and our Allies captured an enemy trench south of the cemetery of Berny.

The British having had time to consolidate their positions from Ginchy to Leuze Wood, from which positions they menaced Morval and Combles, General Fayolle decided to advance his left wing between Combles and the Somme.

On Tuesday, September 12, while Mr. Lloyd



FRESH PRISONERS ARRIVING AT A "CAGE." [Official photograph.

George was visiting the rear of the British salient, and desultory fighting was proceeding in High Wood and east of Ginchy, the turning movement which was designed to sever Combles from Sailly-Sallisel and to place the French astride of the Péronne-Bapaume road began. It was preceded by a terrific two days' bombardment of the enemy's lines, west and east of the road. These consisted of a belt of entrenchments descending from Morval to the banks of the Somme. Behind them on the road the villages of Rancourt, due east of Combles, and Bouchavesnes, due east of Maurepas, had been organized for defence with characteristic German thoroughness. Rancourt was just in front of the large wood of St. Pierre Vaast. On the country road from Combles to Rancourt, the farm of Le Priez had been converted into a small subterranean fortress. Between Cléry-sur-Somme and Péronne was the Canal du Nord, which, after crossing the Bapaume-Péronne road north of Mont St. Quentin, entered the river at Halle. Parallel with, close to, and east of the canal flowed the Tortille, a little tributary of the Somme.

On the morning of the 12th the French were on the western slopes of the little plateau, the summit of which was 76 metres high, and at whose eastern foot ran the Canal du Nord. Thence their line ascended just west of the long patch of woodland known as the Bois de Marrières, and curved north-westwards to the Bois d'Anderlu andthe southern outskirts of Combles. The front from which the advance started, when at 12.30 p.m. the guns lifted, was nearly four miles long. So admirably had the French artillery done its work that within half an hour the whole of the enemy's battered, crater-pitted trenches were in the possession of our Allies. On the left the infantry debouching from the wood of Anderlu passed round the Priez Farm and reached a little chapel 600 yards or so in front of Rancourt. Simultaneously the troops on Hill 111 mounted the western slopes of the plateau between them and the Bapaume-Péronne road and seized the summit of Hill 145. The Germans rallied behind a ruined windmill west of the road. Meanwhile the troops who had traversed the wood of Marrières, which they did not do till 4.30 p.m., the garrison there putting up a plucky fight, came up on the right, and the French guns placed a barrage east of the high road and prevented reinforcements coming up to the aid of the broken enemy. To check the oncoming French, masses of Germans charged out of

Combles and Frégicourt. Another barrage of shells stopped this flank attack. After several hours of stubborn fighting the Bapaume-Péronne road was gained. The French seized houses at the southern end of Rancourt, and deployed along the road as far as Brioche, south-west of Bouchavesnes. The hamlet of Brioche was carried, and, pivoting on it, the remainder of the French forces advanced eastwards, the troops from the Clery region capturing the plateau of Hill 76, and saw below them the Canal du Nord and beyond it the Péronne-Bapaume highway. Not content with these successes and with the capture of 1,500 prisoners including numbers of officers, towards 8 p.m. the French crossed the highway and assaulted Bouchavesnes. After two hours of severe hand-to-hand fighting the ruins of the village were seized. The troops concerned in this brilliant little episode were the 6th Brigade of Chasseurs (comprising the 6th and 27th Chasseurs and the 28th Alpine Chasseurs), a battalion of the 44th and one of the 133rd Infantry. During the night some units of a division which had been rushed up from the Verdun district were hurled at the Hill 76 plateau. Mont St. Quentin, menaced by the French in Bouchavesnes, would be in great danger if the plateau was not recovered. Time after time the German columns crossed the canal and swarmed up the eastern slopes only to be driven back in hopeless confusion.

At daybreak on Wednesday, September 13, the French resumed the offensive up the road from Bouchavesnes to the village of Haut-Allaines, north-east of Mont St. Quentin. They stormed the German positions on the western slopes of the plateau of Hill 130 and the farm of the Bois l'Abbé, which was half a mile east of the Bapaume-Péronne road. At the same time, in the direction of Combles, they cleared the Germans from the six successive trenches round the Le Priez Farm, which itself was carried on the 14th. In the two days' fighting over 2,500 prisoners had been taken, and in Bouchavesnes alone 10 pieces, several of them heavy guns, and 40 machine-guns.

Enraged at their defeat the German leaders counter-attacked throughout the 13th. Two regiments were sent against the Farm of Bois l'Abbé. The defenders at first gave way, but the chasseurs with irresistible *élan* swept the enemy from the wrecked building. Hill 76 was also the scene of stubborn encounters. For hours the fighting went on, but at last the plateau remained in French hands. South of the Somme on the same day, in the hope of retrieving his signal defeat north of the river, the enemy advanced again and again at various points. He was everywhere repulsed, a company west of Chaulnes being wiped out by the French fire.

It will be seen that the battles of September 9, 12, and 13 had materially improved the Allied chances of breaking right

GENERAL BARON VON MARSCHALL,
One of the German Commanders on the Somme.

through the German lines north of the Somme. Combles was now under the fire of the British from the west and north-west, and under that of the French from the south and south-east. A section of the Bapaume-Péronne road was firmly held by our Allies, and Mont St. Quentin could be attacked from the north and north-east as well as from the west. Mont St. Quentin, 350 feet high, was, indeed, protected by the Tortille on the north and the Somme on the south-west, but it would be difficult henceforth for the Germans to send supplies of ammunition and guns to its defenders, for most of the roads leading to the hill were under the direct fire of French batteries. Nor had the Germans anywhere between the Ancre and Chilly gained counter-balancing successes. During the night of the 12th-13th they had been repulsed near Mouquet Farm, and on the 13th the British had pushed ahead north of Ginchy. On the 14th there was a lull—the lull which precedes the storm—on the British front, and the French beat off attacks north and south of Bouchavesnes, and south of the Somme advanced by bombing east of Belloy. The situation was decidedly promising for the Allies.

The progress towards Thiépval had already been considerable, but between us and that village there lay an intricate organization of trenches, produced by the strenuous exertions of the past two years. The key of this position, an elaborate stronghold embodying the highest examples of the engineer's art, was the central kernel known to the Germans as the *Wunderwerk* behind the Hohenzollern Trench and 600 yards in front of Thiépval. It was placed on the spur which runs south-eastwards from Thiépval towards Authuille, and dominated to a considerable extent the surrounding country. The main value of this fortification, beyond its intrinsic strength, was the fact that from it the Germans could sweep the ground to "Sky Line" trench and Mouquet Farm. It was plain, therefore, that before any advance could be made by the British up the valleys on either side of the spur it was necessary to capture it. Moreover, before our centre could move towards Courcelette and Martinpuich the Germans had to be expelled from these advanced posts, whence our troops moving to the assault of the Courcelette sector could be struck in flank.

THE COMMANDANT PERSONALLY INSPECTS THE DEFENCES.

The *Wunderwerk* itself had formed the target



PLAN OF THE "WUNDERWERK" AND ADJOINING GERMAN TRENCHES.

of our artillery for the previous fortnight with the usual result. So far as concerned the works above ground, it had been beaten and blown out of existence and many of the dug-outs had been destroyed or seriously damaged. Yet some still remained which afforded shelter to many of the garrison, and in the trenches before and around it which had escaped to some extent the devastating fire of our guns, the enemy was hanging on in some strength, and it was recognized that the Germans rightly attached great importance to this part of their line. It was part of Sir Hubert Gough's task to capture it, and it was determined that the operation was to be carried out on the evening of September 14.

Before our infantry advanced to the assault the usual tornado of projectiles swept over the doomed spot. Suddenly our artillery increased their range and formed a barrage behind the *Wunderwerk* to keep back the enemy's supports. The effect of this, combined with the havoc wrought on the actual position, had a double effect. The remains of the unhappy garrison had seen their comrades falling all around them, and knew that their retreat could only be made through a veil of shell-fire. Many of them fled before the British infantry closed with them; others remained to put up a really good hand-to-hand fight. It was not of long duration. Our men had come on swiftly and with determination, and soon cleared out their opponents and drove such of them as survived and did not surrender into the barrage which few lived to pass through. The German casualties were very heavy, ours but a few, while the total advance we made was along a line of 900 yards and a depth of 350. The *Wunderwerk* and the trenches connected with it on the spur were in our hands and an advance on Mouquet Farm and Courcelette could now be proceeded with without fear of flank attack.

No sooner were our troops in the German position than they began to turn it into a stronghold for themselves. The nature of their task may be judged from the statement of a sapper. "The Germans," he said, "do not stay in their trenches any more. These are so badly blown up that we have to dig them anew." The enemy appreciated that they had been deprived of an important point which it was probable that we should endeavour to hold at any cost. Counter-attacks were, therefore, made, and although these did not actually take place till the next evening, as they had no practical relation to the fighting on the 15th they may here be disposed of. Endeavours to recover the lost ground were made twice by the Germans. One took the shape of a direct attempt to turn the British out of the captured position, but this failed completely; indeed, it could scarcely be regarded as serious. The assailants came on in half-hearted fashion and made no effort to come to close quarters. Indeed, they contented themselves with a stationary and harmless bombing when quite a hundred yards from our newly occupied line. The only result was a numerous series of harmless explosions in front of the British trench which were totally devoid of effect on it.

Against our left a more rational assault was delivered. Here the position was more favourable, for the German trench on the north-western side of the Thiépval slope lapped round the line we held and this somewhat outflanked it. Moreover, the distance between the two opposed lines was small, and the attacking troops were able to get well within bombing range from almost the first onset. The conflict lasted for some time and was severe. There does not seem to have been any actual collision between the hostile forces; the fighting was conducted chiefly if not entirely with bombs, we alone using up 1,500. But eventually the enemy was driven back, and he then allowed us to consolidate the conquered position without further hindrance.

GENERAL VON KIRCHBACH,
One of the German Commanders on the Somme.

On Friday, September 15, both Allies had arranged for a further conjoint attack. Sir Douglas Haig had ordered Sir Hubert Gough's army, which formed the left wing of the British in the ensuing battle, and was now on high ground in the Thiépval salient with its left centre secured by the capture of the *Wunderwerk*, to act as a pivot to the 4th Army on its right commanded by Sir Henry Rawlinson. The latter was to direct his efforts to the rearmost of the enemy's original systems of defence between Le Sars on the Albert-Bapaume road and Morval. If he were successful, the left of the attack would be extended to embrace the villages of Martinpuich and Courcelette. As soon as the advance had reached the Morval line, the left of the British would be brought across the Thiépval ridge in line with the Fourth Army.

To the right of the British, General Fayolle was to continue the line of advance from the slopes south and east of Combles to the Somme, directing his main efforts against the villages of Rancourt and Frégicourt, so as to complete the isolation of Combles and open a road for the attack on Sailly-Sallisel. By this time the whole of the forward crest of the main ridge from Mouquet Farm to the Delville Wood, a distance of 9,000 yards, was held by the British, giving them a clear view over the slopes beyond. East of Delville Wood to Leuze Wood, which is a thousand yards from Combles, we held a line of 3,000 yards, while farther east on the other side of the Combles Valley the French had, as previously narrated, successfully gained ground. The centre of our line was well placed, but on the British flanks there were still difficult positions to be won. Ginchy, which had been taken, is situated on the plateau running towards Lesboeufs and to the east of Ginchy the ground drops somewhat steeply towards Combles. North of Combles, but a little below the edge of the plateau, stood the village of Morval, commanding a wide field of fire in every direction. It was an obstacle to the French advance through Frégicourt on Sailly-Sallisel. From Leuze Wood the British right would have a distance of 2,000 yards to cross, passing over the valley which intervenes between the wood and Morval. Combles itself was strongly fortified and held by a large garrison and, although dominated from the Leuze Wood, and by the French left on the heights across the valley, still remained so serious an obstacle that it was best to avoid taking it by direct assault and to render it untenable by both armies pressing forward along the ridges on either side of it.

The direct capture of Morval from the south presented considerable difficulty, that of Sailly-Sallisel, which was about 3,000 yards to the north of the French left, was an even harder task, for the advance had to be made along a line flanked on one side by the strongly fortified wood of St. Pierre Vaast and over the Combles Valley, which was dominated by the German work on the high ground to the west.

It will be seen how necessary it was to have

GENERAL FAYOLLE,
Commanded a French Army on the Somme.

close cooperation between the Allied armies to make the sufficient progress on the British right without which the advance of Sir Douglas Haig's centre was impossible. At the time when this operation commenced the Fifth Army followed a line back some distance from Mouquet Farm down the spur which went between Pozières, and then, crossing the intervening valley, mounted the Thiépval ridge to the *Wunderwerk*, which we had captured on the evening of September 14. It will be seen what an important point of support this formed for any further advance against Thiépval. In this direction General Gough had since July 3 been making methodical progress in which great skill and patience had been displayed, and had considerably improved his position. For the moment it was not an essential part of the plan of operations to capture Thiépval itself by a sudden rush, which would only have

GENERAL MICHELER,
Commanded a new French Army south of the Somme.

been successful at the price of heavy casualties. An advance in the direction of Courcelette would indirectly threaten the Germans on the high ground in the neighbourhood of Thiépval and render the capture of this village easier.

What direction was the French Army to take to connect with the British forward movement and facilitate the advance towards Bapaume? Plainly it was desirable, after Rancourt and Frégicourt had been won, to capture the wood of St. Pierre Vaast and to gain the height on which Sailly-Sallisel was situated.

At the beginning of the Battle of the Somme the French line extended from a point near Hardécourt across the Somme by Dompierre, and Fay, to the east of Lihons and west of Chilly. Since July 1 General Fayolle had made a considerable inroad into the German fortified belt north and south of the Somme. The French, as related, had taken Maurepas and reached the southern outskirts of Combles and were also at Priez Farm, across the country road which ran from Combles to Rancourt, which was on the summit of the plateau overlooking the narrow valley at the northern end of which was Combles. South of Rancourt our Allies had severed the main road running between Péronne and Bapaume by occupying Bouchavesnes. Along the right bank of the Somme the French had pushed their way through Curlu and Clery-sur-Somme until they were within a few thousand yards of Mont St. Quentin, which is close to Péronne on the south side of the Tortille.

Sir Henry Rawlinson, after clearing the Bouleaux Wood—the northern end of the wood of Leuze—was to push on towards Morval, while the French from Priez Farm would advance on Frégicourt, the fortified hamlet between Combles and Rancourt. South of Frégicourt was a collection of trenches which had to be carried, and to the west of this point a trench ran north-westwards and joined the southern defences of Morval. From this trench another behind Frégicourt went westwards to Combles station. Combles was a strongly fortified point possessing vast underground caverns extending under the village over an area of nearly 400 yards.

Rancourt, a straggling village traversed by the Bapaume-Péronne highway, was defended on the south by a network of trenches, on the west by the works at Frégicourt and on the

TRENCH CUT THROUGH A RUINED VILLAGE.

east by the wood of St. Pierre Vaast, through which was cut a road from Rancourt to Manancourt, and Etricourt. The wood of St. Pierre Vaast and the Vaux Wood to the east of it had been treated by the German engineers in the same way as the woods of Mametz, Trônes and Delville. Entrenched on several lines, entangled with barbed wire, freely provided with communications, they formed together a most formidable defence, with the village of Manancourt in support. At the northern edge of the wood, close to Sallisel and Sailly-Sallisel, the ground was almost on a level with the highest point north of Ginchy. Beyond Sailly-Sallisel the ridge rapidly descended towards Bapaume. Between Rancourt and Sailly-Sallisel a German trench crossed the high-road

Taking the foregoing into consideration and looking at the map, it will be seen that if the French secured Frégicourt they had turned both Combles and the St. Vaast Wood and thus facilitated the acquisition of the defensive group formed by the two woods and the village of Manancourt. Once this was gained, with the ridge line in the Allies' possession, they would have before them the more gentle slopes descending to the north.

South of the Somme, while the British and General Fayolle were making their advance north of the river, General Micheler was to advance between Barleux and a point south of Vermandovillers, a front of between 7 and 8 miles. Here the French had to deal with a strong line of German defences based upon the fortified villages of Barleux, Berny, Deniécourt, Soyécourt, and Vermandovillers. Of these Soyécourt had already been captured, but the remainder still formed an unbroken chain of strong posts. Deniécourt was of special value to the Germans. It consisted of the village of that name, together with the country house and park belonging to the Comte de Kergorlay. The house itself had long been reduced to ruins, but these had been utilized to form a most formidable keep with the park defences to the German position in this part of their line. Barleux stood at the bottom of a narrow valley dominated by high ground, of which the French held the northern and western sides. The French trenches then ran across flat ground for a mile and a half and crossed the Barleux road at Berny-en-Santerre. The retrenchment formed by this latter village in the German position had, so far as its outer edge was concerned, been occupied by French troops since the early days of September, but they had not been able to penetrate beyond a little park at the east end of the village.

Berny-en-Santerre was a point of considerable tactical interest to the Germans. Placed at the entrance of a long, narrow valley, which ran for a distance of 3 miles to the Somme

THE FIGHT IN THE CEMETERY AT CURLU.

north of Briost, it completely commanded it. The valley cut across the German lines, which were here almost parallel with the Somme. If the French could occupy Berny-en-Santerre and the valley they would cut the German position in two. A mile farther to the west was Deniécourt, already described, and three-quarters of a mile beyond it Soyécourt. The village of Vermandovillers stood in the re-entering angle of the French front.

The front of battle from Thiépval to Chilly, measuring 20 miles as the crow flies and about 25 along the actual trench front, may be looked upon as divided into three sections. One of these was south of the Somme from Barleux to Chilly, and it was here that General Micheler commanded what may be regarded as the right flank of the operations. The troops of General Fayolle extended the French line from Barleux across the Somme at Omiécourt and thence to the wood of Douage, where it joined on to the British forces.

The history of the operations hitherto given shows that these three groups—the British, Fayolle and Micheler—had not attacked simultaneously, but that each in accordance with the plan laid down by the supreme commanders had operated to some extent independently—one at a time, each having its own special objectives. On the 15th, however, this was changed, for the whole force of the Allies moved forward at the same time from the line Thiépval to Vermandovillers in a combined endeavour to thrust the enemy back over the whole front of attack.

The fighting described in this chapter represented considerable gain of ground, with the noteworthy feature that there was a distinct falling off in the resisting power of the Germans. This was shown not only by the increasing number of unwounded prisoners, but also by the fact that our successes were obtained with diminished losses, proving clearly that the enemy's power of continued contest was not what it had been.

A force which feels it is being beaten is apt to have recourse to means very often futile, but which it fondly hopes may have some useful effect. Such was the case with the Germans. To hide bombs just before abandoning trenches which go off when trodden on may cause a few casualties, but can produce no useful military results. Still less justifiable is the employment of the old-fashioned man-trap, probably known to some of our readers as an object of curiosity in a museum. This enlarged rat-trap will break the leg of a soldier who manages to get caught in it, but such dastardly devices as these bring in time their own revenge. They infuriate the men who see these atrocities, and they punish them.



[Official photograph.

ONCE A DWELLING, NOW A STABLE.

CHAPTER CLXXI.

THE WORK OF THE MERCANTILE MARINE (II).

THE TONNAGE PROBLEM—VITAL IMPORTANCE OF THE MERCANTILE MARINE—SOME STATISTICS—SIR JOHN JELLICOE'S TRIBUTE—INCIDENTS OF THE SUBMARINE WAR—THE RAPPAHANNOCK—THE NORTH WALES—THE CITY OF BIRMINGHAM—THE ARTIST—THE CALEDONIA—SEIZURE OF MERCHANT CAPTAINS—GERMAN RUSES—THE ARMING OF MERCHANT SHIPS—THE CLAN MACLEOD—THE CALIFORNIA—THE ARABIA—GERMAN MINES AND MINELAYERS—THE MALOJA—AIR ATTACKS—GERMAN RAIDERS—THE SOUTHPORT.

IN an earlier chapter * some account was given of the vital part taken in the Great War by the mercantile marine, and the gallantry and heroism displayed by the officers and men of the merchant navy when faced by unprecedented perils. It has also been fully explained how, an important proportion of the British mercantile tonnage having been requisitioned for the naval and military purposes of ourselves and our Allies, the balance remaining over had become barely sufficient for the essential needs of civil life in the British Isles. It was obligatory, therefore, that reliance should to a large extent be placed upon neutral shipping for help in bringing to these shores the necessary food supplies and raw materials for our manufactures. The enemy had quickly realized the situation, and when he had failed to effect any considerable success with his submarines in a war of attrition upon the ships of the Navy and their auxiliaries, his attention was directed to the commercial traffic. The earlier attempts of the German submarines to bring about a blockade of the British Isles by the wanton destruction of passenger liners and traders and fishing craft, both Allied and neutral, have also been described, and it has been seen how the campaign was met and foiled by the inexhaustible resourcefulness, ingenuity, and courage shown by the seamen of the regular Navy and mercantile marine alike. In this chapter the narrative of the enemy operations against commercial sea-borne traffic is carried down to the early spring of 1917, when they attained great intensity and virulence.

It will be seen from the following accounts of selected instances of attacks upon merchant ships during the period under review that, although the German methods varied considerably, their treatment of the crews of the ships destroyed was substantially the same in every case. Ships were almost always attacked without warning; the unfortunate seamen and passengers, if there were any, were seldom given sufficient time to take to their boats, and they were left to reach the shore as best they could. Sometimes the distance from land was so great that the majority of the survivors perished before succour came. Sometimes the Germans shelled the boats as they left their stricken ships, murdering the occupants in the most cold-blooded manner. No respect for the custom of the seas, the laws of man, or the dictates of humanity restrained the barbarity of the callous Germans. The one feature which stood out in bright relief against this picture of black cruelty was the heroism, the devotion, and the endurance of the brave

* Chapter CXX., Vol. VII.

and hardy mariners. They never failed, in face of every danger, and indescribable suffering, to exhibit the splendid discipline of their calling and the unquenchable courage of their race.

During 1916 there came about a distinct change in the general attitude of Great Britain towards the merchant navy. The value and importance of the work of the trading vessels

THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE CROSS.
(Full size.)

and their sturdy crews had always been more or less recognized, but during this year the growing scarcity of carrying tonnage, owing to the enlarged demands upon the shipowners for military requirements and the extended activities of the enemy submarines, had far-reaching effects, especially in the rise of food prices and the shortage of certain staple commodities. This condition of things brought home to the people, not merely the important, but the vital, nature of the work of our merchant seamen Previously the average British citizen had regarded them as valuable; he was now compelled to realize, if he had not already done so, that they were indispensable. In the House of Commons on November 15, 1916, Mr. Runciman, then President of the Board of Trade, spoke of the question of sea transport as being the key to the war situation and as the A.B.C. of European politics. "I must say," he declared, "that if we are successfully to victual our people throughout the remaining period of the war, it is also absolutely essential to regard shipping as labour is regarded, as serving the national interests, not only when flying the fighting colours but when it is carrying food over here." In other words, it was not only as a reserve for the fighting Navy, both as regards men and vessels, and as a means for the conveyance of troops and military requirements of all kinds, that the merchant service came to be accepted by the public generally as an essential part of the life of the nation, but also in its everyday capacity.

This recognition was signalized when it was announced in the *London Gazette* on December 22, 1916, that the King had been graciously pleased to approve the award of Decorations and Medals to a number of officers and men of the British mercantile marine "in recognition of zeal and devotion to duty shown in carrying on the trade of the country during the war." There followed the names of 11 merchant captains who were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, and seven quartermasters, firemen. and the like, who received the Distinguished Service Medal. In addition, 73

THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL.
(Two-thirds scale.)

officers and men had their names published in the *Gazette* "as having received an expression of commendation for their services," and six officers were granted commissions as Lieutenants in the Royal Naval Reserve. The Council of the Mercantile Marine Service Association expressed the opinion that these awards were merely a preliminary to further recognition of British merchant seamen, "who have gone to sea with wonderful regularity, notwithstanding the increased risks from mines and torpedoes—cruel instruments which do not distinguish between neutral and belligerent,

combatant and non-combatant. When the veil is lifted," this message concluded, "the noble part that has been played in the war by the masters, officers, and men of the British merchant service will surprise many—even of those who think they know the seaman and the dogged courage of his race."

Speaking on the Navy Estimates on February 21, 1917, Sir Edward Carson, the new First Lord, quoted from a return brought up to October 30, 1916, dealing with transport operations at sea since war began. In regard to *personnel*, the total numbers which had been moved up to that date across the seas had been 8,000,000 men, and, although he regretted to say there had been two or three untoward incidents, when the vast domain of sea over which they were moved was considered he thought it might be said that these men were transported almost without mishap. In regard to supplies and explosives, 9,420,000 tons had been moved, with 47,504,000 gallons of petrol, and over 1,000,000 horses and mules. The sick and wounded moved also numbered over 1,000,000. So much for the ships on "war work." As regards those which were retained in the carrying trade of the Empire, Mr. Runciman, then President of the Board of Trade, in a speech on October 17, 1916, said there were 297 vessels employed permanently abroad, because we had to provide for our not being entirely out of the shipping business after the war. In normal times there were thousands of vessels engaged in purely foreign trade, and we had merely kept the skeleton of that connexion alive. Then there were cargo liners, loading on berth, and tramps chartered to liner companies while loading on berth—their total being 588. That, said Mr. Runciman, was not a large number to keep alive the connexion between this country and other countries: a mere skeleton of the organization necessary. Lastly, there were the free tramp steamers which were able to go out and take the high rates prevailing, and which numbered 233. Only about 60 of this number were engaged in carrying food. Mr. Runciman continued: "I have given the House a total which reaches 1,118 vessels, which are, for good national reasons, free to trade where they will. Out of a total merchant fleet of nearly 10,000 vessels, only 1,100 ocean-going vessels are free to conduct their own operations. Then what of the rest? There is a very large number of vessels engaged in the service of the Army and Navy. The Foodstuffs Requisitioning Committee has a very large number of vessels under requisition. There are steamers trading on behalf of the Allied Governments, steamers trading on behalf of the Colonies."

KHAKI AT THE DOCKS: TRANSPORT WORKERS' BATTALION HANDLING SUPPLIES.

The knowledge that the number of ships for bringing food to the British Isles was much less than in normal times obviously increased the determination of the enemy to prosecute their submarine war. Earlier chapters have shown the dauntless spirit in which the mer-



HOISTING CARGO ABOARD.

KHAKI AT THE DOCKS: TRANSPORT WORKERS UNLOADING FLOUR.

chant seamen withstood the first attacks. That spirit was in no way lessened by the more virulent and brutal methods to which the Germans descended. They failed entirely to intimidate or terrorize the British merchant seamen, whose conduct elicited many notable tributes.

King George, in acknowledging through his Secretary, Lord Stamfordham, the receipt of a copy of the Imperial Merchant Service Guild *Gazette* on July 14, 1916, said that he felt sure "the country at large joins with him in appreciating the noble services rendered by the officers and men of the merchant service since the beginning of the war, and the heroism displayed by those who have risked and often given their lives in carrying out their arduous duties." Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, speaking at the Fishmongers' Hall on January 11, 1917, also referred to the merchant service in the following terms:

Without our mercantile marine the Navy—and, indeed, the nation—could not exist. Upon it we have been dependent for the movement of our troops oversea—over seven millions of men having been transported—together with all the guns, munitions, and stores required by the Army. The safeguarding of these transports, both from the attack of such surface vessels as have been at large and from submarine attack, has been carried out by the Navy. We have had to draw also upon the *personnel* of the mercantile marine, not only for the manning of the transport ships, but also very largely for the manning of the whole of our patrol and mine-sweeping craft, nearly 2,500 skippers being employed as skippers R.N.R. The number of R.N.R. executive officers has increased almost fourfold since the outbreak of war. Indeed, it is impossible to measure fully the debt which the country owes to our mercantile marine.

In the old days it used to be said that there was jealousy between the mercantile marine and the Royal Navy, but whatever may have been the case then, there is no room now in the Navy for anything but the most sincere admiration and respect for the officers and men of the mercantile marine. I think I know sufficient of those officers and men to believe that the feeling is reciprocated. Those of us who have been closely associated with the officers and men who man our armed merchant vessels and patrol craft have realized from the first day of the war how magnificent were their services, how courageous their conduct, and how unflinching their devotion to duty under the most dangerous conditions. The value of the services of the officers and men of the mercantile marine goes also far beyond their work in armed vessels. When one thinks of the innumerable cases of unarmed ships being sunk by torpedo or gun fire far from land, in a heavy sea, with the ship's company dependent upon boats alone for their safety, one is lost in admiration of the spirit of heroism of those who not only endure dangers and hardships without complaint, but are ever ready to take the risks again and again in repeated voyages in other ships.

Similarly, Sir Edward Carson on February 21, 1917, in dealing with the submarine menace, said it was wearying work to read of the boats with frozen corpses that were brought in from ships torpedoed without notice, yet he was encouraged by the fact that he had not heard of one sailor who had refused to sail. That, he declared, was what was going to win the war.

To come now to some of the most stirring examples of the way in which the mercantile marine employed in pursuit of its ordinary trade withstood the stress of the intensified German submarine war, reference may first be made to a series of cases of which the details were officially published. The Furness-Withy liner Rappahannock, a steamer of 3,871 tons, built in 1893, and fitted with wireless telegraphy, left Halifax, Nova Scotia, for London on October 17, 1916, and should have arrived at the end of the month. The only other news received concerning her was a statement in the Berlin official wireless report, on November 8, to the effect that she had been sunk. She was evidently torpedoed without warning, and the 37 men in her crew all drowned. In announcing the loss the Admiralty said: "If the crew were forced to take to their boats in the ordinary way it is clear that this must have occurred so far from land, or in such weather conditions, that there was no probability of their reaching the shore. The German pledge not to sink vessels 'without saving human lives' has thus once more been disregarded, and another of their submarines has been guilty of constructive murder on the high seas."

On December 29, 1916, the Admiralty drew attention to another case, if anything more brutal in its details, the sinking of the 4,342-ton steamer Westminster, built in 1905 and belonging to the Westminster Shipping Co., the crew of which vessel were fired upon while in their boats. The official statement said:

The degree of savagery which the Germans have attained in their submarine policy of sinking merchant ships at sight would appear to have reached its climax in the sinking of the British steamship Westminster, proceeding in ballast from Torre Annunziata to Port Said. On December 14 this vessel was attacked by a German submarine, without warning, when 180 miles from the nearest land, and struck by two torpedoes in quick succession, which killed four men. She sank in four minutes.

This ruthless disregard of the rules of international law was followed by a deliberate attempt to murder the survivors. The officers and crew, while effecting their escape from the sinking ship in boats, were shelled by the submarine at a range of 3,000 yards. The master and chief engineer were killed outright and their boat sunk. The second and third engineers and three of the crew were not picked up, and are presumed to have been drowned.

Great Britain, in common with all other civilized nations, regards the sinking without warning of merchant ships with detestation, but in view of the avowed policy

THE S.S. "WESTMINSTER": TORPEDOED WITHOUT WARNING.

of the German Government, and their refusal to consider the protests of neutrals, it is recognized that mere protests are unavailing. The captain of the German submarine must, however, have satisfied himself as to the effectiveness of his two torpedoes, and yet proceeded to carry out in cold blood an act of murder which could not possibly be justified by any urgency of war, and can only be regarded in the eyes of the world as a further proof of the degradation of German honour.

In a wireless message dated January 17 the German Government attempted to refute the statements contained in the British Admiralty *communiqué*. These particulars were based on the statements of the survivors made on oath, but on receipt of the German denial the survivors were minutely cross-examined, and, as a result of this further investigation, the facts remain unchanged. The vessel was torpedoed without warning and struck by two torpedoes. The survivors of the explosion took to the boats and were shelled by the submarine, the captain and the chief engineer being killed by shell-fire. Furthermore, this cross-examination elicited the fact that no other ship was in sight when the submarine opened fire, and the only surviving boat was not picked up until 27 hours later. The statement in the German submarine officer's alleged report that rescue by the submarine was made impossible by the approach of a patrol steamer must, therefore, be regarded as fiction. The British Admiralty had nothing further to add to, and nothing to modify in, its original *communiqué*.

It proved only too true, as the Admiralty remarked, that mere protests were unavailing. On January 4 they had again to inform the country of a further case of callous disregard for the lives of non-combatant seamen. The British steamship North Wales, proceeding in ballast from Hull to Canada, was reported by the German Wireless on November 9, 1916, as having been torpedoed. Beyond one piece of varnished wood marked "North Wales," found in Sennen Cove, and bodies washed ashore on the Cornish coast, nothing further was heard of her, and it was presumed that the crew took to their boats in the gales raging at the time, and were all drowned. In the destruction of another and larger vessel, the City of Birmingham, about three weeks after the North Wales, there was exemplified splendid conduct by all on board, including some women passengers. The facts relating to the loss of this Ellerman liner, of 7,498 tons, were published by the Admiralty on February 5, 1917, as follows :—

The British steamship City of Birmingham was torpedoed without warning on November 27 last by an enemy submarine when 126 miles from the nearest land. She carried a crew of 145 and 170 passengers, of whom 90 were women and children.

The torpedo struck the ship abreast the afterhold, and

so heavy was the explosion that the ship at once began to settle by the stern. One of the lifeboats was blown to pieces. Engines were stopped and steam allowed to escape from the boilers, while everybody assembled at their stations for abandoning the ship.

A heavy swell was running, but within 10 minutes of the explosion all boats had been lowered and all the passengers and crew were clear of the ship. In accordance with British sea tradition, the master, Captain W. J. Haughton, remained on board until the ship sank under him; he was picked up half an hour later by one of the boats.

The conduct of the crew and passengers was admirable throughout. The master reports that the women took their places in the boats "as calmly as if they were going down to their meals," and when in the boats they began singing.

Three hours later the boats were picked up by a hospital ship [reported at the time to have been the Letitia], and the passengers and crew mustered. It was

A TORPEDO ON ITS FATEFUL MISSION.

Torpedoes usually travel beneath the surface: this one is exceptionally high in the water.

VICTIMS OF A U-BOAT OUTRAGE.



THE "CITY OF BIRMINGHAM," TORPEDOED: LOWERING THE BOATS.

then found that the ship's doctor, the barman, and two lascars were not among the survivors and had presumably been drowned.

A shocking case of men suffering from being exposed in open boats in mid-winter was made known by the authorities on January 31, 1917. Four days earlier, or on the morning of Saturday, January 27, the British steamship Artist, when 48 miles from land, in a heavy easterly gale, was torpedoed by a German submarine. In response to her appeal sent by wireless, "S.O.S.; sinking quickly," auxiliary patrol craft proceeded to the spot and searched the vicinity, but found no trace of the vessel or her survivors. Three days later the steamship Luchana picked up a boat containing 16 of the survivors. The boat had originally contained 23, but seven had died of wounds and exposure and were buried at sea. The surviving 16 were landed, and of these five were suffering from severe frostbite and one from a broken arm. The crew had been forced to abandon their ship in open boats, in a mid-winter gale, and utterly without means of reaching land or succour. Those of them who perished during those three days of bitter exposure were murdered, and to pretend that anything was done to ensure their safety would be sheer hypocrisy. As the Admiralty pointed out, the pledge given by Germany to the United States not to sink merchant ships without ensuring the safety of the passengers and crews had been broken before, "but never in circumstances of more cold-blooded brutality."

The foregoing, it will be noticed, were cases in which, as far as the available information showed, the merchant vessels were attacked by torpedo, and usually without warning. This method of destruction was by no means general, however, being very costly, inasmuch as the submarines had only a limited carrying capacity for torpedoes, and when these missiles had been expended a return to some base or depôt became necessary if the vessels had no other means of waging their unlawful war on the trade.



GERMAN SUBMARINE FITTED WITH WIRELESS SIGNALLING APPARATUS.

In cases where for any reason the submarines refrained from torpedoing vessels at sight —and also from the torpedoed ships if it was

practicable—the Germans inaugurated, some time during 1916, the practice of taking prisoners the captains of the merchantmen, perhaps with a view to giving them, if possible, the status of combatants. On December 4, 1916, the Anchor liner Caledonia, of 9,223 tons, was sunk in the Mediterranean, and her master, Captain James Blaikie, taken prisoner in this way. On the 10th it was alleged in an official Berlin telegram that the Caledonia endeavoured to ram the submarine without having previously been attacked by the latter. Fears were aroused lest this announcement was an attempt to justify in the eyes of the world another judicial murder of an English mercantile marine captain, as Captain Charles Fryatt, of the City of Brussels, had been executed in the previous July.* Representations were therefore made to the Government that the Germans should be informed that if any harm was done to Captain Blaikie, one of their officer prisoners of high rank would be shot forthwith. On December 14 it was announced that the American Ambassador at Berlin had been asked to report at once any action the Germans contemplated against the captain, and on the 19th the welcome news was received that the German Foreign Office had given a personal assurance to the Chargé d'Affaires of the United States in Berlin that Captain Blaikie would not share the fate of Captain Fryatt. The German Admiralty considered the Caledonia as an armed cruiser, and therefore, that in attempting to ram the submarine Captain Blaikie was only doing his duty. Early in January news was received from Captain Blaikie stating that he was quite well. It was subsequently reported that he was detained in a military officers' camp at Friedberg, Hessen.

A few weeks before the destruction of the Caledonia a group of steamers, including neutrals, had been destroyed in the Atlantic by U 49, and their captains taken on board the submarine, but later they were released, and were then able to give an account of their experiences in the "black hole" of a German under-water craft. Captain Arthur Patterson, of the British steamer Setonia, was in the submarine for eight days; Captain Yellugsen, of the Norwegian ship Balto, for seven days; and Captain Frederick Curtis, of the American steamer Columbian, for six. Captain Curtis gave the following account in an interview:—

My ship carried a cargo of about 9,000 tons and a crew of 109. We were all saved. I stopped on the demand of the submarine, whose commander ordered me to abandon my ship with the crew immediately, which we did without other baggage than two satchels with documents and money.

Submarine U 49 at once fired two torpedoes at the Columbian, which immediately sank. The crew were left in the lifeboats, while I was taken on board the submarine, which plunged immediately afterwards.

I was taken into the quartermaster's small cabin, where I found the captains of the Setonia and Balto.

CAPTAIN JAMES BLAIKIE.

After me came the captain of the Norwegian ship, Fordalo.

The cabin was very small. It contained a little folding table, a folding chair and three wall bunks. All were permeated with the odour of benzine. There was no communication with the exterior cabin. It was absolutely dark both by night and day.

We were given each morning a few morsels of black bread, a cup of coffee, and a small portion of bad butter. At noon we had stew made of canned meat and soup. Supper was at 10, consisting of coffee or tea, with butter or marmalade. Hours passed in this narrow prison, very long and disagreeable. The captain of the submarine was a man about 36, while the crew of 40 sailors were all very young and were dressed in shiny leather clothing.

The merchant captains were allowed at intervals between the operations of the submarine to go on deck and smoke a cigarette. They were watched by members of the crew armed with revolvers, but when they went below the crew put aside their weapons. There was only one chair in the cabin, which the captains used in turn; otherwise they lay down in their bunks. Towards noon on November 9 the submarine signalled to the

* Chapter CLIII., page 53.

DAMAGE TO A SHIP'S BOWS BY MINE.

Swedish steamer Varing, 13 miles off the Spanish port of Camarina, and this vessel took on board the captains and landed them.

A variant of this procedure was observed in the case of an unnamed steamer which was stopped, ordered to take on board survivors of three other vessels, and then compelled to follow the submarine for three days. The three vessels were the British steamer Auchencrag, of Glasgow, which was sunk on January 12, 1917, with the loss of four of her crew; the sailing vessel Kilpurney, of London, of 1,944 tons; and the Danish steamer Omsk, of Copenhagen, 1,574 tons. There were 84 members of the crews of these three vessels, who were apparently left in open boats. Another steamer was then stopped, as already mentioned, and, having rescued the shipwrecked crews, was forced to follow the course of the submarine from 9 a.m. on January 13 to midnight on January 16. The submarine then helped herself to the cargo of this steamer, and what she could not or did not wish to take for her own use was ordered to be discharged overboard. Then she made off. Many anecdotes of the tricks and methods of the submarines could be related. On January 5, 1917, the correspondent of *The Times* at



HOLE IN A SHIP'S SIDE MADE BY A MINE.



REPAIRING A SHIP DAMAGED BY A MINE.

Amsterdam reported that German submarines were sending out the "S.O.S." wireless signal to lure British vessels to destruction. The *Telegraaf* learnt from an officer of a large steamer of an important Dutch line that on the journey from the Dutch East Indies he received, while in the Bay of Biscay, an "S.O.S." message. Proceeding to the place indicated, he found a German submarine, which was not in distress, and the captain of which expressed regret that it was a Dutch and not a British vessel which had arrived. He said: "We don't want you to save our souls. We want the British to save our souls."

There were other ruses adopted by the Germans to lure the merchant ships to their destruction, and such tricks necessitated increased caution and alertness on the part of the officers and men of the latter. On Decem-

ber 16, 1916, the Danish steamer Gerda was stopped in the Bay of Biscay by U 46. The captain was ordered to come on board the submarine with his papers. He was detained, and a prize crew of six men and a lieutenant was placed in the Gerda. They replaced the Danish by German colours, and gave out that



THE ANCHOR LINER "CALIFORNIA."
Sunk by submarine, February 7, 1917.

the vessel would be taken to Hamburg as a prize. As a matter of fact, her course was set in a south-westerly direction, and the steamer was used as a decoy to attract other victims for the submarine, which followed the Gerda. In the next two days three steamers were sunk. Each time the Gerda approached a ship she hoisted the Danish flag, but after sinking the vessel the German flag was rehoisted. The Gerda was also used as a depôt for the crews of the sunken ships, the number on board her increasing to 62. On the 19th the fresh water gave out, and being then off Cape Finisterre the Germans entered the bay east of Finisterre within the territorial limits. All on board the captured vessel were then ordered into the boats. They were forbidden to take any extra clothes or other possessions, a German officer standing at the head of the gangway with a revolver to see that this order was complied with. Nautical instruments and certain other articles were then stolen by the Germans and taken into the submarine, after which the Gerda was towed outside the territorial limit and sunk.

In other cases some curious anecdotes were related about the methods of the submarine crews. The captain of the Spanish steamer Gaeta, which was sunk about the middle of January off the north coast of Spain, reported that the Germans removed all the provisions from his ship, and before leaving handed him a card bearing the words, "The U 44 sank the Gaeta." There were other examples of German swagger, as, for instance, when an American ship, stopped off the coast of Cornwall, was spared, and her commander given a certificate showing that his ship had been granted "permission" by the German submarine captain to sail up the English Channel. An amusing sidelight upon the conscience of a German submarine commander was forthcoming when a ship's boat, containing the master and crew of a small vessel, reached Guernsey in the last week of December, 1916. The master had been "submarined" for the second time, and the commander of the submarine was the man who had sunk his first vessel. On the first occasion, among the valuables retained by the German officer was the master's gold watch, but after sinking the second vessel he recognized the master and returned the watch. Some three weeks after this the daily list of losses included the three vessels, two British and one Danish, which have already been referred to. The crews were hurriedly ordered into their boats, and one of the latter, belonging to the British steamer Auchencrag, capsized and drowned four men. Yet the Germans found time to help themselves to the stores of their victims, including 40 cans of whisky.

The deeds of heroism on the part of the merchant seamen which light up the cruel and grim record of the submarine war are innumerable. It must suffice to mention one, which the Royal Humane Society deemed worthy of the award of their Stanhope Gold Medal and £5 as the most gallant feat of the year. The hero was John Paxton, a fireman in the steamship Swedish Prince, which vessel was attacked by a submarine in the Mediterranean on August 17, 1916. In the hurry to abandon the ship Paxton was left on board with three other men. There was a high wind and a heavy sea was running, but Paxton by his gallantry saved all three of these men. He jumped overboard, and called to the first man to follow. He then swam with him to the nearest boat. The two other men were rescued in the same manner. This gallant deed is a reminder of the heroism which inspires all classes of our merchant service, whether on deck or below. The situation of the engine-room complement in ships attacked by torpedo

is one calling for a high degree of courage, yet the men never shirked their duty. When the Italian steamer Unione, for instance, was torpedoed on April 10, 1916, the vessel sank so quickly that all the firemen lost their lives. Some were probably killed by the explosion, but the remainder had no chance to reach the deck before the vessel foundered.

In devising measures for meeting the piratical onslaught of the German submarines the British and Allied Admiralties could count, as Lord Lytton said in the House of Lords on February 13, 1917, on "no one sovereign remedy for dealing with the subject, no one panacea which can be used to clear the seas of these pests." The danger was one which could only be met by the successful combination of a very great number of measures, and by the cooperation of all branches of the Service, and also of the public. One important step which was attended by good results was that of arming the merchant ships. The policy was adopted by the Coalition Government, as stated by Lord Lytton on February 13. It was rapidly pushed forward by the new National Ministry, and the rate of progress at which merchant ships were provided with guns was very much increased. When he spoke on the Navy Estimates on February 21, 1917, Sir Edward Carson was able



THE SINKING OF THE "CALIFORNIA."

135—3

to say that, in the previous two months, the number of armed merchant ships had increased by 47·5 per cent. He added:

I do not know that that conveys to you the amount of work that was involved. We had, in the first place, to get guns in competition with the Army. We had to get the mountings, and, above all, we had to get the gun ratings. All I can say is that the increase in the arming of the merchant ships is going on better and better each week. When I tell the House the percentage, so far as I can gather, of the number of armed merchantmen and unarmed merchantmen that have escaped the submarine menace, they will see how right we were to throw our whole force and power into carrying out this arming. As far as I can gather, of armed merchantmen that escape there are about 70 or 75 per cent., and of unarmed merchantmen 24 per cent. Therefore, you will see how important is every gun you get and every ship you arm.

These figures show how well the merchant seamen adapted themselves to the new conditions, and what good use they made of the weapons with which they were provided. The guns, of course, would have been useless without trained crews to handle them, and captains of nerve and judgment as well as daring to decide when and how to open fire. There was at least one case on record where the mere appearance of a gun in a merchant ship was sufficient to scare away her submarine antagonist. This was in the case of the Harrison Line steamship Director, and the incident happened on January 25, 1916. According to the statement of a horseman of New Mexico, on his arrival at New York on March 14, the Director was bound for Liverpool. and when about 200 miles from the Irish coast sighted a submarine some distance astern, endeavouring to overhaul the liner. For two hours the submarine hung on, in spite of the best speed that the engineer of the Director was able to get out of her.

SURVIVORS OF THE "CALIFORNIA."
The three children (Margaret Little, aged 9; Mary, aged 3, and Andrew, 13 months), whose mother and eldest sister were drowned

SURVIVORS OF THE "CALIFORNIA."
Mr. Kesson, the Chief Officer, giving an account of the torpedoing of the ship.

A typical case in which a British steamer baffled a submarine by means of a gun, and damaged if she did not sink her under-water antagonist, occurred on the evening of July 15, 1916, near Algiers, as reported in *The Times* on August 7 and 8, 1916. Captain David Thomson, master of the steamship Strathness, sent to his employers the following extract from the ship's log describing his encounter:—

July 15, 6.0 *p.m.*—Saturday a terrific explosion occurred on port side of steamer nearly amidships, heaving water and smoke over the top bridge, making steamer shake and tremble. I thought it was a torpedo, but could see no submarine about. A few minutes afterwards shots were fired by submarine, but we could not make out his position. At last gunner made him out astern, and we commenced firing at him. His shots were going right over us, and landing in the water a few yards ahead; one shot nearly got us, dropping in the water a few yards astern of steamer.

At our sixth shot submarine was hit, and also with our seventh, when a big explosion with fire was caused in the submarine. Then firing ceased, and submarine disappeared, which I have no doubt was sunk by our fire. Altogether the submarine fired about 15 shots,

but none took effect. We fired seven shots, and two hits were made. Great credit is due to the gunners for the way in which they worked, especially the remarkable marksmanship they made at the submarine. Engines were opened full out and zigzag courses were steered. Latitude 37.05 N., longitude 3.38 E., where submarine was sunk or disappeared.

A contrast to the foregoing action, and one which shows equally the stubborn and dauntless qualities of the British merchant seaman and the brutality of the Germans when they have a helpless foe to deal with, is afforded by the circumstances attending the loss of the steamship Clan MacLeod, sunk on December 1, 1915. Captain H. S. Southward, who had to spend



P. & O. LINER "ARABIA."
Photographed after she was struck, and while her boats were alongside. An upturned boat can be seen at her stern.

four months in hospital recovering from wounds, stated on his return home in April, 1916, that a submarine was sighted at 7.45 a.m., opened fire about an hour later, and an hour and ten minutes after this had closed to within half a mile of the steamer. Realizing that he could not save his ship, Captain Southward hoisted the international signal of surrender, stopped the engines, and rounded to. To his surprise the submarine began to shell the bridge, doing considerable damage. He was himself struck by the first shell. The Germans then began to shell the boats and boat crews, killing nine men, wounding six (three fatally) and smashing the starboard boats. Captain Southward, summoned on board the submarine, found the commander in a furious rage because the liner had not stopped immediately. The British master replied to a question on the point that he wanted to save his ship if possible. The German officer then said: "I can shoot you as *franc-tireur*," and the captain answered, "I don't think so." The former then said: "You are assisting my enemy," and the reply was, "I *am* your enemy." In the only two boats which remained, the survivors set sail for Malta. The lifeboat, with Captain Southward and 50 men, was picked up at 6 p.m. on December 2, but the cutter, with the chief officer and 19 men, remained adrift until 2 a.m. on December 4, having thus been tossed about for the greater part of three days and three nights.

It is not surprising that, with such untold hardships and dangers confronting them, the risks of which they accept cheerfully every day of their lives, there should have been expressed many tributes of praise to the merchant seamen, and a desire to afford them greater recognition. As the *Daily Mail* said early in 1916: "If for these men there is no Westminster Abbey at the last, let us at least know them and be able to take off our hats to them in their life." Lord Beresford shortly afterwards remarked, at a meeting of the Mercantile Marine Service Association, that "he did not think the



THE "ARABIA" SINKING.

recognition of the Mercantile Marine was sufficient, or what it ought to be; he did not think they got their due. . . . There ought to be a special decoration for the Mercantile Marine. . . . They had to remember that, with the exception of the transports, which were convoyed, every mercantile ship that left port or went to any of their vast Dominions over the sea was in greater danger than a transport or man-of-war, because she was unprovided with convoy, and they knew this was the class of vessel that their barbarous adversaries liked to sink without warning."

The value, as an example to their crews and passengers, of the admirable coolness and calm courage shown by mercantile officers when their ships were overtaken with disaster cannot be

spoken of too highly. When the Anchor liner California was torpedoed without warning on February 7, 1917, and remained afloat for only seven minutes, the captain, in accordance with British tradition, did not leave his post on the bridge until the vessel sank beneath him A number of the officers also stood by the sinking vessel even after the boats had filled, and they had then to plunge overboard to save themselves from being carried down by the suction of the huge hull. Similarly, when the P. and O. steamer Arabia was destroyed, also without warning, in the Mediterranean on November 6 1916, an Eastbourne doctor

SURVIVORS FROM THE "ARABIA."



WHITE STAR LINER "CYMRIC."

who was on board, said: "What one must be proud of was the calmness, discipline, and self-possession with which officers, crew, and passengers gathered, without the least confusion, at their pre-ordained places. It seemed rather a rehearsal of what was to be done in case of disaster than a disaster itself. . . . A touching spectacle, on which the Allies must be congratulated, was the appearance on the horizon, practically from all directions, 15 minutes after the alarm call, of five Allied steamers, rushing at full speed to our rescue, and reaching us three-quarters of an hour later." Although the ship had 457 passengers, including 169 women and children, on board, every one was saved. Of the crew, two engineers alone were missing, and were believed to have been killed by the explosion; all the rest were picked up. When the Marina, a Donaldson liner, was torpedoed on October 28, 1916, Captain Browne and his chief engineer both remained on board until the last. They then jumped for a boat, but missed it, and were drowned. Some of the survivors of this ship were adrift for 31½ hours in pouring rain before being picked up. In one boat during that time the occupants had only three biscuits and a bit of bully beef each.

The following anecdote is related in connexion with the sinking of the White Star liner Cymric on May 8, 1916, in which all the crew, except five killed by the explosion of the torpedo, were saved. James Rogers, a trimmer, said that he was in a boat, which was smashed, and the nine men in it thrown into the water, but they were all rescued. They had to sit nine and a half hours in an open boat with their clothes wet through. "The Germans have missed me again," said a cheery member of the crew. "I was in the Southland when she was torpedoed in the Mediterranean last September." "Had enough?" he was asked. "Not me," he replied, "I shall be off again as soon as I can get a berth." This readiness of the seamen to volunteer for further service was exemplified in scores of instances. In fact, the men accepted it as a matter of course. The sea was their calling, and whatever its perils they would face them. As Dr. Macnamara said on February 15, 1917: "There had been nothing finer in the history of the war, crowded though it was with deeds of herosim on the part of the Army and Navy, than the way in which the officers and men of the Merchant Service had carried on their duties, and this they would continue to do in spite of Germany's latest threat of unrestricted savagery. The nation could never hope to repay them sufficiently, and any sacrifice which civilians could make was insignificant compared with that made by those men."

This chapter has so far dwelt chiefly upon the dangers to the mercantile marine from the submarine war, which was the greatest menace confronting the traders. It must not be forgotten that there were other means employed by the enemy to destroy or injure them, some no less callous and brutal in their application. The laying of mines in the track of peaceful shipping continued, and when, owing to the

degree of control asserted over the trade routes by the British Navy, it was no longer possible to pursue this policy to any large extent by surface vessels, the Germans designed a special type of submarine to do it. A specimen submarine minelayer was the UC 5, exhibited in the Thames in July and August, 1916; another was the UC 12, which fell into Italian hands.



UC 5.
A German mine-laying submarine.

Mines were also dropped by the disguised raiders of armed mercantile type sent out by the Germans.

The P. & O. line Maloja was among the principal victims of mines during 1916. She was destroyed off Dover on February 27, and of the 411 lives on board 155 were lost. The explosion caused great damage, the captain remarking at the inquest that he saw boats, davits, and *débris* going up into the air, while the poop was blown up. He ordered the ship to be stopped and the engines reversed, to take way off the ship and enable the boats to be lowered. A few seconds later the ship began rapidly to pick up stern way, and the order was given to stop engines, but it could not be executed as the engine-room was by that time flooded. With the ship going eight or nine knots astern it was not possible to lower boats safely, besides which she had a list of about 75 degrees. Had the engines stopped every one would have been saved. There were some pathetic cases of loss among the passengers. An accountant in the National Bank of India was returning to India after a holiday in England, during which he had been married. His wife was accompanying him, and they both slid off the sinking vessel just after he had put a lifebelt on her. The wife was picked up after being in the sea for 25 minutes; the husband was drowned. Several military officers taking passage in the ship also lost their lives.

Another species of attack of which the merchant steamers had to run the gauntlet was that from the air. If this method was not so deadly as the under-water attacks, it was severely trying to the nerves of the seamen, loth as they were to admit anything of the kind. One of the earliest affairs of the kind occurred about 7 a.m. on the morning of March 23, 1915, when the Teal, a small steamer on a voyage from Amsterdam to London, was

PICKING UP THE CREW OF A SUNKEN VESSEL.

attacked by a Taube aeroplane. According to the account of one of the officers, when the Teal was between the Schouwen and the North Hinder Lights, the first mate, who was in charge at the time, saw an aeroplane coming up on the stern. Near the Teal was a fishing trawler which sent up a five-star rocket, apparently as a signal to the airman and his observer. The Flushing steamer, which was two or three miles

off and must easily have seen all that happened, kept on her course, taking no notice whatever. As soon as the Taube came up to the Teal the first mate changed his course. A bomb was dropped, but missed the steamer by about 40 yards, raising a great column of water. A second bomb fell on the opposite side to the first. The Taube then, after making a wide circle, dropped two more bombs in quick succession. But as the mate was steering a zig-zag course they were eluded. Two or three minutes later the observer in the Taube opened fire down on the Teal with a machine-gun, but without success. Then a number of steel darts were dropped, one of which struck the vessel but did no damage. Finally the Germans opened fire again with their machine-gun, firing at least another dozen rounds, but they had no more success than before, and gave up the attempt, having bombarded the Teal for three-quarters of an hour.



STEAM YACHT AS MINE-SINKER.

There were also the dangers facing the merchant seamen from Zeppelins. Like the aeroplanes, very few of these monsters succeeded in destroying any trading vessels. This, however, was not for want of trying, but because of the lack of precision and reliability in their weapons. One ship sunk by a Zeppelin was the coasting collier Franz Fischer, a captured enemy vessel trading under the British flag. She left Hartlepool on January 31, 1916, on a voyage south, and when she was at anchor off the Kentish Knock on the following evening a Zeppelin appeared right over the vessel and dropped an explosive bomb, which struck the ship amidships. She sank within a couple of minutes, all on board being lost. It was on the morning after this that Zeppelin L 19 was found floating in the North Sea by the late Skipper W. Martin, of the trawler King Stephen from Grimsby, which rather pointed to the probability that the same airship may have been responsible for the murderous attack on a humble collier the night before.

In the outer seas the disguised raiders sent out by the Germans had a very limited success. Only two of the attempts made in 1916 to put such raiders on to the trade routes came to anything, the Möwe making several captures in January and February, and a second vessel of the same character being sighted in the North Atlantic on December 4. The crews of the victims of these craft were taken at first on board the raiders, and later transferred to one of the captured vessels delegated to act as a tender. The conditions of confinement were not of the most satisfactory kind, and the

behaviour of the Germans was, as usual, callous and at times brutal, but nothing could "down" the spirits of the British seamen. Captain Andersen, of the Norwegian steamer Hallbjorg, one of the ships sunk by the second raider, said that the merchant seamen were by no means downhearted, and from morning to night they would sing "Tipperary" and other songs. The victims of the raider, who were landed at Pernambuco in January, 1917, declared that they were closely confined, poorly fed, and subjected to much suffering while on board the German vessel, and also the steamer Saint Theodore, which was converted into a "prison ship." It was also stated that 100 lascars, taken from captured vessels, were compelled to work in the raider's stokehold, being told that the German stokers were released for other work. Whenever a merchant ship was captured in daylight moving pictures were taken of the event, according to the captain of the steamship Radnorshire, who said that the German captain told him he had orders to spare all passenger ships and vessels not carrying big cargoes. This British captain also stated that he and his men were kept in the raider's port bow practically without air, and compelled to sleep for five days with "roughnecks." At length the Japanese ship Hudson Maru was utilized to send them into Pernambuco, with barely enough water and sea biscuits to complete the voyage.

A fitting episode to conclude this chapter is that of the escape of the Cardiff steamship Southport, which is not only amusing, but illustrates that never-failing resource which has carried the British merchant sailor through so many stiff ordeals. This vessel was at Kusai, an island in the east of the Caroline group, formerly in the possession of Germany, on September 4, 1914, when a party from the German gunboat Geier boarded her. They hoisted the German flag, damaged and removed parts of the machinery, and left after taking the vessel's papers. The Geier then went elsewhere to try and hold up other merchantmen. No sooner had she gone than the engineers of the Southport set to work to effect temporary repairs. They were successful, and on September 30 it was reported from Brisbane that the steamer had reached there safely after a slow voyage from the Carolines. If ever the Geier went back to Kusai, her officers must have reflected that they had not taken adequate measure of the British seaman's character. They were like the bold German magistrate at Naurn Island, another ex-German possession in the Pacific, who when war was declared took a boat's party off to the British steamer Messina and demanded to be taken on board. "By whose orders?" asked the mate. "By order of his Imperial Majesty the German Emperor," replied the pompous magistrate. The mate gave a loud laugh, and, ordering full speed ahead, the Messina quickly reached the open sea.



CHAPTER CLXXII.

FISHERMEN AND THE WAR (II)

A Previous Chapter—Skippers and Fishermen, R.N.R.—Activity of British Fishing Vessels—Casualties—Heavy War Losses—Adventure on a German Submarine—The Fish Supply—A Prisoner of War—"Submarine Billy"—The Work of Patrollers and Mine-sweepers—Fishermen's Roll of Honour—Acts of Heroism—Sporadic Lawlessness—Out of Bounds—Profit and Loss of Fishing—Prices of Fishing Vessels—Life-Saving—A Fish Yarn—Special Funds and Agencies

IN Chapter CXXI. the organization of fishermen as mine-sweepers and patrollers in connexion with the Royal Navy was described, and their wonderful and effective work was dealt with; the system of fishing which existed before the war was explained, and an account was given of the great changes that hostilities necessitated in carrying on this vast enterprise on which such an important part of the supply of the nation's food depended It was shown how priceless an asset were the men of the deep-sea grounds and the in-shore waters—the fleeters and the single boaters, and to what an enormous extent the *matériel* and *personnel* of the fishing industry had been used by the naval authorities in the successful prosecution of the war at sea. Details were given which showed how extensive and far-reaching were the operations of the one-time fishermen; but it was not until the beginning of 1917 that Admiral Jellicoe publicly stated that the number of vessels of all classes comprising the British Navy was nearly 4,000, and that the *personnel* of the mercantile marine had been largely drawn upon for, amongst other things, "the manning of the whole of our patrol and mine-sweeping craft, nearly 2,500 skippers being employed as skippers R.N.R." The public had been previously allowed to know that 100,000 fishermen were serving with the Navy. In addition to these mine-sweepers and patrollers, fishermen were going to sea, taking all the risks of ruthless warfare, enduring all the privations of an exceptionally severe winter, and doing their business of catching fish and sending or taking it to market. In those hard, dangerous gales there were many casualties of various sorts, including the toll of wandering mines; skippers and men suffered acutely from exposure to the piercing wind and freezing sleet and spray; there were many torn and bleeding hands at work on icy trawls and warlike warps and other sinister contrivances—but the skippers and men endured it all heroically and stoically, and were apt curtly and gruffly to belittle their tribulations, and to declare that hardship was only part of the day's work, and that the fisherman was used to it, just as he was used to being drowned.

Two and a half years after the outbreak of war about 75 per cent. of the first-class fishing boats were on Admiralty service, including all the big steamboats; and the majority of the fishermen had joined the Navy. Yet in spite of these immense calls the work of fishing, mostly by single-boating, but also with a modified form of fleeting, went on, and with so much success that the supply of fish had dropped only about 30 per cent. below the normal.

The work of the 2,500 skippers and the 100,000 fishermen was of every sort that can fall to a powerful and well-organized auxiliary in time of war. When first enrolled the fisher-



THAMES SAILING BARGES TAKING EXPLOSIVES TO THE MEDWAY.
On the right is a submarine, and above is a "kite-balloon."

men were soon busily employed as mine-sweepers and patrollers in armed trawlers; they did transport work in distant waters, and they maintained in splendid fashion their fine tradition as some of the most skilful life-savers afloat. There was no disaster of any description, from a mined or torpedoed battleship such as the Formidable to a submarined ship like the Lusitania or a lost leviathan like the Britannic, in connexion with which one or more trawlers, sail or steam, did not do some noble work of saving life.

The North Sea at the outset of the war gave ample scope for the exercise of the skill and energy of the sweepers and patrollers; but later the area of usefulness was enormously extended, and fishermen who had never known a change on the bleak and dangerous banks were operating in the romantic regions of the Mediterranean, the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea; sunny skies in winter replaced the grey gloom of the Dogger, and when notorious bad weather zones were entered they came as a not unwelcome change to the deep-sea men to whom bad weather and peril were inseparable from a hard existence.

While the German fishing vessels were imprisoned in a cramped area by the British blockade, and the fishing port of Altona had its crowded trawlers, the British fishing craft of every sort were at large upon the seas in numerous capacities. Fine big new trawlers were launched and immediately put in commission; as lads at seaports came of age they gravitated to the toilsome calling of their fathers, so keeping up the supply of new and needed blood; while from decaying fishing ports old men once more adventured with fresh life and hope, and wooden smacks that had grown into being in the 'sixties were reaping the sea's great harvest, and fetching fancy prices when put up for sale Built in 1866, a wooden smack was sold for about £400, although before the war such a craft as she secured no offers, except as firewood.

Old-time crews manned old-time smacks, so that when they were met at sea they might almost have been mistaken for contemporaries of Vanderdecken and his spectral band on board the Flying Dutchman. A remarkable case in point was afforded by the drifter Success of Lowestoft. She was manned by seven hands and their total ages came to 478 years. The "boy" was 62 years old; but he was a mere juvenile compared with the oldest member of the crew, whose years were 75. The skipper was 68, and other ages were 72, 69, 68 and 64. That these old smacksmen were capable of sustained and profitable effort was shown by the way in which they handled their nets and did the hard work of their vessel. They proudly boasted that they had had a good season, and expressed regret, tinged with pity, that

A TRAWLER IN PORT.

the authorities considered them too old to bear the "lighter" duties of a man-of-war.

The fisherman went forth to fish literally with his life in his hands, regardless of the region in which he lived—north, south, east or west. In the beginning the danger zone was well defined. It was mostly in the North Sea, but extended until it embraced the whole of the coasts of the British Isles, and submarines and mines became an ever present menace to the fishermen. The enemy appeared in most unlikely places. One winter day, at a sleepy old-world fishing port, brown-sailed smacks which had put to sea were observed to stagger back in very odd ways, taking every course, apparently, except the right one. It was not until the first skipper landed that the explanation was available, and it was that he had seen a submarine laying mines with the object of cutting off the smacks' return to harbour. The mines had been scattered across the mouth of the romantic bay; but the watchful skipper had seen the cowardly act and had promptly

given the alarm and piloted his comrades through the uninfested areas back to port. His sharpness and skill undoubtedly did much to avert loss of life and ship. Submarines and mines were the cause of the posting as missing of many fishing vessels. There were many

CAPTAIN PILLAR
of the Brixham trawler "Provident," decorated by the King with the Distinguished Service Medal.

mute tragedies of the home seas in connexion with the great army of British fishermen who were keeping up the food supply of the country. And what was happening in western waters was taking place far more frequently in the North Sea.

There had been since the outbreak of war very heavy losses of fishing vessels through enemy attacks while peacefully pursuing their calling. These attacks on fishermen and their helpless craft appealed with special force to the "brave German hearts," as their proud compatriots called them; and in the new campaign of ruthlessness they had heavy bags to their discredit.

The commander of a submarine who wrote a letter to his brother, a military officer shortly afterwards captured on the Somme, said: "For four months I have not been able to renew my stock of torpedoes. I am, therefore, obliged to attack traders with my guns—a very risky proceeding now that the British and French boats defend themselves. A single shot well placed might easily send us to the bottom. . . . My submarine is an old crock. I wish I could get command of one of our new submarine-cruisers. As it is known that my boat is not much good I am not given anything very difficult to do. I am generally after fishermen and sailing boats and run very little risk." A typical raid such as is referred to in this letter was made upon the Brixham fishing fleet on November 28, 1916. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, in broad daylight, a submarine rose to the surface among the trawlers and began her murderous work against the helpless fishermen. She opened fire upon the Provident, Skipper William Pillar, who was the gallant seaman to whom so many of the crew of the battleship Formidable owed their lives after that ship was torpedoed. The shells from the submarine brought down the jib of the Provident, and also parted her topsail halyards. After the first shot, the crew took to their boat, and the submarine then came in close enough to put a bomb in the Provident, which sank her. Then the raider opened on the Amphitrite, whose skipper, William Norris, declared in an interview that after his crew had taken to their boat they were still shelled from the submarine. The boat was not more than 100 yards astern of the Amphitrite when the Germans opened fire. Failing to hit with the two shells directed at the boat, the submarine resumed her shelling of the trawler. The third vessel attacked was the Lynx, and her crew, taking promptly to their boat, were likewise shelled from a range

BRIXHAM TRAWLERS.

of not more than 200 yards, but fortunately escaped. This third trawler was not sunk, but was found derelict and brought into Brixham. The men of all three craft declared it was only by good fortune that they were not injured by the hail of shrapnel fired at them.

Great havoc was done amongst fishing boats off the north-east coast on the night of

August 3, 1916. A German submarine suddenly appeared, and as the peaceful craft were quite helpless she had matters pretty much her own way. She set to work at wanton destruction, and in a very short period sank nearly a dozen of the vessels, which were mostly small motor herring drifters. The skipper of one of the boats, a Scotsman, said it was one of the calmest nights at sea that he ever remembered. The boats had their nets out, their lights were showing, and a good watch was kept. At about midnight an explosion was heard, and it was instantly suspected that a submarine was at work. A second explosion followed, and a fishing vessel was seen to disappear. A number of the drifters had already cut their nets adrift and were making a rush for port and safety. The skipper himself tried to escape, but a big submarine came up rapidly, and he was ordered to stop. Two tall men boarded him from the submarine, each of them carrying bombs.



A GRIMSBY TRAWLER.

The drifter was destroyed, and her crew were taken on board the submarine, on whose deck other fishermen were assembled, making twenty in all. The German commander was in the conning tower, and all the time the skipper was on board the submarine—about an hour and a quarter—he directed his crew below. Three men were beside him, with large glasses, continuously sweeping the seas, apparently intensely apprehensive of the coming of British war vessels.

When the submarine got under way, her speed being estimated at 17 or 18 knots, the commander persistently questioned the skipper as to the lights that were seen, and whether any of the fishing vessels carried guns. A stop was made to destroy another drifter, and fishermen were added to the crowd on the submarine's deck, making a total of 30, all of whom realized that their fate was almost certain if a warship appeared. They were satisfied that if such a vessel came up the submarine would dive and leave them in the sea. This, fortunately, did not happen, and the fishermen, to their intense relief, were put on board a small drifter, and left to themselves. Before he disappeared the submarine commander gave precise orders that lights should be kept burning, and that the drifters were not to move till daylight, the punishment for disobedience being instant destruction. Having issued his directions he resumed his work of sinking drifters.

The skipper described the destruction as

very deliberate and well organized, and he calculated that on an average one vessel was sunk every 16 minutes. In some cases crews of destroyed craft were sent adrift in their own little boats; in others refuge was sought on board vessels which escaped destruction. Finally a patrol boat picked up some of the men and took them into port. The time of the year and the calmness of the weather prevented much suffering and loss of life.

This wholesale destruction of fishing vessels was the forerunner of other similar acts against fishing fleets. Though the losses were heavy, yet they were almost inevitable, in view of the methods which were adopted to cause them, and the vast area of sea which, even under the rigid regulations that were in force, had to be protected by the Navy. It was significant that the fisherman, who suffered most, was the last man to raise the foolish cry, "Where is the Navy—what is it doing?"

While most of the losses amongst fishing vessels were doubtless due to submarine attacks it was not the policy of the Admiralty to announce how or where ships were sunk. Both these facts, Dr. Macnamara stated in the House of Commons, were of use to the enemy. "Information that a vessel is sunk or damaged," he said, "is communicated confidentially to the shipowners concerned and to Lloyd's. If it is stated that they are sunk by submarines it cannot be in consequence of official information from us."

The losses of fishermen and fishing vessels were grievous. Many of them took place during the winter of 1916-17, which was one of exceptional bitterness, and men might well have declared that to go to sea was to court almost sure disaster from submarine, mine, or gale. But the old North Sea spirit triumphed. No danger daunted and no threat deterred. The more the Germans resorted to barbarism the more determined was the British fisherman to reap the harvest of the sea on which he had been a life-long toiler. He went forth and he laboured, under the protection of the all-powerful Navy, and with such success that even in the abnormal state of the weather at the beginning of 1917, when the severest frost prevailed that had been known for 22 years, when ships at sea were filigreed in ice, he was able to send good supplies of fish to market. In January, 1917, the weight of fish landed at Billingsgate Market was 7,348 tons. In the previous January the supplies amounted to 6,741 tons. These quantities were, of

A RECORD CATCH OF BETWEEN 60,000 AND 70,000 MACKEREL AT YARMOUTH.

course, far below the pre-war rates; but at that period four large fleets of steam trawlers were at work on the North Sea, maintaining constant communication with Billingsgate by means of carriers. The *Board of Trade Labour Gazette*, in a review of food prices in 1916, stated: "In July, 1916, fish averaged about 80 per cent. above the level of two years earlier, this being the lowest point reached during the year and representing a drop from 105 per cent. at the beginning of February. At the end of 1916 the price of fish was about one-third higher than a year earlier."

In keeping the markets supplied fishermen ran the gravest risks of death or capture. A skipper who was fishing in the very early days of the war was made prisoner with many other fishermen, their vessels, steam trawlers which were single-boating, being sunk by Germans. For fifteen months he was a prisoner, then he

FILLING BASKETS ON BOARD.

was sent home, being too old to fight; and even if he had been young enough the brutal treatment of his captors would have put him utterly beyond the power of combat. The war had ruined him; he had lost all in adventurously harvesting the Dogger.

Many fishermen went to sea in spite of the fact that they had been submarined or bombed once or more. A very remarkable case was that of a man who won the name "Submarine Billy," because on three different occasions on the North Sea he had sailed in smacks which had been blown up by crews of German submarines. The second time he was shot through the thigh, while in the little boat to which the men had been ordered. Helpless on the water though they were—and there was a little lad amongst them—they were deliberately fired upon by the Germans. With each little brown-sailed smack the procedure was precisely the same—five minutes' notice to quit and take to the boat, then annihilation by bomb.

HAULING "KITS" ON TO THE WHARF.

"About a quarter of an hour after we left the smack there was a terrific explosion," said "Submarine Billy." "The deck split up, there was a lot of fire and smoke, she began to sink, and in about eight minutes she had gone altogether. Our floating home and everything in it went to the bottom." The Germans lost no time over their task, the narrator added. They did not mind unarmed fishermen, but they dreaded the appearance of British destroyers and armed trawlers and patrols. "Submarine Billy" had his woes crowned by being "gassed" by the fumes of a bomb dropped from a Zeppelin which was hovering low in a thick haze. He was asked what happened to the boy. "He was a splendid little chap," he answered. "He had been badly scared, but he pulled up, and in two or three days went to sea again."

"Went to sea again." That summed up the ordinary fisherman's achievement. And all the time he maintained his indomitable optimism, and his resolution never faltered. He was furnished with efficient tools, and knew precisely how to use them; he had faith in his superiors and a childlike trust in the genius that controlled the Navy—and he was incor-

WHITE FISH MARKET, NORTH SHIELDS.
Inset: Scottish Fisher Lasses.

rigibly contemptuous of the German. He was still disposed to look upon the Teuton as the fat, somewhat simple fellow he had so often met near Heligoland and on the Dutch and German coasts, and to whom he had, in hours of relaxation, sung a doggerel composition

PACKING HERRINGS.

of obscure humour which ended with the encouraging refrain :—

"Copenhagen shall be tagen—
Ja, ja, ja!"

But he had solid reason for the faith and comfort that were in him, because he knew what was being done; there was not for him the impenetrable veil which hid the doings of the Navy from the anxious public. Except amongst his own kind he seldom spoke of what he did and saw; letters from sea were rigidly censored, and rightly so, but it was known that not a few Germans, especially in the North Sea, had paid the final price as the result of meeting one or more armed trawlers or patrol-boats. Strenuous and successful work was done by the fishermen auxiliaries. One skipper, a fine, steady, reliable example of his class, who had distinguished himself and received a well-merited honour, said that two German submarines in a certain area had suddenly shown themselves to two armed trawlers—and very soon after the meeting there was "a tough job."



MOCK AUCTION OF FISH AT YARMOUTH.

The winter work of the patrollers was well described by the skipper of a craft on his return to his base. "I get home fairly often," he said, "anyway every two months, then I get four days. I am not mine-sweeping, but doing escort work and patrol, and it's very trying at times. There's something more than haddocks to play about with now, but I think we can manage them all right. . . . I have just arrived in port, having been waiting for an escort for three days, only to hear that she is sunk. So here I am at my base for 24 hours' rest, after eight days at sea. It's a warm place here, on this East Coast. We had our Christmas at sea, but under fairly comfortable circumstances. The weather was not so bad—plenty of rain, but that don't hurt the old North Sea boys."

A sweeper who was busy in submarine-infested areas wrote: "Our men were out and sighted a submarine, but it came on to blow and they had a rough time of it. One drifter was almost lost through a heavy sea coming on board. We have been very busy with the submarines. We have been at it night and day—and so bitter cold, too. One young man coming aboard his ship—it was very dark at the time—fell overboard and was drowned. The glass is well down; the sky looks very bad. It has been bad times with us lately—no rest

while these submarines are about. We are on deck in all weathers, cold and wet through."

"We have been very busy with the submarines lately" another sweeper said, "and the weather has been awful bad for our small craft. They sunk three steamers close here, and afterwards it blew very hard and cold. Poor fellows! We managed to pick up the three boats full of the crews. It blew a heavy gale of wind at the time. One hardly expects a ship to stand it, let alone a small boat."



MINE SWEEPERS.

The trawlers work in pairs: the second vessel can be seen behind the funnel of the foremost; a strong cable is stretched between the two.

Another mine-sweeper said that during four sweeps he brought 12 mines to the surface and exploded them. "I have been out sweeping continually up to yesterday," he went on, "but did not get anything. I believe I have cleared them away, but there might be a few missed; anyhow, the next time we shall sweep east and west, to make certain—have done before the sweeping north and south. I have been at it every morning at 3, finishing at 5 p.m. Last month, when nearly completing the sweeping, I swept up five mines and came across five full petrol tanks, each holding about 51 gallons or more, which appeared as if they had been moored. I therefore set to work by destroying and sinking them."

The fishermen were not good correspondents; to some of them reading and writing were unknown, but there were many, especially of the younger generation, who were able to put on record stories of quiet heroism and resourcefulness. From the English Channel, in the spring of 1916, a sweeper wrote saying: "We have helped to do a little good since we have been patrolling this part of the coast. There are four ships in our division, and we have sunk four mines this last month. . . . We picked up 29 hands off the steamship —— belonging to ——. The crew had just time to get into the boats before the steamer sunk. When we took them on board they found out



SALVING A DERELICT TORPEDO.

MINE-SWEEPING TRAWLERS AT LOWESTOFT.

that the captain and the second mate were not there, so we launched our small boat. Two of our crew and myself went to look for the captain and mate. We had not pulled far before we could hear them in the water, shouting for help. Pleased to let you know that we got them all right. They were swimming away from the ship, or else if they had not she would have taken them down. I heard the explosion. I had just turned in my bunk. As soon as I got on the deck the vessel had begun to sink. She was torpedoed by a German submarine. It was about 9 p.m., and getting dark. I was glad they were all saved and not one injured. I should think their poor wives and children would be pleased when they got the news that all hands were saved."

The fishermen's roll of honour grew to an extent which could be appreciated only by a close study of the lists issued by the Admiralty and published *in extenso* in *The Times*. On December 6, 1916, the Admiralty lists showed that 27 fishermen, second hands, deck-hands, enginemen, trimmers, etc., had been killed; 21 were missing, believed killed; and 11 were missing. There were also announced, three days later, the names of no fewer than seven skippers amongst 34 naval officers reported killed. An official publication contained in January, 1917, the names of 80 skippers who had been killed in action.

Many of the acts of heroism were not recorded, and it was only occasionally that the public, through the newspapers, became aware of the consistently courageous conduct of the fishermen. There was a Grimsby fishing vessel—her name was not given—under whose keel a mine exploded. A hole was made in the vessel's hull, and the little cramped engine-room was filled with scalding steam from the damaged boiler, while the sea rushed in and almost overwhelmed her. The situation was extremely perilous, and called for promptest action and the highest courage. Both were instantly at hand. The chief engineer, F. P. Wilson, and the second engineer, C. E. East, set to work to save both ship and life. Wilson, reckless of the scalding steam and rush of sea, forced his way into the engine-room and plugged, as best he could, the hole caused by the explosion; while East, although violently thrown against the boiler by the motion of the vessel, "made his way to the bunker to save his fireman."

That is to say, he struggled in the blinding, scalding, darkening atmosphere of what was nothing more than a large steel box, crawled and dragged himself to the appalling little hole

CHIEF ENGINEER F. P. WILSON, D.S.M.

which was called a bunker, and saved the imprisoned stoker whose chance of salvation seemed hopeless. While this was going on another trawler near at hand, which had been mined also, was sinking, and her crew of seven were in imminent peril. It might well have been that the men on the other ship thought they had their own hands full, and could do no more; but that was not the North Sea way, it was not the fighting, conquering spirit of the Dogger. In the old days, in the deadly gales which fishers called "smart breezes," when a smack was hove down or a boat capsized in boarding fish, the smacksmen paid no thought to danger and they went about the work of rescue. So now the second hand—the mate—on Wilson's vessel took in charge the launching of the little boat. E. R. Gooderham they called him. He got the boat overboard and took it to the other mined trawler, which by this time was capsizing. Gooderham fought his way into the very vortex, and though the sinking vessel was almost turning completely over on to his boat yet he saved the seven members of her crew; then he strenuously pulled out of the death-embracing area. For these acts of true heroism the engineers were awarded Distinguished Service Medals, while the second hand was "highly commended for exceptional bravery in emergencies." The Victoria Cross had been given for less. This case was merely typical—there were very many like it, all around the British coasts and far afield. Many of the acts were put on record and officially acknowledged; but there were many others, just as splendid, of which no word of praise could be spoken or written, for the doers had perished in the time of their achievement.

A trawler was attacked and sunk by a submarine. A few months later the skipper went off in a drifter for the night, to take the place of a man who was forced to remain ashore. The drifter was blown up; but again the skipper had the good fortune to escape. He was asked what he thought of the matter, and he answered, "There's one good thing about it—you take it calmer the second time!" That was the spirit which, with rare exceptions, was shown by the fishermen; and the exceptions were mostly cases in which men's nervous systems had been seriously weakened by incessant strain. The fisherman had no complaint to make about the inevitable hazards of war; he bore them philosophically, and whenever he could do so he spoke a good word for the enemy. There were rare and precious occasions on



SECOND ENGINEER C. E. EAST, D.S.M.

which he was able to say that the German had acted like a gentleman.

The new and heavy dangers which the war had added to his life had but little effect upon the fisherman, except to make him even more

BOARDING FISH: A BROADSIDE VIEW.



BOARDING FISH: THE SCENE ON BOARD THE CARRIER.

enduring than of old. His courage sustained him in the darkest hours, his resourcefulness enabled him to conquer apparently hopeless difficulties, and his old-time ways were not to be amended except at heavy cost. His habit of closely examining and somewhat carelessly handling oddments that his trawl brought up

A CAPTURED TORPEDO.

from the deep sea clung to him when extreme caution was essential; hence such tales as that of a crew who hauled on board a mysterious object which was believed to be a mine, but was so heavily barnacled as to make identity doubtful. A scraping of the barnacles to solve the mystery resulted in the posting of the vessel and the crew as missing. That, at any rate, was a tale of the sea; and there were many like it.

The old spirit of freedom which was little less than lawlessness occasionally reasserted itself in individuals. Such instances usually came to light by way of the police courts, but one special case was made public through the unexpected medium of an Honours List, in the section "Police Medals: Service at Home and Abroad." Various members of the police forces and fire brigades of the United Kingdom were honoured, and amongst them was the following: "Albert Edward Bell, constable, Isle of Man Constabulary. A drunken skipper of a patrol boat came ashore at Ramsey Harbour with two revolvers, and landed four of his crew as armed sentries. He threatened various people, fired two shots, and then aimed at one of his crew. The revolver missed fire, and while he was raising it again Bell rushed at him and took the revolver away."

This was an unusual instance of drunken folly; it was reminiscent of the wild deeds of "Paraffin Jack" in the days of the old sailing fleets; but there were many regrettable cases of insubordination and other wrongdoing due to drink, as anyone saw who came into contact with the sweepers and fishermen on the vast stretch of coast-line that provided bases. On the other hand the various religious and philanthropic agencies, working with the efficient Naval Chaplains' Department, did much to ameliorate the evil and to raise the tone of the large bodies of men who were assembled at the bases.

At one important base a naval officer who wished to make a special effort to accommodate

DRIFTER BRINGING FRESH FISH ALONGSIDE A WARSHIP.

trawler ratings saw the military officer who was in charge of certain buildings which might be available as temporary quarters. "They shall not come here if I can help it," the military officer declared, and on being pressed for the reason of his objection he replied that he had been given to understand that the trawlermen were the refuse of the community,

CLEANING FISH FOR BREAKFAST.

and were lost to all sense of discipline. This was in the earlier period of the war, the base was in a region greatly frequented by fishermen in normal times, and near a port which had become notorious by reason of its fishing population's doings; yet this port gave lavishly of its toilers of the deep and showed that they merely needed help and guidance to prove themselves as amenable to discipline as any members of the Royal Navy.

One of the most striking features of the affiliation of the fishermen with the Navy was the improvement that took place in directions in which advance seemed hopeless. The rigid restrictions of the drink traffic undoubtedly had much to do with this satisfactory result.

Nothing that the Germans could do deterred the vast body of fishermen from going to sea and trying their luck, and it was obvious that but for the Naval Regulations there would have been skippers daring enough to go over to the German coast itself. Not even the heavy penalties that were imposed for infringement of them kept fishermen away from prohibited areas; and even after severe losses on craft had been inflicted by enemy submarines they persisted on getting out of bounds. In connexion with the actual sinking of some Grimsby trawlers in September, 1916, eleven skippers were charged at the Grimsby Police Court with fishing in prohibited waters. They pleaded guilty, but urged that the offence was unintentional. They were, however, severely punished, for fines amounting to £325 were imposed. One great temptation to enter prohibited areas was undoubtedly the eagerness to get fish, in view of the exceptional prices which ruled on the markets and the enormous incomes which it was possible for skippers and other share-hands to make. It was freely stated at the end of 1916 that there were skippers who were making from £5,000 to £6,000 a year; but this was doubtless an exaggeration, although skippers were certainly earning incomes which went well into four figures sterling.

The prosperity of some of the fishing companies was shown by the fact that one of them was able to subscribe £100,000 to the great War Loan in February, 1917: and skippers who had become affluent invested large sums in the Loan. During the war, as in time of peace, there existed the good and ill luck that are inseparable from fishing, for while some men



THE GRAVE OF A "U" BOAT.

The tell-tale patch of oil on the surface which marks the spot where a submarine was destroyed

reaped fortunes there were others to whom the enterprise meant heavy or complete loss.

In spite of the losses which had been sustained there was not that advance in the price of fishing vessels which had been anticipated, though the increase both in cost of production and in the value of second-hand craft was very considerable. The sum of £6,500 was asked for an iron trawler nearly 27 years old; a small vessel, a 20-year old trawler, changed hands at the reported price of £10,700, a remarkable sum in view of the fact that even at that time a first-class North Sea trawler had been launched at a cost of £10,000, and vessels which had been previously contracted for were only about 35 per cent. above pre-war quotations. Yet with high prices like these to pay it was possible to operate with great success. Allied nations were in the same position as the British, and heavy prices had to be paid for fishing craft. The Japanese-owned steel screw trawler Kaiko Maru, built at Osaka in 1911, was sold to French buyers for £13,000.

No official details were given as to the number of lives which had been saved in various ways by fishermen who were serving in sweepers and patrollers; but reports showed that the number was very great and embraced rescues from ships of every sort and nationality. The Mediterranean was frequently mentioned as the sphere of much of this quiet heroism, a display for which the fisherman's training peculiarly well fitted him, for he was accustomed to prompt action in boat work, and heavy seas in small craft had no terrors for him. Most of his existence had been spent in a vessel over the low rail of which the sea could almost be touched with the hand; he had been in the habit of "throwing" his boat overboard, tumbling into it and hurrying off in North Sea fashion, standing to his rowing, one man facing forward, one man facing aft, the better to meet the uncertain seas; and it was this readiness for emergencies, this celerity in action, that enabled him to say, as one skipper, writing from a Mediterranean base, did say, that within a comparatively brief period the trawlers had saved many lives. Many of these were soldiers; many were women and children.

One of the finest achievements of the trawlers in the Mediterranean was in connexion with the cowardly torpedoing of the Arabia, referred to in the preceding chapter. According to the Admiralty account all the passengers were saved by various vessels which were diverted to the scene of the disaster. Amongst those vessels were several trawlers, whose crews set instantly to work to save the Arabia's people, especially the women and children. A correspondent of *The Times* telegraphed on November 13 from Marseilles a story which had been told to him by Mr Prentice, of the Indian Civil Service. That little narrative revealed something of the rescuing trawlers' fine work: "Ultimately I was put aboard a trawler on which were about 166 rescued. We set off in a calm sea for Malta, 270 miles away The first few hours were by no means unpleasant,



H.M. MINE SWEEPERS' RIBBON
Of which the men are justifiably proud.

but after nightfall the sea grew rough. Every wave swept the trawler from stem to stern. We had few wraps, and most of us lay with drenched clothes till we reached Malta. They were 37 hours of utter misery. On the first afternoon the crew of the trawler gave us a good meal of stew, but that exhausted their supplies, and from that moment we subsisted on ship's biscuits. More than half the survivors on the trawlers were women and children."

Wondrous fish yarns were related in connexion with the war at sea, and even more astonishing than some of the wildest works of fiction



SCENE IN THE FISH DOCK AT HULL.

were devices with which the enemy were credited. The story of a remarkable incident found its way across the North Sea from Sulen, near the entrance to the Trondhjem Fjord. Some fishermen secured a wooden box, which they saw floating on the sea, and on opening it they found a tin box containing a fish. The fish suddenly began to burn and emit a sulphurous smell, whereupon the men, unnerved by the astounding performance of the occupant of this rival to Pandora's box, hurled it back into the water. When this was done the unfriendly fish exploded and flames shot up from it to a tremendous height. The fishing-boat was nearly capsized, her boat was smashed to atoms and her lanterns were destroyed, while one man was nearly killed. The narrator added that the region where this occurred was infested with mines, so that fishermen were almost afraid to go to sea.

Such was the story, and, striking though it was, yet it was not improbable in view of the avowed determination of the "brave German hearts" to sweep the fishers from the seas, and the "frightfulness" of German chemists who, in connexion with the war, had gained a notoriety which was as unsavoury as some of their scientific products.

The special efforts which had been made to alleviate the hardships of fishermen prisoners of war in Germany were continued with unabated energy. As time went on it became necessary to take steps to avoid overlapping in work relating to these captives, and accordingly the Government decided that as from December 1, 1916, all parcels of food must be transmitted to prisoners in Germany through a recognized association. The Royal National Mission to Deep Sea Fishermen was the society recognized by the Government for ministering to the needs of fishermen prisoners of war, and no other association or private individual was permitted to send parcels of food except through the Mission That society had for a considerable period paid close attention to the needs of these unfortunate men and lads, to each of whom, weekly, was dispatched a parcel of food from the Grimsby Institute, under the direction of Miss Newnham. The parcel was of the value of 5s., and was often accompanied by boots and clothing and gifts of tobacco. During 1916 no fewer than 10,075 parcels were sent to prisoners, and so great became the calls upon this special fund that a preliminary expenditure of £40 a week rose, at the end of the year, to nearly £100 a week, and was steadily growing. It spoke well for the interest of the public in the imprisoned fishermen that this special fund was maintained entirely irrespective of the ordinary support which was given to religious and philanthropic work amongst fishermen. It was undoubtedly these parcels

of food and clothing which kept the fishermen prisoners of war healthy and contributed to their comfort and happiness; and there was abundant evidence from the men that without them they would have suffered severely or starved altogether. While these special efforts on behalf of prisoners were being made, a very fine work amongst fishermen ashore was being done, great voluntary help being given on the West Coast by Miss Elizabeth Cooper, who had the support and encouragement of prominent naval officers who were brought much into contact with sweepers and patrollers. Abroad, as well as at home, many voluntary workers interested themselves in fishermen who had joined the Navy, many of whom were absent for long periods without leave. In Rome ladies took in hand the cases of North Sea and other fishermen who had been absent from their homes for 18 months



EXPLODING A BOMB DROPPED ON A SUBMARINE.

The bomb has been dropped from a fast patrol vessel which has chased and overtaken the submarine. It explodes beneath the water at a depth which can be regulated. The photograph shows the wake of the patrol vessel in the foreground.

At the many bases around the coasts there came into existence various social organizations promoted by sweepers and patrollers and their friends, which were the direct outcome of the

A QUIET MOMENT ON BOARD A TRAWLER.

war, and were in keeping with the new and improved position in which the deep sea toiler found himself. There were skippers' clubs and clubs for lower ratings, and the establishment of these rendezvous, when they were of the right and helpful sort, was officially encouraged, and many of them proved beneficial to men who were far from their families for long periods. In numerous instances prosperous skippers who were employed in fishing, and skippers and other men who were sweeping and patrolling, moved with their wives and families to their bases, and in this way helped to make the conditions of war more tolerable.

Great, almost incredible, social changes in the fishing community and in fishing methods had been brought about by the war, and it was obvious to students of the fishing enterprise that some of these changes were merely forerunners of far-reaching alterations that would be inevitable when the war was over. Men had developed a wider and more comprehending outlook, and it was improbable that they would ever return to the old conditions which governed the conduct of the industry, especially in the fleets. The war had severely penalized the fisherman but it had brought him into his own in the way of public recognition and reward.

CHAPTER CLXXIII.

THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1916: (I). TRANSYLVANIA.

THE STRATEGIC POSITION ON RUMANIA'S ENTRY INTO THE WAR—HER ARMIES—THEIR PLAN OF CAMPAIGN—THE RUMANIAN ADVANCE INTO TRANSYLVANIA—THE ENEMY ADVANCE IN THE DOBRUDJA; STOPPED ON THE RASHOVA-TUZLA FRONT—THE GERMAN FORCES IN TRANSYLVANIA—THEIR COUNTER-OFFENSIVE—THE BATTLES NORTH OF THE VULCAN PASS AND ROUND HERMANNSTADT—THE RETREAT OF THE FIRST RUMANIAN ARMY—THE RETREAT OF THE SECOND ARMY TO THE PASSES SOUTH OF KRONSTADT—THE RETREAT OF THE FOURTH ARMY TO THE MOLDAVIAN BORDER—THE CHARACTER OF THE RUMANIAN OCCUPATION OF TRANSYLVANIA—ENEMY FRIGHTFULNESS.

RUMANIA'S intervention in the war was a historic necessity; events were to prove that her entry on August 27, 1916, was a military blunder. The additional number of men that Rumania brought to the Allies was not proportionate to the new extension of the battle line. Her entry into the war implied an extension of the Eastern front by about 750 miles; its length was practically doubled. A lengthening of the front as a rule benefits the side with which lies the initiative. But, from the middle of August, 1916, the Russians had been gradually losing the superiority which they had established during the preceding two months; by the end of August the strategic initiative was no longer with them. Meantime in Greece the deadlock continued, and with it the immobility of the Allies with regard to Bulgaria. Rumania received comparatively little support in the first stages of her campaign; on the other hand, the enemy proved able to raise greater numbers of men, and to raise them more quickly than had been generally expected.

In this war of straight, continuous lines, the position on the frontiers of Rumania could not possibly have remained one of even balance. South of the Jablonitsa Pass—where the Russian battle line touched the Carpathians—the Eastern front presented a fantastic outline. Transylvania formed a vast enemy salient between south-eastern Galicia, the Bukovina (both under Russian occupation) and Moldavia in the north-east, and Wallachia in the south, these two fronts enclosing Transylvania like the arms of an angle of about 60°. But even more peculiar was the position of Wallachia. It found itself completely sandwiched in between Transylvania and Bulgaria; it enters like a deep inland bay between these two countries, the opposite shores facing each other on long parallel lines. Bulgaria itself was in turn sandwiched in between Rumania and the Salonika armies, threatened by the possibility of a Russian invasion from the Dobrudja, and of an advance of the Allies from their Ægean base.

This system of stratified fronts and inter-sandwiched belligerent countries could not possibly have continued for long. The straight, short line had to be regained either by an allied sweep through Transylvania, Bulgaria, and Serbia, or by an enemy sweep through

DORNA VATRA: THE MARKET SQUARE.

Wallachia. It was a shortening of the front in the sense favourable to the enemy that was the result of the Rumanian campaign of 1916. The line reached by the troops of the Central Powers in the beginning of January, 1917, was practically an extension across Rumania of the Carpathian front in Galicia and the Bukovina, along which the Armies of Russia and of the Central Powers had been facing each other ever since July, 1916. The new battle-line across Rumania, from Dorna Vatra to the mouths of the Danube, was only about one-third the length of the front which Rumania had originally added on her entry into the war.

It was certain from the very outset that the Rumanian campaign would become a moving battle. Neither side disposed of anything like the number of troops required for holding the line of August 28, 1916, as a continuous front. The battle had to move—and just as liquids tend towards the level, so the weaker side in a modern campaign seeks, when driven into the open, the shortest possible line on which to regain a stable balance. As against all the dead-locks and immovable fronts, at last a clear field could have been opened here for an Allied advance, for a seeking of new short fronts at the enemy's expense. That the field should have been opened at a most inopportune moment was the tragic blunder of the Rumanian campaign. It might have been foreseen that the enemy would concentrate all his available forces for an invasion of Rumania; indeed, he had no choice in the matter, and could not possibly have rested satisfied with merely holding his own frontier. Quite apart from conquest and booty, it was for him a question of strategic security and of attaining an easily defensible short line on this front for the future. But if the Rumanians were to meet in an open battle German Armies, even approximately equal in numbers, they were bound to find themselves labouring under most serious disadvantages.

The modern system of entrenchments has its origin in the need of cover against the immense destructive power of modern weapons. It stands to reason that the more elaborate the defensive system the easier it is to withstand a superiority of armament. But Rumania, very inferior to the Central Powers in artillery, machine-guns, aviation and all the necessary technical equipment, had to fight a moving battle. Further, leadership and organization count for more in strategic advances and retreats than in stationary trench warfare. There is seldom time to retrieve blunders where big strategic movements take place. Battles are decisive and rallies are difficult. But Rumania entered the war under untried leaders, and with an untried organization; generals who had never seen actual warfare, except perhaps as youths some 40 years before, had to meet the best leaders that the experience and selection of two years of warfare had put at the head of the German war-machine. It was not until Rumania's position had become extremely grave, and for the time being even irretrievable, that Russian Generals and French staff officers were conceded a leading part in the campaign.

In August, 1916, the Rumanian front fell

into three marked divisions. From Dorna Vatra, in the corner between Austria, Hungary, and Rumania, to Orsova, near the meeting point of Serbia, Hungary and Rumania, extended on a stretch of about 380 miles the mountainous Transylvanian front. From Orsova to a point some 10 miles west of Tutrakan, the Danube intervened on a front of about 270 miles between the opposing forces. Lastly, between the Danube and the Black Sea supervened again a dry frontier, separating for a distance of about 100 miles the Rumanian province of the Dobrudja from Bulgaria. It could be regarded as certain that, at least in the first phase of the hostilities, the line of the Danube would not become the scene of any serious operations. Below the Iron Gates of Orsova the river broadens to an average width of almost a mile and attains a depth of 10 to 15 feet. It flows through a flat, low-lying valley varying from two to eight miles in width, and subject to frequent inundations. On the northern—*i.e.*, the Rumanian side—the Danube is lined by a long string of lakes and marshes, which break up the flat clay surface of the valley and impede the access to the river. The southern bank rises on almost the entire stretch steep above the river, forming rocky cliffs, from which the Bulgarian and German artillery could dominate the approaches from the opposite side. There is, of course, no river which could not be crossed by an army disposing of modern engineering resources, and there is no river which could be directly defended on a stretch of 270 miles unless very considerable forces were detailed for that task. Yet on the frontier between Rumania and Bulgaria the indirect means of defence were such as to exclude from the very outset an attempt on either side to open hostilities across the Danube. Why should the Rumanians have gone to the trouble and taken the risk of crossing the river where their boats or pontoons would soon have come under hostile fire, when they had at their disposal the safe river-crossings of Tutrakan and Silistria, and the great railway bridge of Cernavoda, with both banks safely in their possession? In fact, the Dobrudja was for Rumania the bridge-head leading into Bulgaria. On the other hand Bulgaria, although she held a dominating position on the banks of the Danube, could not have risked an invasion of Rumania across the river, as long as the flank and rear of the attacking force were exposed to a counter-offensive from the Dobrudja. Hence, in August, 1916, of the three divisions of the Rumanian frontier, only two counted for purposes of active warfare; there were only two theatres of war—Transylvania and the Dobrudja.

A RUMANIAN FIELD GUN.

In either theatre Rumania required a successful offensive to establish a balance in the strategic position. In this war of railway

ON THE RUMANIAN FRONT.
A priest with the advanced line.

RUMANIANS ON THE MARCH IN THE CARPATHIANS.

manœuvres Rumania found herself under a serious disadvantage on either front. Along more than three-fourths of the Transylvanian boundary the enemy disposed of an excellent lateral railway running parallel to it, at a distance which seldom exceeds 25 miles. In Moldavia the lateral railway on which the Rumanian armies had to rely ran more than 50 miles east of the frontier. In Wallachia east of Ploeshti, they had practically no lateral railway at their disposal—except the main railway from Bukarest to Craiova which runs through the centre of Wallachia and marks a line resembling the path of St. Paul "when the winds were contrary." To give but one example, which, it is true, shows the position at its worst: the journey from the Tömös Pass to the Red Tower Pass, if made on the Transylvanian side, took one over some 80 miles of rail; the same journey, if made by the Rumanian railway, took one over a distance of about 270 miles! Though not quite as bad, the discrepancy was yet very great also with regard to movements as between all the other passes. What this meant from the strategic point of view in a war in which the entire line of the frontier could not be held for lack of forces, does not require elaboration. In fact, Rumania had never prepared for a war against Austria-Hungary. During the last 36 years of King Charles's reign, the country had practically remained under the patronage of Austrians and Germans. It was they who had planned and built its railways. And although much of the course taken by the Rumanian railways was due to the configuration of the ground, very different in Rumania from what it is on the Transylvanian side, yet had the Rumanian railways been built with a view to war, as were those of Hungary, many inconveniences might have been avoided, which counted most heavily against our new Allies in the campaign of 1916.

If it is right to describe the Dobrudja as a Rumanian bridge-head against Bulgaria, one must add that, in 1916, it was one of which the construction had not been completed. In 1913, as a result of the Second Balkan War, the frontier between the two countries had been shifted by some 25 to 30 miles to the south-west. Before the change the frontier ran closer to the Rumanian railway leading from Cernavoda to Constanza than to the Bulgarian railway connecting Rustchuk with Varna. But now the distance between the Rumanian railway and the frontier had become very considerable. Under the new conditions it would, therefore, hardly have been possible for the Rumanians to have taken up an expectant defensive position along the new frontier. It is true they had at their disposal the new railway from Megidia to Dobritch. But in the way of lateral communications they had nothing to put against the Bulgarian line, now only about 15 to 20 miles distant from the frontier. Had the Rumanians opened the campaign by a vigorous advance against Bulgaria, the possession of the so-called New-Dobrudja might have proved of considerable value—it placed the Rumanian armies within striking distance of the railway system of North-Eastern Bulgaria. The main centres of that system were no farther from the frontier than Silistria. But, if the defensive was chosen on this front, the newly acquired ground was dead weight. The Germans described Tutrakan and Silistria by the grandiloquent name of first-class bridge-heads. As a matter of fact they were nothing of the kind; there were no bridges at all across the Danube at those places. These were towns offering convenient conditions for a crossing of the river by boats or pontoons, and had they been properly fortified, they might have proved of some value. But in reality their fortifications were practically useless against heavy artillery. Once Tutrakan and Silistria were attacked by superior forces, there was little chance of holding either place. But these inherent difficulties of a defensive warfare in the Dobrudja do not seem to have been properly guarded against. There is little, if any, excuse for the disposition of the Rumanian forces on the vulnerable Dobrudja frontier on the outbreak of the war.

The Rumanians were throughout decided in favour of an advance into Transylvania. No doubt in this decision sentimental motives counted for very much, just as they had counted for much in the original French advance into Alsace-Lorraine, in August, 1914. The war for Transylvania was Rumania's own war. Her eyes were fixed on Transylvania, the home of the Ruman race, the land of its historic traditions. "*Les Carpathes sont notre histoire*," wrote one of the greatest Rumanian statesmen, "*les Carpathes sont le berceau de notre race.*" Every peasant soldier on entering Transylvania, when greeted in his own tongue by his countrymen from over the border,

RUMANIAN TROOPS AWAITING THE ORDER TO ADVANCE.

could grasp the full meaning of the war for liberation and national unity. Even from the strategic point of view there was more to be said in favour of that decision than was usually admitted immediately after the plan had failed. The Rumanian Headquarters must have looked with misgivings at the central position of Transylvania and its magnificent railway system. If this remained in the hands of the enemy, how could the Rumanians prevent an invasion of their own country when once the enemy had concentrated sufficient forces? How could they escape defeat with their armies scattered in the many passes, and the different detachments isolated and immobilized for lack of proper lateral communications in their rear? Moreover, the defence of a mountain-range is by no means an easy task. "Where a goat can get through, a soldier can," was a saying of Frederick the Great; and nowadays the soldier can carry with him a machine-gun, the most deadly weapon for enfilading positions. There is hardly a pass which cannot be turned. People seem to remember how with a handful of comrades Leonidas held up vast hosts in the Thermopylæ, but they forget the rest of the story; how the Spartans succumbed because there were not enough of them to hold all the approaches of the pass. And on the frontier of Rumania and Transylvania the number of good, convenient passes is enormous. It was, therefore, but natural and justified, even from the strategical point of view, that the Rumanians wished to take full advantage of the initiative and to secure in Transylvania a more defensible position before they had against them any serious enemy forces. Finally a grave political miscalculation determined the course of Rumanian military action. The Rumanian Government seems to have considered it possible to confine the war to the one front on which Rumania's own vital interests were concerned. They thought it possible to avoid war with Bulgaria. They overrated the freedom of action of whatever independent elements there had remained in Bulgaria, and they did not see through the duplicity of the Sofia Court and Government. The political premises on which the plan of the Rumanian campaign was drafted contained, therefore, grave elements of error.

At the opening of 1914 the Rumanian Army consisted of five army corps, and two cavalry divisions. Each army corps was composed of two divisions of the line and one reserve division. The total fighting strength of the Rumanian Army was estimated at 250,000 rifles, 18,000 sabres, 600 modern and 200 older field guns and howitzers, and 300 machine-guns. During the first two years of the European war the numbers

of the Rumanian Army were about doubled. This increase was, however, by no means a clear gain, for it meant also a dilution of skilled forces and technical resources. The circle of educated men is very narrow in Rumania, and it was not possible to enlarge the size of the military *cadres* to almost double their previous size without lowering considerably the level of efficiency. Still worse off was the Rumanian Army with regard to equipment. It was in any case short of heavy guns, machine-guns, flying machines, field telephones, etc. Inadequate use could be made by Rumania of the two years of neutrality, as she was unable to complete her armaments by her own resources, and could not receive any imports from neutrals except through belligerent countries. But what belligerent country would have strained its overtaxed means of communication for the benefit of an uncertain neutral? Could Russia have been expected to do so, when she received a great part of her own war supplies from abroad only by a few and very roundabout routes? And if we discount Germany's allies, it was only by way of Russia that it was possible to reach Rumania. Much was done by the Allies after Rumania's entry into the war had become a certainty. Yet even so the equipment of her armies remained very incomplete, and, in addition, was diluted by the increase in their numbers. At the time of Rumania's entry into the war, her forces were grouped into four armies. But when the Rumanian "Armies" are mentioned, it ought to be borne in mind that they were not armies such as were known on the Western or the Russian fronts. These were merely groups of about four to six infantry divisions, with a complement of cavalry and a by no means overbountiful support of artillery and technical detachments.

Of the four Rumanian Armies, three were directed against Transylvania. The First Rumanian Army under General Culcer and the Second under General Averescu,* were to invade

* General Averescu was to prove in the ensuing campaign Rumania's ablest military leader. He owed his position entirely to his own merits, having risen from the ranks, which was a most significant achievement in the era of the "boyar" rule. He was born in 1859, served in the campaign of 1877 as a trooper, and received a commission of second lieutenant in 1881. He received his further military education at Milan, not in Germany like many of the other Rumanian generals. In 1912 he attained the rank of General of Division. He was Chief of the Staff during the invasion of Bulgaria in the summer of 1913. At the outbreak of the war he commanded the First Army Corps with headquarters at Craiova.



RUMANIAN OFFICERS SELECTING POSITIONS FOR ARTILLERY.

MAP OF TRANSYLVANIA.

Transylvania from the south and the south-east, the front of the First Army extending from Orsova to east of the Red Tower Pass, that of the Second Army from the Red Tower to the Oitoz Pass. The Fourth Rumanian Army, sometimes referred to as the Army of the North, under General Presan, with its right flank joining the Ninth Russian Army under General Lechitsky, was to enter Transylvania from the north-east and east. The Third Rumanian Army under General Aslan was left to guard the Bulgarian frontier.



GENERAL AVERESCU,
Rumania's ablest military leader.

The common objective of the Rumanian Armies which invaded Transylvania was the middle course of the River Maros. It extends like a chord within the Transylvanian arc and forms the shortest natural line between the two extreme ends of Rumania, the north-western corner of Moldavia, and the farthest western front of Wallachia. The railway which runs through the Maros valley may be described as the inner base of the Transylvanian railway system. With it the Rumanians would have gained a well-nigh impregnable position. Moreover, a Rumanian advance into the centre of the Maros valley would have necessarily compelled the enemy to withdraw from the positions on which he was facing the Russian troops in East Galicia and the Bukovina. Eastern Hungary would have been lost to the enemy for good.

At first sight the map of Transylvania presents itself to the unaccustomed eye as a wild maze of railways, rivers and mountain ridges. Yet on closer study the geography of Transylvania is found to be much simpler than at first appears. Two big rivers, the Aluta and the Maros, determine the features of the country. Their sources are close together, near the middle of Transylvania's eastern

RUMANIAN TROOPS IN CAMP.

GENERAL CULCER,
Originally commanded the First Rumanian Army.

frontier, approximately opposite the Gyimes Pass. From thence the two rivers flow in opposite directions—the Maros to the north, the Aluta to the south—skirting the eastern side of the Görgeny, Hargitta, and Barot Mountains, which extend north-west-north and south-east-south. Having reached the flanks of those heavy mountain ridges, the two rivers encircle them, and again approach one another. At the widest point the distance between them amounts to about 90 miles; between Maros-Vasarhely and Fogaras it hardly exceeds 50. The Aluta now flows mainly west until, near Hermannstadt, it suddenly turns to the south, and breaking through the Red Tower Pass, continues its southward course through Wallachia. The Maros also assumes below Maros Vasarhely a predominantly western course with occasional deviations to the south. Thus, having encircled the main mountain-ridges of Eastern Transylvania, the two rivers flow practically parallel to each other. In approximately similar directions run in between the Maros and the Aluta a few minor streams, which have their sources on the western slope of the Görgeny-Hargitta-Barot ridge. Of them the Great and the Little Kokel join the Maros above Karlsburg, the Haar joins the Aluta north of the Red Tower Pass. Between Karlsburg and the Red Tower Pass, where the Aluta again turns away from the Maros, a depression intervenes between the two rivers, opening an easy road between their basins.

The railway system of Transylvania naturally follows the fundamental outlines of the system of mountains and rivers. There is first of all the circular railway of the Maros and the Aluta Valleys, closed by the branch across the Hermannstadt depression. Then there are two important railways following the Kokel Rivers, with their termini on the western slope of the Görgeny-Hargitta-Barot Mountains. Lastly, three branch lines following the valleys of the Weiss, Haar, and of the two other small confluents of the Aluta connect the railway in the Great Kokel Valley with the Hermannstadt-Kronstadt line.

In the circular railway line two parts may be distinguished—an inner and an outer division. The outer division is the part which faces the

Rumanian frontier. It is connected with Rumania by three railways, one across the Gyimes Pass, the other across the Tömös Pass, and the third across the Red Tower Pass. Moreover, several lines run from it toward the Rumanian frontier without direct connexion on the other side. The outer half of the circular railway had been planned as a base for an attack against Rumania. No such attack could have been effectively undertaken by the enemy unless the whole of this line was in his hands. But the loss of the entire outer part of the railway, from Toplitsa past Kronstadt to Hermannstadt, would not have interfered with the enemy's communications with the interior. Only if the inner part had been conquered, if the Rumanians had reached the Maros valley between Maros-Vasarhely, Karlsburg, and Broos, would the strategic basis for the defence of Transylvania have broken down. On the Dees-Karlsburg-Hatszeg line, the position of the Russo-Rumanian forces would have become strategically dominant, and no enemy counter-offensive would henceforth have had a reasonable chance of success. It would have had to be conducted over the mighty mountain wall of Western Transylvania without convenient lateral railways and with hardly any chance for railway manœuvres.

Such a convenient line for defence was badly needed by the Rumanians. As previously stated, Rumania, when she entered the war, was not yet fully equipped for it, whilst Russia's military stores, after the intense summer campaign, were no longer superabundant. Hence it would have been of the utmost importance to secure a convenient line on which the Allied armies could have passed to the defensive while replenishing their stores and completing their armament for the campaign of 1917.

The Rumanians seem to have set a high value on the element of surprise. They knew that the enemy forces in Transylvania were

CARRYING BARBED WIRE TO THE FRONT.

small, and they counted on over-running the country in a short time. Its entire garrison consisted of some four or five Austro-Hungarian divisions under General Arz von Straussenberg. Most of these were composed of battered units withdrawn from the Russian frontier (thus, *e.g.*, the 61st Austro-Hungarian Division, now posted round Gyergyö-St. Miklos, had gone through the Lutsk disaster, and had been sent home to recuperate). All through July and the first half of August the enemy armies were fighting a desperate battle on the Somme, in Volhynia, and in Galicia, and it was not possible to detail any important forces to guard the Rumanian frontier. In the first days of September, 1916, the Hungarian Premier, Count Stephen Tisza, when attacked in Parliament on account of the defenceless condition of Transylvania, answered that the Central Powers had known Rumania's preparations to have been incomplete, and, therefore, had discounted the possibility of her immediate entry into the war. Count Tisza repeated this statement in the speech delivered at the New Year reception of 1917, thus long after the tide of invasion had turned—and for once his word may perhaps be accepted. The initial Rumanian invasion of Transylvania was thus a race—or a gamble—as between two conditions of unpreparedness.



AUSTRIAN SENTRIES HOLDING ROADS IN THE "GOLDEN VALLEY" OF BISTRITZ,
A little to the north of the Rumanian advance in Transylvania.

Yet the Rumanian plan for the invasion of Transylvania can hardly be said to have aimed by the shortest routes at the most vulnerable strategical points; it did not cut in at the flanks of the basic railway line in the central Maros valley, but rather aimed at a systematic advance over the ground and at a systematic eviction of the enemy forces. The Rumanian troops advancing from the east and south-east were to be the driving force, whilst those from the south were to support them by a flanking movement; as the advance proceeded the southern groups were to join the armies moving to the west across Transylvania, thus adding momentum to their movement. The plan resembled in its outlines that followed by the Austro-German forces in Galicia, in the summer of 1915, when Mackensen advanced from west to east, gathering in from across the Carpathians the armies which were standing at right angles to his own line and were pressing against the southern flank of his Russian opponents. The geometrical position of the Rumanian armies with regard to the enemy was, no doubt, similar to that of the Austro-German forces in Galicia in the summer of 1915. Yet the application of this plan to the advance into Transylvania implied very serious risks, such as had never confronted the enemy

armies in 1915. The Austro-German Armies had stood along a continuous line, whereas the Rumanian forces were absolutely insufficient to keep contact with one another when scattered over the enormous length of the Transylvanian frontier. The detachments which entered Transylvania from the south had, therefore, to remain isolated groups until reached by the forces advancing from the east. In other words, a delay in the advance of the main body left these flanking groups in an exceedingly precarious position. The First Rumanian Army, to which this chiefly applies, advanced on a front of over 120 miles! (And even of the troops originally detailed for that front some were soon to be withdrawn for the Dobrudja.) This, of course, does not mean that the First Army actually scattered along the entire line. Its forces were divided into three main groups, each separated from the next by more than 50 miles of mountain range, and with no lateral connexions except some 50 to 80 miles in the rear, in the centre of Wallachia. The group farthest to the west consisted of a single division, and advanced against the Orsova-Mehadia railway; the next group advanced across the Vulcan Pass against Hatszeg, and the third, the strongest of the three, the Aluta Army-Group under General Manolescu, through the Red Tower Pass against Hermannstadt. None of them had made any considerable progress or had yet been reached by the forces from the east, when the enemy counter-offensive came down upon them.

Meantime the Fourth or Northern Army had achieved fair progress during the first month of the war, except that no serious headway had been made by its northern wing, where it would have turned the position of the Austrian Armies facing the Russians on the frontier of the Bukovina. By the end of September, which marks the high tide of the Rumanian advance into Transylvania, the Fourth Army had got within some 15 miles of Szasz-Regen, had passed Parajd, the eastern terminus of the railway line in the Little Kokel valley, and had advanced within short distance of Schässburg in the Great Kokel valley. The Second Army was meantime approaching Schässburg from the south and advancing to the west beyond Fogaras. Measured in square miles the results were conspicuous, but strategically they added little to the strength of the Rumanian position. Also here, in Eastern Transylvania, their forces were scattered; they were divided between the different parallel valleys on the western slopes of the Görgeny-Hargitta-Barot Mountains, without strategic cohesion which would have enabled them to defend their gains against a powerful enemy counter-offensive. In short, the Rumanian plan had been only very partially carried out when this enemy counter-offensive set in. It was an arch without the keystone and collapsed under the heavy blows which were now directed against it. In estimating the causes of that failure allowance has, of course, also to be made for the effects of the early defeats in the Dobrudja. The advance into Transylvania had only just begun when the Transylvanian armies were weakened by a withdrawal of valuable forces to the southern theatre of war. Moreover, the ablest Rumanian leader, General Averescu, had to relinquish the command of the Second Army when called upon to re-establish the seriously threatened position in the Dobrudja.

IN THE VALLEY OF THE BISTRITZ, TRANSYLVANIA.

RELIEVING A RUMANIAN OUTPOST IN THE CARPATHIANS.

The declaration of war found the Rumanian troops massed in readiness along the Transylvanian frontier and awaiting the order to advance. On August 28 they crossed the border at some 18 points. In Eastern Transylvania, the lateral railway in the upper valleys of the Maros and the Aluta was their immediate objective. They were advancing towards it from the Tölgyes and the Bekas Pass; along the road and railway which lead through the Gyimes Pass; through the Uz valley, by the road to Oitoz, and along the mountain paths which cross the frontier near the sources of the Putna and the Naruya. From the south-east the Rumanian columns were converging towards the old city of Kronstadt (Brasso), founded by a German Knightly Order towards the beginning of the thirteenth century. It lies at the southern fringe of a very wide and rich mountain valley, and is the junction of five railways and a network of high roads. One railway line, crossing the mountain chain by the Tömös Pass, connects Kronstadt with Ploeshti and Bukarest, whilst the roads into Rumania spread fan-wise to the south of Kronstadt. By all these roads the Rumanians were now advancing, through the valley of the Buzeu, on the road to Bodzavama, across the Altschanz, the Tömös and the Törzburg Passes. From western Wallachia the Rumanians were pressing forward through the Red Tower Pass to Hermannstadt, and were making along several paths and through the Vulcan Pass for the important mining district of Petrosény. In the extreme west they were pressing forward toward the Cerna valley and against Orsova.

The advance was rapid, all opposition being quickly overcome. On the very first day, the IVth Rumanian Army Corps, which formed part of the Fourth Army, took prisoners seven Austro-Hungarian officers and 734 men. South of Kronstadt, in the Tömös Pass, the 82nd Austro-Hungarian Regiment, composed of Szekels, a Magyar tribe inhabiting Transylvania, opposed itself to the Rumanians. This was a regiment consisting of old, seasoned troops—as part of the IXth Army Corps, in the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, it had gone all through the Galician campaign of 1915, and then through the Volhynian disaster of June 1916. But now this was a different struggle. They fought with desperation, for it was the battle of their own tribe which they were fighting. They, the small Magyar minority which rules Transylvania, were trying to arrest the advance of the Rumanians who came to establish the rights of the Ruman majority in that country. In spite of their obstinate resistance, the Rumanians after a fierce struggle forced their way through the pass. Very different was the attitude of the Czech Regiment, which was sent to meet the Rumanians in the Tölgyes Pass—anyone out to fight their German and Magyar oppressors was looked upon by the Czechs as a friend. They withdrew from the pass, opening the road to the Rumanians, and when again sent to the front from Maros-Keviz in the Maros valley, the Czech Regiment—according to a statement made in the Hungarian Parliament on September 5, 1916—"disappeared without anyone being able to say where they went."

Yet, whether opposed or welcomed, the Rumanians were advancing. In the very first two or three days of the war they captured Kronstadt, Sepsi-St. György, and Kezdi-Vasarhely, thus seizing the whole of the lowlands of south-eastern Transylvania, the Saxon Burzenland as well as the Háromszék ("The Valley of the Szekels"). The Austro-Hungarian troops had also to withdraw from the Upper Aluta Valley, retiring to fortified positions in the Görgeny, Hargitta and Barot Mountains, which, ranging from 4,000 to 5,000 feet in height, and covered with dense forests, offered favourable conditions for defence. By September 9, south of Toplitsa, the entire valley extending at the eastern foot of these mountains was in the hands of the Rumanians. The outer wall of Transylvania had been scaled, and from the lateral valley, with its useful road and railway, the invasion proceeded towards the interior of Transylvania.



HERMANNSTADT.

Meantime, the advance from western Wallachia, though far less rapid, seemed at first to proceed fairly satisfactorily. The Rumanians had forced their way through the gorge of the Red Tower Pass, where the Aluta breaks its narrow path between the rocks, and, on August 30, reached round Talmesh the country of rolling hills and flat, wide river valleys. Beyond Talmesh the Rumanian advance slowed down considerably. From here the roads and railways spread out fanwise in different directions—to the east along the Aluta towards Fogaras, through the valley of the Haar to Schässburg, to the north through the valley of the Weiss, and to the north-west through the Mühlbach-Hermannstadt depression towards Karlsburg in the Lower Maros Valley. A movement along any of these divergent roads would have required considerable forces and a thoroughly organized system of observation. But here, as also elsewhere, the Rumanian Army was groping in the dark, being exceedingly short of flying machines and aviators, and as to numbers, the First Army in its scattered condition had never been fully equal to its task. Moreover, now that it had already embarked on the invasion of Transylvania, it was weakened by withdrawals to the Dobrudja front. It was not until September 10 that the Rumanians entered Schellenberg, some two miles south-east of Hermannstadt. Meantime, the enemy had completely evacuated Hermannstadt, and had withdrawn to the hills which from the north dominate the valleys of the Sibiu and the Haar. From the strong, well-prepared positions on these hills his heavy artillery kept the valleys and town under fire, turning them into no man's land. The Rumanian advance came here to a complete stop, and hardly any serious movement against the Austrian positions north of Hermannstadt seems to have



AUSTRO-GERMAN OFFICERS' OBSERVATION POST, MACHINE GUN SECTION, IN THE CARPATHIANS.

been attempted during the fortnight following on the capture of Schellenberg. Evidently it was decided to wait for the Fourth and Second Armies, which were pressing towards Schässburg and Fogaras, and whose advance from the north-east and east would have turned the enemy positions above Hermannstadt.

In the district north of the Vulcan Pass the enemy offered from the outset a much more decided resistance. Here the Rumanians stood nearest to his vital lines of communication and their advance to Hatszeg had to be prevented at all cost. After severe fighting our Allies occupied in the first days of September the important coal district of Petrosény, and advanced across the mountains through the Streiu valley to Merisor. The progress was necessarily slow. High mountain walls extend east and west. The road and railway wind along steep terraces and through narrow gorges ; again and again opportunity offered itself to the enemy for opposing effectively the Rumanian advance, especially as the Rumanians did not dispose of forces which would have enabled them to execute any wide flanking movements. On September 10 the enemy attempted a counter-attack, west of Merisor. He was repulsed, and the Rumanians, following up their success, gained further ground, capturing two guns, some machine-guns, and 305 prisoners. By September 12 they had reached Baru Mare, where the railway passes over its last big loop and enters a much wider, open valley ; Rumanian outposts advanced even as far as Puj, three miles north-west of Baru Mare. The hardest two-thirds of the road to Hatszeg had been traversed by the Rumanians—but, again, what was the use of the movement when executed by altogether inadequate forces and along a line where no support could reach them from other groups if they were attacked by superior enemy forces ? Only some 75 miles to the east of Hatszeg lies Temesvar, the junction of eight railways, one of the chief *places d'armes* of the Central Powers. Beginning with September 12, German troops began to make their appearance in the Streiu Valley—the forerunners of the enemy counter-offensive.

At the farthest western end of Wallachia, the First Rumanian Division under General Dragalina, a Ruman from the Banat, who had received his earliest military training as a conscript in the Austro-Hungarian Army, was ordered to advance against the Cerna line. It was thus into his own native land, for the liberation of his nearest kinsmen, that General Dragalina was leading his troops. On August 28, at 7 a.m., the Rumanian batteries opened indirect fire, across the Allion Mountain, against the fortifications of Orsova. During the next few days severe fighting developed along the front extending from Herkulesbad to the Danube On September 2 the enemy had to withdraw on to the eastern bank of the Cerna and our Allies occupied the range of hills which dominates Orsova, including Mount Allion (over 1,000 feet high). On the next day they entered Orsova, forced the passage of the Cerna round the villages of Tuffas, Nagy-Zsupany and Koromnok, and captured a few more heights.



APPROACHES TO TUTRAKAN.

A convenient position had been gained at the narrow gates of the Danube for preventing all traffic on the river, but nothing more, no advance of permanent strategic value could have been effected by a single isolated division

Meantime the enemy had struck his blow in the Dobrudja. The Bulgarian Government had waited for five days before declaring war on Rumania, until Field-Marshal von Mackensen, who on August 28 had been put in command of the enemy armies on Rumania's southern frontier, had completed both his military and his political preparations. (The cause of the sudden death of General Jostoff, the Chief of the Bulgarian Staff and an opponent of German dominion over Bulgaria, was not known, but some bullet-holes were said to have been found in his body.) On September 1, after four days' delay, the Bulgarian Government declared war on Rumania and on the same day enemy troops began to cross the frontier. The first blow was directed against the eastern Dobrudja. The

Third Bulgarian Army, under General Tosheff, who had distinguished himself in the First Balkan War and had commanded a division at Lule Burgas, advanced against the Dobritch-Baltchik front. Dobritch is an important centre of roads and railways; here the new railway, which runs north and south through the Dobrudja and connects the Cernavoda-Constanza line with the Bulgarian railway system, is met by the branch line from Baltchik. Through Dobritch runs also the important high-road which connects Silistria with Baltchik. The weak Rumanian forces in this region were unable to resist the Bulgarian advance, and on September 4 the enemy entered Dobritch, whilst on the sea-coast he captured Baltchik, Kavarna and Kaliakra. The attack against the eastern Dobrudja was, however, meant merely as a preliminary movement and did not involve the main enemy forces. Having reached a convenient strategic front, the Bulgarians strongly entrenched themselves north of the Dobritch-Baltchik line and awaited in their new positions the arrival of Turkish reinforcements, of which the first regiment reached them in the first days of September.

Whilst the right wing had thus for its task to arrest on a convenient front any offensive movements which our Allies might undertake in the direction of Shumla or Varna, the left wing of the enemy army was to execute a sweep against and along the Danube, fall on the scattered Rumanian forces at Tutrakan and Silistria, capture that important junction of roads, and thereby open the way for a further systematic advance through the Dobrudja. The first attack was directed against Tutrakan. On September 2 the two best Bulgarian divisions (the First and Fourth), under General Kiseloff, were ordered to advance from west of Kara Agach past Kasimlar, Akhmatlar and Mese Male against the centre of the line of forts which surround Tutrakan. There were 13 of them, extending across low wooded heights in a semicircle in front of the river. The Bulgarian operations from the south were supported from the west by the advance of a mixed German-Bulgarian force along both sides of the Rustchuk-Tutrakan road. The Bulgaro-German troops attacking Tutrakan disposed of heavy Austro-Hungarian siege artillery. During September 3 and 4 the enemy forces gradually closed in against the line of the Tutrakan forts, although the western group suffered severely from the flanking fire of Rumanian batteries from across the river, and also from the fire of the Rumanian Danube flotilla. By the night of September 4/5 the German-Bulgarian troops had reached the close proximity of the forts and had gained possession of Height 131, west



TUTRAKAN.

BULGARIAN TROOPS IN A RUMANIAN VILLAGE

ONE OF SEVERAL MONUMENTS
erected by the Bulgars in memory of Russians who fell in the War of Bulgarian Liberation (1877).

of Staroselo, the highest hill in the district. During the night heavy artillery was moved up on to the western slope of the hill, and in the morning of September 5 began the bombardment of Hill 109 and of Fort 2. Meantime the Bulgarians had opened their operations on the right wing. Their attacks, though delivered with considerable forces and under cover of superior artillery, were repeatedly repulsed. At last they scored their first success in gaining possession of Fort 8, near the village of Antimovo, south-east of Tutrakan. On the same day the Bulgarians succeeded in further enlarging the breach in the Rumanian defences by capturing the adjoining Forts 5-7. Similarly, the German onslaught against Fort 2 met with tough resistance. Though very inferior in artillery, the Rumanians held out for hours under the most violent fire from the German batteries, repulsing several attacks and vigorously contesting every inch of ground. It was not until 5.30 p.m. that the Germans entered Fort 2. On the next day the Rumanians attempted a counter-attack from Hill 62 and Fort 3, trying to break through the enemy ring, but the steadily increasing Bulgarian pressure from the east rendered the position hopeless. The attempt which General Basarabescu, who commanded the Ninth Rumanian Division at Silistria, made on September 5-6 to reach Tutrakan led to no result. The Bulgarians had previously pushed forward their screen against Silistria to the Kapakli-Tchataldja-Alfatar line. They were now pressed back and our Allies advanced as far as Sarsanlar, a place more than 25 miles south-west of Silistria, and only about 12 miles east from Tutrakan. But cooperation with the garrison of Tutrakan was no longer possible. Nor could any effective help reach it from beyond the river—the crossing was already under enemy fire. By the night of September 6 the garrison of Tutrakan had to surrender to the enemy—the Rumanians had to pay the first penalty for having scattered their army in the Dobrudja, and for having assigned valuable forces to the defence of isolated, untenable fortifications, instead of concentrating them on a strategic plan for the defence of the entire Dobrudja.

MAP OF THE DOBRUDJA.

The exultant Bulgarian and German *communiqués* which were issued on the fall of Tutrakan claimed the capture of two entire Rumanian infantry divisions (the 15th and 17th) of 25,000 unwounded prisoners, of 100 guns, 62 machine-guns, etc. These figures are exaggerated. As a matter of fact there had been only one Rumanian division at Tutrakan; possibly the civilian population of Tutrakan was included in the captures to add to their bulk. Yet however much the enemy exaggerated the material importance of his victory, important it was in its immediate consequences, in the moral effect which it produced, and, lastly, because it was the first to expose a serious deficiency both in the Rumanian organization, and in the cooperation as established between Rumania and Russia. Within less than a fortnight from the day which after two years of cautious hesitation Rumania had chosen for her entry into the war, she had suffered a serious reverse. For almost a year Russia had been awaiting the hour in which she could avenge on the rulers of Bulgaria the base treachery committed by them against the Slav idea—and now no sooner had the road into Bulgaria seemed to open before her than it was closed once more. For the Rumanian retreat could not have been arrested at Tutrakan.

The garrison of Silistria grasped the lesson of Tutrakan and evacuated the town which would have proved merely another trap for the Rumanian troops. On September 9 the Bulgarians entered Silistria, which had been theirs until 1913. From the steep rocks which on the southern bank rise some 200 feet above the Danube, the hostile eye of the Bulgarian could now once more survey the flat, fertile Rumanian plain beyond the river.

But as yet the left bank of the Danube lay beyond the enemy's reach. His most immediate concern was now to re-establish the connexion between the Silistria and the Dobritch groups of his Dobrudja army, between which a gap intervened of about 25 miles. The reunion was attempted by means of a further strong advance. The Dobrudja narrows up towards the north; the front along the border as drawn in 1913 is about 100 miles long, on the Silistria-Dobritch-Baltchik line 60 miles, whilst between Cernavoda and Constanza the distance from the Danube to the Black Sea measures only 30 miles. Quite apart from the enormous strategic importance attaching to the Cernavoda bridge, the only one which spans the Lower Danube,* it was necessarily the endeavour of the enemy to

* The nearest bridge across the Danube above Cernavoda was that of Neusatz-Peterwardein in Hungary, about 600 miles up-stream. There was none below Cernavoda.

reach the shortest possible front. The disorganization of the Rumanian forces had given Mackensen the initial victories. But although he was receiving all the time fresh reinforcements he had to reckon with the fact that the Rumanians were fighting on the inner lines, that it was only a question of weeks, if not days, when he would have to meet strong pressure against, the Bulgarian forces in the Eastern Dobrudja. But the enemy wheel along the Danube now threatened its right flank and its rear, and compelled it thereby to retire.

On September 11 the two enemy groups re-established contact with each other on the line extending from Karakiöi, past Alexandria,

KING FERDINAND AND THE CROWN PRINCE OF RUMANIA.

more formidable forces and when he would have to pass from the attack to the defensive. He, therefore, pressed with all speed his wheel along the Danube, until the two wings of the Bulgaro-German army in the Dobrudja stood at right angles to each other. An allied force, consisting of the 61st Russian, the 19th Rumanian, and a Jugo-Slav division, had hitherto fully held in check, and even exerted

Arsabla, and Duzbaţi to Kara Agach. In their further advance the Bulgaro-German forces met, however, with an increasing resistance, and even with some severe reverses. Thus, *e.g.*, on September 12, a few Prussian crack regiments, supported by Bulgarian infantry, knocked against a Rumanian force between Lipnitsa and Kara Orman, losing eight guns and a German princeling who—*ça va sans dire*—



THE QUEEN OF RUMANIA AS NURSE,
Cutting up the dinner of a disabled man.

had displayed in the battle the proverbial "shining heroism" of his race and rank (*cf.* any contemporary German account). On the same day another sore reverse was inflicted on the Bulgarians by the Russians and Serbians on the Bogdali-Tchiflik line. On the next day again a swaying battle was fought round Aptaat, about half-way between the Danube and the Cernavoda-Baltchik railway. Yet all these were mere rearguard actions. The main Allied forces were gathering in prepared positions on the Rashova-Copadinu-Tuzla line, some nine to twelve miles south of the Cernavoda-Constanza railway. This line was reached by the enemy on September 16 and a pitched battle developed along most of the front.

The news of the defeats in the Dobrudja could not have failed to produce a deep and painful impression in Bukarest Government circles, and some of the measures taken at the time bear the marks of flurry and agitation. It was decided to continue the advance into Transylvania, yet three divisions were withdrawn from the invading armies which had been anyhow hardly equal to their task. Moreover the ablest Rumanian general, Alexander Averescu, was sent to the Dobrudja, to replace General Aslan, who had hitherto commanded the Third Rumanian Army (sometimes referred to as the Army of the Danube). Hardly had General Averescu had time to take in hand the work in Transylvania when he was thus transferred to a new theatre of war, only to be sent back to Transylvania about a month later when, in turn, the position in Transylvania had assumed a very grave aspect.

The forces of the Allies on the Rashova-Tuzla line comprised, towards the close of the battle —considerable reinforcements arrived about September 20—eight Russian and Rumanian divisions and one Serbian division, about 16,000 men strong. The Rumanian forces consisted of fresh forces brought up from Transylvania, of the 9th Division from Silistria, the garrison of Cernavoda, and the 19th Division from the Eastern Dobrudja. The Russian forces included the greater part of the 47th Army Corps and the Third Cavalry Division. The Serbian Division which was to distinguish itself very highly in the ensuing battles, consisting almost entirely of Jugo-Slav prisoners from the Austro-Hungarian Army, who, having surrendered to the Russians, demanded to be allowed to fight on the side of

the Entente. Recognition has been made of the magnificent bravery and endurance displayed by that division both by allies and enemies. The supreme direction of all the Allied forces rested with the Russian commander, General Zayonchkovski. The opposing forces of Mackensen were about equal in numbers, and consisted of three Bulgarian infantry divisions (the 1st and 4th, and half of the 6th and 12th), two Bulgarian cavalry divisions, some smaller Bulgarian mixed units, two Turkish divisions of infantry, and a considerable number of German regiments properly distributed as "chaperons" among their allies; Austria and Germany supplied the heavy artillery.

It was in the centre of the Dobrudja that the two armies joined in the first general battle for that ancient high-road of nations.

Like a connecting ridge, the high, hilly tableland of the Dobrudja extends between the Balkan Peninsula and Southern Russia. The chain of hills which runs through the Western Dobrudja and attains its highest point in the north, in the Baba Dagh Mountains (about 1,700 feet high) is the farthest northern branch of the Balkan range. Rising below Silistria to an average of 300 feet above the level of the Wallachian plain, it deflects the Danube from its easterly course. The river turns to the north, divides into many branches and spreads its waters in the low-lying Rumanian plain over a belt of land which, with the exception of the neighbourhood of Hirshova, is about six to ten miles wide. It is not until east of Galatz that the Danube turns again to the east, marking the frontier between the Dobrudja and Bessarabia. Near Braila and Galatz, and between Isaccea and Tulcea, where the Dobrudja Mountains throw out their last spurs to the north, a few convenient crossings open over the Danube. These were, since times immemorial, the gates through which the nations and armies from the north had swarmed towards the coasts of the Ægean. It was along the high-road of the Dobrudja that the Roman Emperor Trajan feared to see the barbaric invaders advance against the Eastern provinces of his Empire. Between the harbour of Constanza and the Danube, where the Dobrudja narrows down to about 30 miles, he constructed three consecutive powerful lines of defence, known even now as Trajan's Wall. Considerable portions of these works

THE RUMANIAN ROYAL BODY GUARD.

are still in existence; the entrenchments are 10 to 20 feet high, and are studded throughout their whole length with fortified camps. It was through the Dobrudja that the successive waves of Goths and Slavs ran up against the territory of the Byzantine Empire, and it was across it that, in the Middle Ages, the nearest land route led from the settlements of the Crimean Tartars to Constantinople. Since Russia had advanced her borders in 1812 to the river Pruth and to the Delta of the Danube, it was by the Dobrudja road that her armies marched to the south, to fight for the liberation of the Greek-Orthodox nations, and especially the Slav sister-nation, the Bulgarians. In 1828 General Dibitch "Zabalkanski" * marched through the Dobrudja against Adrianople, and again in 1854, during the Crimean War, the Russian Armies, under Prince Paskievitch, crossed through the Dobrudja in their advance against Silistria.

The highroad of nations and a temporary shelter to them, the Dobrudja presented no attractions which would have made conquerors choose it for permanent settlements. The central portion is a regular steppe, consisting of fine gray sand overlying limestone rock, with hardly a tree or running water. The rivers lose themselves before reaching the sea. It is an open country, wherein the human eye surveys from any hillock a wide tract of land, desolate and gray like the sea itself. The northern part of the Dobrudja consists largely of barren hills. In the east along the coast the Dobrudja drops towards the sea into flat lowlands, and is girded by a broad belt of lagoons.

But this no man's land which no conquering nation desired to retain became the refuge of broken tribes, of small persecuted communities from the neighbouring States, of fugitive individuals; lastly, during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, of Russia's enemies, especially of Polish revolutionaries who sought the help of Turkey or who entered her service.* To the present day the nationality map of the Dobrudja remains most fantastically chequered. "On forlorn shores I have discovered humble hamlets where Turks dwelt in solitary aloofness," wrote the Queen of Roumania about the Dobrudja in an article contributed to *The Times* of November 2, 1916. "Near the broad Danube I have strayed amongst

* This title, conferred on him by Tsar Nicholas I. for his victories over the Turks, means literally "of beyond the Balkan (mountains)."

* At the time of the Crimean war, the Polish revolutionaries and exiles made the Dobrudja the base of their operations against Russia. They raised a regiment of Ottoman Cossacks, consisting of adventurers of every possible nationality. Their leaders were Michael Czajkowski, better known as Sadik Pasha, and Akhmet Bey Pulaski, a Lithuanian Tartar. They stood in close touch with the Polish Committees at Paris, especially with that of Prince Adam Czartoryski.

SILISTRIA.

tiny boroughs inhabited by Russian fisher-folk, whose type is so different from that of the Rumanian peasant. At first sight one recognizes their nationality—tall, fair-bearded giants, with blue eyes, their red shirts visible from a great way off. It is especially in the Dobrudja that these different nationalities jostle together. Besides Rumanians, Bulgarians, Turks, Tartars, Russians, in places even Germans, live peacefully side by side." And here and there one can come across small settlements of Serbs, Greeks, Jews, and Armenians. They are all the drift-wood of the storms of history. The Tartars in the Dobrudja are fragments of the Golden Horde which withdrew from Southern Russia when the country passed under Christian domination. Among the Little Russians descendants can be found of Cossack rebels, of the followers of Nekrassoff, and of the even more famous Mazepa; among the Great Russians prevail all kinds of quaint religious sects, who in the days of persecution had abandoned their homes—Dukhobors and Old Believers, Molokans and "Bezpapovtsi" ("having no priests"). It was in that no man's land, the home of many various nations, that armies gathered from many distant lands were now meeting in the battle for the great highroad of the Dobrudja.

GENERAL ZAYONCHKOVSKI,
Commanded the Allied Forces in the Dobrudja.

The objective of the Bulgaro-German troops attacking the Rashova-Tuzla line was the Cernavoda bridge and the Cernavoda-Constanza railway. Had they succeeded in capturing these, they would have cut off Rumania's access to the Black Sea and Russia's road to the Balkans. The railway itself is one of the oldest in the Balkans; it was built, still under Turkish rule, by an English Company in 1860, and acquired by the Rumanian Government in 1882. It follows approximately the direction of Trajan's Wall, and cuts its lines at several points. The Carol Bridge, which carries the railway across the Danube, was begun in 1895, and was one of the longest iron bridges in the world; the cost of constructing it amounted to nearly £1,500,000. It starts on the Rumanian side at Feteshti, crosses the left arm of the Danube called Borcea, then the wide inundation plain; and, lastly, the main branch of the river, which at this spot reaches a normal depth of nearly 100 feet. The total length of the causeway, viaducts, and other approaches across the marshes, together with the actual bridge structure, is about 12 miles. A line of forts extends east of Cernavoda, but having been laid out about the same time as the bridge itself, by 1916 they had lost all defensive value. They surround the bridgehead at a distance of about three miles, which is wholly inadequate as against modern heavy artillery. Unless it was possible to hold the Rashova-Tuzla line, some nine to twelve miles south of the bridge and railway, this main artery of the Dobrudja was lost.

On September 16 the Germans opened the attack on their left wing between Arabagi and Cocargea. In the immediate neighbourhood of the Danube the Bâlta Bachin swamps impeded their advance. The attack was pressed with special vigour north of Enigea, where the Germans had been able to collect a very considerable artillery force, and round Copadinu, along the Megidia-Baltchik railway line. After the first day of the battle the German wireless triumphantly announced their having "forced their way" into the Rumanian lines. Even on September 20 Sofia still persisted in the statement that the fighting along the entire line "is developing in our favour." But the German report of the same day is chastened in tone, and prepares the public for reverses. "In the Dobrudja," it says,



RUMANIAN TROOPS IN A DANUBE PORT.

"stubborn fluctuating battles have taken place with hastily brought up reinforcements. The enemy is defending himself with great stubbornness." Indeed, he was. Throughout the first four days repeated enemy attacks were repulsed by the Allied forces, and by September 20, when these attacks were approaching exhaustion, reinforcements arrived which enabled General Zayonchkovski to open a counter-offensive. The Rumanian troops attacked east of the Megidia-Copadinu-Baltchik railway, round Toprosari. The Bulgarian *communiqué* of September 22 records that attack, and closes with the reassuring statement that the Rumanians had been repulsed "in disorderly flight." Curiously enough, the next daily ration of Bulgarian victories—as announced on September 23—has to be located some 10 miles back, on the Casicci-Enghez-Karakiöi line, and on September 24 fighting was reported at Mustafa-Azi, still another five miles farther to the south. Evidently it was the Bulgarians who were in full retreat. Soon the retirement became general, and the defeated German, Bulgarian and Turkish forces were falling back throughout the Dobrudja beyond the line which they had passed on September 14. The rout of the enemy was complete. Yet, unfortunately, the Allied commanders disposed of no fresh reserves, and the troops which had stood in the thick of the fight for the last four or six days were not in a position to press the pursuit. The enemy withdrew his line to an average distance of about 15 miles from the Rashova-Tuzla front, and took up strong defensive positions in which he would be able to await fresh reinforcements and a favourable opportunity for a new advance.

Thus, in the first phase of the Dobrudja fighting, Mackensen had failed to attain his "crowning mercy." The Carol Bridge and the Cernavoda-Constanza railway remained safely in Rumanian hands. Yet the results which Mackensen had attained were by no means inconsiderable. He had snatched from our Allies the initiative in the Dobrudja. He had reached a strong line hemming in the Allied troops on a continuous front—this front being now only half the length of the original Dobrudja border. He had extended his line along the Danube south of Bukarest, thus outflanking Wallachia still farther to the east. He had deprived any Allied Armies which might gather in the Dobrudja of important lines of supply; in other words, he had succeeded in circumscribing the Allies' capacity for military concentrations in the Dobrudja. Tutrakan and Silistria were of small importance as fortresses or strategic *points d'appui*, yet, with a view to communications, they would have been of the greatest value for an army concentration against Bulgaria. Two Rumanian railway lines touch the Danube at Oltenitsa and Calarashi, opposite Tutrakan and Silistria. These could now no longer have supplied the needs of an Allied Army gathering against Bulgaria; it would have had to rely exclusively on the Cernavoda-Bukarest railway, and on the fragments of the line which was being built between Tulcea and Megidia. Lastly, by his advance in the Dobrudja, Mackensen had caused the Rumanians to weaken their forces in Transylvania, just on the eve of the Austro-German counter-offensive.

In Eastern Transylvania the Fourth and Second Rumanian Armies were still advancing. The troops of General Presan were crossing the inner mountain wall formed by the Görgeny-Hargitta-Barot range, and approaching the railheads in the Upper Kokel valleys. The Second Army, under General Crainiceanu, who had succeeded General Averescu on his transfer to the Dobrudja, supported them by a flanking movement from the south-east. On September 16 the right wing of the Second Army reached Homorod and Köhalom, and on the same day the Fourth Rumanian Division under General Simonescu entered the old historic city of Fogaras, in the valley of the Aluta, about half-way between Kronstadt and Hermannstadt. It was from here that the Rumanian national hero, Radu Negru, had started on his victorious expedition across the Carpathians which led to the formation of an independent Rumanian State extending to the Danube. But whilst the advance was thus still continuing in the east and stimulating popular imagination by the historic reminiscences which were taken for good auguries, the first signs of the approaching storm were rising over the western horizon.

The concentration of German troops had begun in the Hungarian plain, especially in the direction of Arad and Temesvar. Most people had thought that the Germans, having taken over the Volhynian and also considerable parts of the Galician front, and having



TYPES OF RUMANIAN OFFICERS.

lost enormous numbers of men at Verdun and on the Somme, would hardly be able to marshal any considerable forces for an expedition against Rumania. As a matter of fact, these forces were obtained, partly from new formations, but to a much greater extent by means of the re-organization of the existing armies which had proceeded throughout 1916. During the first two years of the war each German division had consisted of four regiments of infantry and one brigade of artillery (the intermediary formation of infantry brigades—each comprising two regiments—was dropped in the course of the war, partly in order to simplify the organization, and partly because economy had to be practised in the employment of officers qualified to command big army units). In 1916 the shortage of men and the steady improvement in the mechanical means of defence caused and enabled the German supreme command to withdraw from each division one regiment of infantry; the forces, which had thus been liberated were formed into new divisions.

Stated in plain terms the reorganization was primarily a change in the relative proportions of artillery and infantry. It meant that a weaker accompaniment of infantry was left to each brigade of artillery, and that in the passive sectors of the front, which, after all, constituted by far its biggest part, the German commanders had found it possible to thin their ranks by substituting mechanical obstacles and machinery for men. In that way the greater part was built up of the new formations which were required both in the East and in the West. The most competent Swiss observers stated that at the time when Marshal von Hindenburg was appointed Chief of the General Staff, there still remained 57 German divisions with four regiments each. Here, then, was material for some new 19 divisions, and gradually, as the fighting was subsiding in Volhynia and in the West, German troops were withdrawn from those fronts for Rumania, whilst Austro-Hungarian troops were brought up from Galicia, the Western Balkans and the Italian front. Throughout the three autumn months of 1916 one can trace almost continually the arrival of fresh German and Austrian units in the Rumanian theatre of war.

The first move in the German counter-offensive was directed against the Rumanian force which had crossed the Vulcan Pass and was advancing along the Streiu Valley towards Hatszeg. The enemy had to secure the principal railway line, which leads from Temesvar by Broos (some 20 miles north of Hatszeg) and Mühlbach to Hermannstadt and Kronstadt from any possible flank attacks, before he could undertake operations on a large scale against the main Rumanian forces in southern and eastern Transylvania. On September 15 a group of German and Magyar regiments under Lieutenant-General von Staabs advanced against the positions occupied by the Ruma-

nians on both sides of the Streiu Valley near Baru Mare, and extending from Barlu to Mount Muncelului. The enemy, who disposed of an exceedingly strong concentration of howitzers and mountain artillery, delivered a frontal attack, the main weight of which was directed against the Rumanian left centre, round Mount Branu. After a whole day of very severe fighting our Allies withdrew before the superior numbers of the enemy and his even more overwhelming superiority in artillery. "As far as one can say at present," wrote the war correspondent of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* from German headquarters in Transylvania under date September 20, 1916, "the Rumanians generally fight very well. Reports have reached us from the Hatszeg sector about Rumanian units which, having lost half their effectives, still continued the battle. Similar facts have been observed in other sectors."

The Rumanian retirement from Baru Mare was carried out with considerable skill and in perfect order. The main Rumanian line of communication followed the Hatszeg-Petrosény railway to the east, and ran almost parallel to the frontier; the Hatszeg mountain range intervenes between the two. At Petrosény the road and railway turn at an almost straight angle to the south and cross through the Vulcan and Szurduk Passes into Wallachia. It was naturally the aim of the enemy to outflank the Rumanians in the Hatszeg Mountains and to reach by a short cut the passes in their rear. With that goal in view, he divided his forces into six columns, which attempted a wide sweeping movement through the mountains. But the Rumanians kept their front intact, and holding on strongly to the main range of the Hatszeg Mountains, executed a wheel to the right. Their original front at Baru Mare ran north and south. By September 19 they had reached a line extending east and west, between Mount Tulisini and Petrosény. They were now standing parallel to the frontier with all their lines of retreat fully covered. The wheel on the right wing continued, however, still farther; on September 20 the Rumanians evacuated Petrosény and two days later the enemy reached the Vulcan Pass.

During the night of September 22–23 a new change supervened in the situation. The Germans seem to have imagined that they had finished off their opponents, and withdrew some of their forces to the east, where a big

RUMANIAN CAVALRY.

battle was just developing round Hermannstadt. As soon, however, as an approximate equality of forces had been established, our Allies counter-attacked in the Vulcan Pass, and repulsed the enemy, capturing several hundred prisoners and seven machine-guns. At the same time they carried out a successful outflanking movement from the valley of the Silu Rômênescu, which rendered untenable the enemy's position in the passes. Even more interesting were the developments on the extreme left Rumanian wing. The wheel in the centre and on the right wing had for its pivot the positions in the Tulisini-Muncelului district; there our Allies had stubbornly maintained their ground, thus remaining at a short distance from the principal German line of communications in the Streiu Valley. By a new descent into that valley they now threatened to cut the communications to the west, in the rear of the main German forces, which having turned the corner at Petrosény, were facing south towards the Vulcan Pass. The position of September 15 had thus been reversed within a week. To avoid being cut off in the defiles south of Petrosény the Germans withdrew in haste into the Streiu Valley, and concentrated their forces on their threatened line of communications, mainly round Merisor, on the northern slope of the Hatszeg Mountains.

In the first days of October the enemy resumed his attack north of the Vulcan, and in view of the events which had meantime occurred farther east the Rumanians withdrew to the pass, having previously destroyed the valuable coal mines round Petrosény.

On September 19 General von Falkenhayn, late Chief of the German General Staff, took over the command of the Ninth German Army which had been concentrated in Southern Hungary for a counter-offensive against the Rumanian armies. Besides German troops withdrawn from the Russian front or brought up from the interior, the Ninth Army included also the Alpine Corps which had hitherto been with the Fifth German Army at Verdun, and a number of Magyar regiments, most of which had gained experience in mountain fighting on the Italian front. Whilst General von Staabs was securing the approaches to the Maros from the Streiu Valley, the main forces under Falkenhayn's command proceeded with the next task in hand, and advanced against the strongest detachment of the First Rumanian Army, the Aluta Group round Hermannstadt. The Rumanians were to pay once more the penalty for having dispersed their forces, and were to suffer again from the deficiencies in the equipment and organization of their intelligence service. Falkenhayn, disposing of much superior forces, succeeded by quick movements across the mountains in outflanking and surrounding our Allies in the Sibiu Valley. It was not until a very late hour that the necessary counter-measures were taken, and then it was only owing to the determination and resourcefulness of some of the commanders and to the splendid heroism of the Rumanian peasant-soldier that a most serious disaster was avoided. Yet the losses in men, and still more in material, which our Allies suffered in that unequal battle north of the Red Tower Pass, were considerable.

The main Rumanian positions north of the Red Tower Pass extended east and west, with Schellenberg for their centre. To the east they reached Porumbacu, in the Aluta Valley, on the road and railway to Fogaras; in the centre they extended to Height 566 and the Grigori-Warte (601 metres) north-east of Hermannstadt; in the west to the Szecsel-Orlat-Poplaka line. A gap of about 15 miles intervened between the extreme right wing of the Aluta Group round Porumbacu and the vanguard of the Second Army, west of Fogaras. Similarly the left wing of the Aluta Group west of Hermannstadt, had no connexion either to the west or to the south. The two wings extended like the branches of a tree—their stem being the road and railway through the Red Tower Pass. More than 10 miles of high mountains intervened between the Rumanian positions on the Schellenberg-Orlat front and the Rumanian frontier. No Rumanian forces of any importance had been moved into that vital district in the rear of the left wing of the Aluta Army, and on the left flank of the Red Tower Pass, and even the placing of proper outposts seems to have been neglected.

The plan on which the Germans carried out their operations against the forces of General Manolescu was very simple. They advanced in three groups. On the wings two groups were thrown out, like arms, encircling the Rumanians; the column advancing from the west was to cut their line of retreat through the Red Tower Pass, whilst the eastern column was to step into the gap between the First and the Second Rumanian Armies and prevent any

relief reaching the troops north of the Red Tower Pass from Fogaras or their retreat in that direction. By the time that both these encircling detachments should have reached their assigned positions, the bulk of Falkenhayn's forces was to open from the north and west an attack against the entire line of the Aluta Army.

The Alpine Corps, under the Bavarian General Krafft von Delmensingen was chosen for the encircling movement from the west. A rapid march across high mountains was essential to the success of their enterprise. The Corps, consisting mainly of Bavarian highlanders, trained and used for mountain operations, was admirably equipped for its undertaking. The Rumanians, on the contrary, were neither equipped nor trained for mountain warfare, nor had they as yet any serious experience of it. In the days of King Charles no one thought of the possibility of war against Austria-Hungary, and since 1914 manœuvres on a large scale in the mountains on the Transylvanian frontier could not be undertaken for fear that they might be construed by the Central Powers as a threat or a provocation. It was this lack of experience in mountain warfare which accounted for many blunders committed by the Rumanians during the invasion of Transylvania, and in particular for some of the sad omissions in the disposition of the forces north of the Red Tower Pass, and also for the ease with which these forces let themselves be surprised by the encircling march of the Alpine Corps across the mountains.

The date fixed for the general attack against the Orlat-Hermannstadt-Porumbacu front was September 26. On September 22, a strong detachment of the Alpine Corps was pushed forward from Reussmarkt to Szelistye, as a guard on the left flank of its main forces, which had meantime started their march across the mountains. Their path led by Sinna, across Mount Guga (about 4,500 feet) and Vârful Strimba (almost 6,000 feet) to the foot of Mount Cindrelul. This point was reached by the night of September 23–24 without any resistance having been encountered. On the next day the advance was continued across difficult ground and by bridle paths. It proceeded due south until Mount Strefflesci was reached near the



WITH THE RUMANIAN ARMY: CLEARING UP AT A CAMP.

Rumanian frontier. From here the advance assumed an easterly direction. But a screen was thrown out towards the Rumanian frontier which on the line Mount 1850 to Mount Robu was to protect the flank and rear of the Alpine Corps against any sudden attack from the south. On Mount 1850 the first serious encounter was fought with Rumanian forces on September 25. Another screen in the Gauszoru mountains covered the left flank of the advancing troops. Meantime the bulk of the German forces reached Mount Negovanul during the night of September 24–25, and towards the close of the following day they deployed on the Prejba-Vârful Mare front, about 10 miles east of the Red Tower Pass. On the assigned day—September 26—the Alpine Corps attacked the pass itself, reached both its ends, occupied the mountain spurs which dominate it from the west, and took up positions on Mount Murgasu on the Rumanian side of the border. Near Caineni, at the southern end of the pass, they succeeded towards the night in cutting the railway line which connects Hermannstadt with Rumania.

The German column which was to encircle the Army Group of the Aluta from the east, was faced with a more difficult task. In its advance across the mountain ridge which separates the valley of the Haar from that of the Aluta, it met with determined resistance. Still its superior numbers enabled it to force the crossing of the Aluta at Colun and to interpose in that district an effective barrier between the First and the Second Rumanian Armies.

On the night of September 26 the German artillery began its preparation for an infantry advance; the bombardment continued throughout the night and in the chosen sectors changed at 5 a.m. on the following day into a hurricane fire of the greatest intensity. The attack proceeded from two directions. On the western flank Falkenhayn pushed forward very considerable forces, including some of the best North German regiments against the left Rumanian flank, in an attempt to roll it up towards the east, whilst in the centre a powerful blow was delivered from north of Hermannstadt against Schellenberg, Heltau and Thalheim, with Talmesh for its ulterior objective. It was to break up the Rumanian front and throw the broken forces to the south into the mountains, where they were to be finished off by the Alpine Corps and the troops which advanced from the west.

AIRING GRAIN IN PART OF THE DOBRUDJA PREPARATORY TO REMOVING IT.

WITH THE RUMANIAN ARMY: AN OUTPOST IN A CAVE.

The extraordinarily tough resistance of the Rumanian infantry frustrated the execution of the plan. The Rumanians were by now aware of their critical position, and the order was given for a general retreat in a south-easterly direction. But strong rearguards were covering the movement. On the right wing the villages of Szecsel, Orlat, Guraro and Poplaka had to be captured by the Germans one by one, and bitter, swaying battles were fought in their streets. Similarly the heights of the Obreju, Cipara and Valare were defended with skill and determination, and the Germans themselves give a tribute of praise to the Rumanian troops which fought in that district.

Nor did the advance in the centre proceed with the expected rapidity. It was not until September 27 that the German and Magyar forces captured the Grigori-Warte, whilst on their left other regiments were slowly making their way through Thalheim, Baumgarten and Kastenholz towards Talmesh. Naturally in their withdrawal from the encircled positions the Rumanians suffered considerable losses. Not every detachment received the order to retire whilst this was still possible. Even beyond Talmesh the retreat was by no means easy. The strenuous endeavours of fresh Rumanian forces to break from the south the bar which closed the Red Tower Pass to the retreating Army Group of the Aluta did not succeed in freeing that highway, though they did much to facilitate its retreat to the south-east. The Second Army in the Upper Aluta Valley could not get up sufficient numbers in time to open the road to the east. It forced its way as far as Porumbacu, but by that time the Rumanian detachment, which had stood there on the extreme right wing of the Aluta Group, had been forced by the enemy to retreat to the east—and the German forces continued to separate the two armies. The pressure which the Rumanian armies were meantime exerting in Eastern Transylvania had hardly any bearing on the battle round Hermannstadt. The distance was such that whatever their progress might have been it could not have affected the issue of the battle. Only by the mountain roads east of the defiles were the troops of the Aluta Group able to break through the encircling grip and regain their connexion with Wallachia. The movement was carried out with remarkable skill and in good order. During their retreat to Câineni through the

Altoni Valley the Rumanians even succeeded in capturing 300 prisoners. The battle round Hermannstadt is summarized in the Rumanian official *communiqué* of September 30: "Our



ROCKS OF TRAJAN, ON THE ALUTA.

troops at Hermannstadt, attacked on all sides by superior enemy forces, after fighting which lasted three days, re-established their communication with the south, repulsing the enemy who was attacking from that direction. Our troops retired southwards." The enemy reports, and still more the more or less fantastic descriptions of the battle supplied by enemy correspondents and military experts, suggest, or even explicitly state, that the Army Group of the Aluta was annihilated in the battle and that it never succeeded in reaching again Rumanian soil. "The number of prisoners is increasing hourly, while the booty is enormous," was the suggestive announcement made from Vienna on September 30 But then when definite figures are mentioned in the Berlin report of the next day —though even these figures are left conveniently round—one finds with amazement that the total captures claimed were 3,000 prisoners and 13 guns, whilst the "enormous booty" consisted mainly of railway rolling-stock and laden wagons which naturally could not have been withdrawn once the retreat along the railway line was cut. It was an extraordinary position in which the Rumanians had let themselves be caught round Hermannstadt, but the manner in which they fought when surrounded and in which they finally extricated themselves does honour both to the commanders and to the troops.

"In Transylvania the Rumanian troops advance with circumspection, systematically fortifying the positions gained," wrote *The Times* correspondent from Bukarest. under date of September 25. "An effort is being made to straighten and shorten the front." The district round Schässburg seems to have been chosen for the common objective. As far as the First Rumanian Army was concerned, this effort at concentration was clearly belated, and its attempts in the direction of Holzmengen had made but very slight progress, when it found itself engaged by the bulk of Falkenhayn's forces. But the other two armies continued their advance towards Schässburg and scored several fine successes before the change wrought in the general situation by the Battle of Hermannstadt compelled them to recast their plans. In the last days of September the Rumanian Army of the North reached the district of Libanfalva, about 10 miles east of Szasz-Regen, and Parajd, the terminus of the railway line which follows the valley of the Little Kokel. Even more marked was the advance on both sides of the Great Kokel River, where the Berlin report of October 2 admits the Rumanians to have "gained ground." "The struggle continues in the Görgeny and Hargitta Mountains," says the Rumanian official *communiqué* of the same day. "We took 11 officers and 500 men prisoners and captured four machine-guns." On the next day further progress was made beyond Szekely-Keresztar and 14 officers and 1,228 men were taken, whilst the Second Army, advancing on the front Gross Schenk-Bekokten-Henndorf, captured 800 German prisoners and eight machine-guns. A line drawn approximately through Libanfalva, Magyaros (west of Parajd), Szekely-Keresztar, Henndorf and Bekokten was, however, to remain the high-water mark of the Rumanian advance in Eastern Transylvania, for the Ninth German Army, now about 12 divisions strong, was quickly advancing towards the east. Moreover, the few Austro-Hungarian divisions under General Arz von Straussenberg, which at the end of August had been scattered throughout Transylvania, had by the beginning of October received very considerable reinforcements and, as the southern front was now taken over by the Germans, were all concentrated on the western slopes of the Görgeny-Hargitta Mountains. They were formed into a regular compact army, and henceforth were described as the First Austro-Hungarian Army.

Leaving behind the Alpine Corps in front of the Red Tower Pass, and also sufficient forces

to hold the mountain range, Falkenhayn directed the bulk of his army to the east, along the roads which lead to Fogaras and Schässburg. As previously stated, during the battle of Hermannstadt the Second Rumanian Army had attempted to reach the encircled Rumanian group by marching down the Aluta Valley, and it had forced its way as far as Porumbacu, 25 miles west of Fogaras. The move was bold and risky. It implied an enormous lengthening of the front and an advance along a narrow corridor from which the Rumanians could not have withdrawn otherwise than by retracing their steps. From the south they were closed in by the impassable chain of the Fogaras Mountains, rising in height about 8,000 feet; on the northern side the enemy occupied the parallel valley of the Haar. After the Army Group of the Aluta had effected its retreat into Wallachia there would have been no sense in clinging on to the isolated advanced positions round Porumbacu. The left wing of the Second Army was, therefore, quickly drawn back towards Fogaras. Before the advance of very much superior German forces the town of Fogaras was evacuated on October 4. The retreat became universal. The Fourth and the Second Rumanian Armies were still in touch in the district of Szekely-Udvarhely, yet it was clear that if the retirement was to be continued still farther—which it had to be—the connexion between them could not be maintained for long. Their natural lines of retreat were divergent; the Second Army had to fall back along the roads which cross the frontier range south of Kronstadt, between the Törzburg Pass to the Buzeu Valley, whilst the main body of the Army of the North had to withdraw to the east, covering in its retreat the Gyimes, Uz and Oitoz Passes. On October 5 the right wing of the Second Army stood south-east of Szekely-Udvarhely in the Homorod Valley, the centre covered in the valley of the Aluta, between Heviz and Sarkany, the access to the mountains of the Geisterwald, the left wing extended from Sarkany to the mountain group of Scortia (about 6,400 feet high), on the Wallachian frontier. The further retreat of the Second Army had to be a wheel to the right to the Zernesti-Kronstadt-Sepsi St. György line, and finally on to the frontier range and passes.

TURKISH PRISONERS OF THE RUMANIANS.

The enemy advanced in three groups. On October 5 his left wing, formed by a strong group of German divisions, engaged the Rumanians near Reps (in Magyar: Köhalom), and from here forced its way through the Geisterwald against the Barot-Nussbach line. In the centre a mixed German and Magyar column advanced in the direction of Vledeny and Weidenbach. In the south a third and purely German group marched past Vadu, along the valley of the Sinca and across the Persanerwald by Polana Morulia against the Törzburg Pass. The Rumanians offered a determined resistance along the western edge of the Geisterwald and the Persanerwald, but by the night of October 5 had to withdraw on to the mountainous plateau which, about 15 miles wide, covers the approaches to the plain round Kronstadt. The retreat across that plateau, covered with woods or heather, was effected amid continuous fighting. Under the strong pressure from the southern German column the left Rumanian wing separated from the centre and receded to the south towards the Törzburg Pass and the La Omu mountain group. On October 8 the enemy entered the town of Törzburg. Meantime the main forces of the Second Army had withdrawn on to the Sepsi St. György-Botfalu-Kronstadt line. On the night of October 7 the western suburbs of Kronstadt were entered by the vanguard of the German-Magyar group, which advanced from the direction of Weidenbach. On the following day a battle developed in the plain north of Kronstadt, where the railway line running towards the north in the direction of Földvar, marked approximately the dividing line between the Germans and the Rumanian rearguards. The bulk of the Rumanian Army was on October 8 in full retreat towards the frontier, but the troops detailed to cover the withdrawal were still gallantly counter-attacking near Szent-Peter, or holding the barricades in the streets of Kronstadt. In this battle round Kronstadt the Germans claim to have captured 1,175 prisoners and 25 guns. By October 10 the frontier range had been reached by the Rumanians on the entire front south of Kronstadt. During the last stages of the retreat beyond Kronstadt the enemy was not even in touch with the Rumanian troops, and our Allies carried out the movement quietly and without the smallest demoralisation in their ranks. They withdrew to positions which were about 12 miles from the summit of the frontier range. With that retirement closes the Rumanian invasion of Southern Transylvania. The official *communiqué* issued at Bukarest on October 11 speaks of fighting near Crasna in the valley of the Buzeu, near the village of Altschanz, north of the pass bearing the same name, north of the village of

THE FOGARAS VALLEY.

THE FATE OF TWO SPIES: THE PRIEST'S LAST OFFICES.

EXAMINING PAPERS ON A RUMANIAN ROAD.

Predeal in the Tömös and near Moccui in the Förzburg Pass. The battle for the roads into Wallachia had begun.

The Fourth Rumanian Army under General Presan, though nowhere seriously pressed or threatened by the opposing troops of General Arz, had to conform with the retreat of the Second Army. About October 5 it began its withdrawal to the east along the entire front extending over some 50 miles from Ratosnya in the Upper Maros Valley to the heights south of the Great Kokel River. On October 7 the town of Szekely-Udvarhely was evacuated. During the next three days the Rumanians recrossed the Görgeny and Hargitta Mountains, and on October 10 withdrew to the eastern banks of the Upper Maros and the Upper Aluta. By October 14 the Army of the North had almost everywhere reached the Moldavian frontier, having effected its retreat in the best order and suffering only quite negligible losses. Also on the eastern border of Transylvania the battle from now onwards was fought at the gateways of Rumania.

On October 14 an official statement was published in Bukarest concerning the captures of prisoners by the Rumanians since the outbreak of the war; their number was 103 officers and 14,911 men.

During the fortnight which marks the close of the expedition into Transylvania some new changes were made in the highest commands of the Rumanian Army. On October 9 General Averescu was recalled to his former post on the Transylvanian front, his place in the Dobrudja being taken by his Chief-of-Staff, General Christescu. On October 11 General Iancovescu, one of the ablest Rumanian officers, was appointed Assistant to the Chief of the General Staff, whilst his previous place of Secretary-General to the Ministry of War was filled by Brigadier-General G. Burghele. (General Iancovescu had succeeded at the War Office General Iliescu, who at the outbreak had been put at the head of the General Staff.) On October 24 General Culcer, Commander of the First Army, was replaced by General Ion Dragalina, who had greatly distinguished himself in the preceding operations, and Culcer's Chief-of-Staff, General A. Lupescu, was replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Gavanescu. About the middle

of October the French military mission under General Berthelot arrived in Rumania to reinforce and advise the Rumanian General Staff. General Berthelot himself was one of the most distinguished French commanders, and his arrival was greeted with the greatest joy throughout Rumania.

For seven week Transylvania was the scene of military advances and withdrawals. The

GENERAL IANCOVESCU,
Assistant to the Chief of the Rumanian General Staff.

Rumanian and the Austro-Hungarian armies moved forward and re reated over land claimed by Rumania, but remaining as yet under the Hapsburg scept e. What was the attitude of these armies with regard to the population of Transylvania ?

The districts first entered by the Rumanian armies are largely inhabited by non-Rumanian races. In the east, along the Upper Maros and the Upper Aluta and in the plain of Haromszek, extend the settlements of the Szekels, a Magyar tribe, the worst enemies of the Rumanian nation. They, a small minority, play the masters in Transylvania, and rule with a heavy hand and a bitter hatred the three million Rumans who inhabit mainly the central and western part of the country. In the south, between Hermannstadt and Kronstadt, the descendants of the old German colonists, generally described as "Saxons," form a considerable proportion of the population. The Rumans scattered also in these parts of Transylvania naturally welcomed their fellow-countrymen and liberators. The Germans preserved an attitude of sly neutrality. But the Szekel civilian population, without any provocation, in many places treacherously attacked small scattered groups of Rumanian soldiers. This fact was not merely admitted, but even quoted with praise in the Magyar Press—*e.g.*, in the *Pesti Naplo* of September 1, 1916. Yet nowhere did the Rumanian commanders take to reprisals or go beyond fighting and disarming the civilians who offered them active resistance. Wherever the Rumanian troops advanced proclamations were published promising safety and protection to all inhabitants, including the Jews, without distinction of nationality. And when the time had come to withdraw no damage was done by the Rumanian armies to the property of civilians, even if they belonged to the hostile tribes of Szekels and Saxons. Even enemy papers had to admit the orderly character of the Rumanian occupation. Thus the correspondent of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, who visited the parts of Transylvania which had been evacuated by the Rumanian armies, stated in its issue of October 4, 1916, that he had nowhere seen any farms owned by Szekels or Germans which had suffered destruction during the occupation or retreat.

The Hungarian methods were very different. As soon as the Magyar authorities had recovered from the sudden shock of the Rumanian invasion, a carefully thought out scheme was set on foot for the "evacuation" of the districts likely to come under enemy occupation. No Rumans were to be left behind to welcome or help their brethren from across the border. The Szekels or Saxons (except, of course, men of military age) were left free to remain behind or to withdraw with the Austrian armies, and no damage was done to their property. But the Ruman peasants were compelled to accompany the Austrian troops, and if they refused their houses and farms were set on fire. Moreover, hostages were taken from among the leading Rumans of Transylvania to be held responsible for any untoward incidents which might occur in the country during the

Rumanian invasion. The Bukarest *Universul* of September 16, 1916 (N.S.), published a proclamation issued by he Austro-Hungarian military commander of Fogaras under date of September 6. The popula ion was warned against committing any acts of espionage, high treason or revolt, and the announcement was made that should any such incidents occur Dr. Nicolas Sherban, a Ruman who represented Fogaras in the Hungarian Parliament, would be immediately put to death. Together with him were detained a few leading Ruman priests and other Ruman notables of the district.

As yet the enemy had nowhere advanced on to native Rumanian soil (the Dobrudja, that land of no nationality, may be left out of account), as yet his armies could not teach Rumania their usual lesson of frightfulness. Air-raids were so far the only weapon of frightfulness which the Germans could effectively employ against Rumania. They made of it the fullest and most criminal use. Bukarest lies so near the Bulgarian frontier that not only Zeppelins, but also Taubes, could easily reach it. The Rumanian air service was extremely weak, and whatever machines and flying-men there were, were required for the front. Especially towards the end of September, having made sure through spies that no French or British aviators were in the town, the Germans organized a regular system of raids and murder. A vivid picture of those days was given in letters written by an English lady who worked in a Bukarest hospital, and published in *The Times* of October 26, 1916:

To-day I drove to the hospital with Mrs. C. and my other girl nurse (writes the correspondent under date of September 27). It was 3 o'clock on a lovely sunny day. We got to an open market place, and noticed that all the people were looking up . . . and then, for half-an-hour we were really in it! For there were six Taubes overhead, all dropping bombs.

We bought our cheese quite calmly in the market, and drove on. As we neared the hospital shrapnel began to fall and bombs all round. I picked up one man wounded and unconscious, and took him on with us in the motor. A woman was killed at the gate of the hospital, and another man died on the doorstep. We went in and settled down to work. We had three operations between 4 and 7, and were just going home when men on stretchers began to come in from the different parts of the town where bombs and shrapnel had fallen. I wired home not to expect me till they saw me, and we worked on till nearly 9.30, till all the operations were over. I've never had such a nightmare day, but we finished them all. The other hospitals were all full up, too, and the wounded were all over the town. The casualties were 30 dead and over a hundred wounded, for the streets were crowded when the Taubes came. The beasts flew round and round, hardly a quarter of the town escaped. I got home to find that A. and a lot of others had stood in the garden and watched; five big pieces of shrapnel fell there, and yet the silly people stayed. I have collected the pieces, and shall have them decorated with silver bands. A. consents not to do it again, but he was so interested, and says it was such a fine sight that he couldn't resist it!

One couldn't be excited in the hospital, there was no time. If a doctor is cutting off things and calls out "*pansement!*" or "*aqua lactea!*" like a pistol at your head, you somehow find it, even if you don't know what it is! One just works without realizing at all what one is doing. After it was all over we collapsed and sat in the hospital model kitchen with the petrol-cooking lamp and drank hot tea and "*zwicka*" and tried to recover. I don't feel it's over yet. We shall have the beasts before morning again; they have only half an hour to fly for more bombs, but twice in 24 hours would be too much for one's nerves. They came last night, too, you know, but I was too tired to get up for them.

GENERAL CHRISTESCU
Commanded the Rumanian Forces in the Dobrudja after the transference of General Averescu to the Transylvanian Front.

SEPTEMBER 29.

Well, you'll think I am romancing, but they came again last night—six Taubes—that's three times in 24 hours! . . . Yesterday already seems like a dream except for the fact that we helped to save lives, and that's all that seems to count. In the market, people's arms were blown off, and one man's head; 20 women and children lay dead in the Hospital Colce.

SEPTEMBER 29.

It's nearly 8 o'clock and we've had 12 hours' peace. . . . Three of the poor legless fellows died. . . . I am trying to console myself with the one remaining who will recover. Apparently a Zepp comes at night and the six Taubes by day. The bombs behave differently and procedure is different when avoiding



WRECKAGE OF A GERMAN AEROPLANE SHOT DOWN BY THE RUMANIANS.

a Zepp or a Taube. The latter bombs are small and pointed and timed, they pierce the floor, and explode downstairs . . . so you go up. The Zepp bombs explode on contact—so at night you go down. By day one has time to decide, as one can watch the approach—by night we sleep in our bedrooms and trust to luck. So far we have been lucky. They—the enemy—were undoubtedly well informed by spies, *else they would not have come when all our airmen were away. They are scared of the French airmen, and cowards at heart.*

My nerves are a little off colour to-day. It's seeing the wounded that does it. A child was killed in our street. We had apparently five bombs in the hospital grounds—it has upset the patients, of course, but then the noise of the machine-guns alone is enough to do that. The hospital you were in has had three people killed in it.

And with it all the weather is divine. It's really not the bombardment that has upset me, but all the horrors I've seen. One poor chap with both legs off sat up on his bleeding stumps, saying, "Thank God, I'm alive." No bombs have fallen on the interned Germans, which is significant of spy work. I think that the Red Cross flags should come down off the hospitals, for I'm sure that the Taubes try for them.

SEPTEMBER 30.

To-day was simply very amusing. They came—six Taubes—and they were chased all over the town, and didn't dare drop a bomb. One of the Taubes flew back, and I missed seeing it shot down, for I had to stay with the helpless, who get very nervous.

The French aviators had come back, and soon some British aviators arrived from Salonika and the Ægean Islands, and Bukarest ceased to be the happy hunting ground of the Knights of the Iron Cross.

CHAPTER CLXXIV.

ITALIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE CARSO, AUGUST-DECEMBER, 1916: WAR WITH GERMANY.

MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE OF 1916 IN THE TRENTINO—GENERAL CADORNA'S PLANS POSTPONED—PREPARATIONS FOR THE ISONZO OFFENSIVE—THE FIGHTING OF AUGUST 6—GREAT ITALIAN ADVANCE—FALL OF GORIZIA—ADVANCE ON THE CARSO—RESULTS OF TWELVE DAYS' FIGHTING—FURTHER ITALIAN OPERATIONS AND GAINS IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER—LAST PHASE OF THE CARSO OFFENSIVE—OTHER OPERATIONS—ADVANCE UPON THE FASSA ALPS—MILITARY PROGRESS IN 1916—ITALY AND THE BALKANS—ITALY DECLARES WAR ON GERMANY.

THERE was a great deal of discussion regarding the real objective of the Austrian offensive in the Trentino which was successfully repulsed in June, 1916, after six weeks' very hard fighting.* Many critics threw doubt upon the theory that the invaders really hoped, or intended, to reach the Venetian plain and cut the Italian lines of communication with the Isonzo front. They argued that with the troops available the Austrian Command could not have expected to overcome the much larger forces which General Cadorna was able to bring against his adversaries. There is much to be said for such an argument, but it seems to be based upon two assumptions, neither of which appears justified. It assumes a correctness of judgment on the part of the Austrian, or Austro-German, High Command which fortunately was not always evident. It assumes further that in the event of the invaders establishing themselves successfully in the Venetian plain no assistance would have been given by Germany to the original operating force. If the first phase of the movement had been wholly successful, if the Italian wings, and particularly the left wing, had not defied the violence of the Austrian assault, the door to the plain would have been fairly forced, and, to put it shortly, it would have been worth while going on. Austria's duty was to batter down the gate. There is good reason to believe that if this duty had been fulfilled an attempt would have been made to continue and develop the offensive, with German help if German help were necessary. That Germany and Italy were not yet formally at war would have mattered little. Germany had already helped Austria in every way that suited her, and though it is probable that she wished to avoid war with Italy, or wished at least that the declaration should come from the other side, she would hardly have refused the chance of a smashing blow, if that chance had offered. Very probably Germany would not have been able to assist. Events proved that she had miscalculated the possibilities of Allied action both on the western and eastern fronts, but when the Austrian offensive began, the hopes of the Central Empires were running high.

It may fairly be assumed, therefore, that the Austrian drive in the Trentino had really two objectives. The larger aim must have been to open the way for a decisive blow against Italy. This enterprise seemed to promise a good chance of success, for the enemy command knew that Italy was short of heavy guns, and it had altogether underestimated Italian powers of

* See Vol. IX., Chapter CXXXIX.

resistance and Italian resource. And failing the attainment of the main objective, a second seemed well within reach—to paralyse the Italian offensive which had been prepared on the Isonzo front.

KEY MAP.

(See detailed Maps of Area "A," on page 246, and Area "B" on page 268.)

The Italian preparations had been long and thorough. The winter months of 1915–16 had been spent in ceaseless labour, on the front, in the training camps, and in the munition factories. These last were still too few for Italy's requirements, and she was greatly handicapped by the difficulty of securing adequate supplies of steel and coal, but very great progress had been made. Special attention was devoted to the provision of a new arm—the *bombarda*, a glorified trench-mortar. Italy's manufacturing resources were insufficient to turn out the number of heavy guns required to demolish the enemy trenches in the way that experience on all fronts had shown to be necessary. The heroic attacks of her infantry in the summer and autumn of 1915 had failed to break the Austrian lines owing to lack of sufficient artillery preparation, and the problem that presented itself was very serious. Italy's allies could give little help, for the demands on their output were already greater than they could meet. The question was how to secure a sufficient weight of high explosive fire upon the enemy positions, and the answer was the big *bombarda*, throwing an 11-inch projectile a much further distance than was generally supposed to be within the range of the trench-mortar trib. The *bombarda* had obvious advantages over the big gun, given Italy's special position. It cost little, required a comparatively insignificant amount of the precious raw material, and it could be turned out in adequate numbers. Its disadvantages were equally obvious in a short time. It was much more vulnerable than a gun, for it had to be pushed far forward, where the big flame of its discharge made its position easily detected, so that it became a comparatively easy mark for the enemy's artillery fire. The advanced position, moreover, naturally complicated the question of ammunition supply. Nor was the fire of the *bombarda* as accurate as that of the gun. It was confessedly a *pis aller*, but it served its purpose well, as events were to show.

The formation and training of *bombarda* batteries stood out as a special feature of the winter preparations, but these were very extensive in other directions. The spring found many new formations ready to take the field, and the hard work of the munition factories had brought about a great and necessary increase in the proportion of machine-guns and light and medium artillery allotted to each division. The Italian Army was immensely stronger than it had been during the summer and autumn campaign of 1915.

Preparations were well advanced when



AN ITALIAN "BOMBARDA" OF 240 mm. (9½ INCH) CALIBRE.

information regarding the Austrian concentration in the Trentino indicated that this sector of the line would require reinforcement, and some of the new troops destined for the Isonzo front were diverted to the threatened area. As was shown in Chapter CXXXIX., the extent of the imminent Austrian effort was miscalculated, and it soon proved necessary to concentrate a very large force to provide against the event of the enemy breaking through. A great part of the new reserves were hurried to the Vicenza district, and there the counter-offensive was prepared, in the manner already described.

But General Cadorna never let his mind be diverted from the original plan. When the Austrian troops were still pressing hard upon the last mountain bulwarks and the bursting shells could be clearly seen from Vicenza, he declared his intention clearly and firmly to General Pecori-Giraldi, the commander of the Army that was being so sorely tried. It was at a moment when many feared that all the strength of Italy would be necessary to resist the invader, and when many others thought that in any event General Cadorna would be unable to spare attention and troops for important action on his eastern front. But the commander-in-chief had no misgivings, and no hesitations. His emphatic words, uttered at a time when the fighting in the Trentino filled almost every mind but his own, admitted of no doubt or questioning. "I shall make the big offensive on the lower Isonzo." * As soon as the Austrian offensive was fairly held General Cadorna ordered plans to be drawn up for the quick transport of the necessary forces to their original destination—the Isonzo line. They had another duty to perform first—their share in the counter-offensive that was to signal the final failure of the Austrian attack, but everything was to be in readiness for the moment that General Cadorna foresaw.

ITALIAN GUN ON THE CARSO.

The Austrian offensive, its failure, and the skilful retreat that withdrew the invading troops to strong defensive positions before the Italian counter-offensive could properly develop, have been described. It may well have been a great temptation to the Italian Commander-in-Chief to push the counter-offensive still farther, to free the small area of Italian soil that still remained to the invaders, and win a

* These are the exact words. They closed a historic conversation with General Pecori-Giraldi.

better defensive line. General Cadorna did not play with the temptation. The Austrians began to retreat on June 25, and on June 29 the movement of Italian troops to the Isonzo front began. Reserve units were quietly transported from the Vicenza district; drafts were sent to the armies on the Isonzo, and much war material was collected in the eastern zone. This phase of the preparation lasted exactly four weeks, during which time the troops on the Trentino border were keeping

THE DUKE OF AOSTA.
Commanded the Third Italian Army.

the enemy busy at various points, and the Austrians were further distracted by new movements in Tirol. During the next week, from July 27 to August 4, in the words of the official report, "the real strategic manœuvre was carried out." Large masses of troops, with guns and *bombarde*, were swiftly transferred to the Isonzo front, and by the evening of August 3 every man was in place, and every gun. The direction of the attack was entrusted to the Duke of Aosta, Commander of the Third Army.

The real offensive was preceded by a feint. On August 4, after a heavy bombardment, the Italians launched an attack against the low hills east of Monfalcone. They stormed Hills 85 and 121, both of them already stained deeply with Italian and Austrian blood. But their success was only temporary. The enemy had filled the trenches with gas bombs, which they exploded as they were driven out. In the disorganization which follows the successful use of gas, the Austrians counter-attacked, and the Italians were driven from the trenches they had won. The attack had failed for the moment, but it was to be renewed, and in the meantime the Austrians believed they had found the danger-point. Reinforcements were hurried to the Monfalcone sector of the line, which continued to be heavily bombarded. The guns were now thundering all along the Isonzo front, but special attention was being paid to the little ridge that rises beyond the Rocca di Monfalcone.

On the morning of August 6 the Italian heavy guns and *bombarde* opened a furious fire on a front of about 10 miles from Monte Sabotino to Monte San Michele. The enemy front-line trenches were practically obliterated. The *bombarde* did their duty, and for the first time the infantry could feel that they had a fair chance. No doubt the enemy, smitten by a ceaseless storm of heavy shells such as they had not experienced before, thought that the pendulum had swung too far. The Austrians, like the Germans, had seen the heroic attacks of their opponents fail, or only partially succeed, through lack of heavy artillery; and when the deficiency was made good the Austrians, like the Germans, protested against the fury of shells that beat down their carefully prepared defences and buried many of the defenders in the trenches and dug-outs.

The whole front from Sabotino to San Michele was overwhelmed by the Italian fire, but the main attacks were directed upon two separate sectors—the line that ran from the Sabotino ridge through the broken hills about Oslavia to the hog-back of Podgora and the line traced along the summit of San Michele. The positions on the low ground, between Podgora and the Carso, were clearly doomed if the heights were gained. All the three hills mentioned had already witnessed desperate fighting. The woods on the slopes of Sabotino and on Podgora had gone up in flame long before; the bare, stony crest of San Michele had been won and lost by the Italians, after a brilliant attack which could not be made good owing to the converging artillery fire of the enemy. Sabotino, too, had once been taken, and lost again owing to a delay in the arrival of the reserves. The desolate summit of Podgora

MONFALCONE DURING THE FIGHTING OF AUGUST, 1916.

had for a time been practically a "No Man's Land," but the Austrians had finally dug an elaborate trench system along the line of the ridge.

The positions on the eve of the attack were as follows. The Austrians held the greater part of the Sabotino ridge, their front-line trenches crossing the ridge some distance to the north-west of the highest point (1,995 feet). The Italians held the northern third of the ridge, including a peak known as Hill 507 (1,661 feet). From Sabotino the Austrian line ran down to Hill 188, north-east of the village of Oslavia, thence through Oslavia and west of Pevma to Podgora. This line, with a short stretch of flat ground between Podgora and the Isonzo, formed the Gorizia bridge-head. More than once it had looked as though the Italians would succeed in breaking down the Austrian resistance, but on each occasion the defenders had succeeded in regaining lost ground by means of fierce counter-attacks and a concentration of artillery fire. The position was very favourable to the defence. From the top of Sabotino almost the whole landscape lay plain and open to the west, and those folds in the ground which were hidden from Sabotino were practically all visible either from Podgora, or from Monte Kuk (2,000 feet), on the other side of the Isonzo, two miles due north of Sabotino. On the far or Austrian side Sabotino drops in places almost sheer to the Isonzo valley, giving to troops beneath the crest a comparative immunity from enemy fire. In addition, the Austrians had hewn large caves and driven galleries clean through the mountain, so that reserves of men and munitions could be brought from the valley with the minimum of risk and remain completely sheltered until they were required. The problem of transport up the precipitous north-eastern side was solved by a cable railway which ran up a shallow gully to the mouth of one of the principal galleries.

The line which ran through the Oslavia hills

AUSTRIAN DEFENCES OF GORIZIA.



On Monte Podgora the Austrians were clinging to the eastern side of the hog-back, with a sharp drop to the Isonzo behind. Caverns on the eastern slope gave perfect shelter. The Monte San Michele trenches formed the main and final line of the Austrian defences on this part of the Carso. The four "peaks" are slight excrescences on a nearly level ridge.

and joined the two main bastions of the bridge-head was very strongly held by successive lines of trenches, fronted by wire entanglements of an unusual depth. Podgora was, so to speak,



MONTE SABOTINO AND THE STATION OF THE TRANS-ALPINE RAILWAY.

Inset : The summit of Sabotino.

Sabotino in miniature, for the eastern side of the ridge dropped steeply to the road that ran beside the Isonzo, and the defending side had the advantage of a good deal of "dead ground." The Austrian front-line trenches ran along the crest, those of the Italians a little way below.

The gap in the hilly country between Podgora and San Michele was really defended by the two gate-posts mentioned, though the Isonzo and its tributary the Vippacco were natural obstacles in the way of an offensive. The enemy were not in force on the low ground, except along the short tract that ran from the southern spur of Podgora to the Isonzo, where an intricate system of defence had been prepared.

On the Carso the Italians had won a firm footing, but the enemy had held very tenaciously. The whole western rim of the barren, dreary plateau was drenched in blood. There is a shallow depression running up from Selz that the Italian soldiers called the Valley of Death. The glen leading to San Martino del Carso had earned the right to a similar name. Among the defenders the Carso was known as "the Cemetery of the Hungarians," for the bulk of the troops which had held so long and so

ITALIANS ON MONTE SABOTINO.

gallantly had come from Hungary. Above Sagrado, at the end of June, 1916, when the danger in the Trentino had receded, the Austrians had made a surprise gas attack which practically destroyed the Italian force in the

MONFALCONE, DESTROYED AUSTRIAN ENTANGLEMENTS AND NEW ITALIAN LINE ON HILL 85.

trenches of the sector. Four thousand men were killed outright or died afterwards from the effect of the gas. There was one little square in Sagrado where 600 men who had staggered back from the trenches, gasping, choking, almost unconscious, lay down to wait for the ambulances, and died before they came. It was in this attack that the Austrians first made use, or were first detected in making use, of short spiked clubs to "finish off" the wounded, or those who were disabled by the gas. They broke the Italian line and came streaming down the hillside towards Sagrado, but a furious counter-attack regained the lost ground; they lost several hundred prisoners and very many dead.

On August 6 the Italian line still ran just below the skyline of San Michele along the flat plateau by Monte Sei Busi to the little hills east of Monfalcone, and thence across the Lissert marshes to the sea.

The preliminary bombardment lasted from 7.30 in the morning till 4 in the afternoon, when the infantry attack began. The Italians swept forward, preceded by a heavy curtain fire, and at last the keys of Gorizia were wrested from the enemy. A force of five battalions, selected from the 45th division, the 78th infantry of the Toscana Brigade, the 3rd battalion of the 58th (Abruzzi Brigade), and the 3rd battalion of the 115th (Treviso Brigade), stormed the Sabotino ridge. The force was under the command of Colonel Badoglio, of the General Staff, who had studied the Sabotino problem for months and made the most complete preparations. Digging and blasting had made it possible to concentrate large bodies of men in the front line close under the enemy trenches, and the Austrians were overwhelmed by the first rush. They had taken refuge in their dug-outs and galleries, trusting to wire and machine-guns to hold back the attack until they could reinforce the trenches. But the *bombarde* blew approaches through the wire, destroyed the trenches and buried most of the men in them, and the positions were rushed before the reserves could come out of their lairs. In forty minutes the whole trench system had fallen and the Italian wave had swept on and up to the highest peak, while supporting troops were picking up the enemy reinforcements as they poured out of their caverns —too late. The rest of the ridge was quickly cleared, and evening found the Italians firmly established at San Valentino, the south-eastern end of Sabotino, above the Isonzo, and at San Mauro, a handful of houses at the foot of the ridge, to the south, right upon the river bank.

Among the low hills of Oslavia the attack was not quite so successful. The work of the *bombarde* was deadly. The ground was rent

and upturned as by an appalling earthquake, and when the Italians went forward they trod upon a gruesome field. The resting-places of those who had fallen throughout long months of fighting upon this hardly contested line were desecrated by the cruel fire, and countless bodies, enemy and friend, were laid bare to the summer sun. Hill 188, the scene of many fierce struggles, fell to the Lambro Brigade (205th and 206th regiments), and the lines that ran through Oslavia to Podgora were stormed by the Abruzzi Brigade (57th and 58th regiments). The fighting here was very stubborn. The enemy fought desperately, but was forced to fall back, and by evening the Italians were not far from the village of Pevma, close upon one of the main bridges over the Isonzo. But the Austrians still held the bridges and the low hills immediately in front.

Podgora also fell. The Cuneo Brigade (7th and 8th regiments) broke through on the northern end of the ridge, and swept down to the Isonzo. Here they came into touch with large enemy reinforcements and hand-to-hand fighting went on all night. One battalion pressed on too far and part of it was cut off, some 300 men falling into the hands of the Austrians.* The rest of the ridge was taken by the 12th Division, which stormed Monte Calvario, the southern peak, and went through the lines on the low ground between Podgora and the river.

Meanwhile the attack on San Michele had gone no less favourably. The attack, which covered a front of nearly three miles, was entrusted to the 22nd Division, consisting of the Brescia (19th and 20th regiments), Ferrara (47th and 48th), and Catanzaro (141st and 142nd) Brigades. After repeated assaults the Italians succeeded in breaking through in the centre and establishing themselves along the crest of the whole ridge. The wings of the Austrian line, the positions on the northern slope of the mountain, and the trenches that ran by San Martino del Carso to Hill 150 still held; but they were now doomed to fall, enfiladed as they were from the San Michele ridge. Farther to the south the attack on the hills east of Monfalcone was renewed. Hill 85 was taken by three battalions of Bersaglieri, and this time it was held against all the efforts of the enemy to regain the lost ground.

* The Austrian official *communiqué*, by the simple addition of a nought, made the number 3,000.

MACHINE-GUN EMPLACEMENT ON SAN MICHELE.



GORIZIA AND THE CARSO.

ON MONTE CALVARIO AFTER THE BATTLE.

The first day of General Cadorna's "big push" had borne splendid fruit. More than 3,000 prisoners were taken, with ten guns, large numbers of machine-guns, and a mass of other war material. But this was only the beginning. The work of the first day was far greater in promise than in accomplishment, for at last the key positions of the Gorizia front were all three firmly gripped. And there were guns and shells and men enough to make use of the advantage gained.

It has already been said that the end of the first day's fighting found the Austrians still in possession of the Pevma bridges and the low hills immediately west of the Isonzo. They were still in some force, moreover, between Podgora and the river, and on the steep side of Podgora itself isolated bodies of men clung resolutely to their dug-outs, refusing to surrender. And on the eastern slope of San Michele they still held their second-line trenches and numerous *doline*,* which had been fortified and turned into powerful redoubts. The enemy were not beaten yet, though they must have been sadly disheartened by the loss of positions which they had come to look upon as practically impregnable. They had been taken by surprise, but they had put up a gallant fight everywhere but on Sabotino, where the Italians were too quick for them and had them by the throat before they could move. They were to make desperate efforts still, which were to lessen the weight of the blow that was threatening.

On the evening of August 6 General Boroevich, commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces on the Isonzo, issued the following Army Order:

"The enemy has begun a decisive attack along almost the entire front, and seeks a final success. I expect my troops to give him a worthy welcome and repulse him *completely*. The general situation, to-day more than ever, requires that all our positions, stubbornly defended for more than a year, shall remain in our hands. I have confidence that my wish will be everywhere realized. *Victory must be ours.*"

Reinforcements were hurried across the Isonzo by the Pevma bridges and to the lines on the Carso which still held out, while fresh troops were concentrated for a counter-attack on San Michele. For three days the Austrians not only held most of their positions on the Carso, but made several vain attacks on the lines they had lost. There was a continuous artillery duel, and the dry Carso was darkened by great clouds of smoke and dust. The Italians had no difficulty in holding the San Michele line while they prepared a further effort, and on the left they advanced a little,

* The *doline* of the Carso are deep, round hollows or depressions in the rocky ground, resembling small craters.

ITALIANS ON A CAPTURED HILL ABOVE MONFALCONE.

capturing the strongly fortified positions round the village of Boschini, low down on the northern slope of San Michele, near the junction of the Vippacco with the Isonzo. Meanwhile very hard fighting was continuous on the right bank of the river, from below Sabotino to near Podgora. In the light of knowledge now available it would seem that the Austrians had little real hope of retaking the all-important positions they had lost in this sector. The gallant counter-attacks they made were, probably the desperate efforts of a rearguard deliberately sacrificed to give time for the main forces to retreat to new positions. The retaking of Podgora and Sabotino required very much larger forces than the enemy could dispose of, and the Austrian Command must certainly have realized that with Podgora and Sabotino gone the Gorizia bridge-head, and Gorizia itself, were no longer tenable against a determined attack. Their only course was to evacuate the town, and take up favourable positions on the hills to the east, before the Italian advance progressed any farther. For two days the Austrian rearguard hung on to their last lines on the right bank of the river, and were not content merely to hold but came several times to the attack. In spite of the repeated onslaughts of the Italians precious time was gained, but the defenders paid a heavy price. On the afternoon of August 8 the assailants finally reached the river all along the line, breaking the stubborn resistance of the enemy and taking a very large number of prisoners. In these operations the Toscana (77th and 78th regiments) and Trapani (143rd and 144th) Brigades specially distinguished themselves. Fresh Austrian counter-attacks were beaten back across the river, and though in their final withdrawal the enemy had succeeded in partially destroying the bridges, the summer-shrunken waters of the Isonzo were no great obstacle to infantry. At dusk the same evening detachments of the Casale and Pavia Brigades crossed the river and entrenched on the farther bank, while a force of cavalry and Bersaglieri cyclists was dispatched to reconnoitre the ground. The enemy was in full retreat, covered by a heavy artillery fire, which was directed specially upon the river line and the damaged bridges. The engineers were already hard at work repairing the Austrian bridges and throwing pontoons across the river and next morning the Italians crossed in force and entered Gorizia. The cavalry and cyclists scoured the low ground, picking up prisoners here and there, but meeting with practically no resistance. On August 10 the lines were pushed forward to the lower slopes of the hills east of Gorizia, and to the Vertojbica,

a stream that runs southward to the Vippacco.

On the Carso the Austrian resistance lasted one day longer. Hard fighting went on during August 7, 8 and 9, but the line was cracking, and when the Italians attacked on August 10 it broke. The attack was made on a front of about six miles, from north of San Michele to Monte Cosich, north-east of Monfalcone, and it was everywhere successful. Here, again, the enemy sacrificed a rearguard in order to withdraw the bulk of his forces to a prepared line farther east, and it seemed as though in this sector some of the defending troops had lost heart. One Hungarian regiment near San Martino del Carso, finding itself outflanked by the storming of a trench system on its left, came out and surrendered *en bloc*. This was in notable contrast to the reputation which the Hungarians had won for themselves in the Carso battles, but the troops on this part of the front were doubtless disheartened by the news that Gorizia had fallen, and by the knowledge that they themselves were only covering a retreat from the positions which they had believed untakable. Moreover, the news of General Brusiloff's successes on the eastern front had caused a good deal of murmuring among the Hungarian troops, who were restless at the thought that they were fighting in a part of the Hapsburg dominions which interested them very little, while their country seemed to be threatened by invasion. But the main cause of their depression doubtless lay in the surprise of the Italian attack, the intensity of the bombardment, and the relentless onslaughts of the infantry. Perhaps for the first time the defenders felt that the natural strength of their positions and the elaborate preparations with which Nature had been reinforced would no longer serve them, as they had done in the past. If the formidable system of defence was being torn from them, which they had strengthened in every conceivable manner, and held for more than a year against repeated attacks, how would they fare on the new lines to which they were being driven? Officer prisoners expressed confidence that these new lines would never be taken, and certainly they looked strong enough, but the men could hardly reason in the same way.

The Italian attack of August 10 pushed the Austrians back across the Vallone, the deep, narrow valley that runs southward from the Gorizia plain to the east of Monfalcone, and completely cuts off the San Michele–Doberdo

A DUG-OUT IN THE TRENCHES ABOVE MONFALCONE.

137—3



ITALIAN CAVALRY ENTER GORIZIA, AUGUST 9, 1916.

plateau from the main Carso system. The enemy abandoned all the ground west of the Vallone, except to the east of Monfalcone, where strong rearguards still held Hill 121 and Debeli Vrh, south of the Doberdo lake. Next day the advance continued. On the left the Italians crossed the Vallone and won a footing on the steep eastern slope leading up to the hill of Nad Logem. On the right they had halted, the previous evening, at Doberdo, faced by the ridge of Crni Hrib (the Black Hill), which seemed specially adapted for defence. But next day it was found that Crni Hrib had been practically abandoned by the Austrians and the hill was occupied without any difficulty. On the following day, August 12, the left wing made further progress, storming the heights of Nad Logem and establishing itself firmly beyond the Vallone. The defence here was very stubborn, but the 23rd Division, the Sardegna (Grenadiers), Lombardia, and Catanzaro Brigades, swept away all resistance. Farther to the south the Italians took the village of Oppacchiasella and pushed on about 1,000 yards on both sides of the road that runs eastwards towards Kostanjevica. Debeli Vrh and Hill 121 also fell, but in this

TRENCHES ABOVE MONFALCONE.

sector two hills west of the Vallone road, 144 and 77, still remained in Austrian hands. For three more days lively fighting went on, and the Italians took various enemy trenches, but they were now faced by a new line of defence, and further preparation was clearly necessary. By the evening of August 15 the offensive was checked, for the moment.

Great results had been won. In the twelve days' fighting that began with the attack east of Monfalcone the Duke of Aosta's army had taken 18,758 prisoners (including 393 officers), 30 guns, 63 trench mortars, 92 machine-guns, 12,225 rifles, 5,000,000 cartridges, 3,000 shells, 60,000 hand grenades, and large quantities of other war material. Our Allies had dealt the



AN AUSTRIAN TRENCH MORTAR.

Austrians a very heavy blow, and they had put themselves into a position to strike further blows. The entry into Gorizia was a notable triumph, for Gorizia stood for much, both to assailants and defenders. But the value of its occupation was much more moral than military, as the town and the plain surrounding it were dominated by the new Austrian positions to the east. Of real military value was the occupation of the bridge-head—the Sabotino-Podgora system. It completed the Italian possession of the Isonzo line, and made that line far stronger against a possible enemy attack. For Sabotino and Podgora between them, but especially the former, constitute a wonderful system of observation posts, apt for use in either direction. Both ridges, moreover, and the broken hilly country between, made very strong defensive positions. The Austrians had held them for more than a year against repeated attacks, conducted with the greatest determination, and they had seemed almost impregnable. Perhaps if the defenders had not been deceived by the belief that the Italian offensive power had been broken by the Trentino fighting, the positions might still have held out. Looked at from the east they presented a no less formidable problem. In fact, they were a worse obstacle to a possible Austrian attack than they had been to the Italian advance, for the Isonzo flows beneath them like a moat. And the eastern side of Sabotino drops almost sheer to the river.

The Italians on Sabotino and Podgora were now, roughly, in the same position as the Austrians had been on San Michele. There was this important difference, that some of the approaches to Sabotino were open to direct observation from Monte Kuk, and those to Podgora were under the eyes of Monte Santo, whereas the Austrians on the Carso had been free from enemy observation, except from the air. But the greater height and steepness of the Sabotino ridge may be held to have compensated for this drawback to its value as a defensive position.

directly east of Gorizia presented enormous difficulties. The occupation of the western segment of the Carso, on the other hand, was a step which gave good promise of being the first of a series. The first-line system of defence had been broken along an extensive front, and there was reason to believe that the positions upon which the Austrians had fallen back were less thoroughly prepared than those which had held out for so long. Moreover, the advance had given to the Italians an admirable line of observation points, from which they commanded a wide view, while the Austrians had lost their

THE PIAZZA GRANDE OF GORIZIA; MULE TRANSPORT ENTERING THE TOWN.

The capture of the town of Gorizia was a great blow to Austria and a great triumph for Italy. The occupation of the bridge-head was a solid military gain. The advance on the Carso was more, for it made a much greater change in the prospects of a further offensive. In the Gorizia sector proper the Austrians still dominated the situation from the hills east of the town. The Isonzo bridges were under close and direct observation. The plain about the town lay open like a map. Behind the lower hills to the eastward rises the great range of the Selva di Ternova, and to the north Monte Santo enfilades the plain. Any notable advance

look-out over a great part of the lower Isonzo plain.

An idea of the position in the middle of August may best be given, perhaps, by brief descriptions of the terrain as it appears from two points—the top of Monte Sabotino and a low rise (Hill 150) a little south of San Martino del Carso. San Michele gives a wider panorama than can be seen from this latter point, as it commands a part of the Gorizia plain, but the general view of the plateau beyond the Vallone is better obtained from the more central position.

Straight across the Isonzo, opposite Sabo-

tino, rises Monte Santo—almost a twin ridge, the southern spur of the Bainsizza upland. The intervening gorge is deep and narrow; its wooded sides rise abruptly to a height of nearly 1,800 feet above the river bed, and the two summits are well within rifle range—the distance across being about 1,500 yards. To the north lies the Bainsizza plateau, the wide upland between the Isonzo and the Chiapovano valley, which divides the Bainsizza from the dark masses of the Selva di Ternova. This plateau, which extends nearly to Santa Lucia, the station where the Wochein railway leaves the Isonzo valley, rises like a great rampart above the swift-rushing Isonzo. Looking due east from Sabotino a green valley opens up, with two roads winding into the distance. One turns northward behind Monte Santo, and leads by way of Chiapovano to the Wochein railway. This road is in view for a short distance only. The other leads up to the village of Ternova, and lies open for several miles. But the valley mouth is well guarded, by Monte Santo on the north and by the steep heights of Monte San Gabriele on the south. South from Sabotino, which forms a sharp salient, the whole Gorizia plain shows clear to view, backed on the left by the low wooded hills east of the town, where the Austrians lay in wait, strongly entrenched on the upper slopes, with the Italians a little way beneath them. Southward, again, appears the mouth of the low-lying valley of the Vippacco, with the Carso plateau rising sharply beyond. The view of the Carso from this point is particularly interesting, for here it is seen in profile,



CASTLE OF GORIZIA.

showing how the range of hills that form its northern bulwark rises like a great stairway from the Vallone to the Iron Gates. Nad Logem, Veliki Hribach, Fajti Hrib, Golnek, Trijesnek, Stol, and Trstelj—these are the main steps of the stairway that finally reaches a height of 2,100 feet.

From Hill 150, south of San Martino del

MOVING HEAVY ARTILLERY AFTER THE CAPTURE OF GORIZIA.

Carso, a wide view of the rocky plateau stretches eastwards as far as the ridge running south from Trstelj, which marks the limits of the steady rise from the Vallone. In front the ground slopes gently downwards past the village of Marcottini, till it falls abruptly into the deep cut of the Vallone, from which it rises quickly to the village of Oppacchiasella. Straight eastwards from Oppacchiasella runs the road to Kostanjevica, which shows clearly for some distance, and then dips before rising to the village. A bare two miles beyond, the ridge

It is a dreary picture. The Carso upland is bare and stony, covered only in places by a scanty red soil that is fine dust in the summer and sticky mud in the wet seasons. There are great stretches of naked stone, ribs, and slabs, and boulders heaped bewilderingly together. Here and there grow stunted trees and miserable brushwood tangles, and in sheltered hollows there were in peace time scattered patches of tillage. All the cultivable area is laced by innumerable stone walls, which serve as shelter, even more than as boundary marks,

AUSTRIAN PRISONERS TAKEN AT GORIZIA.

above-mentioned, crowned by the villages of Temnica and Vojščica, each with a tall campanile, shows dark against the sky. To the left the great hill stairway climbs to its summit, and nearer lies a jumble of stony hummocks and ridges—Pecinka, Hill 308, and other rises that are known only by their height in metres. On the right the view is more limited, for just beyond the Vallone, opposite the village of Doberdo and the height of Crni Hrib, a long, flat ridge blocks the view, one end of it known as Hill 208 north, the other as Hill 208 south. Farther to the right are the two low bare hills, Debeli and Hill 144, and beyond them to the south-east the wooded ridge of Hermada closes the view of the enemy country.

against the furious *bora* that scourges the Carso in winter. On the northern and southern edges of the plateau the landscape is less desolate. Fair-sized trees grow on the slopes leading up from the Vippacco valley, and the Hermada ridge is well wooded. But the wide stretch between is all gaunt and forbidding, with no beauty of colour or outline to justify its nakedness.

Even to a casual view the Carso looks a difficult battle-ground for an attacking force, and a closer examination shows how it lends itself to defence. The upland is pitted with *doline* and actual caverns, forming natural systems of fortification that can be readily adapted to modern requirements. The attack suffered from other disadvantages—trenches



GRADISCA AND THE ISONZO FROM THE CARSO.

could not be made, or transformed, in a hurry, for there is no depth of soil. The making of a satisfactory trench demanded rock-drills and blasting charges. Moreover, a high explosive shell that burst upon the rocky surface of the Carso had a very much greater destructive effect than it would have upon softer ground. Not only was the area of destruction wider, but the rock splinters reinforced the deadly work of the shell fragments.

Our Allies had a very stiff task before them, for the lines to which the enemy had retreated were well prepared. But the relative positions were now far more equal, especially for observation. And the Italians had victory in their hearts, while the Austrians had been outwitted and outfought.

The preparations for a further push took some time. It was not until September 14

THE CARSO PLATEAU NEAR DOBERDO.

AUSTRIAN TRENCHES ON THE CARSO.

that an attack in force was launched. On that morning a tremendous bombardment was opened all along the line from the Vippacco to the sea. The weather was threatening, and in the afternoon, just upon the hour fixed for the infantry advance, a furious thunderstorm burst over the Carso. The trenches east of Nad Logem were carried immediately, at the first rush, and large numbers of prisoners were taken, but both on the left and right of this sector the Austrians put up a very stubborn resistance. The fighting was very bloody, especially near Nova Vas, a hamlet about half a mile due south of Oppacchiasella, and on the ridge between the twin Hills 208. A number of trenches were taken, and a good many prisoners, but the Austrian line was not broken; and though the summit of the ridge was gained, only the southern point was held. Farther south the fighting was still more inconclusive, for the Austrians, backed by the big guns on Hermada, held grimly to Hills 144 and 77. Just south of the Vippacco, however, a notable gain was made. After heavy fighting in the afternoon a second assault was carried out in the evening, and swept away the Austrian resistance, bringing the Italians right up to the village of San Grado di Merna, which stands on a little hill immediately south of the river. The hill was surrounded, and the weary troops lay down to rest.

But that night there was little rest. Another terrific thunderstorm broke upon the battlefield, and the guns never ceased. In the early morning the Italian fire redoubled, and after the enemy positions had been hammered for eight hours the chilled and dripping men went forward again. San Grado was taken and a long column of Austrian prisoners came hastening to the rear of the fight, relentlessly pursued by the fire of their own guns. Several important entrenchments in the front of Lokvica (south-east of Nad Logem) were wrested from the enemy, and a further advance was made east of Oppacchiasella. It was hard fighting, and the Austrians contested every foot of ground with the utmost bravery, but the Italians were not to be denied. The following day, after repulsing several counter-attacks during the night, they came again to the assault. They gained ground along a considerable front on the Carso, and took 800 prisoners. The next day was spent in consolidating the new lines, and in throwing back a determined counter-offensive by the enemy, who realized the importance of some of the points he had lost. The Austrian efforts had no result, and several hundred prisoners were left in the hands of the Italians.

During the four days' fighting 4,294 prisoners were taken by our Allies, and a series of useful positions were occupied. It was disappointing that the progress on the right was less satisfactory than on the left, but the Austrian lines on Hills 208, 144, and 77 were very strong and very difficult of approach. Both sides lost heavily here, especially on the two Hills 208, where the Austrians took a couple of hundred Italian prisoners in their successful counter-attack on the ridge.

Our Allies were very soon ready to deal another blow, but persistent rain and mist made observation almost impossible. Here, as elsewhere, little could be done without artillery preparation, and it was well on in October before the offensive could be resumed on the scale planned. Early in the month a preparatory bombardment was actually opened, but the weather broke suddenly and completely, and the idea of an attack had to be abandoned. On October 9 the usual artillery fire was greatly intensified along all the front from eastward of Gorizia to the sea. The guns continued all night, and on the following morning their fury redoubled. Unfortunately, the morning was foggy, as it so often is on the Carso and on the Isonzo line, especially in the autumn. It cleared after midday, but at 2.45, when the infantry went "over the top," visibility was still only fair.

The attack was splendidly successful. The bombardment on the Carso had been crushing in its effect. The Austrian first line was overwhelmed, and when the Italian infantry advanced to the assault they carried all before them along the greater part of the front. Some of the ground gained could not be maintained, for the Austrians hung on desperately to certain important positions, and the advancing Italians found themselves here and there in unprotected salients, close upon new lines of trenches. At nightfall those eager fighters were withdrawn, reluctant to give up the ground won. It was essential to consolidate the new line, to keep the troops together for the next day's advance. Some were cut off, and killed or taken prisoners, but this was the inevitable price of success.

The September operations had left the trench-line on the Carso full of twists and zig-zags, which were straightened out by the attack of October 10. The most important gain was the enemy salient that included Nova Vas and Hill 208 north and ran back just east of Hill 208 south, which the Italians had held



WATER SUPPLY BASE ON THE CARSO.

against the Austrian counter-attacks. This salient was very strongly fortified with three lines of trenches and various "redoubts," but the Italian bombardment pounded the defences to pieces, and the dazed men who survived the destruction had little fight in them. Another important position to fall was the summit of Hill 144. The hill had been hotly contested during the September fighting, but the Italians had been unable to establish themselves on the summit. Now at last they succeeded, but the Austrians hung on to the eastern and southern slopes.

By the end of the day (October 10) the Italian line on the Carso ran almost in a straight line from Hill 144 to the western slopes of Veliki Hribach, with a slight curve forward east of Oppacchiasella, and a slight curve backward west of Lokvica. The Italians had now won the whole of the first line to which the enemy had retreated in August, and they had taken many prisoners. The total for the day was 5,034, including 164 officers, and a great store of war material was found in the conquered positions. Progress had also been made among the low hills east of the Vertojbica. The preliminary bombardment here was less destructive than on the Carso, for the ground was deep in soft mud, but a determined attack carried an important system of trenches between the hamlets of Sober and Vertojba on a front of 1,000 yards, and 861 prisoners were taken.



AUSTRIAN DUG-OUTS ON THE CARSO.

Next morning the weather was very unfavourable. Mist lay thick in the valleys and on the Carso upland, and the artillery fire was slacker. Seizing their opportunity, the Austrians counter-attacked on various parts of the front. For them artillery preparation was less important, for the Italians were in the open, or in the trenches which had been laid in ruins during the two previous days. The fighting was hardest east of the Vertojbica—the enemy had not yet brought up sufficient reserves to take the initiative on the Carso—but the Italians held their ground: and in the afternoon, with clearer weather, they renewed the attack all along the line. They gained ground on the Carso, taking here a trench and there a *doline* or a mined redoubt, and they pushed forward their lines beyond Sober. All day long the fighting was furious, and during the following night and morning the Austrians made desperate efforts to regain their lost positions. The air was fairly clear, and the artillery on both sides was very active. Repeated Austrian attacks upon Sober, the new line south of Nova Vas and Hill 144, were bloodily repulsed. On the front held by a single battalion, near Sober, 400 enemy bodies were counted and buried. About midday the Austrian efforts died away, and the Italians attacked again. They pushed forward towards the summit of Pecinka, and gained a



A COMMUNICATION TRENCH ON THE SLOPE OF THE CARSO.

foothold in the hamlets of Lokvica and Hudi Log, 2,000 yards east of Nova Vas. The line on the Carso was once more bent into curves. On the left the Italians were well forward, near the summit of Veliki Hribach, and in the centre they were close upon the road that runs south-eastwards from Lokvica to Hudi Log. But the Austrians clung to Lokvica, and the Italian right could make little or no progress. Their line bent back from Hudi Log to the east of Hill 208 south, and thence ran across the Vallone to Hill 144.

On October 13 the weather grew worse again. Little fighting took place on the Carso, but

PRISONERS CAPTURED ON THE CARSO.

north of Sober the Italians advanced beyond the hills to the road that runs from Gorizia by San Pietro to Prvacina, the line followed by the Gorizia-Dornberg railway to Trieste. The losses during the four days' fighting were very heavy on both sides. On the first day the Italians lost comparatively few men, and the Austrians suffered very heavily. The Italian artillery fire was exceedingly destructive, and on many parts of the line the enemy was unable to put up a fight. On the second and third day, when the Austrians threw in their reserves, the struggle was terrible. It was comparatively old-fashioned fighting, more or less in the open, for the trenches were crushed and flattened, and the only cover was supplied by the unevenness of the ground. It was a ghastly mêlée, where companies and battalions fought hand to hand, while the artillery on both sides put a very heavy barrage fire on the reserve lines. Comparatively few prisoners were taken, but the Italians brought their number of captures up to over 8,000. The Austrians claimed 2,700, but on this occasion, as on many others, they included in the number the dead left in their lines.

The breakdown of the weather was a heavy blow to the Italians. They were unable to go on as they had intended, and the forced lull in their offensive operations compelled a withdrawal from certain positions which were only steps on the way. They came back to about 500 yards from the summits of Veliki Hribach, and Pecinka. They left Lokvica to the enemy and flattened the Hudi Log salient. It was essential to secure a proper jumping-off place for the next advance.

Bad weather continued for over a fortnight, except for one short spell of 48 hours, which raised unfounded hopes. For more than a week after this break in the succession of warm, wet, misty days the soldiers in the front line were keyed up, waiting for the word to attack, knowing that it would come when the fogs lifted and gave a fair view of the enemy's lines. The weather cleared very gradually. The soaking rains ceased, but the clouds kept very low, and the mists came thinly up from the drenched ground. At length, on October 29,



AUSTRIAN WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS.

there was a hint of cold, and though the next day was overcast, the clouds were riding high and the landscape was luminous and distinct. The last preparations were made. The scene was set for a still greater effort than the two which had preceded it. Next day the curtain would go up if the weather held.

The dawn was clear and grey, and soon the trailing clouds dissolved under a strong sun. All the morning a steady fire went on, and at midday the real bombardment began—from San Marco right down to the sea. The intensity of the fire outdid all previous bombardments on the Carso front, and in an hour the whole of the plateau was covered with a vast pall of smoke, which grew ever higher and thicker till it dimmed the clear mountain ranges and darkened the whole eastern sky. All afternoon, all evening, and all night the terrible fire continued, and when the next dawn broke it grew even fiercer. The day promised well, but the morning mists were slow to rise, and when the hour approached for the infantry attack the whole plateau was still thickly veiled. The infantry went forward at exactly 10 minutes past 11, and the Austrian artillery fire, which had not been very heavy, became much more intense. The enemy pursued the same tactics as during the two previous attacks, reserving their fire until the Italians came into the open, when they sprayed shrapnel over the advancing troops, and plastered the rear lines with high explosive. It was noticeable, however, that along a considerable part of the front the enemy fire was uncertain and fitful. The Italian counter-batteries were doing their work very well.

On the left of the Carso plateau the Italian attack, conducted by the 11th Army Corps, was immediately successful. The lines in front of Pecinka fell to the first rush, Lokvica was occupied after a short but furious struggle, and while Veliki was resisting frontal attacks on the wooded slopes to the north and on the bare western face a supporting column swept through the shattered lines of Pecinka, which had been captured by a Bersaglieri Brigade (6th and 12th regiments), turned northward, swarmed up the stony ridge that leads from Pecinka to Veliki, and took the enemy trenches in the flank. Pecinka fell in less than 40 minutes, Veliki in little over an hour. Nor did the advance stop here. The Bersaglieri pushed on to Hill 308, another stony hummock, east of Pecinka, and the Toscana Brigade, which had captured Veliki, advanced along the ridge to the east and occupied the next peak—Hill 376.

South of Lokvica, and along the Oppacchia-

sella-Kostanjevica road, the attack was equally successful. The resistance of the enemy was completely overpowered. The line was carried forward 1,000 yards east of Segeti, and the strongly fortified cross-roads, where the Lokvica-Hudi Log road intersects that from Oppacchiasella to Kostanjevica, was taken on the run, the advance being pushed to within a kilometre of Kostanjevica. Farther to the south little real progress was made. Hill 238—to the east of Hill 208 south—was carried by the first rush, and ground was gained in the direction of Hill 235, on the edge of the south-eastern corner of the main Carso plateau, just above the village of Jamiano, in the Vallone. The enemy were driven out of Jamiano not for the first time, but the occupation of this point depended on the success of the attack on the heights above, and here it was found impossible to make good the ground won. A strong counter-attack regained

ON THE WATCH IN THE TRENCHES.

Hill 238 for the enemy, and though the fight raged doubtfully for a long time, and the Italians held tenaciously to various points that improved their original line, they could not break through the enemy defences as they had done farther north As the battle died down on the left it grew ever fiercer on the right. All the low ground east and south of Hill 144, where the Vallone meets the valley that runs down westward from Brestovica and divides Hermada and the lower hills by the sea from the main Carso plateau, was a horrible seething caldron of smoke and flame ; and on the heights above fell an unceasing rain of shells. Till night came there was no slackening of the fight.

In the Gorizia sector useful progress was made on the hills to the east of the town, towards Tivoli and San Marco, and on the heights beyond Sober towards the railway. The distance gained was not great, but several important points were occupied, which improved the line and eased the position near the town itself. The ground was deep in mud, and the troops found it very difficult to move, while the effect of the shells was greatly lessened. But this part of the fight was of minor import. The operations on the Carso were what chiefly mattered, and the results of the first day's work were triumphant. The Austrian line was completely broken on a front of over two miles, from the northern rim of the Carso to the Oppacchiasella-Kostanjevica road, and it is difficult to say how far the attacking troops might have gone if they had not been held back to avoid the formation of too pronounced a salient. The enemy lost 4,731 prisoners, including 132 officers, and a great mass of war material. The speed and impetus of the Italian attack were so great that mule trains laden with provisions and ammunition were captured far in the rear of the trenches, before the Austrians had realized that their line had crumpled. The capture of two three-gun batteries of four-inch guns was reported the same night, but it was known already that other guns and a great number of machine-guns were left within the lines torn from the enemy. They were seen and passed in the first onrush of the victorious infantry, but it was days before all the cunning hiding-places were explored and gave up their secrets.

A great hole was punched in the Austrian line by the first day's fighting, but the enemy were not to give in readily to defeat. The surprise had been great, and the counter-attack took some time to develop. It was not until after one o'clock in the morning of November 2 that the Austrian artillery opened a new phase of the battle. A tremendous fire was directed upon the lost ground, especially upon Hill 308, Pecinka, and the ridge running northward to Veliki Hribach. Along this line the Italians

BERSAGLIERI IN A CAPTURED TRENCH ON THE CARSO.

GORIZIA FROM LUCINICO.

were lying out in the open, on the bare stony ground. The enemy trenches were gone—filled with shattered rock and broken bodies—and as yet only a few dug-outs had been discovered. Here and there a *dolina* gave shelter, or a rock cavern, but for the most part the troops had little protection against the furious storm of shrapnel and high explosive. The Bersaglieri Brigade, in particular, was very highly tried by the bombardment, and suffered very heavily. The brigadier and the two regimental commanders spent the night walking up and down in the front lines, and their example held the men firm under the cruel strain. But by the morning only one of the three was left. The brigadier and one of the colonels had both been wounded by shell fragments; the brigadier being saved from death by his helmet. The unhurt survivor was the colonel who had taken San Michele in July, 1915, and held it for 17 hours against repeated attacks till he was ordered to withdraw the remnants of his command.*

Various counter-attacks were attempted during the night, but it was not until towards midday that the real effort came. The reason of the artillery concentration on Pecinka and Hill 308 at once became apparent, for the enemy launched a formidable body of men against these points. They were trying to drive a wedge into the salient that had been formed by the Italian advance. Masses of infantry moved forward from behind Hill 278, to the south-east of Hill 308, but they were met by a terrific artillery fire from the Italian batteries, while the machine guns of the Bersaglieri and an infantry brigade which had been moved up in support played upon them unceasingly. The masses broke, re-formed, broke again. After a little the attack was attempted afresh, but could make no headway. Several times the advance was renewed, but always to break down under the Italian fire. The enemy attack died away, and the Italian line swept forward in pursuit, while farther north the troops on the mountain stairway climbed two more steps—Hill 399 and the very important position of Fajti Hrib (1,425 feet).

The taking of the Fajti ridge was a serious loss to the enemy. It was the key of the Austrian line in this sector. Not only does it dominate Kostanjevica and the network of roads that spreads out from the village; it also commands completely the lower part of the main road that winds upwards from Ranziano to the Carso. An Austrian colonel taken prisoner in the September offensive declared that nothing mattered so long as Fajti Hrib was held, and that the Italians would never succeed in taking it. His estimate of its importance was doubtless exaggerated, but its capture was a heavy blow. By the evening of November 2 the Italian line ran south-westwards from Fajti by Hill 319 to Hill 278, and thence south-eastwards to Hill 229, 700 yards due west of Kostanjevica, just above the terminal loop of the narrow-gauge Carso railway. And patrols

* See Vol. VII., Chapter CIX., p. 69.

SCENE OF THE OFFENSIVE OF NOVEMBER, 1916.
The Fajti Ridge in the Background.

were out well eastward of this line, finding nothing but wounded men and abandoned war material. They pushed right up to Kostanjevica and to a line that runs due north from the village, but here they came in touch with a new trench system which the enemy were holding in force.

In the centre the Austrians had given way completely, but they were holding firm on the wings, and were not content with holding. South of the Oppacchiasella-Kostanjevica road, right down to Hill 144, they delivered a series of determined counter-attacks, and they were equally active among the hills east of Gorizia. But the Italians hung on to the ground they had made good on the first day, and in the evening there was nothing but good news to report. Nearly 3,500 prisoners were added to the number already reported, and among them were a brigadier, a regimental commander, and three field officers.

The position was now very curious, and not without its perils for the victorious Italians. On a front of a little over two miles an advance had been made that varied in depth from two miles to a mile and a half. The salient was very narrow in relation to its depth. The Austrians were in force, and very strongly entrenched, on the wooded slopes that fall to the Vippacco, as far forward as the neighbourhood of San Grado di Merna. Their lines were immensely strong. Thick strands of wire ran from tree to tree in front of the trenches, making impassable barriers, and artillery fire upon a wood is apt to have results the reverse of what is intended. Instead of clearing away obstacles, it adds to them. When the Italians went forward against the wooded slopes south-east of San Grado, they found it impossible to make any great headway against the heaped tangle of wire, chevaux-de-frise and fallen tree-trunks. One line of trenches fell to the attack of a flanking column, but many others lay beyond.

But the positions were turned by the Italian advance on the high ridges, and there were not enough Austrian troops available for an attack on the flank of that advance before it had been thoroughly made good. By the time the Austrians were ready to come up from the Vippacco to the rim of the Carso, the Italians were defending their exposed flank by making a strong attack downhill. On November 3 troops of the 49th Division, which had pushed up inside the newly-formed salient, proceeded to widen it by coming down in the rear of the main Austrian lines between the Vippacco and the Carso. The main attack developed between Veliki Hribach and Fajti Hrib, against the wooded ridge of Volkovniak (925 feet)

RUINS OF LOKVICA—OFFENSIVE OF NOVEMBER, 1916.

which juts out northward from the main plateau. The enemy had not had time to prepare their lines against an advance from this direction. The hill was surrounded and taken, and the Italians reached and occupied the line of the Vippacco, west of Biglia. Opposite the village the enemy still held on to two little hills that formed a bridge-head over the river, and the Italians made no effort to dislodge them from these positions. The northern flank of the salient was now adequately secured.

While this operation was being carried out on the extreme left, a considerable advance was being made on the northern half of the plateau. Hill 291, a kilometre east of Hill 278, was solidly occupied, and farther south the line was advanced to within 200 yards of Kostanjevica. During the day some 500 prisoners were taken, bringing the total for the three days' fighting to 8,750, including 270 officers. The enemy were now right back on their third line all the way from the Vippacco to Kostanjevica. They had lost two very elaborate lines of entrenchment on a front of over three miles. But on the southern half of the plateau, and on the lower ground towards the sea, they were counter-attacking with great vigour, especially in the direction of Hill 208 south. They seemed to hope for a success here that might jeopardize the Italian gains to the north, but they made no impression on the Italians, who were now content to remain on the defensive in this sector. The Italian attack on the right was, in fact, a subsidiary operation. It was hoped that ground might be gained towards Selo and above Jamiano, but when the enemy's lines held against the first push, the offensive was practically abandoned for a containing action. The main objectives were north of the Oppacchiasella-Kostanjevica road. Experience had shown that the Austrian lines from Hudi Log down to the sea were particularly strong. Frontal attacks had gained ground but very little, and at heavy cost. A successful blow farther north promised the chance of capture by another method. For two reasons the Austrian left wing on the Carso was a harder nut to crack than the right. In the first place, the lines themselves, on a considerable part of the sector, were actually stronger. Perhaps they were stronger even by nature; but in addition they belonged in great part to that elaborate first-line system of defence which was broken farther north in the great August offensive, but never quite pierced in the extreme south. In the second place, the southern sector was backed by the guns on Hermada. The whole of the Hermada ridge was tunnelled and galleried in such a way that it was almost impossible to locate the hidden guns with any accuracy, and for this reason the Italian counter-batteries were unable to

ITALIANS IN AN AUSTRIAN TRENCH ON THE CARSO.

keep down the enemy fire as they succeeded in doing farther north. Hermada seemed definitely to forbid a direct advance, and to turn the position from the north appeared to be the only solution of a very difficult problem.

The third day's fighting practically closed this phase of the long offensive. A week later the Italians occupied Hill 309, 1,000 yards due north of Kostanjevica, so that their line now ran practically straight from Fajti Hrib to the outskirts of Kostanjevica. But this operation was virtually unopposed. The enemy had fallen back on their third line, and were making no attempt to hold any of the ground in front of it. The week following the three days' advance was spent by the Italians in consolidating the ground won, and "cleaning up" the battle-field. They were now in front of a strong trench line, to attack which required fresh artillery preparation. A pause was necessary to allow the moving of guns and *bombarde* and the selection of new observation posts. And when this had been accomplished, the weather put a stop to the further attack that had been planned. It broke on the evening of the third day's fighting. The rain came down in sheets, and the whole Carso was swathed in mist. After a week the weather changed for the better, but it did not hold, and just when hopes were highest they were dashed again. Conditions in the trenches became very bad. The lines on the low ground and the *doline* on the Carso were flooded with water, or, rather, with a thick mixture of mud and water, while the rocky Carso trenches were so many small torrents. And always the mist kept low. Early in December everything was ready for a very big attack. Full use had been made of the extra time that had been given by the bad weather, and it was hoped and believed that the results would compensate for the delay. Throughout December the Italian Army waited for the chance it was ready to take, but the conditions were persistently unfavourable, and at the end of the year General Cadorna reluctantly abandoned the idea of a further offensive until the coming of spring. Another stage of the long struggle on the Carso had come to an end.

The main features of Italy's share in the war during 1916 were, of course, the repulse of the

Austrian offensive on the Trentino front and the notable advance beyond the Isonzo. These two fierce struggles—the one lasting uninterruptedly for six weeks, and the other being carried on at intervals through more than three months—were events of first-class importance in the European War, and they naturally overshadowed other military operations which were remarkable in themselves, and would in different times have claimed wide attention. Among these operations the most noteworthy was the Italian advance upon the Fassa Alps. During the first days of the war the Italians had crossed the frontier and pushed up the Val Cismon and the Val Cortella till they were some 15 miles within Austrian territory. A line was established that ran from Cima d'Asta by Cima Spiadon to Caoria, where the torrent of the Valsorda joins the Vanoi, and thence by Cima di Valsorda and Cima d'Arzon to Valmesta in the Upper Val Cismon, about three miles below the famous summer resort and Dolomite centre, San Martino di Castrozza. The enemy made no attempt to contest this advance, but withdrew to the south-western curve of the vast Fassa range which sweeps up from the Trentino Alps to the Marmolada, protecting the Val Fiemme and the Val Travignolo, and the great Dolomite roads that meet at Predazzo. As they withdrew they burned and destroyed. The upper Val Cismon was laid waste, and San Martino di Castrozza, with its great hotels, remained a blackened ruin.

In this region, for more than a year, the Italian and Austrian lines were widely separated, the situation resembling that which long prevailed in the Val Giudicaria. There was an extensive No-Man's Land where patrols met and skirmished in the woods that clothe the lower mountain slopes, where occasional prisoners were taken, and men laid down their lives in little, lonely conflicts that never figured in the official dispatches. The Austrians did not confine themselves to the recognized methods of warfare. "In addition to the usual apparatus of defence, every barbarous device which a feudal Government had inherited from the Feudal Ages was made to serve against the Italians. Traps for wild beasts were set to



REFUGEES FROM A VILLAGE ON THE LOWER ISONZO.

catch men, regardless of the inhuman torture involved." *

The immense mountain rampart which was manned by the enemy seemed to forbid any possibility of an Italian advance. But here, as elsewhere among the Alps and Dolomites, no natural obstacle was considered impregnable by the incomparable mountain fighters of our Allies The first mention of a forward movement was contained in General Cadorna's bulletin of June 27, 1916. The report was characteristically laconic: "In the region of the Upper Vanoi we occupied the Tognola ridge." Tognola is a spur nearly 8,000 feet high, which runs south-westward from the principal range opposite Cima d'Arzon, and divided from it by the Valsorda valley. The news passed unnoticed. All eyes were still upon the uplands of Arsiero and Asiago. A fortnight later a move was made much farther west. The Col degli Uccelli was occupied, the pass which divides the Val Cia (Upper Vanoi) from the Val Campelle, leading down to Borgo and Strigno in the Brenta Valley. This was a diversion. The real movement came 10 days later, at the head of the Val Cismon.

Above San Martino di Castrozza the high road winds up towards the dividing ridge between the Val Cismon and the Val Travignolo. On the right tower the jagged peaks of the Rosetta, Cimon della Pala and Cima della Vezzana, the two latter both over 10,000 feet. On the left rises the rocky mass of the Cavallazza (7,630 feet). The road climbs northward past the Cavallazza, then turns westward behind it and traverses the mountain range at a height of 6,510 feet. This pass, the Passo di Rolle, is one of the only two less than 2,000 metres in height that cross the great chain of the Fassa Alps. The other, the Passo di Colbricon (6,240 feet), lies immediately west of the Cavallazza, dividing it from the much higher ridge of Colbricon (8,540 feet).

Cavallazza looks right down the Val Cismon from north to south, commanding the road from Fiera di Primiero for the greater part of its length. It was a very valuable observation post to the Austrians, and it seemed almost out of the question that they should ever lose



MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE FIGHTING IN THE FASSA ALPS.

* *The Times*, September 6.

it. The huge rock bastions to the east appeared to safeguard the position from a flank attack, for only one feasible route—the Passo di Vallès (6,665 feet)—led from Italian territory down to the Val Travignolo. And this route was easy to defend. The Austrians were enclosed in a rock fortress that seemed inaccessible.

Early in July the preparations for a serious advance were begun. Cavallazza dominated the only road fit for the transport of artillery, so that all the work had to be carried out at night. The Italian lines had by this time been brought forward some distance up the Val Cismon, but a wide stretch still remained between the trenches. The long inaction had given the Austrians a false sense of security, and their patrols were much less active and vigilant than they had been. Moreover here, as on the Isonzo, they were convinced that their offensive on the Trentino border, even if it had failed in its main object, had tied the hands of the Italians on other sectors of the front. Under cover of night guns were hauled up the steep sides of the Val Cismon, and troops were quietly concentrated upon the wooded slopes. Right under Cavallazza there is a dense wood, the Bosco della Chiesa, and here on the night of July 19 the Italian columns assembled for the attack. They were favoured by the luck of a heavy thunderstorm, which helped them to escape notice, and all the next day, which was foggy, they lay unobserved in the woods. The morning of July 21 dawned clear, and a heavy bombardment was opened upon Cavallazza. Under cover of this fire the Italians climbed the steep slopes from the wood, while another column pushed up the road towards the Passo di Rolle. Still another column crossed the Passo di Vallès and came down upon the Val Travignolo from the north-east. The enemy were completely surprised. The Italians gained a footing in the Cavallazza trenches before the defenders had left the dug-outs where they had been sheltering from the rain of artillery fire. There was desultory disorganized fighting for a day, but on July 22 the Passo di Rolle, Cavallazza, Cima di Colbricon and the Colbricon Pass were all safely in Italian hands.

The following day Cima Stradone, a peak north of Cima di Colbricon, was occupied, and during the next few days, in spite of stubborn resistance on the part of the enemy, the Italians pushed down the northern slopes of Colbricon and westward to the little valley of Ceremana, that runs down steeply to the Travignolo from between Colbricon and Cima di Ceremana. In spite of strong counter-attacks by the Austrians, who had hurried up reinforcements of men and guns, these positions were firmly held, and on July 31 the village of Paneveggio, where the road from the Passo di Vallès joins the Dolomite Road, was occupied in force. The whole of the Val Cismon was now free of Austrians, and the Upper Travignolo was dominated by the Italians. The fear of any counter-movement from the north had been removed by a successful advance down the Val Pellegrino, on the far side of Cima di Bocche. This advance was carried out simultaneously with the attack

ARMED ALPINI CLIMBING WITH THE AID OF PICKS.



HAULING A GUN UP A MOUNTAIN-SIDE.

upon Cavallazza and the Passo di Rolle, and resulted in the occupation of positions on the northern slopes of Cima di Bocche and the southern slopes of Monte Allochet.

The enemy had been rendered thoroughly nervous by this swift stroke, which had stripped off a piece of their flank armour. They hastily transferred to the Val Travignolo a considerable body of troops which they would certainly have preferred to employ elsewhere, and made repeated attempts to recapture their lost positions. They brought up fresh guns and used them very freely, but with no result. The Italians held firmly to their gains, and prepared a fresh movement farther west. Great difficulties of transport were faced and overcome, and by August 23 the Italians were assailing the rocky battlements of the Fassa Alps at three fresh points. They seized two outlying peaks below Cima di Cece—Hills 2354 and 2351, one at the head of the Val Fossernica, the other above the Valzanca, and stormed a line of Austrian entrenchments on the lower slopes of Cauriol (8,180 feet), the huge rocky pyramid that stands above the Val Cia (Upper Vanoi) and looks across at Predazzo and Cavalese. The capture of the peaks below Cima di Cece served the purpose of the movement in this sector, which was to relieve the left flank of the troops on Colbricon. The real attack was on Cauriol. In three days the Austrians were cleared out of their entrenchments on the wooded lower slopes, and the Alpini prepared to attack the precipitous rocks that rise above. The enemy opposed a stubborn resistance, but nothing can stop the Alpini but wire, and by August 28 Cauriol had fallen. Next day they extended their hold on the ridge and prepared to meet the counter-attacks of the Austrians, who were hurrying up reinforcements. During the whole of the first week of September the Austrians tried very hard to regain Cauriol; but the Alpini were immovable, and by the middle of the month they were on the offensive again. They fought their way slowly along the rocky precipices north-east of Cauriol. On September 15 they had a stiff fight for one difficult position, but they could not be withstood. The *Tirolesjäger* who faced them fought bravely till most of them were killed. A hundred survivors surrendered. Still the Alpini pushed on; on September 23 they stormed the peak of Cardinal (8,050 feet) that lies midway between Cauriol and Cima Busa Alta, and a little later they took the first peak of Busa Alta.

All through October this extraordinary fighting continued. The Austrians had gradually filled the Val Fiemme and the Val Travignolo with troops and guns. They were clearly anxious, and they made many attempts to drive the Italians off the peaks they had won. They brought up a great quantity of artillery to support their infantry attacks, but to no purpose. On the contrary, the Italians extended their gains, taking a second peak on Colbricon, south-west of the Cima, and resisting every attempt to recapture the position. On October 3 and 4 the Austrians attacked in force but were repulsed with heavy loss, after taking one advanced trench. The October fighting on Colbricon has a particular interest owing to the fact that in this sector the place of the Alpini, who were wanted elsewhere, had been taken by Bersaglieri, who adapted themselves remarkably to this mixture of warfare and gymnastics. It is a hallowed legend that when the Corps of Bersaglieri was first formed the new barracks built for them were unprovided with stairs, so that the men had to reach the upper floors by ropes. The fact of the legend shows at least the spirit of the Bersaglieri training, which is an excellent preparation for work such as they had to do on Colbricon.

Early in October it was hoped that the Austrians might be driven off the line of the Fassa Alps before winter set in. But winter came early, first hampering the operations and finally imposing a complete stop. In other sectors than this, too, the early winter came as a great disappointment to the Italians. General Cadorna had not given up hopes of dealing another blow on the Trentino front, though after securing his flank he made operations in this sector subordinate to the offensive east of the Isonzo. He was still handicapped by a shortage of heavy artillery, but certain local offensives, calculated to strengthen the chosen line of defence, were carefully planned. The first of these took place on Pasubio, or, rather, on the mountain mass of which Pasubio is the highest point. Pasubio itself had resisted every effort of the Austrians during their great offensive in May and June,* but more ground was needed for a satisfactory defensive line, and it was especially important that certain points of vantage, which dominated the Vallarsa road, should change hands. The enemy held the central ridge that runs northward from Pasubio and is known as Cosmagnon. The ridge is wide,

* See Vol. IX., Chapter CXXXIX.

BERSAGLIERI CYCLISTS.

but on the west it drops precipitously and the Austrian trenches ran along the top of the cliffs.

In the afternoon of October 9 the Italians attacked from below the cliffs above the Vallarsa and from the ridges to the south. The artillery had prepared the way by a very heavy bombardment along the whole *massif* as far as Col Santo, and the enemy were puzzled to know where the real attack was coming. Their trenches on the edge of Cosmagnon fell quickly, and the Italians gained a footing on the dreary rolling surface of the broad ridge. It was a strange battle. The whole Pasubio mass was bathed in brilliant sunshine, but the valleys were filled with a thick mist which cut off the mountain from all the world below. During that afternoon, and throughout the clear moonlit night that followed, the Alpini and Bersaglieri pushed slowly forward, meeting and overcoming the reinforcements which the Austrians had hastily dispatched. By the end of the day they had cleared a wide stretch of mountain plateau, 10 square miles in extent, and the next day they advanced to the foot of the peak known as Monte Roite, on the farthest edge of Cosmagnon. The Austrians still clung desperately to their lines on the north and east of the Pasubio system, but the Italians had gained the space they required and freed 10 miles of the Vallarsa road from direct observation.

The left of the Italian line between the Adige and the Brenta was greatly strengthened by this successful stroke, and it was the intention of the *Comando Supremo* to carry out a similar but more extensive operation on the right of the line, in the Sette Comuni. Every preparation was made, but the snow came early and paralysed all movement. Even if it had been possible for the infantry to move, artillery preparation would have been largely ineffective. The deep snow protected the enemy trenches and entanglements, and experiments showed that a great proportion of shells did not burst. Here, as on the Carso, the weather prevented operations which would certainly have borne useful fruit.

It would be difficult to over-estimate the increase in Italian military strength from May, 1915, to the end of 1916. When Italy took the field against Austria she was still only ha'f prepared. A great many gaps had been filled during the period of neutrality, but in the prime requirement of modern war, heavy artillery, there was a very grave deficiency. Her power of manufacturing war material was far from equal to the demands made upon

it, and in Italy, as elsewhere, it took time, first to realize the necessities and then to organize the industry for their supply. By the end of 1916 468,940 workers were engaged in the manufacture of munitions, and of these 72,324 were women. There were 66 principal military factories and 932 auxiliary factories, which between them covered every kind of war work, besides 1,181 smaller establishments for the making of shells exclusively. The production of heavy guns in sufficient quantity was still beyond Italy's powers, but in the case of certain other war material she was able eventually to produce a surplus. As the idea of the "Single Front" gained ground among the Allies and their manufacturing resources developed, certain of Italy's deficiencies were made good from outside, and in return she was able to assist the common cause by increasing her production of other materials beyond her own requirements

By the end of 1916 the Italian Army was incomparably better equipped than it had been a year earlier, and Italy's powers of production were still increasing. It was not only in equipment, however, that the Army had progressed. It had gained technique, and

SUMMIT OF PASUBIO.

it had gained confidence. Long months of war had tempered the raw metal and well-earned victory had put an edge to the steel.

During the winter of 1915-16 the Italian Government had come in for a good deal of criticism, both in Italy and in the Allied countries, on the ground that Italians were taking no part in the tardy attempt of the Entente Powers to repair the diplomatic muddle in the Balkans by military effort. The plain fact is that Italy was not yet ready, from a military point of view, to indulge in the luxury of sending more than one *petit*

A MULE SUPPLY COLUMN.

paquet of her troops on to foreign soil.* It was constantly urged by her critics, with perfect justice, that she had great reserves of men. It was constantly forgotten that modern armies or expeditionary forces are not made of men alone. The fighting between the Adige and the Brenta showed how right Italy had been in refusing to weaken her capacity for

MINARET, NEAR VALONA, OCCUPIED BY ITALIAN TROOPS.

defending her own frontiers at a time when her resources in war material were so limited. Her hesitation to cooperate in the Balkans was natural and right, and was fully justified by time. When her frontiers were secured, and General Cadorna had made adequate preparation for the offensive on the Isonzo, there was no more hesitation. During the month of August the Italian commander in the Valona zone pushed southward, occupying Port Palermo and the coast strip by Kimara, and preparations were made to extend the Italian occupation to the whole of Southern Albania. On August 23 a strong Italian force arrived at Salonika under the command of General Pettitti, an officer who had greatly distinguished himself at a very critical period of the Austrian offensive. A portion of this force was detailed to strengthen the defensive line that ran from the Vardar to the Struma, while another detachment formed part of the Allied Army which advanced upon Monastir. Nor was this the limit of Italian cooperation in the Balkans. At dawn on October 2 an expeditionary force arrived at Santé Quaranta and was swiftly disembarked. On the same day a column marched southward from Tepeleni on the Voyusa and occupied Argyrokastro, and on the following day connexion was established between the two forces. On October 25 it was announced that the Italian forces in Albania had come in touch with the left wing of the Allied advance from Salonika.

The participation of Italy in the Salonika expedition was in itself an answer to certain hasty, if natural, criticisms. The real cause which inspired all such criticism was removed on August 27 when Italy formally declared war on Germany. In Chapter CXXXIX. it was briefly indicated how the absence of such a declaration had led to uneasiness and uncertainty in the public opinion of Italy and Italy's Allies, and how this absence gave rise to much groundless gossip. It was evident to all who were in touch with the situation that a formal declaration of hostilities was inevitable, and was only a question of time and opportunity. Italy had long ago given adequate pledges of her solidarity with the other members of the Entente, by her adhesion to the Pact of London, and by her participation in the Economic Conference at Paris. German troops and German sailors had taken part in military operations against Italy. A state of war existed in everything but name.

Undoubtedly the Salandra Government wished the formal declaration to come from Germany, but Germany still hoped something from her friends in Italian political circles, and she saw clearly that the apparently ambiguous position was a cause of uncertainty in Italy, and of some suspicion in the public opinion of Italy's Allies. The atmosphere of doubt was

* A strong Italian force was entrenched in the Valona region.

all to Germany's advantage, and it may be presumed that she had no intention of altering the situation unless and until the prospect of an important military success against Italy should outweigh the benefits she gained from the absence of open war. As the Italian Government realized that Germany was disinclined to declare war, it took various steps to widen the rupture caused by the breach of diplomatic relations. Some of these have been already indicated. Others were the provisions which definitely forbade any kind of commercial traffic, direct or indirect, with Germany Meanwhile Germany was preventing the departure of Italian subjects, and in many cases treating those subjects as enemies, and in view of this fact the Salandra Government denounced the agreement of May 21, 1915.* The Boselli Government went farther, and on July 19, 1916, a decree was issued providing that the dispositions with regard to Austrian subjects laid down in previous decrees should be extended to "the subjects of all enemy States or of States allied with enemy States." On July 27 the Stefani Agency published a long *communiqué* showing the various points of friction which had arisen. This *communiqué* was nominally in answer to a publication by the Wolff Bureau which had accused Italy of illegal acts, but it was actually a forecast of the inevitable step. That step was delayed another month, but on August 27 the following formal declaration of war was sent through the Swiss Government.

"Acts of hostility by the German Government towards Italy follow one another with increasing frequency. It suffices to mention the repeated supply of arms and instruments of land and sea warfare by Germany to Austria-Hungary and the uninterrupted participation of German officers and soldiers and sailors in the different operations of war directed against Italy. It is only thanks to the assistance which has thus lavishly been bestowed by Germany in the most various ways that Austria-Hungary has recently been able to concentrate against Italy her greatest effort.

"It is necessary to add:

"1. The surrender to our enemy by the German Government of Italian prisoners who had escaped from Austro-Hungarian concen tration camps and had taken refuge in German territory.

"2. The invitation addressed to credit establishments and German bankers at the initiative of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to consider all Italian subjects as alien enemies, and to postpone all payments which might be due to them.

"3. The suspension of the payment to

* See Vol. IX., Chapter CXXXIX., p. 111.

ITALIAN RESERVISTS REPAIRING ROADS IN VALONA.

ITALIANS AT SALONIKA.

Italian workmen of pensions due to them in accordance with the formal dispositions of German law.

"These are all facts which reveal the real feelings, systematically hostile, which the Imperial Government cherishes with regard to Italy. Such a state of affairs could not finally be tolerated by the Royal Government, since it aggravates, exclusively to the detriment of Italy, the deep contrast between the situation *de facto* and the situation *de jure* which has already resulted from the fact of the alliance of Italy and Germany with two groups of powers at war with one another.

"For the above-mentioned reasons the Italian Government declares, in the name of the King, that Italy will consider herself, as from August 28, in a state of war with Germany, and requests the Swiss Federal Government to convey the above communication to the knowledge of the Imperial Government."

The use of the expressions *de facto* and *de jure* practically sums up the situation. There was no real change. Neither Italy nor Germany had a new enemy, but the ground was finally cleared from certain misunderstandings and manœuvres.

CHAPTER CLXXV.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (V.).

THE BRITISH ATTACK ON SEPTEMBER 15—THE "TANKS" IN ACTION—CAPTURE OF COURCELETTE, MARTINPUICH AND FLERS—THE NEW ZEALANDERS—THE GUARDS—THE CANADIANS—SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S VICTORY—IMPORTANT FRENCH GAINS—THE BATTLE OF SEPTEMBER 25—FALL OF COMBLES—BRITISH IN THIEPVAL—RESULTS OF THE BATTLE TO END OF SEPTEMBER—GERMAN LOSSES.

ON the morning of September 15, 1916, the British troops attacked the Germans along the line extending from Bouleaux Wood, between Guillemont and Combles, to the north of the Albert-Bapaume road—*i.e.*, a distance of some six miles.

The ground over which the fighting took place was generally undulating on the south side of the watershed extending from Bouleaux Wood through Delville Wood and High Wood to Thiepval. To the east of Bouleaux Wood the ground sloped down with some sharpness to the valley in which was Combles. This valley divides into two horns, one going north west and upwards to the west of Morval, the other north-east rising up to Sailly-Saillisel. Morval was on a prolongation of the Delville Wood-Ginchy ridge and somewhat below it. North of the main backbone the ground sloped down more gently. The villages which dotted the battlefield were strongly defended and had been largely sheltered from view by trees till the British bombardment swept these away and pounded the villages themselves into mere masses of ruins. Still the trenches round them afforded some cover, and although any protection near the surface had been largely destroyed, sufficient was left, combined with the deeper dug-outs, to shelter the garrisons until they had to resist the near approach of the British troops.

Everywhere the attack was successful; the first and second German lines were captured and, along a good part of their position, even the third line was pierced. The depth of the British in-burst, varying in places, measured on an average from one to two miles, and included Courcelette, Martinpuich, High Wood, Flers, and a large portion of Bouleaux Wood. Thus the British now stood on the high ground extending through Bouleaux Wood and Martinpuich, nearly to Thiepval. Many too were the trophies gained. Prisoners to the number of over 2,300 were gathered in, including 65 officers, of whom no less than six were battalion commanders, a sure proof that the enemy had been taken, or had surrendered, in large units.

The bombardment of the German position had been going on since early morning on September 12, and had become highly intense before the infantry were launched to the assault at 6.20 a.m. It was a remarkable achievement even for the British artillery, which had done so much good and efficient work since it had been adequately equipped. The duties of every heavy battery had been most carefully and exactly worked out, its targets were defined, and it knew when to switch off one and switch on to another. It understood when a barrage was to be carried out and what points behind the enemy's line were to be expressly dealt with.

The field batteries acted with a brave audacity worthy of the highest praise, taking up position after position nearer to the enemy as the latter was pressed back. The forward observing officers pushed up to the high ground as soon

Fig. 1. FRENCH ARMOURED CAR WITH MACHINE GUN.

as the infantry captured it, and so were able to telephone back the directions in which fire was wanted, and to pass back corrections in range and direction when needed.* The fire of our guns of every kind was arranged with a mathematical precision marvellous in itself, yet necessary, to get the full effect from modern weapons. The enemy's artillery was still strong and well worked, but it was not so powerful as ours, which was soon able to dominate it.

* The Forward Observing Officer is an officer who from an advanced position notes the fall of the shells from his battery and telephones back to it, so that the Battery Commander may know how to correct the aim of his guns.

Before discussing the fighting in detail it is necessary to describe the famous "Tanks," which on September 15 made their first appearance on the field of battle.

An armoured train had been proved useful at Alexandria, in 1882, and others had been

Fig. 2. BELGIAN ARMOURED CAR WITH MACHINE GUN.

employed in the South African War, producing, however, no particular effect. They were only improvised arrangements of no great tactical value, being entirely limited to the railways. A car which could move over ordinary ground had to await the arrival of the internal com bustion engine before it could be made in any way successful.* Nor had the first protected automobiles been capable of producing much influence on battle tactics, though they were of some utility as supports to reconnoitring cavalry, or advanced guard infantry, or for reconnaissances on their own account. The reason for this was that they were just ordinary motor-cars, more or less protected by steel shields fixed to them. Types of these are shown in figs. 1, 2 and 3. Fig. 1 shows the French type of armoured car with machine gun. These did good work for the French Army. Fig. 2 is a type made use of by the Belgian Army with a machine gun. Fig. 3 is another Belgian type with a quick-firer. Fig. 4 is an armoured car, the quick-firer of which could be used as an anti-aircraft weapon. Fig. 5 gives the Rolls-Royce armoured car used in Egypt with such good results in the expedition against the Senussi.*

It will easily be seen how liable all these types were to injury of their wheels, the shielding of which was very imperfect. Moreover, the engines and air coolers were not well protected.

The designers of the Tanks worked on different lines entirely. In them the whole of the motor machinery was securely housed inside the car itself. The latter did not run on wheels, but on the two side caterpillar constructions which, revolving, drew the car forward. A glance at Fig 6 will show how much safer and better this method was. Moreover, the wedge-like shape of the front part of the car made it possible to drive through or over obstacles which an ordinary car could not traverse, as its hood would be doubled up; while the longer caterpillar sides formed as it were a movable girder, which enabled the Tank to pass over ditches and trenches. For if the point but reached the other side the caterpillars could claw it forward. The Tank also had a far superior armament to that of any ordinary armoured car, which can take but one or two machine guns or small quick-firers at the most.

Fig. 3. BELGIAN ARMOURED CAR WITH QUICK-FIRER.

* In 1860 a steam-driven armoured car was brought to the attention of Napoleon III. It was armed with two guns and furnished with revolving scythes which were intended to mow down any of the enemy's infantry which might attempt to close with it. Nothing came of the suggestion.

* See Vol. IX., Chapter CXLV.

Several weapons of either or both of these classes could be carried in the Tank, while there was no comparison between the security it afforded its crew and that given to the ordinary armoured cars. No armoured motor-car could charge a brick wall without damage, and even passing over a wire entanglement would be dangerous. But experience soon showed that the Tank could deal with quite considerable obstructions. Its special form enabled it to overcome opposition and pass through or over many obstacles which would be quite unnegotiable by the ordinary motor-car, armoured or unarmoured. To render it as indistinguishable as possible, it was painted in a curious medley of browns, greens and yellows, which harmonized with the broken ground over which it had to pass. We shall see in the description of the fight on September 15 and following days that these novel engines of war played an important part.

Fig. 4. ARMOURED MOTOR-CAR WITH ANTI-AIRCRAFT QUICK-FIRER.

They certainly proved an objectionable surprise to the Germans. The chief of the Staff of the Third Group of German Armies said: "The enemy in the latest fighting has employed new engines of war as cruel as they are effective. No doubt he will adopt on an extensive scale these monstrous engines, and it is urgent to take whatever measures are possible to counteract them."

The correspondent of the *Düsseldorfer General-anzeiger* said that, as the Germans saw the monsters coming on through the mist at the moment when some cessation of the bombardment allowed them to emerge from their shelters, "their blood froze in their veins":

> Stupefied by the earthquake which had raged around them they all rubbed their eyes, which were riveted as if deprived of sense on the two fabulous creatures. The imagination, flogged by the storm of fire, was full of excitement, and no wonder it had the mastery over these men, tried by suffering, who were well aware that the enemy would push with all the means of destruction through a wall hard as steel, though made of frail human bodies. They have learnt not to fear men, but there was something approaching which the human brain, with tremendous mechanical powers, had fitted out for a devil's trick, a mystery which oppressed and shackled the powers, because one could not comprehend it with the understanding—a fatality against which one seemed helpless. One stared and stared as if paralysed.
>
> The monster approached slowly, hobbling, moving from side to side, rocking and pitching, but it came nearer. Nothing obstructed it; a supernatural force seemed to drive it onwards. Someone in the trenches cried "the devil comes," and that word ran down the line like lightning. Suddenly tongues of fire licked out of the armoured hide of the iron caterpillar, shells whistled over our heads, and a terrible concert of machine-gun orchestra filled the air. The mysterious creature



Fig. 5. ROLLS-ROYCE ARMOURED CAR
As used in Egypt.

had surrendered its secret, and sense returned with it, and toughness and defiance, as the English waves of infantry surged up behind the devil's chariot.

Describing the participation of two of these "land Dreadnoughts" at Flers on September 16 the correspondent said:

Our machine-gun fire and hand grenades rattled ineffectively on their iron hide. As our rear connexions

Fig. 6. A BRITISH "TANK" IN ACTION CROSSING A SHELL-CRATER.



STAR SHELLS IN THE EARLY MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 15.

were cut, the artillery could not be summoned to help against the mass fire of these iron towers, as they easily destroyed what remained of the garrisons of the advanced shell holes. They then advanced over the first German line away into Flers village, remaining there some time. When the English infantry had arrived and occupied the village they proceeded further on the Ligny-Thilloy road. Meanwhile, as their appearance became known in other rear positions, well-placed shots made an end of their triumphal march behind the village.

But although one Tank seems to have been disabled, the Germans did not succeed in capturing any of them. The Tanks, for their part, brought in many German prisoners, usually following submissively behind, or, as in the case of a few officers, inside.

It is plain that the moral effect of the new weapons was great, and it will be seen from the narrative which follows that tactical gains were very considerable. Officially called His Majesty's Land-Ships, each of them had a name given it by its crew; two which were attached to the New Zealanders on September 15 were known as "Cordon Rouge" and "Crême-de-menthe."

September 15 was fine, but the morning mist still clung to the ground and somewhat obscured the movements of the infantry. The huge projectiles from the big guns and heavy howitzers



THE CAPTURE OF COURCELETTE AND FLERS.

boomed over the heads of our men in the front line and burst with terrific explosions on their target, destroying the front line of German trenches. At first the enemy did not appreciate that an assault was imminent, probably because the British artillery had expended so much ammunition on the German position as to keep the majority of its garrison lying close for shelter, and thus the sudden intense fire was regarded as a mere incident in the artillery duel and not as a prologue to the coming infantry assault. The Germans, too, in the days immediately preceding the attack, had been distributing a considerable amount of shell fire against their opponents' position, and are said to have had over 1,000 guns in action against us. But we had more, and our artillery had distinctly gained the upper hand before our infantry went over the front trench parapet at 6.20 a.m.



[Canadian War Records.

CANADIANS FIRING A HEAVY HOWITZER.

There is some reason to believe that the Germans were planning an attack at the same time as we were, for the number of men in their position was larger than usual, although this may also have been due to the reliefs arriving and being there with the outgoing garrison before the latter had left. Still it is certain that shortly before our advance began a German force covered by bombers crossed No Man's Land and made a rush at the trenches where part of the Canadians were assembled; coming suddenly out of the mist which concealed their approach, they flung their bombs into the trench and, following on, succeeded in entering it. The success was but a short one. It was the hour fixed for the British advance and forward accordingly went our men, sweeping the Germans back before them. This was the only incident before our attack began, and it had no effect whatever on the arrangements.

The left of our attack executed by one Army Corps was engaged with the German positions from Thiepval down towards the Stufen (called by us the Stuff) Redoubt; beyond it the Canadians directed their efforts against Courcelette. Beyond these again the remainder of General Gough's command was aimed at High Wood and Martinpuich.

On the right of the Fifth Army was the Fourth Army under Sir Henry Rawlinson. The village of Flers was the objective of the left of this force. Against it were engaged the left of Rawlinson's men, one Corps going for Flers, and the New Zealanders pushing forward to the west of the village.

The length of the right portion of this attack was about 2,500 yards, and extended from the east side of Delville Wood to some distance

THE SEAFORTHS HOLDING A FRONT-LINE TRENCH OPPOSITE MARTINPUICH.

east of Flers. Beyond this was the remainder of the Fourth Army connecting with the French.

The German position to be attacked formed a treble line of works well strung together by connecting trenches amply provided with bomb-proof shelters and covered by a very strong wire entanglement. A fourth formidable line had also been recently constructed in front of Le Transloy, facing almost west and covering the road from that important village to Bapaume. In advance of the first line were several advanced works with the usual machine-gun emplacements, which allowed a powerful flanking fire to be brought on any troops who endeavoured to pass between them. It was necessary to silence these before an attack could make progress.

One of them was the so-called "Mystery Corner" at the eastern end of Delville Wood, which at this time was still in German hands, though most of the rest of the wood had been for some time in our possession. It was a formidable redoubt, well provided with machine-guns which would enfilade any British attack moving northward across its line of fire. Moreover, it protected two lines of communication trenches which went back from this point towards the great length of trench known as the Switch Trench, which ran from the neighbourhood of High Wood to the south of and past Flers, towards the east. It was plainly necessary, therefore, to storm this redoubt and turn the enemy out of the connecting trenches before the main advance could be pushed forward towards Flers.

Somewhat before the time fixed for the assault, when the half light of commencing dawn had scarcely appeared, two detachments, about a section each, crept swiftly and quietly forward. One tackled the redoubt, the other the communicating trenches. The assailants of the former were over its parapets and in the midst of the garrison before the latter could get their machine-guns into action. A short, sharp combat sufficed to settle the question of possession—the redoubt was ours, and with it some 50 prisoners and its armament of machine guns.

The other detachment was accompanied by two Tanks, and supported by them went for the two communication trenches. But little opposition was met with, for here our artillery had been able to enfilade the hostile defences, and they found them almost filled up with dead and dying, the result of the recent bombardment. Now the way was clear for the main advance.

The first thing to be done was to capture the

Switch trench. But in advance of it there were two other trenches, roughly parallel to it, known as the Brown Trench and Tea Support Trench, while more to the east, and behind the Switch, was the Gap Trench, which connected up with the trench running from the front of Lesboeufs, past Gueudecourt to the Grid Trench 1½ miles to the rear.* In addition to these more elaborate works there were many shell-craters organized for defence, many little projections from the innumerable connexion trenches in which machine-guns and riflemen were nested. The position was, indeed, a powerful one, and had it not been thoroughly searched out by our artillery fire would have been impregnable to an infantry attack. Fortunately our guns had dealt with it thoroughly, and those who were about to assault it were first-rate fighting men.

The men told off went over the parapet in a succession of waves, and in advancing went by the two detachments which had taken the redoubt and communication trenches, and were now resting after their labours. These, although their task was done, and all their officers wounded, declined to be left behind, and acted as a connecting link between two units of the attack, which became a little separated as the advance went on. The troops concerned in the direct attack on Flers and to the right of it were chiefly Londoners who had not had much previous experience, but they bore themselves that day as well as any war-seasoned troops. They showed their readiness in the intricate fight both in trench storming and the more individual work of hunting the Germans out of the village. The Switch Trench was quickly entered by the first two waves of men, who then proceeded to round up the few—very few—living Germans, the majority having been killed by the British artillery fire.

Leaving the front line of men to hold the newly won ground, the officer in command sent the supports forward against Flers. Forcing their way over shell craters under machine-gun and shrapnel fire, they reached the outer line of the village defences. Here they were held up, for the German trench was covered by a strong wire entanglement. It was a job for a Tank, and one arrived to do the business. Coming

* The reader will do well to refer to the coloured maps of the battle area which form the frontispieces of Vols. IX. and X.

AWAITING THE ORDER TO ADVANCE.

up in its own fashion with a deadly persistence, it passed over shell craters, reached the wire, and then proceeded to iron out flat a sufficient length of the obstacle to give the infantry room to advance, meanwhile bringing a deadly flanking fire to bear on the defenders of the German trench. Once the way was clear, our foot soldiers moved forward once more, and Flers was taken with a rush. There was really very little resistance, and the position does not appear to have been held with any determination. Perhaps the garrison had fled before the terrifying monster which proceeded up the main street amid the cheers of our men, as calmly as an omnibus up Oxford Street. Two counter-attacks were made about three and four in the afternoon; both were stopped without difficulty by machine-gun fire.

On the right of this portion of Sir Henry Rawlinson's army, the fight at this time was of a tentative nature.

The New Zealanders took a considerable part in the battle of the 15th. The position against which they advanced lay between Flers and High Wood, on the high ground at the top of the plateau. Their flanks were protected by the British troops attacking Flers and on their left. The assault was furnished by the men of Auckland, Canterbury, Otago, and Wellington, and their main objective was the German trench 500 yards ahead of the British line. Our men advanced in a series of waves with distances between them, and they suffered on the upward move from both shrapnel and machine-gun fire. But nothing could stop them, and they burst into the German trench. A prolonged and desperate close-quarter fight ensued, in which scarcely any other weapon was used than the bayonet. It was a terrible combat of comparative silence, in which little was to be heard except the clash of steel and the half-smothered cries of the wounded. But eventually the garrison were completely conquered; few, indeed, escaped with their lives. A slight pause was made there, and then the advance began again, a distance of 800 yards to the second German position, consisting of two lines of trenches covered by deep wire entanglements.

This time the New Zealand Rifles led the assault, moving in open order, yet keeping touch and their alignment. The enemy's defences had been considerably damaged by

[Official photograph.

WOUNDED GUARDSMEN NOWISE DOWNHEARTED.

[Official photograph.

THE CANADIANS ADVANCING TO THE CHARGE.

our artillery fire, but several machine-gun emplacements were still in working order, and much of the wire obstacle was still effective. The New Zealanders suffered heavily, but stuck to their task, in which they were soon aided by a powerful auxiliary. Two Tanks, which had been somewhat delayed in their progress over the shell-pitted ground, now came up and proceeded with characteristic deliberation to flatten out the wire for the infantry to pass, then getting astride the German trench and beating out the machine-guns and their detachments by their fire. In vain the Germans bombed them and covered them with rifle fire; they carried out their task. A German battery 1,500 yards off brought its fire to bear on them, but obtained no direct hits, and was itself soon reduced to silence by British guns. Then the infantry came on and drove back the rest of the German garrison. The New Zealanders went on still farther, accompanied by one of the Tanks. They succeeded, indeed, in progressing beyond the troops at Flers and on their left flank, in both of which directions the fighting had been stiffer, and their fire swept down the shallow gulley which points north-east 1,500 yards west of Flers.

The projecting salient they made threatened the lines of the enemy from either flank. The Germans naturally made a strong counter-attack, and the New Zealanders were drawn back to a straighter line which ran westward from the north end of Flers village, and there they held their ground.

A more desperate counter-attack was delivered by the enemy in the afternoon in conjunction with a similar effort against Flers already mentioned. It was equally unsuccessful; but in this case it was not fire only which stopped the Germans. The downward slope of the ground appears to have afforded some shelter to the latter in their advance, and they came on in a more or less dense line, to use cold steel. The New Zealanders were ready to meet them with their own weapon, and gallantly led, dashed into them at the double with their bayonets, while the Germans stood to receive them. Such was the impetus of our troops that they drove back their opponents after a short struggle. Their slow retreat grew faster, and then became a run, until, finally, they took to their heels and fled helter-skelter, pursued by the New Zealanders. There were no more counter-attacks by the enemy in this part of the field.

While the fighting had been going on round Flers, the Guards had been engaged in another part of the front. All five regiments took part.

The place of assembly, before the advance, had been on the hither slope of the Thiepval-Ginchy Ridge, and the nature of the ground on the farther side and its occupation were not very well known. It had been thought that there was some little distance before the line of trench to be taken would be reached. But no sooner had the men gone some 200 yards and breasted the crest than they found themselves before two lines of trenches covered by an unbroken wire entanglement defended by machine-guns and bombers to back up the infantry. The three battalions of Coldstreams led the advance, supported by the Grenadiers, with the Irish Guards in reserve behind them



THE CAPTURE OF THE SUGAR REFINERY AT COURCELETTE BY THE CANADIANS.

The troops on the right of the Guards had been held up by obstacles, and thus the Coldstreams going on beyond them exposed their right flank and suffered accordingly. But they drove steadily onwards, over wire, over parapet, till Briton encountered German in the trench. Nor were our opponents loth to meet the attack. Both sides fought desperately with bomb and bayonet. The Coldstreams were reinforced by the Grenadiers, and the Irish Guards came up too, while later on the Welsh joined in the fray. After an hour or more of handy-strokes we gained the victory, and once more the Guards went on. They saw the German infantry beating a hasty retreat before them, they saw the German gunners endeavouring to remove their guns. They had advanced more than 2,000 yards from the point of departure, they had broken a gap in the German lines, but they had come to the limit of the possible and wisely determined to halt where they were and dig in. They had taken 200 prisoners, and disposed of many hundreds of the enemy.

The night by no means brought peace. The Germans launched counter-attack after counter-attack on them, but in vain, and so the Guards won through the darkness and held the position they had conquered.

Martinpuich and High Wood formed the connexion points of the battle between Flers and Courcelette.

High Wood had only been partly in our possession, the northern portion being still in the hands of the Germans when the battle of September 15 began. What they held they held strongly with a mass of machine guns. Here the Tanks gave great assistance, and, indeed, it was they that really turned the enemy out. Going on over trees, over wire, over trenches, they flattened out the enemy, and by 10 o'clock the whole wood was in our hands. Meanwhile the infantry had moved to the assault of Martinpuich. The front defences of the village were taken with a rush, but a counter-attack drove our men back. They went forward, once more supported by Tanks, and this time with entire success. The Bavarians fled before them, and the Tanks plied them with fire, enfiladed their trenches, sat on their dug-outs and thoroughly dominated them in every way. Many were the prisoners who fell to them—over a hundred surrendered to one alone, and two of the crew sufficed to keep them till the infantry came up. Another captured a regimental commander who came out of a dug-out to see what was going on.

The share taken by the Canadians in the advance of September 15 and 16 was considerable. When they went over the parapet and advanced over the ground towards the German position they saw Martinpuich on their right and Courcelette to their left front, with an intervening network of trenches. Mouquet Farm, or rather the trenches round it, formed

[Official photograph.

SETTING FUSES.

their first objective, and part of these were captured after a short but severe struggle. Farther forward pressed the Maple Leaves, towards the brick ruins and white chalk heaps of what had once been the renowned sugar refinery, the subterranean defences of which still served to shelter the enemy, who also held the trenches right and left of it. These together formed the main objective of our troops. But before they could be reached other works had to be taken. Nor were they captured without a considerable fight. As usual, the German trenches were so laid out that portions of them, manned with machine guns, flanked their lines. These for a time held up the movement. But soon a new auxiliary arrived to aid the Canadians—His Majesty's Landship "Crême de Menthe." Moving deliberately but continuously forward, lurching a bit as it bumped over the shell craters and other obstacles, but always getting nearer and nearer to the German

line, the steel-clad automobile battery passed through the cheering foot-soldiers and went on amid a hail of rifle and machine gun bullets to which it paid no attention. Then, taking position across the German front trench, its fire swept to right and left down it, and thus eased the way for Canadian infantry to continue their advance. The enemy's machine-guns were silenced and a considerable number of prisoners taken, and the main line of the German entrenchments here was captured, and even parts of the trenches on the outskirts of Courcelette. Soldiers from all parts of Canada took part in the triumph—Mounted Rifles from the eastern provinces with men from Toronto, London, and Kingston; while from the western side came the men from Vancouver and Regina, with the volunteers of Winnipeg, from the centre of the Dominion. It was a glorious combination. Having reached the point above indicated, the storming force proceeded to dig itself in, while the reserve battalions were brought up to complete the occupation of the ground gained.

The attack had indeed been so successful that Sir Julian Byng, the Canadian Corps Commander, determined to push on still farther and take Courcelette, although the evening was advancing. The reserve battalion had now come up, and was told off to lead the new assault. A French Canadian battalion swung round to the left and struck the village on the eastern side, while other Canadians pressed straight forward against it. It was through a hot fire of artillery and small arms that our troops advanced, but they would not be denied, and, in the darkening shades of evening, the outer ring of the Courcelette fortification was broken through and the greater part of the garrison, now thoroughly demoralized, were made prisoners. Defences were improvized, and these served to beat off several counter-attacks made during the night against the newly won village. The prisoners taken numbered over 1,000, together with two pieces of artillery and a number of machine-guns and trench mortars.

On the extreme left, in front of Thiepva and down towards the Bapaume road, it was not the policy of Sir Douglas Haig to push matters to extremities at this period. But here, too, fighting went on; attacks

[Canadian official photograph.

CANADIANS HANDING DRINK TO GERMAN PRISONERS TAKEN BY THEM AT COURCELETTE.

[Canadian official photograph.

A KITE BALLOON PREPARING TO ASCEND.

were driven off, and some little progress was made.

The victory gained was a great one, and the Germans had been taught a lesson. Sitting down beyond the risk of danger the higher commanders might order their men to hold on till death or make counter-attack after counter-attack. But there is a limit to the capacity for resisting loss beyond which troops will not go. This had been reached by the Germans on the ground where the fighting of the 15th took place, and hence the great results gained this day by the British Army. In the language of General Haig, the fighting of the 15th and 16th was of great importance, and probably the most effective blow which had yet been dealt to the enemy by British troops. The damage to his *moral* was probably of greater consequence than the seizure of dominating positions and the capture of between 4,000 and 5,000 prisoners. Guards, Northumbrians and London Territorials, Scottish and English New Army divisions, with troops from Canada and New Zealand, shared the glory of the battle between them. Nor were our aviators without their share. They destroyed 15 aeroplanes of the enemy and drove others off, then they came down lower and used their machine-guns on the enemy's guns and on the infantry in his trenches. At the same time they kept constant count of the enemy's movements, observed his batteries, and informed our own where to fire. The perfection to which the work of the Royal Flying Corps had been brought is impossible to put into words.

September 16 was chiefly a day of consolidation of our new position and of driving back counter-attacks of the enemy which were entirely unsuccessful. Late in the evening our troops obtained a considerable success, taking the "Danube" Trench near Thiepval on a front of about a mile, and with it many prisoners and a considerable quantity of rifles and equipment abandoned by the enemy. The network of defences round Mouquet Farm, which had been in dispute for some weeks past was almost completely conquered, and we extended our gains near Courcelette on a line of 1,000 yards. A number of minor advantages were secured on other parts of the British Front.

On the 17th, to the south of the Ancre, the Germans made several heavy counter-attacks, which were all repulsed. One which came from the direction of Lesbœufs and from the country

[Official photograph.

PRISONERS COMING IN.

north of Flers was caught by our artillery barrage and suffered heavy loss. Between Flers and Martinpuich a German brigade commenced an attack in the direction of High Wood. Our troops, only two battalions, did not wait for them to join issue, but leaving the shallow trenches which they had recently made, went on at a double to meet them. The result was never for a moment in doubt. Although the Germans were in threefold strength they were driven back with great slaughter.

[From the official Ancre film.

PRISONERS CLAIMING THEIR LETTERS AND OTHER PROPERTY.

To the north of Mouquet Farm more ground was gained. Our artillery, too, maintained its fire generally against the German line, and among other successes blew up an ammunition dump at Grandcourt. During the night further progress was made east of Courcelette and our line was appreciably advanced, and we gained more ground south of Thiepval, thus threatening to surround this position.

The Germans, on the other hand, under cover of a heavy bombardment, managed to enter one of our trenches west of Mouquet Farm, but were at once counter-attacked and driven back with heavy loss. During the night they kept up an intermittent artillery fire against various points of our line.

It was at this juncture that the French and British Commanders-in-Chief exchanged the letters published below:

TO GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG.

General Headquarters of French Armies.

September 17.

My Dear General,—I desire to convey to you my most sincere congratulations on the brilliant successes gained by the British troops under your command during the hard-fought battles of the 15th and 16th of September. Following on the continuous progress made by your Armies since the beginning of the Somme offensive, these fresh successes are a sure guarantee of final victory over our common enemy, whose physical and moral forces are already severely shaken.

Permit me, my dear General, to take this opportunity of saying that the combined offensive which we have carried on now for more than two months has, if it were possible, drawn still closer the ties which unite our two Armies; our adversary will find therein proof of our firm determination to combine our efforts until the end to ensure the complete triumph of our cause.

I bow before those of your soldiers by whose bravery these successes have been achieved but who have fallen before the completion of our task; and I ask you to convey, in my name and in the name of the whole French Army, to those who stand ready for the fights to come, a greeting of comradeship and confidence.

J. JOFFRE.

TO GENERAL JOFFRE.

General Headquarters, British Armies in France.

September 19.

My Dear General,—I thank you most sincerely for the kind message of congratulation and goodwill that you have addressed to me and to the troops under my command on their recent successes. This fresh expression of the good wishes of yourself and of your gallant Army, without whose close cooperation and support those successes could scarcely have been achieved, will be very warmly appreciated by all ranks of the British Armies.

I thank you, too, for your noble tribute to those who have fallen. Our brave dead, whose blood has been shed together on the soil of your great country, will prove a bond to unite our two peoples long after the combined action of our Armies has carried the common cause for which they have fought to its ultimate triumph.

The unremitting efforts of our forces north and south of the Somme, added to the glorious deeds of your Armies unaided at Verdun, have already begun to break

down the enemy's power of resistance; while the energy of our troops and their confidence in each other increases from day to day. Every fresh success that attends our arms brings us nearer to the final victory to which, like you, I look forward with absolute confidence.—Yours very truly,

D. HAIG, General,
Commanding-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

On September 18 another important advance was made. East of Ginchy and north-west of Combles we captured the important work known as the Quadrilateral, which gave us an important gain of ground and straightened our line. We also captured five heavy howitzers, two field guns, and lighter pieces.

While the British on the 15th were capturing Courcelette, Martinpuich and Flers, the French, who at nightfall on the 14th had carried enemy trenches just south of Rancourt and some hours later had repulsed attacks east of Clery, moved forward north of Priez Farm, threatening Combles from that region. South of the Somme also, at 4 p.m. in the sector Deniécourt-Berny they delivered two charges. To the east of Deniécourt a trench and small wood were wrested from the enemy; and north-east of Berny three German trenches were seized. Two hundred prisoners and 10 mitrailleuses remained in the hands of our Allies. The next day the troops of General Fayolle from Bouchavesnes struck northwards in the direction of the wood of St. Pierre Vaast, and reached a narrow depression south of the wood. Another trench north-east of Berny was carried the same day.

On the 17th, in the afternoon, a great battle was delivered south of the Somme between Barleux and Vermandovillers. Numerous trenches were carried south of Barleux. The enemy was cleared out of the last houses held by him in Berny, and his lines from Berny to Deniécourt were pierced. Deniécourt was completely surrounded, and the German entrenchments thence to Vermandovillers were stormed. Simultaneously the enemy was ejected from such portion of Vermandovillers as he had still managed to retain. Violent counter-attacks towards nightfall were repulsed with terrible punishment to the foe. When sun set the French had been everywhere successful and had captured 700 unwounded prisoners, among them 15 officers. The battle went on through the night, counter-attack succeeding counter-attack. Vainly the troops of the 10th Ersatz Division strove to retake the ground lost near Berny. On the 18th the French finally secured Deniécourt, and pushed on towards Ablaincourt. At nightfall they were before the hamlet of Bovent. They had also captured three little woods south-east of Deniécourt and a trench west of Horgny, a village east of Berny.

During the night of September 18-19 the British beat off several determined counter-attacks south of the Ancre, destroyed two gun

[French official photograph.

THE TRENCHES AT VERMANDOVILLERS: ARRIVAL OF FRENCH REINFORCEMENTS.
Photographed from an aeroplane.

emplacements, and exploded an ammunition store. South of Arras we cleared the enemy from 200 yards of trenches, and the French made further progress south of the Somme to the east of Berny, taking some prisoners. The next day, September 20, north-east of Béthune, in the neighbourhood of Richebourg l'Avoué, three raids resulted in the capture of prisoners and a machine-gun. A hostile balloon was brought down south-west of Arras. In the Somme area a German attack on the British trenches east of Martinpuich was easily repulsed. The next evening, south of the Ancre, in a torrential downpour, the New Zealanders were violently and continuously attacked, but at no point did the Germans penetrate their lines, and at daybreak the ground in front of their trenches was seen to be littered with the dead and dying. Many prisoners were captured in this and other regions.



GENERAL DUPORT,
Chief of the French General Staff.

On September 20 the main event was the determined effort of the Germans to drive back the French north of the Somme. The 18th Corps had been brought up from the Aisne and the 214th Division which was on its way to the Eastern Theatre of War, had been hastily recalled. It had arrived on the 14th. With these fresh troops, the Crown Prince of Bavaria, at 9 a.m., attacked General Fayolle's position between the Priez and l'Abbé farms, and east of Clery to the Somme. The 214th Division operated in the Bouchavesnes region. Preceded by violent bombardments, mass after mass of the enemy were precipitated against Bouchavesnes and the French trenches north and south of it. Four waves of grey-green infantry were cut down by the French guns before Priez Farm. The survivors fled, leaving the ground covered with corpses. But at 3 p.m. the Germans after a succession of bloody checks burst into the north-east end of Bouchavesnes. It was only a momentary triumph, for the French rallied and drove them out at the point of the bayonet. Few of them escaped and several officers and men were captured. The 75- and 120-mm. guns and the mitrailleuses had here, and at Priez Farm, caused frightful losses. At ridge 76, which is crossed by the road from Clery to Haut Allaines, regiments of the 18th Corps were kept at bay by the barrages of shell and shrapnel fire, but, nearer the Somme, parties of Germans succeeded in entering some trenches. They were swiftly ejected by counter-attacks. At nightfall the desperate contest died down. Prisoners stated that one company alone in the 11th Bavarian Division lost 110 men out of 210, that two battalions of the 123rd Prussian Regiment had been almost wiped out and that the 12th Reserve Division had suffered terribly. "I cannot understand," said a French artillery officer present, "how, after so many disastrous experiences, the German Higher Commanders can order attacks to be carried out in massed formation. The road from Combles to Rancourt is covered with dead Germans, sacrificed to no purpose." General Fayolle was able to report the victory to the new Chief of the French General Staff, at the Ministry of War, General Duport, who took the place the next day of General Graziani, whose health had broken down. Since the first months of the war the latter had filled this onerous post attached to the French War Office. It must not be confused with that occupied by General de Castelnau, who still continued to direct the movements of the armies at the front. Duport, a colonel in August 1914, was an infantry officer. He had been educated at the Military College of St. Cyr, and had fought on the Algerian frontier between 1885 and 1888. Promoted General of Brigade in

June, 1915, he had been since August 31, 1916, Commander of the 14th Corps d'Armée. Like so many other officers almost unknown at the beginning of the war, he had forced his way up by the exercise of conspicuous abilities.

So bloody had been the repulse of the German 18th Corps and 214th Division, that the next day, Thursday, September 21, Prince Rupprecht made no further attempt to pierce the lines of General Fayolle north of the Somme.

On the British front in the neighbourhood of Flers, bombing parties vainly endeavoured to wrest from us the positions taken in the battle of the 15th–16th. The night before, in vile weather, there had been encounters on the edge of Courcelette and north of Martinpuich. A hostile kite-balloon fell to the ground in flames, but, as against this, we had to record the loss of an aeroplane.

During the night of the 21st–22nd, while our troops were raiding enemy trenches south of Arras and north of that point, seizing a crater in the Neuville St. Vaast region caused by the explosion of one of our mines, an advance was also made by the British between Martinpuich and Flers. Up to the 21st our line sagged eastward from Courcelette round the northern end of Martinpuich and hugged the eastern face of the village. Thence it zigzagged towards Flers. It was now decided that the mill of Martinpuich, 500 yards north of the village, must mark the alignment of our front from Courcelette cemetery to Flers, and that a redoubt between the mill and the Albert-Bapaume road must be carried, and the German salients in our position flattened out. After desperate fighting two lines of hostile trenches were carried, and 24 hours later the redoubt was stormed. On the 23rd a strongly fortified system of trenches east of Courcelette was captured and we advanced on a front of about half a mile. The day before (September 22) at nightfall a violent German attack west of Mouquet Farm had been driven back by our fire with heavy losses. In the course of the 22nd our guns had destroyed 10 hostile gun-pits and damaged 10 others, while five ammunition dumps were blown up. A squadron of 50 aeroplanes the same day bombed an important railway junction. Two trains loaded with ammunition were smashed and many violent explosions caused. Railway works and sidings elsewhere and aerodromes and other points of military importance also received attention. As a consequence of aerial duels, three enemy machines were destroyed, five damaged severely and others driven to earth. Our loss was five machines.

Meantime, on September 22, the French had pushed a little nearer to the doomed village-fortress of Combles. On the northern slopes of

FRENCH RED-CROSS MEN WAITING IN A TRENCH OUTSIDE COMBLES

the hillock beyond the wood of Anderlu, towards the road from Maurepas to Frégicourt, the enemy had converted into a small fortress an isolated house in front of Combles and close to the road. The machine-guns in it held up the French advance. After an attack very ably executed the house was surrounded and carried by assault. Ninety-seven men and three officers were captured. Simultaneously between Frégicourt and Priez Farm the French stormed German trenches on the east slope of the Combles ravine. The enemy's endeavours to hinder the French movements in this direction by renewed counter-attacks between Priez Farm and Rancourt were repulsed by curtains of shell fire.

By this date the total of the prisoners captured by the Allies in the Battle of the Somme had swelled to over 55,800, of which 34,050 had been taken by the French.

Preparations were now being made by the Allies to fight another battle similar to that of September 15–16. It was preceded by aerial enterprises on a large scale and by bombardments of almost incredible intensity. The French wrecked 25 enemy machines on September 23, we seven. The same day five bombing raids against railway stations on the German lines of communication were successfully executed by the British. In the course of an air fight one of our airmen collided with his opponent. The German plane fell to the ground, while ours, after a vertical descent of several thousand feet, was righted and returned safely, the pilot flying over 30 miles with an almost uncontrollable machine. Our losses on the 23rd were five machines.

Among other noteworthy incidents at this date, the celebrated French airman Guynemer brought down his seventeenth and eighteenth hostile machines, and on the 24th Captain de Beauchamps in the "Ariel" and Lieutenant Daucourt executed one of the most daring flights on record. For the first time Essen, the great military manufactory of Germany, was bombed in broad daylight. The workshops of Krupp were defended by no fewer than 250 anti-aircraft guns, and numerous German aeroplanes were naturally on the watch to intercept raiders. Nevertheless, the intrepid Frenchmen succeeded in dropping twelve bombs on Essen and in returning safely to their base. Captain de Beauchamps, who was not 29 years old, had for many months been commanding the squadron "des As" stationed on the eastern front of the French lines. He had had under him Guynemer and other distinguished pilots,

[*Official photograph.*

BRITISH FIELD BATTERY CROSSING A FORD.

including Daucourt. Of his then recent exploits the destruction of a Fokker on April 7 and of a Drache on May 22, 1916, had caused him once more to be cited in an Order of the Day.

The night before the visit of De Beauchamps and Daucourt to Essen a fleet of Zeppelins, probably 12, had crossed to England. Two were destroyed in Essex, while they did no material injury to us.*

As for the Allied bombardments north and south of the Somme which had commenced on the 23rd, a French artillery officer remarked: "A terrible drama is being enacted on the Somme. I have been through the whole of the Verdun battle and I have been two months here, but I have not seen anything like the havoc wrought by the Allied artillery yesterday. It surpasses anything I have witnessed."

It speaks for the stubborn courage of the Germans that on Sunday, September 24, while their trenches were being inundated with high-explosive shells, they took the offensive at several points. A British post east of Courcelette was assaulted; three attacks were delivered west of Lesbœufs against our men and the French garrison of the Abbé Farm, and troops in trenches south of it had to withstand a violent assault. These efforts on the part of the enemy were all unavailing.

Monday, September 25, was the anniversary of the Battle of Loos, which now seemed as remote an event as the Battles of Le Cateau, the Marne, and Ypres. It was a beautiful, clear autumnal day. Not a cloud was in the sky; a golden haze rose from the fields and crept over the ruined villages and the litter of what once were woods. Anticipating from the frightful violence of the bombardment that the Allies were about to renew their general offensive between Thiepval and the Somme, the Germans dispatched in the early morning two flocks of aeroplanes to reconnoitre. They were peppered with shrapnel, met in mid-air by our aeroplanes, and driven back followed by our pursuing airmen, who, with the observers in the "Ruperts" (kite balloons), directed the fire of our artillery. The balloons, iridescent in the sun-light, seemed like aerial monsters decked with glittering trappings for some State occasion.

The plan of General Fayolle and Sir Douglas Haig was to break farther into the lines of the enemy between the Albert-Bapaume road and the Somme. Should success attend their efforts, Sir Hubert Gough was the next day to storm Thiepval and the ridge behind it. The whole night-long guns of all calibres had been firing incessantly.

At 12.30 p.m. the final bombardment before the infantry attack opened. The din was indescribable. Perhaps four times as many guns

LIEUT. GUYNEMER.

as had been in action along the whole front of the great Battle of Liao-Yang in the Russo-Japanese War were concentrating their fire on a belt of ground only about 14 miles in length. Most of those guns were immensely more powerful than any employed by Oyama or Kuropatkin, and the front of battle was very much shorter. At the end of 10 minutes the deafening noise slightly diminished. The infantry combat had begun.

At the Battle of Loos-Vimy the efforts of the Allies had not been properly co-ordinated, the French attacking several hours after the British. No such mistake was made on this occasion. The tension was applied simultaneously to every link in the German chain of fortified positions. Several systems of trenches between the Bapaume-Péronne chaussée and the Canal du Nord were carried by the French, who arrived in places at the banks of the canal. East of the road the French captured Hill 130, south-east of Bouchavesnes, and Hill 120 to the north-east of that village. Gradually the

* See Vol. X., p. 192.

FRENCH SOLDIERS ENTRENCHED IN A SHELL-HOLE OUTSIDE COMBLES.

Germans were being thrust back into the valley of the Tortille. Still more important, Rancourt, due east of Combles, was taken. Situated on the southern side of a bare narrow plateau, one of the highest points in the neighbourhood, it dominated the great wood of St. Pierre Vaast, the edge of which ran about 500 yards to its east. Part of Rancourt was traversed by the Bapaume-Péronne highway; the remainder of the village was clustered about a road through Frégicourt to Combles. From the centre of Rancourt a narrow ravine descended to the wood, in the hollows of which the Germans had installed batteries bombarding the French lines from the Priez Farm to Bouchavesnes. This ravine bristled with machine-guns. With the capture of Rancourt, which formed, as it were, the main link between the wood and Combles, the fall of Combles could not long be delayed. The only communication now connecting it with the rest of the German lines was the road which ran upwards through Frégicourt across the Bapaume-Péronne highway to Sailly-Saillisel. As will shortly be related, the last of the other roads by which the garrison of Combles could be supplied with food and munitions had been cut by the British when they stormed Morval.

Frégicourt, a hamlet of 10 houses with a chapel in it, still remained to be taken. On the 24th our Allies pushed up to the southern side of it, and evicted the Germans from their powerful organizations between Frégicourt and Hill 148, which is on the northern edge of Rancourt. Thus the connexion of Combles with Sailly-Saillisel was snapped and, as the British were by now in Morval, there was no longer any road by which the garrison of Combles could be reinforced. The enemy's sole access to the village was by a narrow ravine twisting north-eastwards to Sailly-Saillisel and the Bapaume-Péronne highway. This ravine was under the fire of the Allied artillery, machine-guns and rifles.

During the night the French continued their advance on Combles, from which the Germans were dragging some of their guns up the ravine, down whose centre ran a little stream. While four French aeroplanes armed with guns fired 82 shells on the convoys and enemy's organizations in front of Sailly-Saillisel and in the wood of St. Pierre Vaast, the infantry of our Allies stormed Frégicourt. Patrols descended the slopes towards the Combles ravine and reached and seized the cemetery of this town, situated at the point where the route from Sailly-Saillisel reaches the western mouth of the ravine. Other Allied detachments

moved up to the southern edge of Combles. One of them captured a trench at the south-west end and in it a company of Germans. The unwounded prisoners taken already amounted to 800. Violent counter-attacks delivered at nightfall against the French right between the Bapaume-Péronne highway and the Somme, with a view to forcing the French to suspend their movement on Combles, had been bloodily repulsed.

It is now time to describe the operations on the 25th of Sir Henry Rawlinson's army, which prolonged the Allied line from the wood of Leuze above Combles on the west to Martinpuich. Among Sir Henry Rawlinson's objectives were the villages of Morval—which, as we have seen, was on one of the roads used by the Germans to supply Combles—of Lesboeufs to the north-north-west of Morval on the Ginchy-Le Transloy road, and of Gueudecourt farther down the slope on the way to Bapaume. A belt of country about 1,000 yards deep curving round the north of Flers, which is south-west of Gueudecourt, to a point mid-way between Flers and Martinpuich, was also to be cleared of the enemy. The battle-front was six miles long.

Morval, it will be recollected, stands on the height north of Combles, which lies below it at the bottom of the valley. With its subterranean quarries, trenches and wire entanglements, it was a formidable obstacle. The Germans still held part of the wood of Bouleaux, north of the wood of Leuze. Their machine guns lined two trenches, "Lemco" and "Bovril," south-west of Morval, and two sunken roads leading from the village to Lesbœufs. After the tremendous bombardment already described the British infantry, at 12.30 p.m. on the 25th, advanced to the attack. The enemy expected that the wood of Bouleaux would be assaulted, but our efforts at this point were confined to seizing two trenches west of it. Nearly at right angles to these was an embankment pitted with deep dug-outs, held by a large force equipped with machine-guns and *minenwerfer*. Here the

[*Official photograph.*

GERMAN GUN EMPLACEMENT AT COMBLES.

SHATTERED GERMAN WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS AT COMBLES.

THE MAIN STREET OF COMBLES.

fighting went on half way through the afternoon. Finally the dug-outs were cleared, and 80 prisoners and five *minenwerfer* captured, together with a great store of shells. After dark patrols entered Bouleaux Wood, which was being evacuated by the Germans owing to the result of the struggle in Morval.

Meanwhile, north-east of the wood our troops simultaneously advanced on both sides of the Ginchy-Morval road. The northern sector of Morval gave little trouble. At the approach of our bombers the garrison surrendered. In the southern sector there was more resistance. The Germans manfully defended the "Lemco" and "Bovril" trenches and a trench cut from the eastern end of the village in a quarter circle to the road to Frégicourt. As the British were north and the French in the Frégicourt region south of them the position of these brave men was untenable and they began to dribble off in the direction of Sailly-Saillisel.

The British troops to the left of the detachments assaulting Morval were equally successful. Exposed to severe machine-gun fire they seized the road from Morval to Lesbœufs and stormed into the latter village.* Some of the men swept up the road to Le Transloy, others encircled the village, from the ruined chateau in which machine-guns for a time continued their fire. Between Lesbœufs and Gueudecourt eight German battalions attempted to stem the British advance but were quite unable to do so. "My men," said a Baden officer, "would not stand. I could not make them fight; they had had enough."

The attack on Gueudecourt did not yield such good results. At the point where the Ginchy-Gueudecourt and Flers-Lesbœufs tracks cross one another a German redoubt barred the way. In the neighbouring shell-craters groups of Germans with machine-guns assisted its garrison.

Before the village on the west and southern sides there were two trenches strongly fortified and protected with barbed wire. They were known as Grid Trench and Grid Support. The Ginchy-Gueudecourt road crossed them just below the village in a deep ravine, which at this point forked, one branch passing up the western, the other up the eastern, side of Gueudecourt. Across both branches of the ravine went the road from Le Transloy to Eaucourt l'Abbaye. In Gueudecourt itself were machine-gun posts and numbers of defended shell-holes and hidden strongholds.

Advancing from the line held by them east of Flers our men closed on Gueudecourt. The German artillery in the background deluged them with shells, and the redoubt at the cross-roads swept the advancing infantry with machine-gun fire. From a redoubt at the junction of Grid Trench with another trench a hail of bullets proceeded. This redoubt was eventually carried by a bombing party, but at

* A captured German Army Order, dated September 21, emphasized the importance at that time of the position at Lesbœufs as "the last protection of the artillery, which must in no circumstances be lost."

nightfall we had not succeeded in storming Gueudecourt. West of this place Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops secured the fortified belt already referred to between Flers and Martinpuich. Apart from the failure to capture Gueudecourt, victory had everywhere attended the efforts of the Allies. Slowly but surely they were passing from the basin of the Somme into that of the Scheldt.

During the night of the 25th–26th the struggle went on. The sky was lit up from below by white flares, throwing a vivid light over parts of the battlefield and showing the rims of the shell-craters snowy white. Combles, a dark spot in the middle of the semi-circle of fiery explosions caused by the Allied artillery, seemed deserted.

While the French stormed Frégicourt and descended into the cemetery and the eastern houses of the ruined town and reached those to the south, our troops picked their way down from the wood of Leuze and through the abandoned wood of Bouleaux. At 3.15 a.m. on the 26th a strong patrol with machine-guns



"CEUX SONT LES ANGLAIS!"
The meeting of British and French in the village of Combles, September 26, 1916.

reached the railway which ran from the Somme up the valley and ended in Combles. Through the gloom they saw figures approaching them. One of these drew near and reconnoitred.

"Ceux sont les Anglais!" he cried. The Allies had joined hands in Combles.

This town, which before the war had contained 3,000 inhabitants, had been, as it were, an arsenal for the Germans at the Battle of the Somme. Most of the stores had been previously removed, but more than 1,800 rifles, four *flammenwerfer*, and thousands of rounds of artillery ammunition and of grenades were taken by the British alone. Fighting continued in the ruins and the caves under the village, but the whole town was soon entirely cleared of living Germans. The dead lying in heaps bore witness to the terrible effects of the fire of the Allied guns.

Besides taking their share in the capture of Combles, the French in the afternoon of the 26th seized a small wood north of Frégicourt half-way to Morval, and also the greater part of the enemy's fortifications from this wood to the western border of the wood of St. Pierre Vaast.

With the seizure of Morval and Lesbœufs, almost the whole of the high ground between the Albert-Bapaume and Péronne-Bapaume roads came finally into the possession of the Allies. The Germans in the apex of the triangle Albert-Bapaume-Péronne were everywhere under the observation of the British posted on the captured heights. But on the Péronne-Bapaume road the enemy was still entrenched on Hill 148, just north of Rancourt, and on Hill 153, east of Morval. These hills were parts of a winding ridge, cruciform in shape, on which Sailly-Saillisel and Saillisel, practically one village, were built. The road to Bapaume crossed the ridge and went through Sailly. It then descended to Le Transloy, rose again at Beaulencourt, and thence descended to Bapaume. The villages of Morval and Lesbœufs were on the eastern slopes of Hill 154, north of Ginchy, and were separated from Sailly-Sallisel by the ravine up which most of the garrison and guns in Combles had been withdrawn.

RUINS OF COMBLES CHURCH.



In the early hours of Tuesday, September 26, the advance on Gueudecourt was resumed. A Tank had been brought up in support of the infantry. It was especially useful at the point where Grid Trench and Grid Support crossed the Ginchy road in the ravine, and in reducing a strong post at the south-east end of the village. When this fell Gueudecourt was



COMBLES, AS THE ALLIED ARMIES FOUND IT.

[By permission, from the official Ancre film.

CHEERING A "TANK."

speedily entered, and 650 prisoners were taken. While our men were rounding them up the Tank proceeded into the open country, and, something going wrong with its machinery, it was surrounded by the Germans, who peppered it with bombs, shot at every chink in it, even climbed on its roof, and hammered at it with the butts of their rifles, the crew meantime being engaged inside in repairing the Tank and shooting down its assailants, who made no impression on it. Possibly the Tank might have been captured had not its plight been perceived by our infantry who, issuing from Gueudecourt, rescued it. Some 250 to 300 dead Germans lay around the Tank, evidences of its effective fire.

Cavalry patrols pushed beyond the village. Our line from Morval to Gueudecourt now ran parallel with the Bapaume-Péronne road.

In the afternoon the Germans debouching from Le Transloy flung themselves on our trenches between Gueudecourt and Lesbœufs. Checked by shell and rifle fire they were charged with the bayonet and flung back in utter confusion. Another counter-attack was directed on the eastern corner of Courcelette from the warren of German trenches between the sunken Courcelette-Le Sars road and the Albert-Bapaume highway. It was temporarily successful, the enemy penetrating the outskirts of the village. The British troops rallied, and bayoneted and bombed the intruders, and, following in pursuit, began to clear out the Germans from their dug-outs.

Between the British and the Péronne-Bapaume road still lay the large village of Le Transloy, from which the counter-attack already narrated had issued. To reach Le Transloy and the highway our troops would have to move down bare slopes and then into and up the western face of the ravine under the fire of the enemy on the Sailly-Saillisel ridge. Nevertheless, with the Allies also in Combles and the French in Rancourt, the German hold on the road north of Rancourt, on the wood of St. Pierre Vaast and on Sailly-Saillisel was becoming every hour more precarious.

To take Bapaume, the capture of which would have a psychological, as well as a strategical, effect on the war, it was not, however, necessary to move from the heights down the highway. At Gueudecourt we were but three miles from the edge of this important town. In the night of the 26th–27th, Sir Henry Rawlinson pushed his troops from Flers on Eaucourt l'Abbaye, on the road from Gueudecourt to Le Sars, through which village runs the Albert-Bapaume highway, and during the 27th we carried trenches north of Flers on a front of 2,000 yards, and gained a foothold to the east of Eaucourt l'Abbaye. Our lines



TRENCH MORTARS FOUND IN COMBLES VILLAGE.

in the apex of the triangle Albert-Bapaume-Péronne now resembled a wedge pointed towards Bapaume.

By nightfall on September 25, the results of the offensive conducted by Generals Fayolle and Rawlinson had been so great and the resulting position of our forces so favourable, that Sir Douglas Haig decided that the moment had now arrived for Sir Hubert Gough to push on northward in the direction of the Ancre, and drive the enemy out of Thiepval and off the main ridge behind that village. As the ridge commanded the valley of the Ancre it had been fortified with peculiar care by the Germans, some of whom were still on the edge of Mouquet Farm. In Thiepval, the 180th Regiment, composed of Wurtembergers, had been placed as early as September 1914, when the race for the sea was beginning. An apple orchard before the village formed an advanced work. At the southern end of the ruins was a great pile of red bricks and raw earth—all that remained of a château occupied by a German tenant before the war. It is significant that, according to report, its large cellars had been made before the opening of hostilities. These cellars were the central point of a vast labyrinth of tunnels. All served for shelters and storehouses. A sunken road, with passages to dug-outs along its course, ran northward from the middle of Thiepval towards the cemetery, which as usual was a fortress in itself. On the bare ridge behind and to the north of it, at a thousand yards distance, was the Schwaben Redoubt, an irregular oval measuring nearly 700 yards long by 300 wide, built in the fork of the roads leading from Thiepval to St. Pierre Divion and Grandcourt, both villages on the Ancre. A thousand yards east of it, and connected with the Schwaben Redoubt by the Hessian Trench, was the Stuff—or Stufen—Redoubt, garrisoned by the 153rd German regiment. These fortifications were furnished with innumerable underground shelters. From the western end of the Schwaben Redoubt a maze of trenches descended steeply to the ruins of St. Pierre Divion. Well-timbered alleys connected the Schwaben and Stuff Redoubts with the village of Grandcourt in the valley below, and a couple of hundred yards north of the Stuff Redoubt was another redoubt called "The Mound." The whole face of the ridge down to the Ancre had been hollowed out by the Germans during their two years' occupation. The size of the caves constructed by them may be gathered from the fact that one used as a dressing station and hospital contained 125 beds.

From the vicinity of the Stuff Redoubt a trench called "The Regina" ran eastwards, parallel with the Albert-Bapaume chaussée to the road which proceeds northwards out of Le Sars to Pys and Miraumont, the village next to Grandcourt going up the Ancre. Between Thiepval and Courcelette, lower down the up-slope of the ridge and to the north of Mouquet Farm, which, as previously mentioned, was not completely cleared of the enemy, was the Zollern Redoubt.

It may be imagined how formidable were the barriers from the Zollern Redoubt and Thiepval upwards still barring our way to the valley of the Ancre, from St. Pierre Divion eastwards. The whole of the works were heavily wired, and the lines of approach to this position were swept by the fire of German batteries from the high ground north of the Ancre.

When, on July 1, the Ulster troops had, in spite of their great gallantry, vainly assaulted its western face, the enemy was brimming over with confidence in his own courage and skill and in the supremacy of German military engineering. He had not yet seen villages as elaborately fortified as Thiepval wrested one by one from his grasp. By September 26, judging from letters found on soldiers of the German 180th and 153rd Regiments, the nerves of many of the men hidden in the dug-outs on the Thiepval ridge were shaken. "We must reckon," wrote a soldier of the 180th Regiment on the morning of Sir Hubert Gough's offensive, "with

FIRING THE BOMB.

the possibility of an attack at any moment, and we are in a tight corner. The British now have aerial torpedoes, which have a frightful effect."*

* Large trench bombs, or possibly Stokes bombs.

Another soldier of the 180th Regiment put his ideas on paper (apparently a little later on the same day):—

We relieved a machine-gun crew who had the only entrance to their dug-out knocked in by a shell after a

HEAVY FRENCH TRENCH BOMB.

gas bomb had fallen in it. You cannot imagine what misery this is. Our company commander was gassed, and is now in hospital. The bombardment has begun again at a rate to make a man dizzy. I think we shall soon have either to get out or be taken by the British.

Men of the 153rd Regiment, which was holding the Stuff and Zollern Redoubts and the outskirts of Mouquet Farm, were equally despondent. Four days before—on September 22—one of them wrote:—

In case of attack we are not in a position to defend ourselves, much less to attack—the rifles have been dragged through the mud and are useless. All we have are bayonets and hand grenades, but I think if the

"Tommies" came over no one would put up a fight; the men would gladly go over to them.

And on September 25, when Sir Henry Rawlinson and General Fayolle were making their great push and Sir Hubert Gough was preparing his, the following was penned by another man of the same regiment:—

We are about an hour from the trenches, 36 of us in a dug-out. It is not surprising to hear that men are missing, for they are torn to pieces; many are buried and never get out again. It would be better if German women and girls could be here, for the war would soon be over then.

It was from the South, from the Wunderwerk to Mouquet Farm, that Sir Hubert Gough, on the morning of the 26th, delivered his attack. The capture of Courcelette, east of the Zollern redoubt, had appreciably lightened his task. After a very severe bombardment our troops, following behind the ever-advancing barrage and accompanied by Tanks, came over the parapets of their trenches at 12.30 p.m. The right wing, passing by the few Germans still hidden beneath the outbuildings of Mouquet Farm, whose influence by this time was of but little moment, made for the Zollern Redoubt in three successive waves. As they charged forward they were unexpectedly attacked in the rear by enemy machine-guns which had been suddenly hoisted to the surface at some outbuilding of the farm. A working party of pioneers who happened to be near dropped their tools, and headed by a young officer and followed by other units, rushed for the gun emplacement and forced a way into the dug-outs. For six hours a desperate struggle went on in the tunnels and chambers below the farm, which stopped all attention of the garrison to outside matters. Finally our men emerged with 56 German privates and an officer taken prisoners. Meanwhile the Zollern Redoubt had been stormed and prepared for defence by our men.

In Thiepval itself the struggle was of the fiercest. From the apple orchard machine-guns played on the advancing infantry, while streams of bullets proceeded from the château, the sunken road and the cemetery. Passing round the eastern side of the village our bombers got between it and the cemetery and then turned back and entered Thiepval from the northern end. Slowly the surface of the ruins was conquered, but no impression could be made on the château. Suddenly, amid wild cheering from our men, a Tank hove in sight, its guns

WITHIN A HUNDRED YARDS OF THIEPVAL.

BRITISH ADVANCE TO ATTACK.

firing their hardest. A hail of shot pattered ineffectually on its sides ; bombs burst on them but did not penetrate. Nothing could stop its onward movement. It charged the mound of red-brick and earth ; and the garrison of the isolated château despairingly surrendered. Another Tank which had rendered good service reached an obstacle over which it could not climb. It halted and became for the nonce a stationary fort.

The Wurtembergers driven from the surface took refuge in their tunnels and caverns, and for hours the fight went on with bomb, knife and bayonet. Loud cries mingled with the sound of the exploding bombs gave testimony to the deadly nature of the struggle. Night fell but brought no cessation of the contest. By the light of electric torches our men hunted the enemy from one lair into another, and it was not till 8.30 a.m. on Wednesday the 28th that Thiepval was finally in our hands. The Germans had believed that it was impregnable. It had been defended, not by raw levies, but by some of those troops who in August, 1914, had swept victoriously through Belgium and who had had many months in which to prepare their strongholds without much interruption by fighting.

The cemetery of Thiepval, the Schwaben Redoubt, and the Stuff Redoubt, with the trenches binding them together, had still to be carried before the summit of the Thiepval salient would be securely held. From this chain of fortified works the enemy descended again and again into the ruins of the village, each time being beaten back with heavy loss. On the 27th we resumed the offensive. The south and west sides of the Stuff Redoubt were carried, together with the trench connecting it with the Schwaben Redoubt. During the afternoon the latter was assaulted and, in spite of desperate resistance, the southern face of it was captured and our patrols pushed to the northern face and towards St. Pierre Divion. The next day (September 28) our guns concentrated on the cemetery of Thiepval, the Schwaben Redoubt, and the neighbouring work known as the Crucifix. A *Times* correspondent who was present gave a graphic description of the barrage of gun-fire and the subsequent assault :—

Beyond the little company of ragged trees and mottled patch of ground which are all that there is of Thiepval we saw the region of the Cemetery—marked by another small company of tattered tree-stumps—and all the rise beyond where the Crucifix was and the Redoubt lay, disappear in an instant behind the dreadful veil. The barrage lifted for a moment, and we knew that the infantry were going into that hell of smoke and fire and death. We saw the cloud spread northward as our guns increased their range to positions beyond, and, as the wind drifted the smoke away, the region on which our storm had first broken came out peacefully into the sunlight again. Our men had gone beyond it.

Presently on that same region the enemy's shells began falling—sure sign that it was our ground now and not his—and still the tide of battle moved on. Ever northward the curtain of our bursting shells passed steadily, until it engulfed only the farther side of the Redoubt and down to the German first line on the Ancre ; and there it hung. Between it and us the enemy's shells dropped in increasing numbers, on Thiepval, on the ground which our men



THE CAVALRY LINES ON THE SOMME, SEPTEMBER, 1916. [*Official photograph.*

had just swept over, and at large over the middle distance and the foreground of the picture. But always the centre of the fight hung at the farther side, where the last slope from the high ground of the ridge goes down to the valley.

Well into the afternoon we watched, and then went to meet the wounded, to seek prisoners, to find anyone who could tell us of what was happening behind the pall. But I still know nothing definite beyond what we saw ourselves. We broke through the position at the Cemetery and stormed into the Redoubt. Fighting there appears to be still going on. All the ground from here down to the valley is a maze of trenches, the German front line which he has held for two years and all the support lines and communication trenches and strong points with which in that time he has supplied himself. Among these trenches and along the front line the struggle still rages, and British soldiers are finishing the task, half done yesterday, which Germany for two years has believed that no troops could ever do. Whether they have yet succeeded or not, and whether this last corner of the ridge is ours, we shall know to-night.

When the sun set the ruins of the cemetery were in the possession of the British, and we had also penetrated into the Schwaben Redoubt.

By the 28th the prisoners captured by the British in the fortnight's fighting amounted to 10,000. Sir Hubert Gough and Sir Henry Rawlinson had reached most of their objectives. Almost the whole of the summit of the ridge from above Thiepval to Morval and beyond were in the possession of the British. We looked down on the valley of the Ancre from the south side, we were within three miles of Bapaume, and, in places, but two miles from the Bapaume-Péronne highway, a section of which from Rancourt southwards to beyond Bouchavesnes had been secured by our Allies.

On the evening of September 27, it having been discovered that in the neighbourhood of Courcelette we had broken through the last line of the German entrenched positions, some Canadian cavalry were promptly dispatched to Pys, a hamlet between the Ancre and Le Sars, the last village fortress blocking the approach to Bapaume by the Albert-Bapaume road. Two lieutenants and 24 troopers proceeded straight up the road itself. The next morning two patrols located Germans in Destremont Farm, which was a mile beyond our trenches and 300 yards south-west of Le Sars, on the Albert-Bapaume road. There was a skirmish, in which one Canadian was killed and a second wounded. Another patrol discovered enemy units between Le Sars and Pys, and still another threaded its way across the Regina trench, which ran north-west of Courcelette and parallel to the Bapaume road nearly as far as Le Sars, but was driven back by snipers. As a consequence of the reports furnished by the Canadian cavalry, a Toronto battalion on Thursday, September 28, advanced a thousand yards to the north-east of Courcelette, while a New Brunswick battalion estab-

[Canadian official photograph.

CANADIANS ADVANCING WITH PICKS AND SHOVELS READY TO DIG THEMSELVES IN.

lished itself close to the south of the Regina trench. A Montreal battalion also took part in these operations, the machine-guns of a Brigade protecting its flank. German details counter-attacking were wiped out by the fire of the latter. The Borden Battery assisted. Three of its guns were hit, and some casualties incurred.

While the Canadians at the point of junction between the armies of Sir Hubert Gough and Sir Henry Rawlinson were wedging themselves in north of the Albert-Bapaume road, the Germans to the west of Courcelette clung desperately to the northern edge of the Thiepval salient. On the 28th, when the fine weather broke up and rain began to fall we had, as already described, captured the Thiepval cemetery, and broken into the southern face of the Schwaben Redoubt. During the night of the 28th-29th the Germans shelled heavily the lost positions, and our bombers were at work on the remainder of the redoubt and in the Hessian trench, which connected it with the captured Stuff Redoubt.

The next day, Friday, September 29, rain fell in torrents, but the fighting still went on at these points. A counter-attack drove us from a section of the Hessian trench, but later in the day this was recovered. A single company in the morning had stormed Destremont Farm, which formed an advanced post to Le Sars. Four miles away to the east Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops had occupied 500 yards of enemy trenches in the direction of the Bapaumé-Péronne road, while between Morval and Frégicourt our Allies were approaching that chaussée. Morval had been handed over to the French in order to facilitate their advance on Sailly-Saillisel.

The activity exhibited by the Allied artillery was maintained on Saturday, September 30. The German guns replied to the best of their ability during the night of September 29-30, heavily shelling our battle-front south of the Ancre. It was the prelude to violent counter-attacks in the vicinity of the Stuff Redoubt and the Hessian trench. The last of them was delivered at 5 a.m. on September 30. At noon we again advanced and gained the whole of the trench with the exception of a small section which was attached to the sunken road to Grandcourt on the Ancre. This road had been entrenched and enemy reinforcements were constantly ascending it from Grandcourt

LOADING UP LIMBERS WITH AMMUNITION.

[Official photograph.

HOWITZER IN ACTION ON THE ANCRE.

to aid the Germans in the Schwaben Redoubt, Hessian trench and Regina trench previously referred to. On the French front progress had been made north of Rancourt by grenade fighting.

Up to this date the gains of the British since September 14 had been as follows: *

The number of prisoners captured had swollen to 26,735. We had secured 27 enemy guns, 40 trench mortars and over 200 mitrailleuses. Of the 38 German Divisions—which at full strength would have numbered about 450,000 infantry—no less than 29 had had to be withdrawn in an exhausted or broken state. The half-moon of upland ground south of the Ancre with every height of importance had been carried; we had now direct observation to the east and north-east; and the enemy had been driven back upon his fourth line behind the low ridge just west of the Bapaume-Péronne road between Bapaume and Le Transloy.

The importance of the three months' offensive was, however, not to be judged solely by the distance advanced, but had to be gauged by the effect upon the German numbers, material and moral. Hindenburg had been obliged since September 15 to reinforce the Crown Prince of Bavaria with twelve new divisions or roughly 100,000 infantry, of which seven divisions had been launched against the troops of our New Army. The enemy had used up his reserves in repeated costly and unsuccessful counter-attacks without causing the Allies to relax their steady and methodical pressure. Shelled, bombed and bayoneted from villages, woods and trenches which their engineers had fondly believed they had rendered impregnable, the Germans were at last beginning to doubt the gain of any decided victory. Some extracts from letters or diaries found on prisoners at this time will show their feelings. One unfortunate wrote:—

> We are actually fighting on the Somme against the English. You can no longer call it war, it is mere murder. . . . The slaughter at Ypres and the battle in the gravel pit at Hulluch were the purest child's play compared with this massacre, and that is much too mild a description.
>
> We are here now on the Somme in such an artillery fire as I have not experienced—indeed, no one has in the whole war. Cover there is none; we lie in a shell-hole and defend ourselves to the last man. He who comes out of this fire can thank God. It's frightful; such a murder here.
>
> I have not been through anything like it in the whole war. It may well be called sheer hell. It is unendurable.

Another in hospital said: "We are already sick of the damned war. . . . My feeling about it is such that if I am to go back I shall serve for three weeks and then get ill again, for there is no object in fighting any more." Here is a picture of the conditions under which some of

* See further Official Summary of October 3, published in *The Times* of October 5.

SOME OF THE PRISONERS.

the garrisons of the subterranean fortresses were living:—

The gallery in which we now are is tolerably well constructed. . . . In it are also a machine gun and its crew of four men, two sentries, one wounded, two men with carrier pigeons, two men who have lost their way—altogether 29 men. The gallery is full from top to bottom. There are two men sitting on every other step of the stairs. The air is fearfully bad and hot, as there is no proper ventilation. . . . We have to live here for four days. Several of us were ill, and fresh air was not to be had. We dare not stick our heads outside the entrance, for enemy airmen are continually on the watch, and the artillery sweeps the entrances with shrapnel.*

Most of the prisoners complained of the superiority of the Allied airmen.

There are no trenches in the front-line position. The men lie to a large extent in shell-holes. The enemy aviators descend to a height of about 80 metres and fire on them with machine-guns and signal with horns. The enemy's aviators are far superior, especially in numbers. Our airmen are powerless and are put to flight as soon as the enemy machines approach our trench lines.

Occasionally a German relieved his mind with hysterical and comic abuse:—

We will not spare our insolent, villainous enemy, but destroy everything that comes into our hands, for the cowardly blackguards see that they cannot do anything with us in the trenches, and so now their aircraft have to fly to our towns and there destroy our poor innocent women and girls—a very shameful proceeding on the part of the cowardly blackguards, and one which will stand to their credit later on. But, thank God, we can say that we have not led our Fatherland against poor women and children, but with an iron fist have raised our weapons in the fight against the venomous hosts of our enemy and have nobly and justly defended our Fatherland, and so that we hope a victorious and lasting peace may ensue.

* *Manchester Guardian.*

No doubt the slaughter of unoffending British citizens on land by Zeppelins or on sea by submarines was, in this egregious person's eyes, commendable. But he howls like a whipped dog when his own people suffer.

As a matter of fact, however, our airmen never intentionally bombed civilians. They had other work to do. "For every enemy machine," wrote the British Headquarter Staff on October 3, "that succeeds in crossing our front it is safe to say that 200 British machines cross the enemy's."

The French military authorities, also summed up the situation at the end of September, 1916. They pointed out that at the time of the commencement of the Somme offensive the Germans had possessed two main lines of fortifications. The first, from 500 to 1,000 yards in depth, was based on the powerfully organized positions of Thiepval, Ovillers-la-Boiselle, Fricourt, Mametz, Curlu, Frise on the

Somme, Dompierre, Fay and Soyécourt, and consisted of a series of parallel trenches—usually three in number—between which were innumerable shelters for men, machine-guns and ammunition. Behind it came a second line of positions from Grandcourt on the Ancre, through Pozières, the two Bazentins, Longueval, Guillemont, Maurepas, and across the Somme to Herbécourt, and from Herbécourt southwards through Assevillers and Belloy en Santerre to Ablaincourt. Between the first and second lines were in places systems of intermediate trenches, and along the whole front of the second barrier ran wide barbed-wire entanglements. Farther back were a series of other organizations constructed during the battle.

Such had been the tremendous obstacles



GERMANS, CAPTURED BY THE FRENCH, PASSING THROUGH A TRENCH UNDER THE EYES OF THE BRITISH.

[Official photograph.

DRAWING WATER FOR COOKING.

encountered by the British and French on the 25 miles front. Nearly all the first and the greater part of the second of the lines had been carried between July 1 and July 6. Between July 6 and September 3 the remainder of the second line had been occupied. From September 3 onwards the Allies had continued their offensive, constantly proving their superiority over the enemy. Between July 1 and September 17, the French alone, continued the report,

[Official photograph.

DINNER-TIME ON THE ANCRE.

had taken 30,000 unwounded and 4,500 wounded prisoners, and had captured 144 guns of which more than half were heavy pieces, a number of trench mortars, about 500 machine-guns, vast quantities of shells and a captive balloon. The Allies had conquered a zone of territory considerably greater than that won by the Germans after six months' fighting at the Battle of Verdun. Up to September 17, no less than 67 fresh divisions and 17 fresh battalions had been opposed to them. The greater part of these divisions and battalions had been drawn from sectors where no battle was in progress. "The Battle of the Somme," said the French report, "has destroyed the German will to conquer before Verdun. As the Somme battle has developed the German attacks on Verdun have become weaker and weaker, and the German troops that were concentrated before the great French eastern fortress have ebbed away regularly toward the Somme. Better still, with the development of the Somme battle the enemy before Verdun soon changed from the offensive to the defensive."

The French report, it will be perceived, did not deal with the momentous fighting since September 17, or with the operations of General Micheler's Army between Ablaincourt and Chilly. Since September 17 the French, north of the Somme, had, as related, captured Rancourt, and they were now on the outskirts of Sailly-Saillisel, while General Micheler's thrust eastwards had rendered it more and more difficult for the enemy to maintain himself in the area west of the Somme from Ablaincourt through Barleux to Péronne. In the Biaches region, General Fayolle's troops were already in the south-western environs of Péronne, and from the east of Clery and from Bouchavesnes they were within striking distance of Mont St. Quentin, the northern key to the city. The points of the blades of, as it were, a pair of scissors, which crossed at Frise, on the Somme, were closing, and Péronne, like Bapaume, might be expected in the near future to be cut off and compelled to surrender.

[Official photograph.

SORTING THE MAIL FROM HOME.

Whether, however, Péronne and Bapaume were secured mattered comparatively little. In this warfare of attrition the great question exercising the minds of the Staffs on both sides was how to reduce the opponent's effectives. Until the enormous forces yet at the disposal of Hindenburg had been materially reduced

[Official photograph.

INDIAN CAVALRY DISPATCH RIDER COMING BACK FROM FLERS.
Road-makers are at work among the wreckage of a wood.

by casualties it was idle for the Allies to expect decisive victories. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of September 27 boldly asserted that in strategy the Entente had won nothing. This was a criticism derived from the study of old wars, when battles were decided by piercing positions or outflanking them. But, by September, 1916, the test to be applied when considering the result of a battle was almost an arithmetical one. Had the balance of effectives, weapons, and munitions shifted as a result of the struggle? Applying this test to the Battle of the Somme from July 1 to September 30 the answer was unequivocal. The writer in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* might allege that Hindenburg's calm course had not "swerved a hair's breadth from its intended path"; but if that were true, why had the Battle of Verdun subsided and the Germans, after their prodigious losses, abandoned their offensive?

The movements of the German forces in the Western theatre of war during the Battle of the Somme also told a significant tale. At this epoch the enemy appears to have had in the field 193 divisions, of which 117 consisted of three, 57 of four regiments, the remaining 19 being of various sizes. One hundred and twenty-four divisions had been stationed on the Western front. Now, at the beginning of the Battle of the Somme, from July 1 to July 9, the 25 miles long line of entrenchments had been held by 18 divisions. From the 10th to the end of July, 15 of them were withdrawn and replaced by 12 fresh ones. In the last week of August no fewer than 26 divisions were shuffled from one position to another on the front of battle, and in the third week of September six divisions were brought up to the Somme from other positions between Ostend and Mülhausen, and seven divisions retired and six divisions which were resting displaced. Simultaneously two divisions were withdrawn from the Verdun region. One was sent into Champagne, and the other into Belgium.

It is obvious that if Hindenburg had not been obliged by dire necessity he would never have imposed the immense labour involved in moving these masses of troops to and fro, especially when his object was not to fight an offensive but a defensive battle. It must, moreover, be remembered that the extraordinarily complicated character of the lines north and south of the Somme rendered it most inadvisable suddenly to send new troops to garrison them. In the struggles of earlier periods officers and men could quickly understand the features of a position which they were called upon at a moment's notice to occupy, but here the mazes of tunnels and trenches, and the thousands of dug-outs, required to be studied for days before their tactical value could be fully appreciated. To rush men ignorant of the locality into the labyrinthine entrenchments was to court disaster.

The truth was that the initiative in the Western theatre had at last passed from the Germans to the Allies.

CHAPTER CLXXVI.

PERSIA AND THE WAR.

PERSIA AND ITS POPULATION—AN OUTLINE OF PERSIAN HISTORY—THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH CONNEXION—THE SHERLEYS—JOHN ELTON—PERSIA AND THE NAPOLEONIC WARS—TREATY OF TURKOMANCHAI—RUSSIA AND INDIA—NASIR-UD-DIN—THE BENEFITS OF BRITISH INTERVENTION—BRITISH CONCESSIONS—MURDER OF NASIR-UD-DIN—"SISTER MUZAFFER"—REVOLUTION OF 1906—THE CONSTITUTION—DEPOSITION OF MOHAMED ALI—THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF 1907—THE SPHERES OF INFLUENCE—POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES—EVENTS FROM 1909 TO 1914—REGENCY OF NASIR-UL-MULK—MR. SHUSTER'S MISSION—RETURN OF MOHAMED ALI—GERMAN INTRIGUE—PERSIAN "NEUTRALITY" IN 1914—TURKISH INVASION AND THE GERMANS IN PERSIA—MILITARY EVENTS IN 1915 AND 1916—SIR PERCY SYKES'S MARCH—PERSIA AFTER TWO YEARS OF WAR.

IN an earlier chapter, "The Invasion of Chaldea," * some pages were devoted to an account of the British connexion with the Persian Gulf, extending over a period of three centuries. This touched the fringe of a larger question—the relations between Great Britain and the ancient kingdom of Persia—but touched only the fringe of it; for though the northern shore of the Gulf is mostly Persian territory the southern shore is not, and the control by Great Britain of these waters and shores is mainly a maritime question, which could therefore be best treated separately. The present chapter will deal with Persia as a whole, and its connexion with the war.

In the first place it may be desirable to say a few words about the geographical position of Persia, and about the character of the country and its population.

Between the Mediterranean on the west and the frontier of India on the east lie the territories of three considerable Powers—Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan. These territories cover a tract 2,500 miles in breadth, of which Persia occupies the central portion—a block 900 miles broad. It is bounded on the north by Russia and the Caspian, on the south by the waters of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea; and its area is more than five times that of the United Kingdom.

The conformation of Persia is remarkable, for the bulk of the country consists of a vast plateau, with an average height of nearly 4,000 feet above the sea, surrounded by lofty ranges of mountains. This plateau is called by the Persians themselves Iran, or the land of the Aryans, and it is known by this name throughout Asia. The classical name Persis was derived from Parsa, now Fars, the most famous province of Iran. Naturally a country of such extent is not one uniform tableland. Large parts of it are comparatively low-lying desert, possibly once an inland sea; its surface is broken in other parts by rugged highlands, or by lakes of immense size; and beyond the encircling mountain ranges, near the northern and southern seas, there are districts which have a character of their own, entirely different from that of the central tract. Nevertheless, the description given above may be regarded as approximately accurate. Somewhat the same configuration of country may be found in Spain and South Africa.

The climate of the great central plateau is

* Vol. III., Chap. LII.



GENERAL MAP OF PERSIA.

[The Inset shows the spheres of influence established by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.]

in many respects agreeable. The average rainfall is small—perhaps not more than 10 inches, and the air is extraordinarily dry and clear. In summer the heat is often great, over 100° F. in the shade; but owing to the dryness it is not, as a rule, oppressive. In winter there is hard frost for some months with occasional falls of snow; but the sky is generally cloudless, and the air exhilarating. The scenery in its own way is beautiful, for though the greater part of the plateau is stony and bare the clearness of the atmosphere gives vast distance; and the mountains and plains take exquisitely pure shades of colour.



[Murray Stewart.

ON THE KARUN RIVER.

The great white cone of Damavand, rising from the blue range of the Elburz, may be seen against the northern sky from the plains a hundred and fifty miles away. Moreover the plateau is not all bare. Among the mountain ranges are grassy valleys and stretches of woodland watered by clear snow-fed streams; and even on the plains, where water has been brought down from the flanks of the ranges by underground channels, the picturesque villages are surrounded by green fields, and shaded by lofty poplars and planes.

The soil of Persia, where water can be obtained, is in many parts extremely fertile. It produces excellent wheat and other cereals, tobacco, cotton, beet, and fruit of many kinds. In some parts of the country grapes are almost as common as blackberries in England, and the village streets may be seen roofed with vines. Good wine is made in various provinces, notably in Shiraz, where it somewhat resembles sherry. Indeed Xeres is said to have derived its vine and its name from Shiraz. Mulberries abound, and pomegranates, apple orchards are common, and melons of various kinds are cultivated in great quantities. The peach, nectarine, apricot, fig, orange, and many other fruits are believed to have come to Europe from Persia. Dates are grown in the low country near the sea. The flowers of Persia are as varied as the fruits. Almost all that can be grown in Europe can be grown in Persia, and it is difficult to imagine anything more beautiful than a Persian garden in spring and early summer. Violets line the water runnels in countless numbers, and are followed by iris and lilac and laburnum and roses. Blackbirds and nightingales sing day and night, and the crested hoopoe and blue jay build in the trees and walls. Wild flowers, too, abound in the mountain valleys.

Practically there are no navigable rivers in Persia. The torrents which pour down from the mountains in spring with the melting of the snows lose themselves in the dry plains of the central plateau, where the unclouded sun causes strong evaporation. One river, the Karun, breaks from the western mountains and joins the Shatt al Arab in its course to the Persian Gulf, but even the Karun is navigable by large vessels for a short distance only—about 110 miles—and it does not belong to Persia proper—the plateau of Iran—for it takes its rise in one of the encircling ranges. The inland rivers, such as they are, were evidently at one time

utilized freely for irrigation, and are so even now to some extent; but the main resource of the country for this purpose is the winter's snowfall. This not only covers and directly nourishes the crops, but fills the flanks of the mountains with water, which is tapped and drawn away by underground irrigation channels, or "kenats," often many miles in length.

The population of Persia is small for so large a country, probably not more than ten millions, if as much; and though the numerous ruined cities and irrigation works seem to suggest that the population was once much greater, this is now disbelieved by those best qualified to judge,



A BOUNDARY PILLAR ON THE TURCO-PERSIAN FRONTIER.

who doubt whether it ever exceeded fifteen millions. The present population consists of two main divisions—the dwellers in the cities and villages of the plains, and the nomad tribesmen who wander about with their black tents and flocks and herds between their summer and winter quarters. These nomads form perhaps a quarter of the total population, and hold on a more or less independent tenure the mountain tracts into which they retire for the summer, though they all call themselves Iranis and own the suzerainty of the Shah. They are of various races, chiefly Turks, Lurs, Kurds and Arabs. Some of the nomads are of good fighting stock, though without discipline; and indeed it may be said that the Persians in general make efficient soldiers, for they are a hardy, frugal race, capable of enduring much exposure and fatigue. They are withal amenable to discipline, not wanting in courage, and remarkably intelligent.

The trade of Persia is small. In old days, when the immensely rich commerce of the far east used to flow to the markets of Europe through Persia, the country gained greatly by it, and became itself the seat of considerable wealth; but this state of things has long passed away, and Persia is now a poor country, with a total foreign trade of probably less than ten millions sterling. Even its modern silk trade has almost perished, and its once flourishing towns and trade roads bear every mark of decay. Nor does there seem to be any immediate hope of a revival of prosperity.

Nevertheless, it is evident that a large country so situated, and in some ways so favoured by Nature, can never, in spite of its small population and its poverty, be a negligible quantity in the politics of the East; and a study of its history shows that, in fact, it has from the earliest times proved itself capable of becoming, not once but again and again, the centre of a mighty empire. Nothing in the records of the past is more striking than the part which Iran has played among the nations of the world, and unless this is understood the present importance of the country, decadent as it seems, can hardly be



RUINED PALACE IN THE FORGOTTEN CITY OF KOH-I-KOUADJA, IN SEISTAN

realized. Persia may be now merely a great *nominis umbra*, but it enjoys throughout Asia, on account of its ancient power and civilization and culture, a prestige which should not be undervalued. It would be impossible within the limits of a chapter to do more than glance at



THE FORESHORE AT BUNDER ABBAS.

the salient points of Persian history, but this much at least must be done.

It may be said that Persian history emerges from the glittering mists of Irani legend something more than five hundred years before Christ, when Britain was an almost unknown island inhabited by Celtic tribes. Then a great conqueror and king, Cyrus, established himself in Southern Persia, and, first subduing the Medes of the north, carved out for himself an empire stretching from the ffontiers of India to the shores of the Mediterranean. His son Cambyses added Egypt to the Persian dominions, and not many years later Darius crossed into Europe and made himself master of Thrace and Macedonia. How he and his son Xerxes were repelled at Marathon and Salamis, and Greece was saved, all the world knows. Then gradually the strain of distant conquests told upon Persia, and after the dynasty of Cyrus had lasted two hundred years Asia ceased to prevail over Europe. In the fourth century before Christ Alexander the Great swept back the Persians to their own country, and broke to pieces the first Persian Empire.

Lovat Fraser.

PIER AND CUSTOMS HOUSE AT BUNDER ABBAS.

139-2

For five hundred years after that time Persia, though not the colossal power she had been, yet played an important part in the affairs of the world. Under the kings of the dynasty of Seleucus, Alexander's general, she was still great; and then, under the Parthian kings, sprung from the country about her north-eastern frontier, she carried on a long and not unequal contest against the power of Rome,

SULTAN AHMED, SHAH OF PERSIA.

whose dominion had extended into Western Asia. The Parthians established their capital outside Iran, at Ctesiphon on the Tigris, and they were finally overthrown not by the Romans but by the Persians themselves, who rose against them two hundred years after the beginning of our era.

Then once more a purely Persian dynasty gained supreme power in Iran. This dynasty, the "Sassanian," ruled Persia for about four hundred years, and raised her to a height of strength and glory such as few nations had ever attained. While Britain was a Roman province the Persian kings maintained, as the Parthians had done, a long-standing warfare against the Roman power, and they even on one occasion took captive a Roman Emperor. Their line endured through the early centuries of Christianity, and fell only when, in the seventh century, the new faith of Mahomed suddenly burst upon the world.

The Persian Empire was then almost as extensive as ever, and its wealth was great, but misrule and decay had set in; and though the Arabs, swarming out of their desert sands in all the fervour of their first enthusiasm, found Persia blocking their road to the eastward, with the capital of her dominion still at Ctesiphon, she was no longer the virile and efficient power she had hitherto been. There was some severe fighting, for the Moslems were greatly outnumbered, but Ctesiphon fell, and after a few years Iran itself was completely subdued. The religion of Zoroaster, himself a Persian, was then, and had been for many centuries, the prevailing faith, but most of the Persians now embraced Islam.

It would be impossible to follow in any detail the course of Persian history during the earlier centuries of Mahomedan rule in Asia. At first Persia was merely an outlying province of the Moslem Empire, and was ruled by governors under the Arab Caliphs. Then, about the middle of the eighth century of our era, Baghdad, which was close to Ctesiphon, became the capital of the Caliphate, and the influence of Persia began to assert itself at the new Court. Though conquered, Iran was far more civilized than her conquerors, "and there opened an era of culture, toleration, and scientific research,"* which bore witness to the intellectual superiority the Persians had established throughout Western Asia.

That superiority remained for several hundred years the main glory of the ancient kingdom. As the military power of the Caliphate declined Persia became the prey of various conquerors and dynasties, mostly foreign, none of whom raised the country to its old imperial rank. But during that period literature, science, and art made at times surprising progress, and Persia was never perhaps greater or so great in the influence which she exercised on the culture of other countries—from India to Spain. Her literary

* Muir: "The Caliphate."

eminence may perhaps be judged from the fact that the Persian writer best known to the western world, Omar Khayam, who died in 1123, is regarded in his own country as not entitled to a place in the front rank of Persian literature.

About the year 1500, after the throne of Iran had been occupied by Turks, Tartars, Uzbegs, and others, including conquerors like Chengiz Khan and Tamerlane, a native Persian dynasty, that of the Sufi or "Sophi" kings, established itself and won for the national religion, the Shiah branch of the Moslem faith, a recognized place in the world. The fourth monarch of this line, Shah Abbas, ascended the throne in 1585, and held it for 40 years, being thus a contemporary of Queen Elizabeth in England and the great Akbar in India. Shah Abbas more than held his own against the formidable power of Turkey on the west, and also reconquered the country on the east nearly up to the frontiers of India. Nor was he only or mainly a conqueror. He ruled Persia with firmness and justice, and raised it to a great height of prosperity. The remains of the roads and other public works which he constructed are to be found even now all over the country, and the splendour of his capital at Ispahan became famous throughout the world. Envoys and travellers from the foremost countries of Europe came to pay their respects to the "Great Sophi," and Iran again held up her head as one of the most powerful and magnificent of the nations. More than twenty centuries had passed since the rise of the first Persian Empire, and though the dominions of Abbas were not as extensive as those of Cyrus they still stretched from Baghdad and Mosul to Kandahar. The influence of Iran stretched much farther, for throughout the Mogul Empire of India the very language of the Court and the camp was Persian, and Persia was the model in literature and the arts.

For a hundred years after the death of Shah Abbas his dynasty remained on the throne, but it produced no other great ruler, and early in the eighteenth century its power had greatly declined. The Turks had come forward again on the west; Russia, though still distant, was beginning to threaten the northern provinces; in the east Kandahar was lost; in the south the Arabs of the Gulf were harassing the Persian shores; and throughout Persia the old military spirit seemed to have faded away. Finally, in 1722, the Afghans from the east invaded the country, and after one half-hearted stand near the capital, the Shah gave up his crown to the Afghan leader. It seemed as if the greatness of Iran had fallen for ever.

Yet within the next twenty years Persia had once more risen from her ashes, and not only resumed her place among the great nations of the East but found among her people a man who could lead her armies from victory to victory and make her again, for a short space at least, the centre of a mighty empire.

MIRZA MEHDI KHAN.
Persian Minister in London.

The story of this revival is one of the most romantic in the long course of her national life. It cannot be told here at length; but in a few words it was as follows. Five years after the Afghans took Ispahan a Persian robber chief of Turcoman descent, Nadir Kuli, who had gathered about him a body of hardy freelances, became aware of the small number of the invaders and determined to expel them. Attaching himself to one of the Shah's sons he was soon joined by considerable numbers of Persians, and within three years, after some fierce fighting, he had destroyed the Afghans and gained for himself a great

reputation. He then turned on the Turks, defeated them in some bloody battles, and carried his arms to the Caucasus. The Russians, who had occupied some Persian districts in the north, now withdrew from them, and Iran was free. The grateful Persians thereupon raised Nadir to the throne. In three years more he had conquered Afghanistan and marched into India, where he overthrew the Mogul Emperor and took Delhi, returning with colossal plunder. Then he invaded Central Asia, and subdued both Bokhara and Khiva. By 1740 his conquests were as extensive as the territories afterwards overrun by Napoleon in Europe. Unhappily Nadir Shah's character then rapidly deteriorated, and he became a rapacious and bloody tyrant. At last, in 1747, execrated by the Persians, whose idol he had been, he was murdered, and his dominions fell to pieces. His reign lasted almost exactly the same time as Napoleon's.

After his death Iran passed through a period of turmoil, until in 1794 a capable but blood-thirsty eunuch named Aga Mahomed, belonging to the Kajar tribe, made himself master of the throne, which had been in dispute between several pretenders. His first act was to invade the northern province of Georgia, which had declared itself independent under one of Nadir Shah's generals, and now sought the protection of Russia. The greater part of Georgia was reduced, and the Persians once more became masters of Tiflis and Erivan; but a Russian army of 40,000 men advanced into the country, and it would have gone hard with the Persians but for the fact that at this juncture the Empress Catherine died, and her troops were withdrawn. The rest of Persia had meanwhile submitted to the eunuch king, and Iran was reunited. Then followed his assassination, after a short reign of three years; but in spite of some revolts his nephew and heir, Fath Ali, succeeded without much difficulty in making himself Shah, and the dynasty of the Kajars was firmly established. It has lasted until now.

So far, in this short sketch of Persian history, no reference has been made to the connexion between Persia and Great Britain. It may now be desirable to show at what points the two countries came into contact, and in what circumstances a connexion which was at first slight and transitory became close and permanent.

The Persians, as mentioned above, had in early times embraced the teaching of Zoroaster; but always deeply interested in religious thought, they had also welcomed Christianity, and in the sixth century the Persian Church was very active. It is said that at this time a Persian bishop named Ivon visited England, and that the name St. Ives is derived from him.* Seven hundred years

* Sykes, *History of Persia.*



SHIRAZ: THE GATE OF BAGH SHAH.

later, during the reign of Edward I., after some correspondence between the Courts of Persia and England, Geoffrey de Langley was sent to Persia on a mission, but no complete account of this is known to exist. Again, in the reign of Henry IV., the conqueror Tamerlane, then in possession of Persia, wrote a letter offering free commercial intercourse, and the draft of King Henry's reply has been preserved. Both letters were carried by an English friar preacher resident at Tabriz. But these communications seem to have had no tangible result, and until the time of the Sophi kings England and Persia had practically no connexion with each other. Then, the spirit of adventure at sea having been stirred in England, and a lucrative trade opened up with Russia, Anthony Jenkinson, Captain General of the Muscovy Company's fleet, was instructed to open up commercial relations with Persia as well. This he proceeded to do, and starting from Moscow in 1561, three years after Queen Elizabeth came to the throne of England, he reached Persia, and was received by the then Shah, Tahmasp. The trade which he established did not last long, for Persia was at the moment passing through a period of revolt and anarchy. Moreover, the storms and pirates of the Caspian Sea made voyages extremely dangerous. In 1581, therefore, the venture was abandoned. But it had shown the way to our people, and had attracted much attention in England, as is proved by the literature of the time; and before the close of the century a fresh attempt was made to get into touch with Persia. This time it was made not by merchants, but by "gentlemen adventurers," and with remarkable success. There are few episodes in the history of the English connexion with the East more interesting than the story of the visits of Sir Anthony Sherley and his brother, Sir Robert, to the Court of Shah Abbas, and of the influence which they exerted over the young monarch. It will be found related by Sykes,* who attributes to the work of the two brothers the friendly spirit with which Europeans have been treated ever since in Persia. It will suffice to say here that Sir Anthony Sherley found the Shah's Army consisting entirely of tribal horsemen, who could not hope to face unaided the trained and disciplined army of the Turks, then the best in Europe. Sherley's suite included a cannon founder, and some batteries of artillery were now added to the Persian forces, several thousands of regular infantry being also formed and trained. Such was the confidence which Sherley had succeeded in inspiring that he was now sent by Shah Abbas as Persian Ambassador to the Courts of Europe, in order to invite their cooperation against Turkey. He did not apparently have much success in this mission; but his brother, Sir Robert—who remained in Persia—became

NADIR SHAH.
From a painting formerly in the possession of Sir John Malcolm.

Master General of the Persian Army, and greatly distinguished himself in several successful campaigns against the Turks, which ended in leaving Shah Abbas master of Kars, Mosul, Baghdad, and many other places far beyond the frontier of his original possessions. It may justly be claimed, therefore, that Englishmen had some part in the success of this great king and conqueror, who raised Iran to a position such as she had never occupied since the Mahomedan conquest. Meanwhile, also, the English, coming from India, had established themselves on the shores of the Persian Gulf, and in 1622, acting with the Persians, they wrested from the Portuguese the great fortress of Hormuz, which for a hundred years had secured to Portugal the command of these seas, and of the lucrative trade between India

* *History of Persia.*



[Lovat Fraser.

OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF THE GOVERNOR OF BUSHIRE, THE PRINCIPAL PORT OF PERSIA.

and Europe by this ancient route. Practically the fall of Hormuz was the beginning of England's control of the Gulf, which has continued until now. That control was not taken from the Persians, who were no sailors and never held it, but was established with their consent and cooperation.

From this time until the reign of the conqueror Nadir Shah there is no striking feature in the history of the British connexion with Persia; but it is satisfactory to find that in that last period of Persian greatness Englishmen made themselves respected and honoured as they had been in the days of Shah Abbas. The most prominent among them, the one who gained the confidence and favour of the Persian monarch, was a man who, like Jenkinson two hundred years earlier, came to Persia in the interests of trade. In 1739, while Nadir Shah was absent on his expedition to India, and his son was ruling Persia on his behalf, one John Elton determined to revive, if possible, the English trade with Persia by way of Russia. Taking a cargo of goods to Resht on the Caspian, he was well received, and obtained a "farmán" or order couched in the most favourable terms. Returning to England, he obtained support for a scheme by which the Caspian Sea was to be made the base of a trade with Persia, Bokhara, and Khiva. The Russian Government raised no objection, and in 1742 two ships, built in Russian territory, were launched on the Caspian. They were the best ships yet seen on that sea—vessels "of good oak, regularly built, well fitted," armed with some small guns, and flying the English flag. But before long they, not unnaturally, aroused the jealousy of the Russians, who feared for their own trade, and when, in the following year, Elton was persuaded to enter the service of Nadir Shah, who had now returned to Persia, the Russians became actively hostile. It was a curious position, and not wholly connected with trade. The fact was that Nadir had been foiled not long before by the mountain tribes of the Caucasus, whom he was trying to subdue, and he thought, quite rightly, that with a fleet on the Caspian he would be able to turn the range. It would also have strengthened his position greatly in the Turcoman country to the east of the Caspian. Elton was therefore appointed Chief Naval Constructor, and given the title of Jamal Beg. This was the first occasion on which a Persian monarch had shown that he understood the value of sea power. Not only did Nadir attempt to become master of the Caspian in the north, but he determined to dominate also the Persian Gulf, and actually launched a small squadron on these southern waters. How great an effort this entailed may be judged from the fact that Nadir transported timber from the Caspian forests for something like eight hundred miles, right

across Persia. His death soon afterwards put an end to Persian naval enterprise; but it was a fine conception. Elton meanwhile, with infinite toil and against heart-breaking opposition, had succeeded in building and launching on the Caspian a twenty-gun ship. He survived his great master for some years, and remained in Persia until he was killed in a local rebellion. But the Russians put an end to the English trade across their territory, and little now remains of that venture but the fascinating volumes in which one of our traders, Jonas Hanway, has described his travels in Persia, and the state of the Court and country during the latter days of Nadir Shah.

[Lovat Fraser.

BRITISH RESIDENCY, BUSHIRE.

Nevertheless the British connexion with Persia was not to be limited for long to the factories in the Persian Gulf; and when it revived it was to become not only political in character but permanent. The immediate reason for its revival was the far-sighted ambition of the great Napoleon, who had long recognized the fact that the vulnerable point of England was her empire in India, not yet fully consolidated, but already of great extent and of vast commercial importance. To strike her there, and deprive her of the rich Eastern trade which had built up her wealth and power, as it had built up the wealth and power of every nation in turn which had become master of it, seemed to him the best if not the only way of bringing her to her knees. At the close of the eighteenth century he was, therefore, turning over in his mind vast schemes of invasion by land across Western Asia, and meanwhile supporting as far as he could the Indian powers still hostile to her. One means of raising trouble against her was to incite the then ruler of Afghanistan to invade the plains of India as Nadir Shah had done, and either directly or indirectly this means was tried. Lord Wellesley, then Governor-General in India, received warning from the Afghan ruler that the invasion was contemplated, and, conscious of the danger that such an attack might disturb many of the Indian powers, Lord Wellesley tried, with success, to induce the young Shah to bring pressure on the Afghan ruler. But this was not all. It became known that France and Russia had actually agreed upon a scheme of

joint invasion, under which a Franco-Russian force was to march from the Caspian by way of Persia and Afghanistan, and persuade these powers to cooperate. In 1800, therefore, an officer from India, Captain Malcolm, arrived in Bushire, charged with the negotiation of an agreement by which the Shah, Fath Ali, was to undertake to keep up the pressure on Afghanistan, to exclude French influence from his country, and to grant increased facilities for British trade. Malcolm, a man of remarkable character and capacity, was completely successful in his mission, and a satisfactory agreement was concluded.

In the meantime the Russians had again turned their attention to Georgia, and in the same year that Malcolm was at Teheran, which had now become the Persian capital, the province was formally annexed. Though it had been rather a tributary than a part of the Persian dominions, this was a serious blow to Persia; and after two or three years spent in preparing an army the Shah determined to make war. In 1804 hostilities began, and at first the Persians had a measure of success. The Russians were repelled from Erivan, and suffered some further checks. But the Shah had been well aware of the danger he was running in committing himself to hostilities with so powerful an enemy, and he had done his best to obtain help from England. His overtures were not successful, the British Government being slow in coming to a decision; and in his disappointment the Shah at last made up his mind to throw in his lot with the French, who had been trying for years to win him over. In 1807 an envoy was sent to Napoleon, and found him at Tilsit. An agreement was then concluded by which the French and Persians were to join hands against Russia, and the Shah further consented to cooperate with the French in an attack upon India. Thus by the procrastination of the British all the results of Malcolm's mission had been thrown away.

Not only this, but in the same year a French general, Gardonne, appeared in Persia with a large staff, and set to work to organize the Persian Army. The Peace of Tilsit between France and Russia had meanwhile been concluded, and, to the deep disappointment of the Shah, nothing had been said about the restoration of Georgia. But it is believed that Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander then discussed the project of a joint invasion of India,

[Murray Stewart.

BOAT ON THE CASPIAN SEA.

PERSIAN SOLDIERS ON PARADE.

and there seems to be no doubt that Napoleon hoped to arrange an alliance with Persia against England. How much value he attached to this scheme may be judged from the fact that he at one time contemplated sending his brother Lucien to represent him at Teheran. It must be admitted that at this juncture Persia had regained a position of considerable importance among the nations.

Her position was perhaps not raised by the events of the next twenty years. The Russian campaign went badly in the end, owing to the incompetence of the Heir Apparent, who was in command, and in 1813 the Persians signed a treaty surrendering not only Georgia but many other districts and towns. On the other hand, the years 1808 to 1814 witnessed a series of negotiations between Persia and England, which ended, after some rather unseemly wrangles between rival British missions, in a treaty which secured to Persia a considerable yearly subsidy, the promise of British aid in case of aggression upon her territories, and some other advantages. From this time a British Legation was established in Teheran, Persia thereby becoming entitled to direct diplomatic intercourse with the Court of St. James, instead of having to deal with the Governor-General of India. The arrangement was probably a mistake from the British point of view, but it was a gain of status for Persia. Moreover, such hostilities as occurred between Persia and her old enemies the Turks and Afghans during the next few years ended with a fair measure of success on her part. But unluckily the strong feeling against Russia which had been aroused by her success in the former war, and by other circumstances, led the Persians in 1826 to enter upon a war of revenge. They had at first considerable successes, but, as before, they were soundly beaten in the end, and the war was closed by the Treaty of Turkomanchai, 1828, which marked the beginning of a new era, for not only did Persia make further cessions of territory, but she agreed to concede to the Russians various extra-territorial privileges which were inconsistent with the entire independence of the country, and gave an opening for much interference in the future. From this time dates the ever-increasing influence which Russia has exercised not only over the policy but over the internal affairs of Persia. The terms of the Treaty led other European Powers to base their relations with Persia upon a similar footing, but the geographical and military position of Russia secured to her a special predominance which nothing since has permanently shaken.

The Treaty had another effect. The Persians, deeply mortified by the loss of prestige



[Murray Stewart.

A SCENE ON THE ROAD FROM RESHT TO TEHERAN.

involved in their cessions on the north-western side of their country, turned their eyes elsewhere in the hope of finding compensation. Turkey was too strong to be attacked with much hope of success, and the natural result was that the Persians began to push out eastward, with the view of regaining their old possessions in the country lying between them and India. This tendency was encouraged by the Russians, who found it convenient to divert the thoughts of the Persians from their western borders, and were, moreover, not disinclined to let England feel that any action on her part which crossed Russian interests in Europe could be countered by threats to the security of the British dominions in Asia. Great Britain was not slow to recognize that a new situation had arisen, and that any extension of Persia eastward, with Russian support, must have an undesirable, if not dangerous, effect upon her position in India, for the Indians, accustomed to irruptions from the north-west, looked to that quarter with constant apprehension or hope. From this time began the feeling among British statesmen in India and England that Russia had now taken the place of France as a menace to India—a feeling which, with the gradual advance of the Russians in Central Asia, became stronger and stronger until it led to an acute and ceaseless conflict of policies between the two Powers. And one main field for that conflict was Persia, which was the greater and the more powerful of the two countries lying between the Russian and Indian frontiers.

The Persians soon entered upon their eastern advance, and in 1833 they laid siege to Herat. But in the following year, before the place had fallen, the long reign of Fath Ali Shah was ended by his death, and the operations in Afghanistan were for the time interrupted.

It is a curious circumstance that at this time the Persian Army in the west was commanded by a Scottish artillery officer, Sir Henry Lindsay Bethune, who, coming to Persia with Malcolm, had been for several years in the Persian service, and had greatly distinguished himself in the Persian war against Russia. The new ruler, Mahomed Shah, marched from Tabriz upon the capital with a considerable force under this officer, and though revolts broke out in various provinces, he succeeded, after a victory gained by his British General, in completely establishing his power. He was helped in doing so by an Englishman, Rawlinson, who had lately come to Persia as member of a British military mission.

The Russians had cooperated with the British in supporting Mahomed Shah's claim to the throne; but it soon became evident that they were not disposed to welcome the British mission, which was on a considerable scale, all arms of the Service being represented. Nor, in spite of the help he had received from the British, did the Shah show any inclination to treat the mission with favour. The officers composing it were, on the contrary, opposed

[Lovat Fraser.

IN THE GROUNDS OF THE BRITISH RESIDENCY, BUSHIRE.

and thwarted by the Persians, and after three or four years they all left the country.

Meanwhile, in 1837, the Shah marched upon Herat. The place was besieged, and would almost certainly have fallen but for the arrival in disguise of a young English officer, Eldred Pottinger, who filled the defenders with his own indomitable courage, and repeatedly beat off the Persian attacks. In the following spring the British and Russian Ministers, McNeill and Simonich, both joined the Royal camp, the former doing his best to persuade the Shah to raise the siege, the latter giving his personal aid and that of a battalion of Russian deserters. The Shah now threw himself entirely

[Murray Stewart.

VIEW AT MOHAMMERAH.

into the hands of the Russians, and McNeill withdrew from the camp; but after a final desperate assault had been repulsed, with great loss to the Persians, and the British had made a hostile demonstration in the Persian Gulf, the disheartened monarch abandoned the siege. The whole episode raised the reputation of the British and for the time lowered that of the Russians, but it had the effect of bringing to a head the rivalry of the two Powers, who from that time forward were regarded throughout Asia as open antagonists, if not as open enemies.

It led, too, to a most unfortunate expedition into Afghanistan from India on the part of Great Britain, but that did not directly concern Persia, and need not be discussed here.

Lord Palmerston, who was then in power in England, had throughout given to the British representative a loyal support which was proof against all the intrigues and attacks of the Shah, and set a good example to future British Governments, not always followed. But the Shah, though forced to abstain from a policy of open hostility towards Great Britain, remained deaf to all good advice, and when he died in 1848 he left the country in a deplorable condition—the treasury empty, the army unpaid and discontented, and the administration in complete disorder.

Mahomed Shah was succeeded by his son Nasir-ud-Din, a boy 16 years of age, whose accession was undisputed. According to custom he had been Governor of the northern province of Azarbaijan, the inhabitants of which are mainly of Turk descent, and speak Turki, not Persian. The army was largely recruited from this province. As the ruling dynasty was itself sprung from a Turk tribe, the Kajars, and had throughout relied upon its Turk troops, it was always subject to outbreaks of discontent on the part of the Persians proper, who regarded themselves as a superior people. But the position had been more or less accepted, and on this occasion no revolt occurred.

The young Shah, nevertheless, had his troubles to face, and at the beginning of his reign the country was considerably disturbed by the Babis, a new sect whose doctrines seemed harmless enough in so far as they were comprehensible. There were some Babi risings, and an attempt on the Shah's life, followed by some horrible punishments and massacres. Whatever their faults the Babis showed the most heroic courage, as Persians often do, and gained much sympathy by it.

Soon afterwards occurred the Crimean War, and this resulted in a serious breach between Persia and Great Britain. The Russians had sought the aid of the Persians against their old enemies the Turks, while from Great

Britain and France, to whom the Shah made overtures, he received what he resented as the rather contemptuous advice to remain neutral. He did so, but his Government got up a quarrel with the British Minister, Mr. Murray, who was grossly insulted, and eventually broke off relations as McNeill had done. In the following year, 1856, a Persian Army once more marched upon Herat, which, having no Pottinger within its walls, was at last taken and re-united to the Persian dominions. The British Government felt that this action could not be condoned, and sent a force to the Persian Gulf; but the maintenance of Persia as a buffer between Russia and India having now become a fixed part of British policy, no attempt was made

NASIR-UD-DIN.
Shah of Persia, 1848-1896, the last of the autocratic rulers of the country.

at a serious war of conquest. Still, some troops were landed near Bushire, and a Persian force, which attacked them, was beaten at Khushab. The British, under Sir James Outram, then took Mohammerah and Ahwaz on the Karun, the Persian Government, meanwhile, having already sued for peace and signed a Treaty at Paris, by which they agreed to evacuate Afghanistan and recognize its independence. The terms imposed by the victors were extraordinarily mild, and the result was to improve British relations with Persia.

It was fortunate that the British Government had taken the Persian aggression so lightly, for a few months later the sudden storm of the Sepoy mutiny broke upon India, and it would have been a grave embarrassment if a British force had then been locked up in Persia.

Sykes, who refers to this point in his History, observes incidentally that the Persian War led to the introduction of "khaki"—some Persian troops clothed in this dust-coloured uniform having been almost invisible at a distance. Khak is the Persian word for dust or earth.

Not long afterwards began the great advance on the part of the Russians in Central Asia which caused so much apprehension in India and has so seriously affected the situation of Persia. At the time of the Crimean War the Russians had not subdued the mountaineers of the Caucasus, and in Central Asia they had practically obtained no footing at all. Between them and the northern frontiers of Eastern Persia and Afghanistan lay the territories of the Central Asian Khanates of Khokand, Bokhara and Khiva, and the Turcoman desert—all sparsely inhabited tracts, but vast in extent. Checked by the result of the Crimean War from further expansion in other directions, Russia now set to work to stamp out finally the resistance of the Caucasian tribes, and that being at last effected, she was free to throw her weight eastward. By 1865 she had beaten the first of the Khanates, Khokand, and after capturing Tashkent had formed in that direction her frontier province of Turkestan. This led the Ameer of Bokhara to take the offensive against her, with the result that he also was defeated, and lost in 1868 the famous city of Samarkand. In the

A COSSACK REGIMENT IN PERSIA.

following year Russia occupied two points on the Eastern coast of the Caspian, against the strong protests of Persia. From there she could threaten the Turkomans of the desert, and, on the other side of the desert, the remaining Khanate, Khiva. Provocation was not wanting, and in 1873 Russian columns pushed out from north and south and closed upon Khiva, which was taken. The Khanates were now all gone, and only the nomad Turkomans of the desert remained to defy her. Against them she gradually worked forward from the Caspian along the northern border of Persia, and after suffering one severe defeat at their hands she won her way in 1881 to their poor stronghold at Geok Tepe. A heroic but hopeless resistance followed, and the fort was stormed. Awed by the slaughter there, the rest of the Turkoman country submitted, and by 1884 Central Asia was in Russian hands. Thus in five and twenty years from the fall of the Caucasus the Russians had pushed forward a distance of a thousand miles and were on the border of Afghanistan. The effect upon Persia was immense. Her prestige was greatly impaired by her exclusion from the Turkoman country, which she had often penetrated, and, what was far more important, Russian territory now marched with her whole northern border—from end to end. It is true that she was thereby protected from Turkoman raids, which had been a terrible affliction to her in the past It is true also that Russia had effected her conquests with very small forces, and was still weak in Central Asia—where she could not dispose of 50,000 men. But that weakness would disappear with time, and Persia was now enveloped.

In the meantime England had not been wholly negligent of her interests in Persia, and though she did not strengthen her military position she had in various ways established a considerable influence in the country. Perhaps the most striking enterprise in which she engaged was the introduction of telegraphs. During the Indian Mutiny the need of direct telegraphic communication between England and India had been severely felt, and it was decided that a line should be carried across Persia from the Turkish frontier to Bushire, whence a cable was to be laid down the Persian Gulf. There was much opposition from Persian officials and local tribes, but by the end of 1864 the first single line had been completed, a performance which reflected great credit upon the British officers and men by whom the work was done. A few years later a thorough double line was constructed from London to Teheran, across Germany and Russia, the Indo-European Telegraph Company carrying on the line to India. The great trunk lines led to the extension of telegraphs all over Persia, under a Persian Minister of

A LESSON IN THE KORAN.

Telegraphs with an English adviser. Persia had thus not only been opened up to communication with foreign countries, but had been greatly helped in the control of her own provinces. Throughout the country the British telegraph officials became a power for good in many ways, and their work was greatly appreciated. It was of incalculable value to Persia.

Another great benefit conferred upon the country by British intervention was the definition of the Persian frontiers on the east —first between Persia and Baluchistan, and later between Persia and Afghanistan in the disputed district of Seistan—by the first Director of Telegraphs in Persia, Sir Frederick Goldsmid. These settlements were made in the early 'seventies, and were afterwards completed by missions under Sir Thomas Holdich and Sir Henry McMahon. A small but increasing trade was thus opened up between India and Persia by way of Seistan.

The later part also of the reign of Nasir-ud-Din Shah was marked by considerable developments in the relations between Great Britain and Persia. It was a time of continued and growing rivalry between Russia and England. Notwithstanding this rivalry, which led to the constant thwarting of British schemes by Russian influence, Great Britain obtained from the Shah some useful concessions, which were beneficial to both sides. In 1888, largely owing to the energy of the British Minister, Sir Henry Drumond Wolff, the Shah agreed to open to commercial navigation the lower part of the Karun river. The value of this concession was vastly exaggerated by the British public, for, as before remarked, the river is navigable for little more than a hundred miles, and does not reach the plateau of Persia at all. Also the concession was marred by the proviso, a proviso not only destructive but opposed to British Treaty rights, that no buildings were to be erected on the banks of the river, such as coal stores, warehouses, shops, caravanserais, workshops, etc. In spite of all this, chiefly by the tact and persistence of Messrs. Lynch Bros., who opened up a new road from the old capital at Ispahan across the mountains to the river, and ran steamers for a time at a loss, a considerable trade was developed, and the adjacent country greatly benefited, so that "the recent history of the Karun Valley adds yet another pacific triumph to the long list already won by the officials and merchants of Great Britain."

Another concession, granted in 1889, was for the foundation of a British bank, to be called the Imperial Bank of Persia, with the exclusive right to issue notes. This institution had at first many difficulties to overcome; but it proved to be of the greatest use to all classes of Persians, and to the Persian Government itself.

A third British concession was less fortunate. This was the grant to a company in 1890 of entire control over the production and sale of tobacco in Persia. This concession affected not only tobacco growers and sellers, but the whole people, men and women alike, for in Persia everyone smokes. Its terms aroused general indignation, and eventually the chief religious authority published an order by which smoking was wholly forbidden throughout the country. The order was implicitly obeyed, except, so far as is known, by one man, the Minister of Telegraphs, whose friendship for the English was so great that he gallantly sat on his open balcony in the capital smoking his "kalian." No one else dared to do

ON THE RIVER KARUN. [Murray Stewart.

so, and as disturbances were breaking out the Shah cancelled the concession, agreeing to pay a sum of £500,000 to the company as compensation

The state of affairs in Persia during the next five years, the closing years of the Shah's life, and of the old order in Persia, was not entirely free from trouble; but it was one to which many Persians must have since looked back with deep regret. The independence of Persia was ostensibly complete, and the Shah was an absolute monarch, with no constitutional limits whatever to his power over the property and lives of his subjects. In practice the treaty with the Russians and subsequent events had somewhat impaired Persian independence, and the Shah's sovereign rights within his kingdom were limited by two circumstances which he could not afford to disregard—namely, the possibility of popular revolt against oppression, and the power of the priesthood, who administered a large part of the law and had great influence in other ways. Nasir-ud-Din, a thoroughly virile man, was in many respects a strong ruler. Well built and well featured, he lived an outdoor life, was an extraordinarily good shot, and if, as was said, he loved wine and women, he always kept himself in vigorous health. He was also a man of exceptional intelligence and knowledge. Like the Tudors, he knew when to yield, and could do so ungrudgingly, which made him all the stronger. He had behind him the experience of more than forty years on the throne. It must be admitted that he had his faults: he was somewhat rapacious and selfish, putting his own pleasures first and leaving the administration of the country too much to others, whom he well knew to be corrupt if not incapable. The Persian Army, which long after the beginning of the century had been capable of making a good fight against Russian troops, and had generally held its own against the Turk and the Afghan, was now practically non-existent—a few thousand men without pay or discipline or modern arms. The only efficient force in Persia was a small body of so-called Cossacks, officered by Russians, which had been formed in 1882, after Great Britain had declined to lend officers for a similar purpose. The country was badly ruled, the practice being to put up to auction every year the farm of the several provinces, and leave the Governors to recoup themselves as they pleased for the sums they had paid to the Shah and his officials. The customs were also farmed, and the collection of the royal land taxes was left to a body of men over whom there was no supervision. Under such a system it may easily be understood that Persia was being steadily impoverished, and that the imperial revenue was small. It amounted to less than a million and a half sterling, and the Treasury was always in difficulties for ready money. The real head of the administration was Asghar Ali, the Prime Minister, or Sadr Azem, who had held the post for some years and thoroughly understood how to manage his royal master. A man of low birth, but of singularly attractive manners, and in his way strong and adroit, the Sadr Azem had become extremely powerful. He was popular with Europeans, for he was merry and pleasant and entertained lavishly. Nor was he unpopular with Persians in general. But he was a man of the old school, with no capacity for administration, thoroughly corrupt, and, with all his outward *bonhomie*, unscrupulous and vindictive to a rare degree. "*Sui profusus, alieni appetens*," he drew from the farm of the customs and many other sources an income far larger than that of any European Prime Minister, and had become a man of great wealth.

[*Elliott & Fry.*

SIR PERCY SYKES.

Formerly British Consul-General at Meshed. Author of "A History of Persia." Restored order in Southern Persia in 1916.

Nevertheless, the condition of Persia under the last of its autocratic kings was not altogether an unhappy one. The country no



MAIN GATE OF THE CITY OF TEHERAN.

longer had power to stand by itself against foreign aggression; but it was held up by the rivalry between England and Russia, and maintained an apparent independence by steadily playing off one Power against the other. Except the annual payment due to the Tobacco Company, Persia had no national debt whatever, and this amounted only to a few months' revenue. The people were misruled, but were able to protect themselves against intolerable oppression by turbulent action against their weak governors, and their material condition was not one of real hardship. Accustomed from time immemorial to the autocratic rule universal in the East, and feeling no desire for representative institutions or other Western luxuries, such as a pure judicial system, and roads and railways, they had no great cause of complaint. Nor did they greatly complain. There was murmuring at times and occasional disorder; but, on the whole, they liked their gallant old Shah; and with their sunny climate, and cheap food, and not too much hard work, they passed their time happily enough. Their firm conviction was that everything Persian was immeasurably superior to everything foreign, and all they really wanted was to be left in peace.

The relations between the two rival Powers—England and Russia—were at that time watchful, and more or less antagonistic. The geographical and military position of Russia gave her by far the stronger hand in this game; but the position of England was not wholly unsatisfactory. It might, if the British hand had been boldly played, have become much more so, for in 1895 a change of government in England had raised great hopes in Persia, and the old Shah, always in want of money, had made overtures for an arrangement by which in return for a loan he would have placed himself to a great extent in British hands. But the credit of Persia in the English market was then very low, and the loan, small as it was, could not be raised without a guarantee, which, though the security was ample, the British Government would not give. The proposal therefore fell through, the Shah was deeply disappointed, and the chance was lost, never to recur. Still England retained much weight in Persia. The Germans, already bent upon a great scheme of development eastward, through Turkey, were beginning to show considerable interest in Persia as well, and had nearly succeeded in obtaining a concession for an important road between the Turkish frontier and Teheran; but as yet they had practically no influence. Nor had any other European Power. As it was said, "In Persia England and Russia play the game, the others look on and mark the points."

Such was the condition of affairs when in May, 1896, Persia was startled and shocked by the news that the Shah had been murdered. Some years earlier he had expelled from the country a Persian named Jamal-ud-din, who had made a name for himself in Europe and elsewhere as a Musulman preacher and reformer. One of this man's disciples, deeply impressed by his teaching and his wrongs, had determined to kill the Shah, and taking advantage of His Majesty's visit to a mosque near Teheran, had shot him through the heart as he was about to

kneel down in prayer. Nasir-ud-din cried out "Ai Khuda!" ("Oh, God!") and fell forward —dead. The Sadr Azem, who was with him, at once had the body carried to a closed carriage, and giving out that the Shah was only slightly wounded, drove back to the Palace at Teheran. From there he sent word to the British and Russian representatives, who soon afterwards joined him; and with their help arrangements were made for the succession of the Heir Apparent, who, according to custom, was at Tabriz as Governor of Azarbaijan. It was a critical moment, for there were at the capital several regiments of troops who had received no pay for years, and had lately shown a threatening spirit. One of the Shah's sons was Commander-in-Chief, but in this emergency he refused to take any action, and applied for protection to the British and Russian Legations. The Prime Minister, however, acted with spirit and promptitude. Money for the payment of the Persian troops was supplied by the British Bank, and distributed immediately; the Cossack regiment, under its Russian officers, was called out to patrol the town; and in the morning, when the news of the Shah's death became known, all was in order. A few weeks later the new Shah, Muzaffer-ud-din, arrived in Teheran and quietly succeeded to the throne.



THE KOTAL PASS, ON THE ROAD FROM BUSHIRE TO SHIRAZ.

Weak in character, and not strong in health, he created from the first an unfavourable



[Lorat Fraser.

BRITISH CONSULATE IN THE TOWN OF BUSHIRE.

impression in Teheran. Such was his fear of sharing his father's fate that he had not the courage to make a public entry into his capital; but halted some miles outside and stole into his palace in the dead of night. This excited the open derision of the Persians, who, whatever some may think, are not wanting in courage themselves, or inclined to forgive the want of it in their rulers. From that moment "Sister Muzaffer," as they called him, had lost caste with his people, and he never regained it.

Yet in spite of his weakness, perhaps in part because of it, his reign was an important one in the history of Persia. It was the reign in which autocratic rule passed away from the country after 25 centuries, and her people received their first Constitution.

It would not be easy to explain in full the causes which led to the new order of things. But briefly it may be said that from the time

SHAH MUZAFFER-UD-DIN.

the Shah came to the throne his one leading idea seemed to be the procuring of large sums of money to lavish on extravagant foreign tours, or on his favourites. When he had dissipated in this way such treasure as he had inherited from his father, and the family domains, his only resource was a foreign loan. He did make an effort to reform the Customs administration by the introduction of Belgian controllers, and this step was in a measure successful, but it did not supply his immediate

SHAH MIRZA MOHAMED ALI.

wants. In Great Britain, owing to the refusal of the British Government to give a guarantee, money was not to be got; and in 1900 the Shah turned to the Russians, from whom he received on severe terms two loans aggregating about four millions. The money was mostly squandered, and the loans proved disastrous to the country, for they were the forerunners of several more, which hopelessly embarrassed the Persian finances and aroused a violent feeling of resentment among the Persians. They also led to a Perso-Russian Customs agreement, which was very unfavourable to Persia and, incidentally, to British trade. Then began, with remarkable suddenness, a popular outcry for various administrative changes. Few, if any, of the Persians appeared to know exactly what they wanted; but a strong spirit of discontent with the old order, and of desire for something else, had undoubtedly permeated the nation. How it had come no one could tell. As one eminent Persian said, "None of us know. It seems to have risen out of the

ground." It may have been due in part to the fervent preaching of Jamal-ud-din. Then the result of the Russian war with Japan produced an extraordinary effect upon the Persians, who imagined that whatever the Japanese could do would be easy for them —whether it were to defeat a great military Power or to reform a system of government. Altogether, the spirit of unrest and self-assertion was aroused, and under the guidance of some men who had been in Europe, the new feeling took the form of a demand for a Constitution, a demand which, strange to say, received considerable support from the priesthood. After the Shah had made one concession after another, and some twelve or fourteen thousand Persians had taken "bast"—sanctuary—in the British Legation—a common method in Persia of bringing pressure to bear on a Government—Muzaffer-ud-din finally gave way, and in August, 1906, he signed a paper granting the people a National Assembly. Two months later the Assembly was formally opened by the Shah in person, though no members had yet been elected but those for the city of Teheran. Then the Assembly proceeded to draw up a written Constitution on Western lines; and in January, 1907, this was signed and ratified by the Shah and his Heir Apparent. A few days later the Shah died.

Thus, with a suddenness which was astounding to all concerned, the Persians found themselves in possession of the rights and liberties which five years before no one among them would have dreamt of receiving, or desiring.

It may perhaps be mentioned here that during the reign of Muzaffer-ud-din, in 1903, the Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, paid a visit to the Persian Gulf, which was of some importance, particularly in connexion with the persistent efforts of Germany for five years past to gain a footing on the coast of this sea. In these efforts she was helped by the Turks. Lord Curzon's attitude towards the question of the Persian Gulf had always been a decided one, and his visit was of much advantage to British interests.

Muzaffer-ud-din was succeeded by his son, Mohamed Ali, and it very shortly became evident that the new Shah, though he had signed the Constitution, had not the smallest intention of abiding by his word. Arrogant even beyond the wont of his family and wanting in self-control, he entered at once upon a course of action which could only end in disaster. While the feeling in favour of the National Assembly increased daily throughout the country, taking various forms, some of them legitimate enough, some violent and indefensible, Mohamed Ali seemed determined to stamp out the whole movement and become an absolute monarch like his ancestors. One of his first acts was to call back to Teheran his grandfather's old Minister, Asghar Ali, who was known to be reactionary in his views, and was consequently murdered by an ardent "Nationalist." The British and Russian Legations, now acting together, gave the Shah good advice, which he practically disregarded. Matters went from bad to worse. There was fighting in Tabriz, and in Teheran itself, where the National Assembly was broken up by shell fire. Finally, in 1909, when the Russians had pushed troops into Tabriz, and to within a hundred miles of Teheran, for the protection of Europeans, "Nationalist" forces, including a contingent from the great Bakhtiari tribe, marched upon the capital, and, skilfully outmanœuvring the Shah's troops, made themselves masters of it. The Shah was deposed by the National Assembly, and his son Ahmed, a boy eleven years of age, was put on the throne.

ABDUL KASSIM, NASIR-UL-MULK,
Regent during the youth of Shah Sultan Ahmed.

Meanwhile the famous Convention of 1907 between Russia and England had come into



THE SHAH AND HIS MINISTERS.

The Shah is seated on his marble throne; his Ministers are seen on the right of the picture; in front is an official who is giving some important information.

force, and had been published in Persia. As everyone knows, the purpose of this agreement was to bring to an end the long rivalry between the two Powers in Asia, and with that object to define their respective spheres of influence. So far as Persia was concerned, the two contracting Governments agreed to respect the integrity and independence of the country; but in order to avoid future misunderstandings regarding their interests Persia was divided into three zones—Russian, Neutral, and British—within which the two Powers were to act on certain specified lines.

The idea of a friendly understanding between England and Russia was not a new one. It had often been more or less vaguely put forward, and for thirty years it had found a consistent advocate in Sir Alfred Lyall, who had published a series of papers dwelling upon the evils of the existing antagonism in Asia between two nations "whose interests undoubtedly point towards amity and concordant views in Europe." His argument throughout was that "Russia and England cannot be perpetually manœuvring against each other in Asia if they desire to act together in Europe," and he never ceased to urge the advantages of a formal agreement, or to deprecate the excessive distrust of Russia which then prevailed among Englishmen. Sir Alfred Lyall had been Foreign Secretary in India, and his views had become the doctrine of the Indian Foreign Office, with the result that in 1886, after a joint Boundary Commission, there was signed an agreement between Russia and England which defined the northern border of Afghanistan. This was the first step towards the general understanding of 1907. But in 1886 the time had not yet come for that general understanding. Russians then, and for many years longer, regarded the twentieth century as theirs, and were unwilling to fetter themselves by further positive engagements. It was not until after the Russo-Japanese War, and the changes of feeling it brought about in Russia, that a general understanding became possible. As Lord Lansdowne said in the House of Lords in 1907, "until lately we know that she kept us at arm's length."

As to the specific terms of the Convention, its critics had no difficulty in showing that, especially with regard to Persia, the British Government had made a very indifferent bargain. Practically the whole of southern Persia, up to and including the line from Kermanshah by Hamadan, Ispahan and Yezd to the Afghan border, had till then been regarded as well within the field of British influence and British trade, which extended far beyond that line. The line itself was now placed within the Russian zone, and most of the country to the south of it was made neutral, not British. Though Russian trade and Russian influence were gaining some ground they were not in a position to justify such a partition as this, for, as *The Times* afterwards pointed out, British interests lay "almost exclusively in the neutral zone and not in the British sphere."

When the Convention was signed, its effect in Persia was great, perhaps greater than in any part of Asia. The Persians then for the first time found that they could no longer rely upon the rivalry of which they had made so much use. This was a severe shock, and created much alarm. It made the Convention very unpopular throughout the country. This unpopularity was greatly increased by the partition of



ISPAHAN: THE GREAT SQUARE, ABBAS MOSQUE AND NAGAREH KHANA.

force, and had been published in Persia. As everyone knows, the purpose of this agreement was to bring to an end the long rivalry between the two Powers in Asia, and with that object to define their respective spheres of influence. So far as Persia was concerned, the two contracting Governments agreed to respect the integrity and independence of the country; but in order to avoid future misunderstandings regarding their interests Persia was divided into three zones—Russian, Neutral, and British—within which the two Powers were to act on certain specified lines.

The idea of a friendly understanding between England and Russia was not a new one. It had often been more or less vaguely put forward, and for thirty years it had found a consistent advocate in Sir Alfred Lyall, who had published a series of papers dwelling upon the evils of the existing antagonism in Asia between two nations "whose interests undoubtedly point towards amity and concordant views in Europe." His argument throughout was that "Russia and England cannot be perpetually manœuvring against each other in Asia if they desire to act together in Europe," and he never ceased to urge the advantages of a formal agreement, or to deprecate the excessive distrust of Russia which then prevailed among Englishmen. Sir Alfred Lyall had been Foreign Secretary in India, and his views had become the doctrine of the Indian Foreign Office, with the result that in 1886, after a joint Boundary Commission, there was signed an agreement between Russia and England which defined the northern border of Afghanistan. This was the first step towards the general understanding of 1907. But in 1886 the time had not yet come for that general understanding. Russians then, and for many years longer, regarded the twentieth century as theirs, and were unwilling to fetter themselves by further positive engagements. It was not until after the Russo-Japanese War, and the changes of feeling it brought about in Russia, that a general understanding became possible. As Lord Lansdowne said in the House of Lords in 1907, "until lately we know that she kept us at arm's length."

As to the specific terms of the Convention, its critics had no difficulty in showing that, especially with regard to Persia, the British Government had made a very indifferent bargain. Practically the whole of southern Persia, up to and including the line from Kermanshah by Hamadan, Ispahan and Yezd to the Afghan border, had till then been regarded as well within the field of British influence and British trade, which extended far beyond that line. The line itself was now placed within the Russian zone, and most of the country to the south of it was made neutral, not British. Though Russian trade and Russian influence were gaining some ground they were not in a position to justify such a partition as this, for, as *The Times* afterwards pointed out, British interests lay "almost exclusively in the neutral zone and not in the British sphere."

When the Convention was signed, its effect in Persia was great, perhaps greater than in any part of Asia. The Persians then for the first time found that they could no longer rely upon the rivalry of which they had made so much use. This was a severe shock, and created much alarm. It made the Convention very unpopular throughout the country. This unpopularity was greatly increased by the partition of



ISPAHAN: THE GREAT SQUARE, ABBAS MOSQUE AND NAGAREH KHANA.



[From Shuster's "Strangling of Persia."

RUSSIAN AND PERSIAN OFFICERS OF THE "COSSACK BRIGADE."

Treasurer-General, whom the Persian Government had appointed to reorganize their finances, selected Major Stokes, Military Attaché in the British Legation, as the fittest person to command a new gendarmerie which it was proposed to embody. It was in the circumstances a rather risky step to take, as the British Foreign Office seems to have felt; but when Mr. Shuster pressed it their reply was that before accepting the appointment Major Stokes must resign his

THE RUSSIAN GENERAL BARATOFF (IN UNIFORM) AT THE RECEPTION BY THE SHAH IN THE PALACE AT TEHERAN.

The marble throne can be seen in the background.

THE SHAH OF PERSIA INSPECTING A RUSSIAN AEROPLANE AT TEHERAN.
(The Shah is the second figure from the left.)

commission in the Indian Army. Major Stokes and the Persian Government naturally regarded this reply as giving assent, and acted upon it. Then Russia objected, on the ground apparently that a British subject should not be employed in such a position within the northern zone, and the British Foreign Office advised Persia to yield to the objection, though in theory Persia was independent and entitled to make the appointment. *The Times* commented upon the vacillation shown on this occasion, and observed that the "affair reflected no credit on either the British or the Russian Foreign Offices." It certainly was not calculated to raise British prestige in Persia. There were too many instances of the kind, and the general impression left upon the mind of any one reading the newspapers and blue books of the time would probably be that as the British Government had shown a some-

what excessive complacency in agreeing to the terms of the Convention, so they afterwards showed a somewhat excessive complacency in carrying it out. Still it may be admitted that without the Convention the state of affairs in Persia might have been even worse than it became with the Convention in force, and in any case the general understanding with Russia bore invaluable fruits elsewhere. It is mainly from that point of view that the Convention must always be judged. Its effect undoubtedly was to bring Russia and England together, and put an end to an antagonism which had long threatened the peace not only of Asia but of the world.

RUSSIAN OFFICERS AND (on the right) THE BRITISH ATTACHÉ AT KERMANSHAH.

To return to the course of affairs in Persia after the deposition of Mohamed Ali Shah. It seems useless to do more than give a very brief summary of events between 1909 and 1914. During that time the government of the country was carried on largely in accordance with the views of the Mejlis or National Assembly, a body which contained in its ranks some unquestionably patriotic and enlightened men who were doing their best for the country, but contained also, as was only natural, many members who showed no sign of practical ability to understand the new conditions, and some who were reactionary and corrupt: From the young Shah of course no help could be expected; and the Regents appointed to control the administration, one of whom, Nasir-ul-Mulk, was a man of European education and high character, found that their powers were insufficient to enable them to do their work effectively. There

GUNS CAPTURED BY THE RUSSIANS AT KERMANSHAH.

MIRZA HASSAN KHAN, G.C.M.G.
Mushir-ed-Dowleh. Special Envoy, and several times Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.

was great need of money, for during the disorders of the last two years the collection of taxes had been practically abandoned, and the Mejlis was very reluctant to raise any foreign loans. The army, with the exception of the small Cossack Brigade under its Russian officers, was unpaid and utterly inefficient. It had for many years been very small in numbers, and now it had for all practical purposes ceased to exist. All over the country disorder had broken out, and it increased year by year. The roads in the south, and indeed in most parts, became thoroughly unsafe, and all trade suffered severely. In 1910 the state of things in this respect was such that the British Government thought it desirable to inform the Persians that unless they restored order within three months the task would have to be undertaken by levies under British-Indian officers—a proposal afterwards wisely abandoned. In the following year, Nasir-ul-Mulk being Regent, some serious attempts were made to improve the situation. A capable and honest American, Mr. Shuster, was put in charge of the Treasury, which was not only empty but owed a considerable sum in arrears. He did some excellent work, but, not thoroughly understanding the situation, he unfortunately came into conflict with the Russians, who, after a few months, called for his dismissal, and sent an ultimatum to the Persian Government containing this and other demands. They were perforce accepted, for a Russian force was within a hundred miles of the capital. About the same time some Swedish officers were brought into the country to raise a gendarmerie for the restoration of order on the trade routes and elsewhere.

But the situation was now complicated by the landing in Persia of the ex-Shah Mohamed Ali, whose adherents raised trouble in various districts and threatened to advance on the capital. One of them, Arshad-ud-Dowleh, actually did advance to within forty miles of it, with a force consisting mainly of Turcomans. He was met by a smaller body of Nationalist troops, who defeated him and took him prisoner. Then followed a pathetic scene which recalls in some measure the story of Drake and Doughty. The vanquished general, who had been wounded, was courteously treated by the Nationalist chiefs. They attended to his wound, let him have all he wanted, and kept

THE ZIL-ES-SULTAN,
Great-Uncle of the Shah.

him in friendly conversation for some hours of the night. Then, against his entreaties, the meeting broke up, and early the next morning he was led out to execution. Asking that his body might be sent to his wife in Teheran, and that a locket he was wearing should be buried with him, he stood up with his eyes unbandaged and received a volley from the firing party. He fell, but only one bullet had struck him, and a second party was told off to finish the work. When all was ready he rose to his knees and again faced the line of rifles, calling out as he did so, "Long live Mohamed Ali Shah." Then he fell dead. It was a death which showed that courage and loyalty are to be found among Persians. Arshad-ud-Dowleh's defeat saved Teheran, and practically destroyed the ex-Shah's chance of regaining his throne.

About the same time two or three squadrons of Indian cavalry were sent up to Shiraz. This place being over a hundred miles from the sea by a difficult mountain road, flanked by wild tribesmen, the step was not a wise one; and

MIRZA MOHAMED ALI KHAN, G.C.V.O.
Ala-es-Saltaneh. Some years Persian Minister in London; Foreign Minister and Prime Minister.

MIRZA HASSAN KHAN.
Mohtasham-es-Saltaneh. Several times Minister of Foreign Affairs; also held portfolios of Finance, Interior and Justice.

it proved unfortunate, for the regiment could do nothing in such a country and was soon practically shut up. After remaining in a false position for a year or more and losing a British officer and some men killed, it was withdrawn, not without danger. The Russians at that time had about 13,000 men in the north of Persia, who could protect themselves.

So matters went on, the country becoming more and more disturbed, until the southern roads were practically closed and British trade at a standstill, while the so-called Government at Teheran made little or no effort to restore order. The Swedish officers did raise a certain number of men for their gendarmerie, but under great difficulties for want of money, and eventually with no great success. Except in the capital, where the Cossack Brigade and a strong body of Bakhtiari tribesmen kept matters quiet, and in the provinces occupied by Russian troops, there was little security for property or life. Nor was the situation improved by the action of the Germans, who ever since the Russian defeats in the Japanese War had become more active in their policy, and were now working steadily in various ways to take advantage of the popular feeling against



KASVIN.

England and Russia. In 1914 they had acquired considerable influence with some of the people about the Government, and others. Such was the condition of affairs in Persia in the summer of that fateful year. Persia was too disorganized and weak to take any serious part in a great war, but her geographical position and the anarchy that prevailed throughout the country made her a fine field for the intrigues and military action of others. It may be added that, while Germany was working in her customary method among the Persians, their old enemies, the Turks, had during the recent years of disorder encroached at various points upon the western frontier, and, though a mixed Commission was at work upon a general settlement of the line, the Turks were in possession of considerable tracts of Persian territory.

Shortly after the outbreak of war the Persian Government declared its neutrality. It was



TABRIZ

hardly in a position to act otherwise. No doubt there was now among a large section of the people a feeling of hostility towards Russia and England. There was also, perhaps, considerable sympathy for the Turks as a Musulman Power taking up arms against the infidel. On the other hand, though Russia was withdrawing some of her troops for service elsewhere, she was still capable of striking a swift blow at the capital; and England, in spite of her rather feeble proceedings during the last few years, could be dangerous if roused. Moreover, both Russia and England still had many friends or partisans in the country. And Turkey, though a Musulman Power, was deeply hostile to the Shiah faith. Public opinion, therefore, was by no means unanimous. Finally, Persia, with all her glorious past and all the national self-esteem which was the result of it, had no army and no money. It was better for her, therefore, to stand aside if possible and run no risks. Perhaps her decision to do so, if indeed she had come to any real decision, was strengthened by the prompt action taken by England in landing a force on Turkish soil at the head of the Persian Gulf and taking Basra. It will be remembered by those who have read an earlier chapter of this History, "The Advance towards Baghdad," that the taking of Basra was soon followed by the dispatch of a brigade to occupy Ahwaz in Persian territory and protect the British oil wells.* Both to north and south, therefore, Persia had Allied troops within her borders, and in some strength. The fact, unpalatable as it might be, counselled prudence.

But if Persia remained on the outbreak of war ostensibly neutral, her territory was to become the scene of varied fighting, though not on a very large scale. A chapter of this History, entitled "The Intervention of Turkey," described the situation in 1914 at the point close to Mount Ararat where the frontiers of Russia, Turkey and Persia come together, and gave an account of the manner in which the Turks opposed to the Russian army of the Caucasus tried to turn the Russian left by marching through Persian territory on Tabriz.† This important town was taken at the beginning of 1915 by a small Turkish force, with the help of some thousands of Kurd horsemen, the Persians making no effective resistance; but before the end of January the Russians, who had evacuated the place, returned and expelled the invaders. After this reverse, and some minor reverses which followed it, the Turks apparently gave up the hope of acting effectively in the extreme north of Persia, and resolved to throw their weight farther south upon the British at Ahwaz and, if possible, upon the main road running from the Baghdad province to the Persian capital, by way of Kermanshah and Hamadan. This was the road by which they could best work upon the interior of Persia, in cooperation with their German allies, and perhaps even create a diversion against England in Afghanistan. The Germans were ready to do their share. They had in Kermanshah a Consul, Schünemann by name, who was well supplied with money and had been working energetically among the surrounding tribes. They had also at Ispahan, in the centre of Persia, an unofficial agent, Pugen, who was doing all he could to raise trouble and to persuade the ignorant inhabitants that the Germans, including their Kaiser, had embraced the Moslem faith. This individual dressed himself in Persian attire, wore an armlet inscribed with the Musulman Kalama, or profession of faith, and was generally daring and picturesque. In the capital itself were the German Minister, Prince Reuss, the Austrian Minister, and the Turkish Ambassador, all apparently able to dispose of unlimited money and considerable

THE AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN.

* Vol. X. Chapter clviii.
† Vol. III. Chapter xlix.

quantities of arms. And elsewhere, in Shiraz, in Yezd, in distant Kerman, even in Afghanistan, German agents were busily spreading their fables about German victories and the speedy advent of a Turco-German army of invasion. In Afghanistan these efforts failed, the Ameer Habibullah remaining staunch to his alliance

BRITISH REFUGEES ON THE ROAD FROM ISPAHAN.

with England; but, liberally backed with money and rifles, they had no small effect upon the imaginative Persians.

The result of the propaganda was soon seen. During the year 1915 the Turks, fully occupied with the British at Ahwaz, who drove them over the border, seem to have sent no regular troops into the centre of the country; but in the spring small bodies of irregular horse crossed the frontier to Kermanshah, and soon afterwards trouble broke out at many points. First the Russian Vice-Consul at Ispahan was murdered. In July, as far south as Bushire, a body of nomad tribesmen in German pay prepared an ambush for a British patrol, and two British officers were killed. A month or so later the German Schünemann, having collected a force some hundreds strong, waylaid on the road to Hamadan the British and Russian Consuls at Kermanshah, and the gendarmerie giving them no help, they were compelled to retire. On September 1 the British Consul-General at Ispahan, Mr. Grahame, an officer who had exceptional sympathy for the Persians, was fired upon and wounded. A few days afterwards the British Vice-Consul in Shiraz, a Persian himself, was attacked and died of his wounds. *The Times* of September 10, commenting upon these occurrences, wrote that the chaotic anarchy in Persia had become chronic.

"Persia is now one great Alsatia. Bands of brigands roam the country districts looting indiscriminately, and often adding murder to their lesser crimes. In the few cities and towns some semblance of authority is still maintained, usually by the strongest local official, who pays very little heed to such orders as reach him from the capital. The gendarmerie, commanded by Swedish officers, a force which was never a great success, is losing such grip as it ever had, and the men are disaffected because they can get no pay. . . . Turkish irregulars have ravaged Persian territory far and wide in the Lake Urmia district, without



[*Elliott and Fry.*

COLONEL W. F. O'CONNOR.
British Consul-General at Shiraz, made prisoner by the Germans.

incurring any marked disapproval from the Teheran Government. The confusion extends to the capital, where the youthful Shah exercises little control, and Ministries succeed one another with even more frequency than usual. Corruption is rife, as of old, and many Ministers and Deputies have yielded to the temptations of the German gold lavishly spent among them. . . . The new factor in the Persian situation is, indeed, the ubiquity and audacity of the German agents, who peram-

bulate the country with plentiful supplies of cash and rifles, and do their best to promote confused and muddled hostilities. . . . German Consuls, with the aid of machine-guns and mercenaries locally enlisted, have not hesitated to attack the Consular representatives of Great Britain and Russia. . . . The German Legation at Teheran, and the German Consulates at Ispahan, Kermanshah, and elsewhere, are stated to have become armed camps. . . . The Persian Government professes to be helpless, and probably is so."

This was an unpromising state of affairs, but worse was to come. A few days later the British and Russian community in Ispahan found the condition of the town so threatening that with the concurrence and help of the Persian authorities they left for the capital, more than two hundred miles away, where there seemed to be a better chance of security. Then the Swedish officer in command of the gendarmerie disbanded the force, as he could get no pay for it, though the British and Russian Governments more than once lent some money for the purpose. Even in the capital things were not going well. Early in November, 1915, it was known that there was a considerable force of Europeans and Persian mercenaries in the German and Austrian Legations ready for action; that some of the more violent members of the National Assembly were in German pay; and that the Germans and Turks were trying to induce the Persian Government to enter into an agreement for combined hostilities against Russia and England. There were rumours that the Shah and his Government were hesitating, and contemplating withdrawal to Ispahan. So critical was the condition of affairs that Sir Edward Grey made a statement in the House of Commons referring to the proposed agreement, and a Russian force advanced to within a few miles of Teheran in order to protect the Legations. Then the German, Austrian and Turkish representatives left the capital and marched some miles down the road to the south. They had with them the leader of the "Democratic" party in the National Assembly and other officials, and they confidently hoped that the Shah would follow. On November 15 there was a close trial of strength between the hostile Powers, and for hours the fate of Persia hung in the balance. At Shah Abdul Azim, six miles away, where old Nasir-ud-din Shah had been murdered twenty years before, the Ministers of the Central Powers waited in full uniform, with a great part, perhaps half, of the National Assembly, and the disbanded gendarmerie and other troops in parade order under German, Turkish, and Swedish officers. In Teheran were the British and Russian Ministers, doing their best to dissuade the Shah from leaving his capital. The young ruler, still hardly more than a boy, seemed completely

PRINCE HENRY XXXI OF REUSS,
German Minister at Teheran.

unable to come to a decision, and asked piteously for advice from all about him. The majority of his Ministers seemed to be in favour of his going, and assured him that they represented the feeling of the people, as perhaps they did. On the other hand, one or two of them, notably the Farman Farma, a prince of the Kajar house, stood staunchly by the cause of the Allies. At last, after much painful hesitation, the Shah decided that he would remain in Teheran, and, to the intense disappointment of the assemblage awaiting him by the mosque on the southern road, word came that they need not expect him. The Russian and English Ministers were assured that for the future the attitude of the Persian Government would be one of "benevolent neutrality," and the dramatic crisis was over.



COSSACK AND CONSULAR GUARD AT THE LANDING OF GENERAL SIR PERCY SYKES.



NAVAL GUARD OF HONOUR AT THE LANDING OF GENERAL SIR PERCY SYKES.

Soon afterwards the Farman Farma was appointed Prime Minister, and for the time, so far as the Persian Government was concerned, all seemed to be going well from the point of view of the Allies.

Nevertheless, all was not going well in the country. A few days before the scene at Teheran a body of the disbanded gendarmerie at Shiraz broke into open revolt, and led by some of its Swedish officers, surrounded the British Consulate. The Consul, Major (afterwards Colonel) O'Connor, having no troops at his disposal, was made a prisoner, and with him the few British in the place. The women were sent away to the port of Bushire, where, after some threatening demonstrations, they arrived in safety. The Consul and his companions were marched away and handed over to some local khans who were under the influence of a German ex-Consul, a certain Herr Wassmuss, who had distinguished himself by the energy of his intrigues. They were not released for several months. The German Minister with his following, meanwhile, took up a position at Kum, about a hundred miles from the capital, and from there carried on his irregular warfare. There were risings, brought about by his people, to the west near Hamadan, and far away to the east in Yezd and Kerman, where, it is said, the insurgents murdered a cousin of the well-known Indian Mohamedan leader, His Highness the Aga Khan.

The news of the British repulse at Ctesiphon in Mesopotamia strengthened the hands of the Germans; and before long their armed adherents in Persia, including some Turkish irregular horse, amounted to something like 15,000 men. But their success, such as it was, did not last long. In Bushire the British had now firmly established themselves, and there was a strong revulsion of feeling in their favour in the southern districts, while in the north the Russians struck some telling blows. The force they could spare for Persia was small; but in December they broke up a dangerous rising near the capital, and after defeating a Turco-German force on the main Turkish road they took Hamadan. A few days later, on the 21st, another Russian column took Kum, the German headquarters, the Minister and his motley assemblage making no stand; and before the end of the year the Russians had pushed down the road to the town of Kashan, threatening the centre of fanaticism and disaffection at Ispahan itself.

In the following year, 1916, the tide of affairs in Persia turned still more strongly in favour of the Allies. On the western side of the country there was some fighting between the Russians and Turks upon the main road before mentioned, a road which has been the scene of fighting and the highway of trade from time immemorial. By it, for thousands of years, caravans bore the riches of the Far East to the capitals of the ancient Empires in Mesopotomia and the shores of the Bosphorus; and by it countless armies marched to and fro—westward and eastward. By it Darius retreated before Alexander the Great, and the Arabs carried the victorious banners of Islam into the centre of Asia. It was now to see the ebb and flow of battle in the greatest war of all time. The armies engaged were, it is true, small in comparison with the armies of old days, for the main fields of the war were far away; but Turks and Russians were to fight on that classic ground. The first success was with the Turks, who, flushed with their success against the British at Ctesiphon, pushed forward across the border early in the year, occupied Kermanshah, and advanced to the neighbourhood of Hamadan, the Ecbatana of the Greeks. In the month of March the Russians advanced in their turn, drove back the Turks, and got as



[Elliott & Fry.

SIR CHARLES MARLING,
British Minister at Teheran.

far as Kerind, only 150 miles from Baghdad. About the same time their southern column arrived at Ispahan and re-established the Allied Consulates in the old capital of Shah Abbas. Soon afterwards the German Emperor telegraphed to "the Commander-in-Chief of the Persian National Army," in reality the leader of a small force of Persian rebels, and announced that General von der Goltz and other German officers were being sent to help him. It does not appear that they ever arrived; but about this time the energetic Schünemann, with the leader of the Democrats in the National Assembly and other German adherents, were captured by a local chief and sent to Teheran. Then the Turks pushed forward once more, retook Kermanshah, and apparently in the course of the autumn got to a point 250 miles beyond the Persian frontier, where they were again checked.

Meanwhile in the south of Persia the British had been doing their share. Not only had they cleared the country about Ahwaz, and established themselves firmly at Bushire, but they had sent into the country to the south-east a detachment under a British officer, Sir Percy Sykes, formerly Consul at Kerman. Beginning his career 25 years before as a subaltern of British cavalry, Sykes soon developed a taste for exploration and other work outside the limits of regimental duty, which led to his being employed in Persia. At Kerman, and afterwards as Consul-General in Meshed, he remained for more than 20 years. A man of remarkable energy, physical and mental, and an equally remarkable capacity for gaining the goodwill of the Persians, he became, in course of time, the first authority in all matters connected with the country. He travelled all over it, made himself thoroughly acquainted with its people, and wrote some books about it which were full of varied information. His *History of Persia*, in particular, showed deep study, and was a work of the greatest value. Some time after the war had broken out, and the state of Persia had become what has been described, His Majesty's Government decided to send Sykes, who had then left Persia, to restore order in the disturbed districts of the south and east. Going out to Bunder Abbas early in 1916 with the rank of Brigadier-General and the task of raising a body of Persian military police, he pushed up to his old post at Kerman, set matters right there, and then marched across the country disturbed by the Germans to Yezd, Ispahan, and Shiraz. The length of the march was over a thousand miles, and the difficulties great, for the whole country had been in anarchy for months and the tribes were now armed with German rifles. Apparently, General Sykes was successful in restoring order throughout the country east of Ispahan; and, arrived there, he was instructed to raise his force of tribal levies to a total of 11,000 men, the arrangement being that the Russians were to raise a similar force for service in the northern half of the country. This arrangement seems to have been made between the three Governments of Persia, Russia, and Great Britain; and to have formed part of a wider agreement by which the Russian and British Governments undertook to help Persia in reorganizing her finances and her administration. The terms of the agreement would appear to show that the provisions of the Convention of 1907 were wisely modified to recognize the fact that the special interests of Great Britain lie more in the neutral zone of that Convention than in the British zone.

At the end of the second year of the war the condition of affairs in Persia was on the whole promising. The Persian Government had shown a more friendly disposition. The mischief done by the Germans had been largely counteracted. Order had been restored in many parts, and arrangements had been made which gave some hope of general improvement. But the Turks remained in possession of large tracts of Persian territory in the north, and it was by no means certain that the German evil had been wholly extirpated. Until some crushing blow struck by the Russians in Asia Minor, or by the British in Mesopotamia, should break the power of Turkey in the East, and put an end once for all to Turkish military action across the Persian frontier, the situation in Persia would not be secure.

Whether in any case Persia could ever again become a really independent kingdom, standing by her own strength, was very doubtful. The Iran of Cyrus and Shah Abbas had fallen low indeed; and, however much Englishmen might wish to see her restored to something like the position she had held for twenty-five centuries, the hope of such a revival could not be a confident one.

CHAPTER CLXXVII.

THE END OF AMERICAN NEUTRALITY.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY—THE CONTROVERSIES WITH GERMANY FROM MAY, 1915, TO JANUARY, 1917—ANALYSIS OF THE SUBMARINE WARFARE DISPUTES—THE DEUTSCHLAND INCIDENT—GERMAN DEFIANCE—UNITED STATES BREAK OFF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS —GERMAN AGENTS AND THEIR CRIMES—THE GERMAN PROPOSAL OF ALLIANCE WITH MEXICO— THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY AND AMERICAN OPINION—PRESIDENT WILSON'S RE-ELECTION—HIS PEACE NOTE—AMERICAN PACIFISM AND ALOOFNESS EXAMINED—THE TRADE DISPUTES WITH GREAT BRITAIN—ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS—LOANS TO THE ALLIES—CHARITABLE SERVICES—THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE—THE "PREPAREDNESS" MOVEMENT—THE MEANING OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION.

ON February 3, 1917, exactly two and a half years after the beginning of the Great War, Mr. Woodrow Wilson, who in the previous November had been re-elected President of the United States of America, announced to Congress that diplomatic relations with the German Empire had been severed. On April 2 the President asked Congress to declare that a state of war existed between the United States and Germany. By April 6 the Administration resolution had passed both Houses. Thus ended the long period of American neutrality, and the present chapter reviews the history of the eighteen months that preceded the rupture of relations with Germany, a period which, whatever might be the consequences of American intervention in the war, must be reckoned as one of the most important in American history. This period witnessed the beginning of the evolution of the United States from an isolated and self-centred country into a World-Power.

Before the war the United States never had a real foreign policy save the negative policy implied by the Monroe doctrine. "Leave us alone in our hemisphere," America virtually said to Europe, "and we will not meddle in your affairs." True she had in the previous twenty years fought with one European country, and had joined with others in trying to stabilize the affairs of China; but the freeing of Cuba was not unconnected with the moral and political obligations imposed by the Monroe doctrine — the protection of New World Republicanisms from the anti-democratic tendencies of old-world monarchies. The acquisition of the Philippines was accidental and incidental, and John Hay's promulgation of the open door in China was little more than a passing demonstration of altruism. As a contribution to permanent policy it did not rank much higher than America's earlier naval crusades against the pirates of Algeria and the buccaneers of the Barbary Coast. Even its author regarded it mainly as a diplomatic *tour de force;* and President Wilson, by withdrawing from participation in the Six Powers loan in China at the beginning of his administration, relegated it to the limbo of abandoned policies.

In August, 1914, the old tradition against any sort of entanglements in Europe—the

tradition that made the United States enter the Algeciras Conference in 1906 on the express understanding that their interest in the Morocco complication was and would remain purely academic—had been reinforced by the accession to power of a Government of orthodox Liberal tendencies. So far as his official actions showed, Mr. Wilson had no more idea of the ultimate significance to the world of the later and more obviously sinister manifestations of the Prussian spirit than Gladstone, and some other British statesmen, had of its earlier manifestations. Not only was there no official crystallization of the best and most virile American opinion in the shape of a protest against the rape of Belgium, but the President proclaimed, on August 19, 1914, that the United States ought to remain neutral in thought as well as action. "The United States," he said, "must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impartial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another."



JAMES MONROE,
Secretary of State under James Madison, at the time of the Declaration of War with the United Kingdom in 1812, afterwards President. Author of the famous "Monroe Doctrine."

A comparison of such a view with Mr. Wilson's proposal two and a half years later for American participation in a League to Enforce Peace gives some idea of the educational effect of the war upon the United States, or rather the educational effect of Prussian lawlessness and savagery. The contrast is the more striking when the proposal is read in the light of the progress that even before the rupture with Germany had been made towards a growing popular demand for universal military service of some kind and for an adequate fleet. In his message to Congress in December, 1914, the President virtually ignored the war as being of no concern to the United States. In his second inaugural Address of March 5, 1917, he specifically stated that the reactions of the war had definitely proved that the United States could no longer live aloof.

From the time of the sinking of the Lusitania in May, 1915, down to the German Proclamation of "Barred Zones," of February 1, 1917, it was with Germany that American diplomacy and American public opinion were chiefly engaged. The Lusitania incident and its aftermath of diplomatic exchanges, in which the cynicism of Berlin was only equalled by the patience of Washington, have been sketched in a previous chapter.* War, or at any rate a rupture of relations, was averted because neither side wanted it. Berlin quibbled, procrastinated, and beclouded the controversy in every possible way. The President forbore to force the pace because, as a Liberal, he disliked the idea of war, because he knew that the country was not ready for war, and because he felt that he could best serve the cause of humanity by remaining neutral. And the Lusitania was but one of many incidents. The White Star liner Arabic foundered on the morning of August 19, 1915. Sworn evidence submitted to and afterwards published by the State Department in Washington made it perfectly clear that she was deliberately sunk by a German torpedo.

The defence of the German Government, in their Note to the American Government dated September 7, was that the commander of the criminal submarine "became convinced" that the steamer had the intention of attacking and

* See Vol. V., chapter lxxxix.

ramming him, because the Arabic, when approaching the place where he was preparing to sink by shell fire the Dunsley, a previous victim from which the crew had escaped, after altering her course pointed directly towards the submarine. The German Government, continued the Note, regretted that Americans should have perished, but refused to acknowledge liability. They would, however, arbitrate, if the United States liked. On September 14 the American Government submitted to Berlin evidence that convincingly rebutted the German accusation against the Arabic. Berlin, though it afterwards sought to make good its case by voluminous argument, saw that the game was up and changed its tactics. On October 5 Count Bernstorff wrote to Mr. Lansing, the American Secretary of State, a letter to the effect that the orders given to submarines to eschew passenger ships "had been made so stringent that a recurrence of incidents similar to the Arabic case is considered out of the question." The German Government, Count Bernstorff continued, were convinced that the submarine commander really thought he was going to be rammed; but they did not feel that they could impugn the word of the British officers of the Arabic that such an intention never entered their heads, and hence could only regret and disavow the act and promise to pay indemnity for American lives lost. This offer Mr. Lansing accepted on behalf of the President.

Hardly had a crisis over the Arabic been averted than on November 7 the Italian liner Ancona was sunk by a submarine flying the Austro-Hungarian flag. The circumstances of the sinking as recorded by Mr. Lansing in his note of December 6 were particularly brutal. The vessel was fired upon and sank while passengers were still on board vainly waiting to be taken into the boats. "The Government of the United States," said Mr. Lansing, "considers that the commander of the submarine violated the principles of international law and humanity . . . (by a) wanton slaughter of defenceless non-combatants." Therefore Austria-Hungary, if she valued the continuance of good relations with the United States, must disavow the crime and punish the responsible officers. Vienna's answer was characteristically impertinent. If the United States, it said in effect, really had to write so sharply, they might at any rate have the courtesy to designate the source from which they got their information. Also, what had the rulings for the conduct of submarine warfare which they had laid down in their correspondence with Germany got to do with Vienna, which had no authentic record of that correspondence? The Ancona case was a case for discussion, not for vituperation. Mr. Lansing countered by showing that the Austrian Admiralty had admitted that the Ancona had been torpedoed while passengers were still on board and by renewing the demands of his



SIR CECIL SPRING-RICE, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O.,
British Ambassador to the United States.

first Note. Vienna came back with a long rigmarole giving its version of the case and talking about the need of further investigation. Before the controversy could be developed the Persia was sunk with equal barbarity. By this time the Central Powers had realized that they had nothing much to fear from the President's indignation, that in fact he wanted to keep the peace as much as they did at that time. As a result, the Persia incident, like the Ancona case and indeed the Arabic case, was obliterated behind a veil of lies, misrepresentations, and plausible half-promises about reformed behaviour.

Berlin characteristically tried to take an ell when she had been given an inch. The Wilhelmstrasse was virtually certain that, provided Germany conducted submarine warfare with a show of carefulness, and provided that she



SUBMARINES BUILT IN AMERICA FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, INTERNED BEFORE DELIVERY AT CHARLESTON NAVY YARD.

avoided spectacular crimes involving the wholesale slaughter of Americans, or the obviously illegal sinking of large ships, the President would not live up to his determination, proclaimed at the time of the proclamation of the first submarine blockade in February, 1915, and repeated after the sinking of the Lusitania, to uphold the rights of neutrals and the laws of humanity as well as to protect the lives and property of his nationals. Not content with this considerable victory for "frightfulness," Berlin tried to go a step farther and to use the submarine campaign to embroil the United States with Great Britain.



THE "PRINZ EITEL FRIEDRICH," GERMAN AUXILIARY CRUISER, INTERNED AT NEWPORT NEWS.

She ran into port with passengers from several ships which she had sunk.

At the beginning of February, 1916, it was announced that Germany had "surrendered" in the Lusitania controversy. The chief object of the President had been to get Germany to disavow the act—that is to say, to admit that it was an illegal accident. His second object had been to secure some sort of reparation. His third object had been, by using the Lusitania as the leading submarine case, to pin Germany down to a definite promise that she would reduce her barbarities to such a minimum that the United States would be able to continue on terms with her.

The Germans allowed the President to win his third and, incidentally, his chief object—on paper. They repeated their pledge that unarmed merchantmen should not be sunk without warning and unless the safety of the passengers and crew had been assured, provided, of course, that the vessel did not try to escape or resist. Regarding disavowal, Germany refused to depart from her position that submarine warfare was a justifiable retaliation against the British blockade, but admitted that it was wrong to imperil the safety of neutrals. She offered to pay a full indemnity for American victims on the Lusitania, whose death she "greatly regretted." The "surrender" was not received with much enthusiasm. Stalwart opinion, which in the East especially had been growing increasingly bitter at the President's

patience in face of successive atrocities, condemned him for his readiness to accept blood-money for the murder of Americans. Scepticism was expressed as to the sincerity of German guarantees of safety in the future. The loophole left by the provision that merchantmen might still be sunk if they tried to resist or escape search could, it was pointed out. be enlarged indefinitely by the cynics of Berlin, But such criticism was inevitable. What surprised people was the silence of the President's supporters in Washington. They seemed nervous and preoccupied. There was no effort to display the compromise as a "diplomatic triumph." The cat did not remain long in the bag.

Berlin's retreat was purely strategic. At about the same time that Count Bernstorff "yielded" over the Lusitania, Mr. Lansing had forwarded to the Allied Governments a Note suggesting that, owing to the changed methods of maritime warfare, merchant ships ought not to be armed for defence. After registering his dislike of the German habit of killing non-combatants, Mr. Lansing said that he did not feel that a belligerent should be deprived of the proper use of submarines in the interruption of enemy commerce. They should, of course, obey the laws of visit and search; but so fragile were they that they would have great difficulty if merchantmen were allowed to carry any arms whatsoever.

Prior to the year 1915 belligerent operations against enemy commerce on the high seas had been conducted with cruisers carrying heavy armaments. Under these conditions international law appeared to permit a merchant vessel to carry an armament for defensive purposes without losing its character as a private commercial vessel. This right seems to have been predicated on the superior defensive strength of ships of war, and the limitation of armament to have been dependent on the fact that it could not be used effectively in offence against enemy naval vessels, while it could defend the merchantmen against the generally inferior armament of piratical ships and privateers.

The use of the submarine, however, has changed these relations. Comparison of the defensive strength of a cruiser and a submarine shows that the latter, relying for protection on its power to submerge, is almost defenceless in point of construction. Even a merchant ship carrying a small calibre gun would be able to use it effectively for offence against a submarine. Moreover, pirates and sea rovers have been swept from the main trade channels of the seas, and privateering has been abolished. Consequently, the placing of guns on merchantmen at the present day of submarine warfare can be explained only on the ground of a purpose to render merchantmen superior in force to submarines and to prevent warning and visit and search by them. Any armament, therefore, on a merchant vessel would seem to have the character of an offensive armament. . . .

It would, therefore, appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally just arrangement if it could be agreed by the opposing belligerents that submarines should be caused to adhere strictly to the rules of international law in the matter of stopping and searching merchant vessels, determining their belligerent nationality, and removing the crews and passengers to places of safety before sinking the vessels as prizes of war, and that merchant vessels of belligerent nationality should be prohibited and prevented from carrying any armament whatsoever.

In presenting this formula as a basis for conditional declarations by the belligerent Governments, I do so in the full conviction that your Government will consider primarily the humane purpose of saving the lives of innocent people rather than the insistence upon a doubtful legal right which may be denied on account of new conditions.



[Brooklyn Eagle.

"WILL THE SCRAP OF PAPER HOLD?"

Mr. Lansing's suggestion constituted a complete abandonment of American policy, which, as defined in a memorandum from Mr. Bryan to Count Bernstorff, dated September 19, 1914, was that merchant ships might be armed for defence in a strictly limited fashion, one gun, calibre not to exceed 6 inches, to be mounted abaft with a small quantity of ammunition and without expert gunners to serve it. American opinion received the Note with consternation. The conservative American Press warned the President that to treat armed merchantmen as warships would be a breach of neutrality and that the idea of depriving vessels of their only means of defence against the murderous attacks of submarines was, to put it mildly, unfair. Some newspapers—e.g., the *Philadelphia Ledger* on

February 13—went further and accused the State Department of having deliberately purchased the so-called surrender of Germany over the Lusitania by a promise to try to force us to disarm our merchant ships. The accusation gained weight from the behaviour of Count Bernstorff, who went about rubbing his hands with glee. "From this time forward," he was reported to have said, "all maritime controversies will lie between the Allies and the United States." There is no reason to believe that the State Department struck any such bargain. The facts of the case seem to have been that it was temporarily deceived by Count Bernstorff's plausible argument that, if vessels were armed, and if, as he had reason to believe, they sometimes shot at submarines on sight, submarines could not approach to hail them and therefore could not live up to his side of the Lusitania bargain. The period of the State Department's aberration was short. The surprise, not to say the indignation, of the Allies was conveyed to the President so authoritatively from London that he instructed Mr. Lansing to abandon his suggestion. Count Bernstorff was discomfited but not beaten. His efforts to embroil the United States and Great Britain had failed; but it might still be possible for Germany by a mixture of "frightfulness" and diplomatic chicanery so to work upon American opinion as to enable her to continue her career of piratical assassination.



GERMAN SUBMARINE UNDER REPAIR.

Before the failure of their first effort, the German Government had transmitted to Washington on February 11, 1916, a lengthy Memorandum accompanied by exhibits in the shape of a list of Allied vessels alleged to have attacked submarines offensively, copies of instructions as to the handling of guns alleged to have been captured on British vessels, and various other documents, which were either unconvincing or harmless, to prove that we were using our armed merchantmen deliberately to destroy well-meaning submarines and were rapidly increasing the number of our armed ships. The Memorandum said:—

> In the circumstances set forth above, enemy merchantmen armed with guns no longer have any right to be considered as peaceable vessels of commerce. Therefore the German naval forces will receive orders, within a short period, paying consideration to the interests of the neutrals, to treat such vessels as belligerents.
>
> The German Government brings this state of affairs to the knowledge of the neutral Powers in order that they may warn their nationals against continuing to entrust their persons or property to armed merchantmen of the Powers at war with the German Empire.

The Memorandum reached Washington at the end of February, simultaneously with the inauguration of Germany's new submarine campaign, which, though conducted on the hypothesis that no merchant ships would be sunk without due regard for life unless they tried to attack or escape, was nothing but the old practice of irresponsible murder under a new charter of piracy. Germany merely relied upon the allegation in her Memorandum about the promiscuously offensive propensities of our vessels to becloud the issue should Americans suffer. Had not the Arabic trouble been tided over by statements that the ill-fated liner was preparing to ram? Need any greater difficulty be expected if, in the event of another disaster, the submarine captain had a report promptly written for him showing that the victim was about to attack or trying to escape?

Germany over-estimated the President's patience and the desire of his advisers to be neutral at all costs. She proceeded too fast and too ostentatiously on her rake's progress. She torpedoed the Norwegian barge Silius almost before the State Department had digested Berlin's latest Memorandum. The Silius incident raised doubts, but before they could be resolved a far worse offence plunged the whole



THE CROSS-CHANNEL STEAMER "SUSSEX."

submarine controversy back into the melting-pot. On March 24 a Teutonic torpedo blew the bows off the French Channel steamer Sussex. Americans were killed and wounded, and the lives of others were jeopardized. Washington was more worried than at any time since the Lusitania tragedy. The public was aroused, especially in the East, though it patriotically forbore to do anything that would force the President's hand.

The President acted with his usual poise. After due delay to collect information, he asked Germany for her explanation. The explanation was characteristically unsatisfactory and it arrived only after the torpedoing of the Eagle Point, Manchester Engineer, Englishman, Berwindvale, and of the Red Cross steamer Portugal in the Mediterranean had enhanced the fear that Prussian promises were still not worth the paper they were written on. It asserted that the Sussex had been taken for a mine-layer and enhanced the blatancy of the lie not only with a quantity of meticulously deceptive details but with pictures comparing the Sussex with the imaginary mine-layer. This extraordinary document Washington rebutted with convincing details, supported by affidavits, in a Note dated April 18. It recapitulated the whole history of the submarine controversy, laid stress upon its patience, politely indicated a suspicion that Berlin had not been acting in good faith, and regretted that it would have to break off relations if there were more atrocities.



THE "SUSSEX" AFTER THE DESTRUCTION OF HER BOW SECTION.

The commanders of the Imperial Government's undersea vessels have carried on practices of such ruthless destruction which have made it more and more evident as the months have gone by that the Imperial Government has found it impracticable to put any such restraints upon them as it had hoped and promised to put. Again and again the Imperial Government has given its solemn assurances to the Government of the United States that at least passenger ships would not be thus dealt with, and yet it has repeatedly permitted its undersea commanders to disregard these assurances with entire impunity. As recently as February last it gave notice that it would regard all armed merchantmen owned by its enemies as part of the armed naval forces of its adversaries and deal with them as with men-of-war, thus, at least by implication, pledging itself to give warning to vessels which were not armed and to accord security of life to their passengers and crews; but even this limitation their submarine commanders have recklessly ignored.

Vessels of neutral ownership, even vessels of neutral ownership bound from neutral port to neutral port, have been destroyed, along with vessels of belligerent ownership in constantly increasing numbers. . . . Great liners like the Lusitania and Arabic and mere passenger boats like the Sussex have been attacked without a moment's warning, often before they have even become aware that they were in the presence of an armed ship of the enemy, and the lives of non-combatants, passengers, and crew have been destroyed wholesale and in a manner which the Government of the United States cannot but regard as wanton and without the slightest colour of justification. No limit of any kind has, in fact, been set to their indiscriminate pursuit and destruction of merchantmen of all kinds and nationalities within the waters which the Imperial Government has chosen to designate as lying within the seat of war. The roll of Americans who have lost their lives upon ships thus attacked and destroyed has grown month by month until the ominous toll has mounted into hundreds.

The Government of the United States has been very patient. . . . It has made every allowance for unprecedented conditions and has been willing to wait until the facts became unmistakable and were susceptible of only one interpretation.

It now owes it to a just regard for its own rights to say to the Imperial Government that that time has come.

THE GERMAN "COMMERCIAL" SUBMARINE "DEUTSCHLAND" AT BALTIMORE.

It has become painfully evident to it that the position it took at the very outset is inevitable—namely, the use of submarines for the destruction of an enemy's commerce is, of necessity, because of the very character of the vessels employed, and the very methods of attack which their employment of course involves, utterly incompatible with the principles of humanity, the long-established and incontrovertible rights of neutrals, and the sacred immunities of non-combatants.

If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines without regard to what the Government of the United States must consider the sacred and indisputable rules of international law and the universally recognized dictates of humanity, the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the Central Empires altogether. This action the Government of the United States contemplates with the greatest reluctance but feels constrained to take in behalf of humanity and the rights of neutral nations.

On April 19, the President appeared before Congress and read a paraphrase of the Note which was greeted with emphatic approval by the Legislature and by the whole country.

The Sussex Note was in point of fact most important. It put the issue plainly before Germany. In it the President reverted to the only sound principle upon which the submarine controversy could be conducted. He insisted that Germany should behave herself on the seas in the interests not only of American life and property but of international right and decency. He took, in fact, the same line as he had taken after the assassination of the Lusitania but which he seemed to desert in his later Lusitania Notes and in his treatment of the long string of Teutonic crimes between the Arabic and the Sussex. During that time scant attention was paid to the sinking of merchantmen of neutral or belligerent nations, provided no American citizen was injured; and there can be no doubt that this seeming willingness to allow a certain latitude for illicit warfare had bred in Germany a strong conviction that the United States would put nothing more efficacious than words in the way of an almost unlimited use of the submarine. This belief the Sussex Note shook considerably. It took Germany by surprise. It left her no choice but to climb down and to hide her discomfiture behind a characteristic veil of bluster about the illegalities of the British blockade and of blarney about her willingness to make peace if only the overweening ambitions and hatreds of the Allies would let her. That was the gist of the cumbrous and offensive Note of May 4. The Note, however, did contain radical concessions to the American point of view.

As far as it lies with the German Government, it wishes to prevent things from taking such a course. The

German Government is prepared to do its utmost to confine the operations of war for the rest of its duration to the fighting forces of the belligerents, thereby also insuring the freedom of the seas, a principle upon which the German Government believes itself, now as before, to be in agreement with the United States.

The German Government, guided by this idea, notifies the Government of the United States that the German naval forces have received the following orders: In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and destruction of merchant vessels recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared as naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.

But neutrals cannot expect that Germany, forced to fight for her existence, shall, for the sake of neutral interest, restrict the use of an effective weapon if her enemy is permitted to continue to apply at will methods of warfare violating the rules of international law. Such a demand would be incompatible with the character of neutrality, and the German Government is convinced that the Government of the United States does not think of making such a demand, knowing that the Government of the United States has repeatedly declared that it is determined to restore the principle of the freedom of the seas, from whatever quarter it is violated.

Accordingly the German Government is confident that, in consequence of the new orders issued to its naval forces, the Government of the United States will now also consider all impediments removed which may have been in the way of a mutual cooperation towards the restoration of the freedom of the seas during the war as suggested in the Note of July 23, 1915, and it does

[American Press Association.

AN AMERICAN SUPER-DREADNOUGHT: THE U.S. SHIP "ARIZONA."

not doubt that the Government of the United States will now demand and insist that the British Government shall forthwith observe the rules of international law universally recognized before the war as they are laid down in the Notes presented by the Government of the United States to the British Government on December 28, 1914, and November 5, 1915. Should the steps taken by the Government of the United States not attain the object it desires, to have the laws of humanity followed by all belligerent nations, the German Government would then be facing a new situation, in which it must reserve itself complete liberty of decision.

After a period of indignant cogitation American official and public opinion decided

MR. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Navy.

to accept the "concessions" thus conveyed, with the explicit proviso that it was to be clearly understood at Berlin that the American Government could not "for a moment entertain, much less discuss, a suggestion that respect by German naval authorities for the rights of citizens of the United States upon the high seas should in any way or in the slightest degree be made contingent upon the conduct of any other Government affecting the rights of neutrals and non-combatants. Responsibility in such matters is single, not joint; absolute, not relative." (Note of May 8, 1916.)*

A lull in the submarine campaign ensued. But it lasted only a few weeks, and it soon became apparent that Germany had reverted to her policy of torpedoing everything she could in any way she could, with the exception of a liner upon which American passengers might be presumed to be and of vessels flying the American flag. By October 1, 1916, it was announced by the British Admiralty that of the 262 vessels destroyed since the Sussex at least 15 had been attacked without warning. The State Department, however, reported officially that in none of these cases had anything been found that could be taken as proof of the violation of Germany's promise of May 4. The United States was in fact slipping back, as she did after the Lusitania, into the narrow national principle that nothing concerned her unless the lives of her nationals were jeopardized. Again encouraged by her attitude, and irritated and worried probably by the success of the British offensive on the Somme, Germany gradually increased the scope of her operations.

Her first move was to try to paralyse American self-respect by a strong dose of "frightfulness." During the summer of 1916 Americans had been electrified by the sudden appearance



MR. FRANK L. POLK,
Counsellor to the State Department and Acting Secretary of State.

at Baltimore of a German ocean-going mercantile submarine, the Deutschland, under the command of Captain Koenig. The visit, it was clear, impressed people immensely with the possibilities of the submarine. On October 7 it was followed up by the arrival in the harbour of Newport, which besides being a fashionable sea-side resort is also a naval station, of a submarine flying the German naval flag and armed with the regular torpedo tubes and guns. On October 8, after having been visited by

* For the effects in Germany of the Sussex crisis and the fall of Admiral von Tirpitz, see Vol. IX. p. 370.

the admiring representatives of official and naval Newport (not only the officers but also its crew seemed to be men especially picked on account of their physical appearance and linguistic attainments), and probably after exchanging with the German Ambassador, who was at Newport, all sorts of useful information, the U 53 left Newport within the prescribed 24 hours. Within 48 hours of her departure she sank within sight of the American coast six ships—four British, one Dutch, and one Norwegian. In each case the submarine commander warned his victims, and thanks to the help of American war vessels all lives were saved.

MR. JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
Secretary of the United States Navy.

MR. NEWTON D. BAKER,
United States Secretary for War.

The incident made a vast sensation. Friends of the Allies were indignant that the U 53 should have been allowed to come into Newport and communicate with Count Bernstorff. They pointed out that, in deference to an American protest against the hovering of British and French cruisers in American waters which had been registered during the preceding winter, the Allied warships had greatly curtailed their activities in the Western Atlantic, and that the United States Government had thus indirectly facilitated the commerce-destroying mission of the U 53. There was even greater indignation at the way in which American war vessels seemed to have acted as tenders to the German submarine, rescuing the lives it imperilled and thus enabling it to ply its work within the limits of humanity imposed by President Wilson.

So strong were the feelings aroused that the American Navy Department, hearing that they had spread to high quarters in England, prepared a letter setting forth the real facts for the informal use of the American Ambassador in London. The letter was addressed to Mr. Polk, the Counsellor of the State Department, by Mr. Franklin Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and dated November 18, 1916. The salient passages of this document, which satisfactorily disposed of an unpleasant incident, are here published for the first time:

I am particularly sorry that anyone in the British naval service believed that the American Navy would act unneutrally towards them, because of the exceedingly pleasant relations and good feeling which has heretofore existed between the two services. I think I may say this with perfect propriety, because it is simply a recognized fact that the relations between the British naval service and our own have always been of the most friendly nature

It would seem from Mr. Page's letter that it is believed in London that one of our destroyers obeyed the demand of the German submarine commander to move his ship and thereby facilitate the destruction of one of the merchantmen, and that we have not been frank in giving all the facts. May I say that there has been no reason at any time why all the facts should not be published, and that the only reason for confining ourselves to a general statement that we had been in every way

neutral was because we did not realize that any more detailed statement by the Navy Department would be of the slightest interest either to the British Government or the general public.

However, as the misinformation in regard to this particular episode does seem to exist, I am only too glad to give you the real facts of what occurred. On the morning of October 8 the Naval Radio Station at

COUNT BERNSTORFF,
German Ambassador to the United States from 1908 to 1917.

Newport, Rhode Island, received a S O S call from the s.s. West Point. The West Point stated that she was 10 miles south-south-east of the Nantucket Lightship. On receiving this information, and in compliance with the well-known and time-honoured custom that has ever characterized seamen in responding to the call of seafaring people, orders were given to the destroyers then in the harbour immediately to proceed to the assistance of the vessel. These orders were promptly carried out by all the destroyers then in the harbour. On reaching the vicinity of the Nantucket Lightship it was discovered that a German submarine had already sunk the West Point, and that the crew of that vessel had been safely landed on the Lightship and information was received from several other vessels that they were being attacked by a submarine. The destroyers naturally went to the vicinity of these various vessels in order to render such assistance to the crews and passengers as the dictates of humanity might necessitate under the conditions. Special emphasis should be laid on the fact that the sea was at that time smooth, and that in the case of vessels which were abandoned at any distance from the Lightship the German submarine was careful to tow the boats containing the personnel up to within easy reach of the Lightship. It does not seem possible to contend, in the light of what actually occurred, that any of the passengers or crews were in danger at any time.

Among the vessels which had been stopped by the submarine was the Dutch vessel Bloomersdyk. She had been stopped late in the afternoon and her personnel had been directed to abandon her before 6.30 p.m. These orders were carried out and her officers and crew abandoned the ship, the submarine in the meantime standing over to another ship which had been stopped several miles away. Several destroyers went to the vicinity of the Bloomersdyk and two of them, the U.S.S. McDougal and the U.S.S. Benham, received numbers of the crew of the Bloomersdyk on board, taking them out of the Bloomersdyk's boats. The Benham had been lying within a few hundred yards of the Bloomersdyk receiving a portion of the officers and crew on board, and having determined that there were no additional persons still left on board the Bloomersdyk was proceeding to get under way to return to Newport in accordance with instructions. At this time the German submarine returned to the Bloomersdyk and actually did signal to the Benham. requesting her commanding officer to move a little farther off in order that there might be no possibility of injury to the Benham or her personnel and stating that he was about to sink the Bloomersdyk. However, at the time this message was received the Benham had accomplished the purpose for which she was in the locality—*i.e.*, receiving on board a portion of the crew of the Bloomersdyk and ascertaining if there were any additional people still on board—and was in the act of departing quite without regard to the movements of the German submarine or her signalling. There was thus no occasion to regard, and no regard was given to the actions of the submarine.

GERMAN EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON,
Count Bernstorff's official residence.

I have gone over every report and have, further, made personal investigations, and I must tell you frankly that I cannot by the widest stretch of imagination see anything but absolute propriety in the action of the commanding officer of the U.S.S. Benham. The points to remember in regard to this particular episode are that this Dutch ship was abandoned by her officers and crew; that the officers and crew were in the ship's boats in a smooth sea and within two or three miles of the Nantucket Lightship; that the Benham, not for the purpose of saving their lives—for they were in no danger—but to give them comfort and assistance, took some of them on board near the abandoned ship; that she ascertained that no additional persons remained on the Bloomersdyk, and that having completed this duty she went about her business *in regular course. She did not leave the Bloomersdyk in obedience to the signal from the German submarine; she did not leave the Bloomersdyk earlier than she would have if the German submarine had not signalled; she did not leave the Bloomersdyk until her duty had been fully completed.*

This must be the case referred to in London, because I can find no record of a signal being made by the German submarine in the case of any of the other merchant ships sunk.

Another thing not generally known at the time was that, although the United States made no formal protest against the ventures of the U 53, the President did in point of fact summon Count Bernstorff to his country residence in New Jersey and tell him that he could not tolerate their repetition. That, it may be stated incidentally, was the only time that the President saw Count Bernstorff during the war save on purely formal occasions.

The exploit of the U 53 was not repeated, partly, perhaps, in consequence of the President's firmness. In European waters the scope of German submarine illegalities, however, increased steadily. On October 26 the British ship Rowanmore was attacked and destroyed by gunfire. There was no loss of life, but the two Americans and five Filipinos on board stated that the submarine shelled the life-boats as the crew were taking to them.

MR. JAMES W. GERARD,
United States Ambassador in Berlin from 1913 to 1917.

On October 26 the Marina was sunk in circumstances that are sufficiently well known, and six of the Americans on board were lost. Then followed the attack on the American steamer Chenung and the loss of 17 Americans on the Russian. The State Department in none of these cases did more than investigate, and it looked for a time as if the President had forgotten the fine stand which he had taken in



PRESIDENT WILSON ADDRESSING CONGRESS ON FEBRUARY 3, 1917.
The announcement of the break with Germany.

his Sussex Note. But he had not forgotten. He was only biding his time for another decisive stroke, and on January 31, 1917, he got his opportunity.

Towards the end of 1916 rumours had reached Washington in common with other capitals that Germany was contemplating a renewal of promiscuous submarine barbarity. It was recognized that the various more or less overt bids for peace which she had been making betokened a desperation which was bound to cause an explosion of "frightfulness." President Wilson had recognized this himself when he caused Mr. Lansing in his Peace Note of December 18 to say:

"The terms upon which it [the war] is to be concluded they [neutrals] are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done civilization itself which can never be atoned or repaired."*

The explosion came as soon as it had penetrated even the Prussian skull that the Allies were to be beguiled neither by the crocodile tears of Berlin nor by President Wilson's well-intentioned pleadings for the prompt re-establishment of a "warless world." It took the form of a publication on January 31 of a notice that from February 1 onwards the submarines, after granting a short respite to neutral vessels, would torpedo everything in sight in the waters around the British Isles and France and in the Mediterranean. The Note, after some hypocritical platitudes about Teutonic solicitude for the independence of small nations and the "freedom of the seas," announced that, in view of England's brutally illegal use of sea-power, which pressed upon neutrals as hard as upon her enemies, Germany must—

abandon the limitations which it has hitherto imposed on itself in the employment of its fighting weapons at sea.

Trusting that the American people and its Government will not close their eyes to the reasons for this resolution and its necessity, the Imperial Government hopes that the United States will appreciate the new state of affairs from the high standpoint of impartiality, and will also on their part help to prevent further misery and a sacrifice of human lives which might be avoided.

While I venture, as regards details of the projected war measures, to refer to the attached memorandum, I venture at the same time to express the expectation that the American Government will warn American ships against entering the barred zones (*Sperrgebiete*) described in the annexe and its subjects against entrusting passengers or goods to vessels trading with harbours in the barred zones.

In the annexe to the Note Berlin added insult to promised injury by telling the United States that she might send one ship a week to England provided that it was painted, as one American commentator expressed it, until it was "striped like a convict," and followed a prescribed route.

[*From the New York "World."*

"THE SANDS ARE RUNNING LOW."

The effect of the Note was instantaneous. American *amour propre* was stung to the quick. From one coast of the continent to the other there arose a clamour of indignation which two days later (February 3) the President crystallized in an address to Congress announcing that he had handed Count Bernstorff his passports in accordance with the promise that he had given during the Sussex dispute. After recalling to members of the Congress the correspondence that passed at that time, he said:

I therefore directed the Secretary of State to announce to his Excellency the German Ambassador that all diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire are severed and that the American Ambassador in Berlin will immediately be withdrawn, and, in accordance with this decision, to hand to his Excellency his passports.

Notwithstanding this unexpected action of the German Government, this sudden and deeply deplorable renunciation of its assurance given to this Government at one of the moments of most critical tension in the relations of the two Governments, I refuse to believe that it is the intention of the German authorities to do in fact what

* The American Peace Note of December 18, 1916, which is referred to here and in the following pages in connexion with President Wilson's views and policy, will be found in Chapter CLXXX, which deals with the whole peace discussion initiated by the German Note of December 12, 1916.

they have warned us they will feel at liberty to do. I cannot bring myself to feel that they will indeed pay no regard to the ancient friendship between their people and our own, or to the solemn obligations which have been exchanged between them, and destroy American ships and take the lives of American citizens in wilful prosecution of the ruthless naval programme they have announced their intention to adopt. Only actual overt acts on their part can make me believe this even now.

If this inveterate confidence on my part in the sobriety and prudent foresight of their purpose should unhappily prove unfounded, if American ships and American lives should in fact be sacrificed by their naval commanders, in heedless contravention of the just and reasonable understandings of international law and the obvious dictates of humanity, I shall take the liberty of coming again before Congress to ask that authority be given to me to use any means that may be necessary for the protection of our seamen and our people in the prosecution of their peaceful, legitimate errands on the high seas.

I can do nothing less. I take it for granted that all Neutral Governments will take the same course. We do not desire any hostile conflict with the Imperial German Government. We are sincere friends of the German people and earnestly desire to remain at peace with the Government which speaks for them. We shall not believe that they are hostile to us unless and until we are obliged to believe it, and we purpose nothing more than reasonable defence of the undoubted rights of our people. We wish to serve no selfish ends. We seek merely to stand, true alike in thought and action, to the immemorial principles of our people which I have sought to express in my address to the Senate only two weeks ago. We seek merely to vindicate our right to liberty, justice, and unmolested life.

These are bases of peace, not of war. God grant that we may not be challenged to defend them by acts of wilful injustice on the part of the Government of Germany.

Count Bernstorff was handed his passports the same day. Mr. Gerard left Berlin, but not until he had been characteristically detained by the German Government and vainly browbeaten in the hopes that he might commit his Government to giving up the German ships laid up in American ports in case of war, and to the granting of various privileges to German citizens in the U.S. in the same contingency. The Austrian Ambassador—the notorious Dr. Dumba's successor, Count Tarnowski—was allowed to remain in Washington, although he was never officially received by the American Government, and the American Ambassador, Mr. Penfield, in Vienna, pending a clear definition as to Austria's attitude regarding her particular policy; but it was generally taken for granted that the President had definitely made up his mind that lawlessness which according to figures issued a little later by the State Department had cost 232 American lives had to cease.

If Prussian maritime frightfulness brought to an abrupt termination the first chapter of

MR. GERARD'S HOME-COMING, MARCH 16, 1917.
On his left is Mr. John B. Stanchfield, Chairman of the New York Reception Committee, and the nearer figure in front is Mr Clarence H. Mackay.

the history of the relations of the United States and Germany during the war, other factors had powerfully contributed to the same end. All through 1915 and 1916 American exasperation had been steadily rising against the blatant activities of German agents and propagandists. Their activities fell into two classes—political and criminal. The general idea of Berlin was, first, to keep the United States neutral as long as possible; secondly, to gull the public into demanding that the President should cut his policies according to the Prussian pattern—agitate for peace when the Germans wanted it, place an embargo upon the export of munitions to the Allies, and take a strong line against our blockade generally, etc.; thirdly, to impress the American imagination with the reality of Prussian "frightfulness" and actually to injure her trade with the Allies by *sabotage*, the blowing up of munition factories, the crippling of means of transportation, etc.; fourthly, to use the United States as a base for belligerent operations for the extension of *sabotage* to Canada, for the promotion of Indian and Irish unrest, for espionage in France and England, for the smuggling of contraband, and very probably for the furnishing of submarines with supplies during the later phases of the war, just as commerce-destroying cruisers had been supplied to some extent during the early phases of it. It was also clear that Count Bernstorff and his agents were all along preparing difficulties for the United States in the American hemisphere should it be necessary to deflect American attention from the Old World. In Mexico there was a campaign to stir up Carranza against the United States, generally to keep revolution seething, and to cripple if possible by those and other means the Tampico oil fields, whence the British Fleet drew valuable supplies. Nor was there any reasonable doubt but that German cash and intrigue helped in the outbreak of the revolution in Cuba in February, 1917, and were continually active in other Latin-American countries for the behaviour of which the United States were more or less responsible, if only because of their proximity to the Panama Canal.

All this and much besides was brought out in the most dramatic way possible by the revelation, after the rupture, of the German Government's effort through the German Minister to Mexico, the ex-Dragoman, Herr von Eckhardt, to arrange with Mexico and, if possible, with Japan for an offensive alliance against the United States.

Congress was debating a Bill to give the President power to enforce his plans for "armed neutrality" against Germany—to supply American merchant ships with guns—and to take such other steps as might be necessary to secure for his nationals their rights on the high seas. Pacifists, spurred on by the walking delegates of the Teutonic propaganda, were working

GENERAL CARRANZA,
To whom Germany addressed the proposal for an alliance with Mexico.

up a huge opposition, and it seemed doubtful whether the President would get the national sanction for steps which it was deemed that the rupture with Germany and the barbarity of the Prussian submarines rendered well-nigh indispensable. So the Administration sprang upon the public part, at any rate, of a document which had been intercepted on its way to Mexico. The document speaks for itself:

(Authentic copy of the German Foreign Minister's note to the German Minister in Mexico.)

Berlin, Jan. 19, 1917.

On the 1st of February we intend to begin submarine warfare unrestricted. In spite of this, it is our intention to endeavour to keep neutral the United States of America.

If this attempt is not successful, we propose an alliance on the following basis with Mexico: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory of New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona. The details are left to you for settlement.

You are instructed to inform the President of Mexico



AMERICAN SUBMARINES.

of the above in the greatest confidence as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States, and suggest that the President of Mexico, on his own initiative, should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan. At the same time, offer to mediate between Germany and Japan.

Please call to the attention of the President of Mexico that the employment of ruthless submarine warfare now promises to compel England to make peace in a few months.

ZIMMERMAN.

The revelation set opinion ablaze. A dozen pro-Germans, pacifists, or provincial fools in the Senate managed to prevent the passage of the Armed Neutrality Law before the dissolution of Congress on March 4, but public opinion was so aroused by this and subsequent revelations of German intrigue and of the activities of their Irish and Hindu tools that it would have heartily supported the President in any immediate action against Germany within the limits of his constitutional powers.

The whole history of German propaganda, spying, and *agent-provocateur* work in the United States was suddenly thrown into ominous and obvious perspective. Incidents hitherto but half understood were marshalled and their cumulative significance was grasped. The United States, it was seen, was festering with spies. Her industrial and commercial organizations, her relations not only with the Allies but with her Latin-American neighbours were seen to be ubiquitously threatened.

There is no space here to go into the whole of the unsavoury history of the business. Its earlier stages, the New York *World's* revelations regarding Teutonic plans for capturing the American Press in the summer of 1915, the dismissal of Dr. Dumba owing to the proof afforded by papers seized from the American journalist Archibald in the autumn of that year that the Austrian Ambassador was implicated in plots to cause strikes in American munition works, have already been described.* They were followed in December, 1915, by the recall of Captains von Papen and Boy-Ed, the German military and naval attachés. Their recall came as the result of the accumulation of an immense mass of evidence that they and their agents were plotting for the destruction of munition factories, for the arrangement of *sabotage* in Canada, for the fomentation of

* See Vol. V., Chapter LXXXIX.

Indian unrest, for the blowing up of Allied ships, and that they were the directors of a large organization for the forgery and stealing of American passports for the use of spies like Lody and Kuepferle. Its immediate cause was the trial and conviction in New York of Dr. Karl Buenz, a Prussian agent masquerading as a director of the Hamburg-Amerika line, and some of his employees on a charge of filing false clearance papers for the tenders of German cruisers at the beginning of the war. It appeared that Boy-Ed was, among other things, the treasurer of the whole precious organization, and that von Papen had specialized in the destruction of munition factories. After the State Department had asked for and secured their recall, the President in his annual address to Congress, on November 7, 1915, took for the first time official notice of the delinquencies of the German plotters and especially of their German-American assistants. Having alluded to their activities, without mentioning names, he said:

America has never witnessed anything like this before, and never dreamed it possible that men sworn into her own citizenship, men drawn out of the great free stocks, such as have supplied some of the best and strongest elements of that little but now heroic nation that in the high day of old staked its very life to free itself from every entanglement that had darkened the fortunes of older nations and set up a new standard here, that men of such origins and such choices of allegiance would ever turn in malign reaction against the Government and people who had welcomed and nurtured them and seek to make this proud country once more a hotbed of European passion. A little while ago such a thing would have seemed incredible, because it was incredible. We made no preparation for such a contingency. We would have been almost ashamed to prepare for it, as if we were suspicious of ourselves and our own comrades and neighbours.

But the ugly and incredible thing actually has come about, and we are without adequate Federal laws to deal with it. I urge you to enact such laws at the earliest possible moment, and I feel that in doing so I am urging you to do nothing less than to save the honour and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out. They are not many, but they are infinitely malignant, and the hand of our power should close over them at once. They have formed plots to destroy property, they have entered into conspiracies against the neutrality of the Government, and they have sought to pry into every confidential transaction of the Government in order to serve interests alien to our own.

The President's demand for better laws was characteristically ignored by Congress until after the departure of Count Bernstorff, a year later. All through the winter the German propagandists and plotters kept up their work. Now it was a case of lurid advertisements of British brutality in starving German babies; now it was support of Count Bernstorff's



AMERICAN SAILORS.

diplomacy by efforts to gull or blackmail Congress into fomenting trouble over our arming of merchantmen and otherwise to embarrass the President; now it was a spasm of manufactured agitation against our blockade or the formation of some Irish-German-American society for the confusion of the common enemy.

All this was of considerable educational value, and prepared the way for the next

MR. ELIHU ROOT,
Secretary of War in the McKinley Cabinet,
Secretary of State in the Roosevelt Cabinet.

sensation. On April 18, 1916, indictments were returned against von Papen on charges of furnishing money, electric generators, fuses, and wires for the destruction of the Welland Canal in Canada. His unofficial successor, von Igel, was simultaneously arrested in New York and his papers seized. A day later, while the President was reading to Congress a paraphrase of his Sussex Note, it was announced that the papers revealed plots of the highest importance and that Count Bernstorff wished to obtain diplomatic immunity for them. The State Department ironically replied that the Ambassador might have any or all the papers if he would officially recognize them as Embassy property. The papers were not published, apparently because they implicated certain well-known Americans with German tendencies; but the incident increased popular suspicion. Von Igel, though indicted, was afterwards allowed to accompany Count Bernstorff back to Germany. Then followed the Presidential campaign of 1916, in which the German propagandists still further lost caste by their unsuccessful efforts to form a German party and to blackmail the candidates.

Thus by the time of the rupture, despite the fact that their attitude after it showed that the majority of German-Americans were loyal, just as the result of the Presidential election showed that they voted mainly as Americans and not as Germans, the American public had been made "receptive" as to the significance of the German spy menace. Proof of that was given, not only by the meticulous preparations which were made against riots, but by the way in which the publication of the Zimmerman letter was followed by an hysterical outpouring of apprehension and speculation, often accompanied by wonderful stories about German activities in Cuba, Mexico, Colombia, Nicaragua, of submarines in the Gulf of Mexico, etc. The President's patient treatment, both of the German plotters within his gates and of the German pirates without his gates, thus received one great justification. Had not time and opportunity been given Dumba, von Papen, Boy-Ed, and other officials like Franz Bopp, the German Consul-General in San Francisco, indicted in January, 1917, for conspiracy to destroy railways and munition factories in the United States and Canada, to advertise their baseness, had not there been a never-ending stream of indictments and convictions on similar counts of unofficial agents like von Igel, Fay, van Horn, and others, had not the disloyal German-American leaders been given such copious opportunities of proving their disloyalty, had not the American pacifists been given equal opportunity of betraying the fact that they were prompted by German lies as well as by their own ignorant sentimentalism, had not the opportunity arisen of circumstantially unveiling Prussian plots in Mexico and elsewhere, had not these and other things been allowed to happen, the President might well have found himself with a divided country behind him after breaking with Germany on account of her piracy upon the seas, with the safety of which the greater part of the American people hardly realized that they had any real concern until the end.

Rightly or wrongly, he thought that patience afforded the best chance of securing practical unity of opinion in favour of a firm policy, should such a policy be forced upon him. But this consideration did not protect the President from a running fire of criticism by a certain section of his countrymen. As has been shown in a previous chapter, long-sighted Americans, so soon as they recovered from the shock of the cataclysm of August, 1914, realized not only that the Prussian menace deserved the positive reprobation of the whole of civilization, but that, if Pan-Germanism succeeded in clamping upon Europe its odious domination, it would be merely a question of time before it tried to engulf the Western hemisphere. By such people the President's demand for neutrality of thought as well as of action was condemned, at first privately, as bad politics as well as bad ethics. There was a feeling that he should have protested in the name of civilization against the rape of Belgium and other Prussian crimes, with the double object of showing the Allies where his Government stood and of educating his countrymen to a sense of their ultimate responsibilities, both selfish and altruistic. It was not known then that, in point of fact, the President did at least protest in an autograph letter to the Kaiser against many of those crimes. All that the public saw was a policy of apparently "ice-cold" neutrality.

Indignation against this policy began to get the better of patriotic discretion after the President's failure to obtain immediate reparation for the Lusitania. It grew, after he passed the Arabic by, until by the winter of 1915-16 it had captured a formidable section of thoughtful opinion. The President was accused of being careless of the honour and interests of the country. He was accused of weakening the national fibre by encouraging his countrymen to shirk responsibilities and to be content to wax rich from war trade, while the Allies

THE GERMAN SHIP "VATERLAND" INTERNED AT NEW YORK.



NEW YORK POLICE GUARDING THE PIER WHERE GERMAN LINERS WERE INTERNED.

bled for the principles which the makers of America had also fought to maintain. He was accused of drugging self-respect by phrases, of being "brave in words and irresolute in action," of sending ultimatums and then being "too proud to fight," a phrase which has become a "byword for derision and contempt of the Government of the United States." Mr. Root, in the speech from which the above quotations are taken (it was delivered in February, 1916, before the New York State Republican Convention), went so far as to say that under a President "by temperament and training" inadequate for the great task which he was called upon to tackle the country was "blindly stumbling towards war."

Our diplomacy [he continued] has dealt with symptoms and ignored causes. The great decisive question upon which our peace depends is the question whether the rule of action applied to Belgium is to be tolerated. If it is tolerated by the civilized world, this nation will have to fight for its life. There will be no escape. That is the critical point of defence for the peace of America. When our Government failed to tell the truth about Belgium, when it lost the opportunity for leadership of the moral sense of the American people, it lost the power which a knowledge of that leadership and a sympathetic response from the moral sense of the world would have given to our diplomacy. When our Government failed to make any provision whatever for defending its rights in case they should be trampled upon, it lost the power which a belief in its readiness and will to maintain its rights would have given to its diplomatic representations. When our Government gave notice to Germany that it would destroy American lives and American ships at its peril, our words, which would have been potent if sustained by adequate preparation to make them good, and by the prestige and authority of the moral leadership of a great people in a great cause, were treated with contempt which should have been foreseen; and when our Government failed to make those words good its diplomacy was bankrupt.

The President's apparent advocacy of a "drawn" war produced similar criticism a year later. Stalwart friends of the Allies, knowing that they were determined to fight it out and not make peace when they were just coming to the top of their strength, accused him of playing a German game and of being false to the best interests of civilization.

There can be little doubt that, as was shown above, the President did suggest peace partly because he feared that a continuance of the war would produce, as it did produce, more promiscuous submarine barbarities, and hence all sorts of complications and possibly war for the United States. But there is also reason to believe that in producing his Peace Note he wished to show the Allies that if they made a just peace they could rely on his doing everything possible to get the United States to support that peace against future assaults by the unrighteous. Even that fine idea, as afterwards enunciated in his Peace League address to the Senate, did not disarm his stalwart and conservative enemies. Mr. Roosevelt, after the Note had been before the public for a fortnight, voiced a considerable opinion when he urged its recall for the following reasons:

The Note, he said, was not only dangerous but profoundly mischievous, because it took no account whatever of the most serious causes of offence that had been given to the United States and had invited an insincere

THE CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, THE SEAT OF CONGRESS.

and improper bidding for our support. Nor is this all. The Note takes up positions so profoundly immoral and misleading that high-minded and right-thinking Americans, whose country this Note places in a thoroughly false light, are in honour bound to protest.

PRESIDENT WILSON.

For example, the Note says, "Thus far both sides seem to be fighting for the same thing." This is palpably and wickedly false. To say that the Germans, who trampled the Belgians under the heel and are at this moment transporting 100,000 Belgians to serve as State slaves in Germany, are fighting for the same things as their hunted victims, is not only a falsehood but a callous and most immoral falsehood, shocking to every high-minded man who loves the peace of righteousness.

Elsewhere the President says that at some unknown date in the hereafter the American people intend to safeguard the rights of small nationalities against big and ruthless nations. Unless this is sheer hypocrisy let the President begin now, and in such case let him promptly withdraw this Note, which has given comfort and aid only to the oppressors of Belgium, and in which he did not dare to say one word in behalf of Belgium's rights.

Perhaps the most preposterous absurdity is the statement that the United States is ready and eager to

guarantee the peace of the world. The spectacle of the President trying by the aid of Mr. Daniels and Mr. Baker [respectively the Secretaries of the Navy and of War] to guarantee the peace of any nation under the sun against a single powerful and resolute foe is as comic as anything ever written by Artemus Ward. If his words meant anything they would mean hereafter that we intend to embark on a policy of violent meddling in every European quarrel and in return invite the Old World nations violently to meddle in everything American. Of course, as a matter of fact, the words mean nothing. The President is nervously backing away from Carranza at the very time he is fulminating these vague threats and uttering these vague promises in reference to the formidable military powers engaged in a great death wrestle.

The best crystallization of the school of thought that opposed the President's patience and aspirations for peace (and it must be admitted that the disciples of this school constituted the bulk of far-sighted and thoughtful Americans) was, however, contained in the



PRESIDENT WILSON REVIEWING NEW JERSEY STATE TROOPS.

resolutions of the American Rights Committee formed in 1916 under the auspices of Mr. George Haven Putnam, who had himself fought and suffered for the cause of Liberty during the Civil War. The resolution ran as follows :

WHEREAS, We hold that Prussian Imperial Militarism has brought about the subjection of the people of Germany to an ambitious and unscrupulous autocracy and the corruption of the ancient German ideals through a dream of World-dominion ; and

WHEREAS, We believe that the success of the scheme of this Prussian Autocracy means the crushing of friendly nations and the subjection of their peoples to a brutal and cruel military rule ; and

WHEREAS, We believe that, intoxicated with the military successes of 1864, 1866, and 1870, and by the wonderful development of the economic strength of the country, the ambitions of Prussian leaders have expanded until they have culminated in a World-war for imperial domination ; and

WHEREAS, This war has been conducted by Prussia and her Allies with practices of unprecedented barbarity, including the killing, under official orders, of thousands of non-combatants, women, and children, and including the crowning atrocity of the Armenian massacres ; and

WHEREAS, We believe that the Monroe Doctrine and even the territories of our own country have been, and now are, an avowed aim of Prussian aggression, and that, in the event of the success of the Teutonic Powers, the next attack would be made against the United States ; and

WHEREAS, Without undertaking to approve all the acts of the Entente Allies in the present War, we hold that the Republicanism of France and the Democracy of England are united in contending for those rights of the people and those ideals of humanity which are essential to the preservation of civilization ; and

WHEREAS, We believe that neutral nations look to the United States as the leading Power that should maintain the principles of international law and defend the sacred principles of humanity, that the people of these nations are convinced of the righteousness of the Allied cause, but hesitate to declare themselves, and that action by the United States would have a potent influence upon hesitant neutrals and would tend materially to shorten the war, to save further sacrifice of human life, and to assure the more speedy triumph of law and justice ;

Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the safety and honour of the American people and their duty to defend and maintain the rights of humanity require us to approve the cause for which the Entente Allies are fighting, and to extend to these Allies by any means in our power, not only sympathy, but direct cooperation at the proper time, to the end that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth : and

Resolved further, That in spite of the unwarranted destruction of American lives, there should be between the American people and the German people no enmity, and that, when the Germans shall abjure, with the dream of empire, the pernicious ideals of their present rulers, the Americans will rejoice to come again into fellowship with them in the work of advancing the true ideals of justice, humanity, and civilization.

How came it that such authoritative outpourings of advice and such weighty attacks upon his policy influenced the President neither directly nor indirectly through popular opinion ? There could, it was clear, be nothing in common between American Republicanism and the militarist doctrines of modern Prussia ; and as to Germany's translation of those doctrines into practice—had it not evoked a chorus of indignation from one end of the country to the

[Chicago Daily News.

"GOING BACK—TIME TO BEAT SOME PLOUGHSHARES INTO SWORDS."

other? Their own experiences of 1914 made it easy for British observers to solve the paradox. The President hesitated because he was trying to translate into policy not the views and aspirations of one section of the country or of society, however well justified he might in his inmost soul consider them, but what he believed to be the wishes and instincts of the mass of his countrymen.

As was indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the war found the United States in the midst of an engrossing process of domestic reform. Rather more than a year earlier she had substituted for the conservative regime of the Republicans a Democratic Government of pronounced Liberal tendencies, with Mr. Wilson at its head. The same thing had happened as happened in England seven years earlier. A conservatism of a vaguely Imperialistic complexion had, thanks mainly to its inability to produce certain domestic reforms, given place to a Liberalism which felt that to justify itself it had to sacrifice everything to the enactment of these reforms. The extra-American responsibilities engendered by the war with Spain were resented or forgotten. There was a serious movement to give to the Philippines the deadly gift of premature independence. The American foot against the open door in China was summarily withdrawn. The Army and Navy were allowed to "slump." American responsibility towards the weaker Latin-American neighbours was vitiated by that spirit of ignorant and feeble



[Chicago Daily News.

"THE FINAL ANSWER."

THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN OF 1916.
Mr. Hughes, the Republican Candidate, addressing the crowd from the railroad car at Grand Pass, Oregon, August 24, 1916.

idealism which must be accounted the chief cause of the tragedy of Mexico. Trained diplomatists were, especially in the Western hemisphere, irresponsibly displaced by the spoilsmen.

There never had been a time when American eyes were turned more generally inwards. The old tradition of isolation was revived. In a famous speech at the beginning of his administration the President had even attempted to give a twentieth-century twist to the Monroe doctrine. That instrument had originally been called into being to protect the nascent Republicanism of the Western world against the Holy Alliance. Monarchies had long ceased to threaten; but, the President proclaimed in effect, the Old World could still impede the untrammelled development of the New World. Raids by the organized capitalism of this era could be just as subversive of the development of weak Republics as the monarchical raids which his predecessors had feared. Therefore the great European investor in backward Latin-American countries should be discouraged. Adherence to the forms of Anglo-Saxon Government would help their Governments just as effectively as bargains with capitalists for the building of railways and opening up of new territory.

The United States was, in short, as unprepared for the repercussion of the war as she well could be. The average as opposed to the educated voter did not understand that the causes and course of a European contest could concern him as closely as anyone. President and farmer agreed that the United States could best be true to her traditions and sentimentally Liberal aspirations if she remained *au dessus de la mêlée*. To considerations of tradition and instinct there were also added considerations of expediency. It was at first feared that there might be trouble from the German element of the population and among the American representatives of other belligerent races, should the United States not officially balance her neutrality. Had not the President actually hinted as much in his neutrality proclamation? There was also, as war trade grew up, as Americans began to use their privilege as neutrals to export to the belligerents, a more material sanction for the *status quo*. The country, it was rather illogically argued, was prosperous with peace, mainly, of course, owing to trade in munitions of war with the belligerents, so why risk a change for the worse or, at any rate, the unknown? The war was regrettable, the crimes of Prussia were abominable: but all the United States had to

see to was that her rights should be respected by both sides, especially her commercial rights, the enjoyment of which would incidentally enable her to send much-needed supplies to the Allies. She would then be powerful and independent enough at the end of the war to act as an "honest broker" in the interests of permanent peace.

Such was and such remained, down to and even after the rupture with Germany, the fundamental point of view of the masses, especially in the West, upon which Mr. Wilson relied for the support of his Government and policies. The Presidential canvass of 1916 and its result in November of that year made that indisputably obvious. The Republican candidate, Mr. Hughes, was chosen by a party dominated by Mr. Roosevelt, Mr Root, and the other stalwarts whose criticism of the President's course is stated above. Mr. Wilson made his fight against Mr. Hughes quite frankly upon the issue of peace and prosperity with the Democrats, war and ruin with the Republicans. Mr. Hughes did not dare take up the challenge. He realized that it would be impossible to educate the people up to a sense of what his supporters regarded as the world-responsibilities of the United States. He relied upon stock issues and his party organization, and was beaten by the vote of the West; the East, the chief home of the "stalwarts," went almost solidly for him. The President was re-elected because the majority of the people, besides liking his Liberalism, were grateful that he should have kept them out of the war, confident that he would continue if possible to tread the pacific path, and not at all afraid that, as his conservative critics said, he was weakening the fibre of the country, lowering its prestige abroad, or endangering its future as a World Power.

The President's victory was, nevertheless, not a victory of the peace-at-any-price group. That group, even before the rupture with Germany, was comparatively weak. It was scattered over the country in small contingents, and it may be doubted whether, without the help of Irish-American and German-American



NEW ENGLAND GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE AT BOSTON ON WAR DEFENCE, FEBRUARY 15, 1917.

Left to right: Mr. Carl E. Milliken (Maine), Mr. Henry W. Keyes (New Hampshire), Mr. Horace F. Graham (Vermont), Mr. Samuel W. McCall (Massachusetts), Mr. Marcus H. Holcomb (Connecticut).

PRESIDENT WILSON AND HIS CABINET.

Back row, left to right: President Wilson, Messrs. William G. McAdoo (Secretary of the Treasury), Thomas W. Gregory (Attorney-General), Josephus Daniels (Secretary of the Navy), David F. Houston (Secretary of Agriculture), William B. Wilson (Secretary of Labour).

Front row, left to right: Messrs. Robert Lansing (Secretary of State), Newton D. Baker (Secretary of War), Albert S. Burleson (Postmaster-General), Franklin K. Lane (Secretary of the Interior), and William C. Redfield (Secretary of Commerce).

propagandists, it would have made its voice heard in the national councils. Its representatives were to be found in small bands in the university towns with which the United States is dotted. They would show up in certain force at religious meetings. They were stronger in Socialist and social reform circles. But they did not materially influence the organizations of the regular parties. Despite the political influence of Mr. Bryan, the Germans usually had some difficulty in finding, during a crisis, enough American assistants in Congress to give a convincing American colour to their agitations. It was rather the peace-at-almost-any-price vote that determined the election—the result of the feeling of pacifically inclined provincials, untrained to realize causes which justify the obvious sacrifices of war, that a statesman so successful in domestic politics and reform work as the President, so obviously cautious in his foreign policy, so obviously bent upon serving American interests when it came to action, however much he might discuss the necessity of making sacrifices for the sake of broader interests, was the man to guide the country, if anybody could, with peace and honour through the troublous years before it.

It was a state of mind which British observers can understand. The development of American thought and policy during the two years between the sinking of the Lusitania and the disappearance from Washington of the German Embassy, resembles in some respects the changes in the attitude of large masses of the British people which took place during the first black days of August, 1914. The British crisis was short because the danger was patent and insistent; the American crisis was long because the danger was to the mass of the people neither patent nor insistent. Not only was the fundamental issue at stake loosely grasped, but Americans are not, like the English, a seafaring race. To those who dwelt in the centre of the continent the maritime crimes of Germany were as remote as were the Armenian atrocities to dwellers in the manufacturing towns of the Midlands or the glens of the Highlands. What did it matter to the farmer of the Mississippi Valley if the Lusitania was sunk so long as he could market his corn in Minneapolis or Chicago? San Francisco lies farther from New York than does London; and it is impossible to travel for days across the American continent with its millions of acres of rich and sequestered farmlands, its teeming provincial towns whose contact with the outside world usually consists of rivalry with near neighbours and a vague jealousy of more distant ones, its never-ending prairies, its mountains encompassing between themselves isolated communities as large as a European country, with its diverse interests and climates, with its endless string of local newspapers (each serving a radius perhaps larger than England, but nevertheless an infinitesimal fraction of the country, and dedicated almost entirely to local intelligence) without experiencing a sense of remoteness, of national amorphousness such as no European State can produce.

Nor was it only the tradition and practice of aloofness and the accident of the ascendancy of Liberalism at Washington that made the war remote to the average citizen almost beyond the bounds of perspective. With one great European Power and with one alone had the United States during her infancy, during her adolescence, and at the great crisis of her maturity had relations calculated to leave lasting impressions. For France at the beginning of the war there was an outpouring of sympathy in which admiration at the gallantry of the sister republic was reinforced by memories of French aid during the revolutionary war. But gratitude to Lafayette and his companions was not sufficiently deep, the significance of the Anglo-French alliance was not sufficiently patent to obliterate memories of our treatment of American shipping during the Napoleonic wars, of the resultant Anglo-American struggle of 1812–14, and of the lack of sympathy with the North shown by influential classes in England during the fight for the preservation of the Union and the abolition of slavery. Such memories had been kept green, to an extent which would surprise those whose knowledge of Anglo-American sentiment is confined to Pilgrims' dinners and other international amenities or derived from intercourse with representatives of the sophisticated East, by the widespread use, at any rate until quite recently, of school histories in which our disagreements were consistently distorted, by the anti-British prejudices of the powerful Irish population, by the more insidious work of the American branch of the pro-German propaganda, and by other factors, some of them economic and some social, into which it is unnecessary to go. During the Boer War gratitude for Great Britain's most useful sympathy with the United



AMERICAN COAST DEFENCE GUNS.

States while she was fighting Spain was forgotten in an almost general outbreak of invective against the "brutal British." Of the persecution of a weak State in this war we could not be accused; but directly it became evident that our blockade of the Central Powers would bear heavily upon neutrals, and would have to be enforced on the broad principles of international law rather than by a pedantic adhesion to obsolete precedents, sympathy with our cause could not long prevent a certain suspicious questioning of our methods which German agents worked day and night to increase.

The earlier stages of the discussion regarding our various Orders in Council and regulations against the trade of the enemy with the outside world should be familiar to the readers of this history. It is proposed to trace here merely the way in which in its late stages the controversy, by forcing the Government to balance its policy of neutrality and to appear to set off British misdemeanours against Prussian crimes, revived in the public mind inherited suspicions of British maritime methods, and thus took the edge to some extent off indignation with Prussian savageries. The blockade policy of the Allies may be summarized as a comprehensive attempt to starve Germany through the control of the high seas by the British Navy, so far as was compatible with international equity. It was based upon the fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon law that old rules shall be adjusted to meet new conditions, a principle which, during their contest with the Confederacy, the Northern States had used ruthlessly to strengthen their at one time none too effective blockade of the Southern States. Among other rules which the Northern States developed was that originally laid down by Lord Stowell: that contraband may be seized even if destined for neutral ports, provided that the captor could prove that its ultimate destination was the enemy forces. Perhaps the chief American charge was that, to meet changed conditions, we developed this rule still farther. In view of the obvious fact that both in law and practice the whole populations of the Central Powers were in effect waging war against us, we did extend, after some hesitation, the doctrine of continuous voyage to virtually everything. Besides enormously increasing the list of commodities treated as absolute contraband, we instituted by degrees a system of rationing neutral countries contiguous to Germany. The system was based, roughly, upon the difference between the normal imports of those countries and their normal exports of imported commodities to the Central Powers. To this system the United States objected in various Notes. She contended that she had the right to trade freely in innocent goods with all neutrals. The ultimate fate of those goods was a question to be settled between the importing nations and Great Britain; and American shipments ought not to be detained on presumption that they were eventually meant for enemy consumption (American Note of October 21, 1915). Nor could they be detained on the assumption that we had established an effective blockade. No blockade, it was argued, could be effective in view of the fact that the blockading fleet did not control the Baltic. Without such control, any

so-called blockade, it was maintained, was unequal as between Scandinavian neutrals and other neutrals. It was further denied that any interpretation of international law allowed us to extend the blockade to the North Sea coast of those same Scandinavian countries (Note of October 21, 1915), while the British prize court procedure and other things were also the subject of a running controversy.

Attacks upon the law of the British policy were accompanied by attacks upon its execution. The Fleet was accused of exercising its right of visit and search in an illegal way. In view of the size and unwieldiness of the cargoes of modern merchant ships, the practice of visit and search at sea was early abandoned in favour of the practice of bringing vessels into port for search. Against this the United States Government protested on the double ground of illegality and inconvenience. They again refused to admit that changed conditions justified new practices. There were many complaints, some of them probably unjustified, of undue length of detention while ships were examined. It was alleged that our insistence upon making neutral vessels call at our ports to have their cargoes examined or to pick up sailing instructions through dangerous areas was used to facilitate the illegal detention, examination, and sometimes suppression of mails between neutral countries. Two Notes were sent the Allies on the subject, on January 4 and May 24, 1916. The protests they contained were based primarily upon the fact that before the war there were signs of a tendency to treat first-class mail matter as immune from seizure on the high seas At first it was even maintained that the Allies had no right even to seize paper values (that position was abandoned in the second Note), and there were many complaints of the unfair way in which American business had been hampered by the detention or loss of letters (as well as by the detention of and censorship of cables—another well-aired grievance), and even of the detention of diplomatic correspondence.

British municipal and Imperial trade regulations also caused heartburnings. At an early period of the war it was decided to prohibit the export from the component parts of the Empire of various staple commodities. This embargo hit many American manufacturers rather hard. The woollen manufacturers relied largely upon Colonial wool, and to give another instance, the metal trades needed plumbago from Ceylon for crucibles and tin from the Straits Settlements for other purposes. Immediately a great outcry went up. As we were clearly within our rights in disposing of our own products as we liked, the Government could not protest. Nevertheless, wishing to make things easy for the United States, we allowed certain quotas of the forbidden materials to go to American manufacturers, provided that they guaranteed that these would not be re-exported or find their way as finished products to the enemy. The arrangement naturally involved restrictions rather irritating to the free American spirit, and it was not long before



COAST DEFENCE GUN: THE BREECH.

the Germans began to spread the idea that our supervision was really part of a scheme for the control of American trade after the war. A similar attack was, during the summer of 1916, made upon our "black list," the name given to our published statutory list supplying British firms with a list of people and firms in neutral countries with which they were not to trade on account of suspicion or proof of enemy relationship. It was clear that here also the British Government had a perfect right to supervise the trade connexions of their nationals But again there was the cry of intent to capture American trade for post-bellum purposes, and this time the American Government joined in it. Brushing aside the explanation officially offered by Downing Street, the American State Department, in a Note dated July 28, 1916,

warned Great Britain in "the gravest terms" that it was manifestly out of the question that the Government of the United States should acquiesce in such methods in restraint of neutral commerce.

Intrinsically none of these and other trade disputes was really serious. There was never any disposition visible on the part of the American authorities to hamper us. The most that they seemed to expect was the removal of



THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON.
The official residence of the President.

petty and irritating restrictions. Thus the main blockade controversy lapsed during 1916, after we had improved and expedited our methods of examining vessels, and had shown by our general attitude that we wished to spare neutrals as much as was compatible with the exigencies of the military situation. The controversy over the detention of mails was substantially relieved by similar means, and no effort was made to underline annoyances with our "black list" by anything more grave than sharp Notes. The persistent German-fomented agitation that the United States should retaliate by placing an embargo upon the export of munitions and food to the Allies was stoutly ignored. No difficulties, except on one occasion (and then there was a quick attempt to make amends), were placed in the way of loans to the Allies. Washington, in fact, acted against us rather for effect than for result. Its nationals came hurrying to it with protests which it could not ignore. German-American traders were on the *qui vive* for an excuse to accuse it of lax neutrality; and in regard to the blockade controversy the weight of American legal opinion was that, whatever our ethical justification, our policy and practices could not in point of fact be justified by law.

The constant airing of grievances against "British abuse of sea-power" had nevertheless its influence upon public opinion. In educated circles it was recognized that the United States had been equally high-handed during her civil war and that we had an equally strong moral justification for high-handedness in this war; but among the masses the lingering memories of our treatment of American shipping during the Napoleonic wars tended to produce distorted views. This the German propagandists were quick to realize. British "navalism," they proclaimed, was what the United States had really to fear. It pervaded the world. Germany's *Militarismus*, even admitting that it existed, concerned only Europe, and with Europe the Western Republics had no concern.

Only some great leader of men could, even with the help of German atrocities and German insults, have aroused the American people to the pitch where they might have sloughed off overnight the incubus of tradition and substituted for their aloof and individualistic conception of a national destiny a realization of the need of a positive international policy. And that statesman was not forthcoming. A Liberal of the Mid-Victorian type, Mr. Wilson had steeped himself in the study of domestic reform to the exclusion of all illuminating interest in international affairs. He was, during his first term of office, a faithful disciple of that Liberal conception of Government which decrees that administrations shall follow public opinion and try to give the voters what they are supposed to want and not necessarily what is good for them and the country. The result was that apathy regarding the fundamental issues of the war reacted from the beginning upon Mr. Wilson's policy and Mr. Wilson's policy encouraged apathy. Profoundly impressed by the latent moral, and obvious economic, strength of the great aggregation of people under his charge, the President seemed for a long time to believe that he could afford to let them carelessly ensue the peace and prosperity that he promised them and at the correct moment throw the weight of their unimpaired strength on the side of a Liberal peace. Educated by years of authority in the peaceful cloisters of a venerable university, a student almost exclusively of Anglo-Saxon Government, he could not bring himself to believe for an equally long time that anything so grossly materialistic and so barbarously ambitious as the German spirit could really have possessed a nation. The contest, he seemed to say in many of his utterances upon

it, had bred an unreal state of affairs: had produced passions and thrown up leaders that were really foreign to the characters of the combatants. After peace these passions would disappear and their effects would be forgotten, if only somebody with authority kept his head and spoke the healing word.

Hence Mr. Wilson's persistent pressure for an early peace until Germany upset his plans in January, 1917. The Prussian militarists, he thought, had had their lesson and had probably lost their teeth. Europe, therefore, should compose her quarrels without more bloodshed. A continuance of the war could only produce ineradicable bitterness with probably another Balance of Power and a peace insecurely based upon force, upon the armies of France, Russia, and Italy on the continent,

THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. WILSON ATTENDED BY MILITARY AND NAVAL ATTACHÉS AND SECRET SERVICE MEN.

and upon the British fleet by sea, instead of upon the sanction of a kind of international Liberalism under which the masses would refuse to be killed or impoverished upon the altar of international rivalry and distrust. To preserve his influence towards such a peace, patience was indispensable, and if German militarism was abominable, it had also to be remembered that British navalism could be rather high-handed. The President consequently looked with some favour upon German generalizations about the "freedom of the seas," or rather, there is reason to believe, the German embroidery of what, so far as this war was concerned, was originally his idea. If, he was understood to have represented to the

WALL STREET THE FINANCIAL CENTRE OF NEW YORK.

Powers some time before he broke with Germany, if there must be more wars, then let it be agreed that neutrals shall not suffer, that the danger of war be "localized." Let all commerce in whatsoever bottoms be free upon the high seas, save only absolute contraband—i.e., manufactured munitions of war and presumably gold and its equivalents.

The people, misled by the assiduous misrepresentations of the Prussian propaganda, did not know that the President when he talked about the "freedom of the seas" was dreaming a dream of which English Liberals may still have shamefaced recollections. They thought that he was directly attacking our blockade. The issue of the war was thus still further darkened, and the tendency to draw back from things not properly understood was encouraged.

Such are perhaps the main reasons, combined with things like the Irish muddle—for American sympathy is always with Celtic Ireland—why the bulk of the American people and their Government seemed to the other Anglo-Saxon races somewhat slow in grasping, as a whole, the meaning of the war, and why even after the rupture with Germany they hesitated to take the seemingly logical step of "getting into the war with both feet" and joining the Allies offhand in their bonded determination to fight till the Prussian menace was crushed. They were, however, passing or ephemeral reasons. Obsolete traditions cannot for ever withstand the onrush of changed circumstances; political theories cannot dam indefinitely the current of the development of a great and virile nation.

If Prussian brutality drove the United States in 1917, first, to a spectacular abandonment of the course of neutrality she had mapped out for herself in 1914, and then into war itself, other forces were during the intervening years working steadily to render the abandonment of neutrality lasting There was first the commercial reaction of the war upon American business. In 1914, at the outbreak of the war, Americans got their first object-lesson of how closely they were connected economically with Europe. The dislocation of Lombard Street was felt equally in Wall Street. Values fluctuated, exchange went heavily against the dollar, foreign trade was upset. Six months later their second lesson began. The Allies had by then realized that the war was going to last indefinitely and that they would require an indefinite amount of supplies, especially artillery and munitions, for the manufacture of which Germany had had the sinister foresight to provide. As the British fleet controlled the sea, recourse was immediately had to the United States.

The result of this commercially is best explained by the following table :—

EXPORTS FROM UNITED STATES.

	1913	1915	1916
United	$	$	$
Kingdom	590,732,398	1,108,122,530	1,754,420,408
France ...	153,922,526	500,792,248	860,839,308
Russia ...	25,965,351	125,794,954	309,450,738
Italy ...	78,675,043	269,723,561	303,533,921
Germany	351,930,541	11,777,858	2,260,634
Austria-Hungary	22,244,599	104,525	61,771

It will be seen that the increase in exports to the Allies far more than counterbalanced, especially during 1915 and 1916, the loss of trade with the Central Powers. The exports consisted mainly, of course, of war material, raw and manufactured, and food. Immense sums were simultaneously lent to the Allies after the autumn of 1915, largely for credits in New York with which exports could be financed. Otherwise the rate of exchange threatened in August, 1915, to go to pieces; the Allies, indeed, as it was, had to export gold to unprecedented amounts, and the United States gradually became glutted with it.

The following is a list of loans to the Allies floated in the United States up to January, 1917 :—

Anglo-French 5-year 5 per cent. on 5½ per cent. basis	$500,000,000
British 2-year 5 per cent. collateral loan on 5½ per cent. basis	250,000,000
British 3- and 5-year collateral loan at 5¾ per cent. and 5·85 per cent. ...	300,000,000
French 3-year collateral loan on 5½ per cent.	100,000,000
French commercial credits	170,000,000
British banks extended loan	50,000,000
Miscellaneous credits	*75,000,000
City of Paris 5-year 6 per cent. on 6·30 per cent. basis	50,000,000
Bordeaux 3-year 6 per cent. on 6¼ per cent. basis	20,000,000
Lyons 3-year 6 per cent. on 6¼ per cent. basis	20,000,000
Marseilles 3-year 6 per cent. on 6¼ per cent. basis	20,000,000
London Metropolitan Water Board 1-year 6 per cent. discount	6,400,000
Canada:	
Dominion 5-, 10- and 15-year 5 per cent.	75,000,000
Dominion 2-year 5 per cent.	20,000,000
Provincial	57,500,000
Municipal	69,000,000
Newfoundland 3-year 5 per cent. ...	5,000,000
Russia 3-year loan	50,000,000
Russia 5-year 5½ per cent.	50,000,000
Italy 1-year 6 per cent.	25,000,000
Total	$1,912,900,000

* Estimated. Includes $25,000,000 credit for grain purchases.



PRESIDENT WILSON (in centre) HEADING THE "PREPAREDNESS PARADE" (JUNE 14, 1916).
A demonstration in favour of preparedness for all eventualities.

At the same time immense amounts of American securities held in Europe were sold back to the United States so as to provide the belligerents with ready money. In 1913, according to official computations, the net American foreign indebtedness, funded and floating, was $6,500,000,000; at the beginning of 1917 it was reckoned at half that sum.

Such a change in the balance of trade and finance could not but have a great effect upon public opinion. While, for reasons not unconnected with lack of foresight and local knowledge on the part of the Allied Governments, the early loans were not well distributed through the country, the sudden appearance of large amounts of foreign paper made people study with a close practical interest European conditions and prospects. Similarly, the immense growth of war trade, besides causing interest in the war, gave sane Americans a stake in after-the-war conditions. It was recognized that war exports were ephemeral; that, therefore, if a serious industrial dislocation was to be avoided, fresh and permanent markets must be found after peace.

The charitable service of the United States Government and of great American organizations to the war-stricken was another thing that simultaneously worked for the abandonment of academic neutrality. Mr. Gerard's great efforts on behalf of the British prisoners in Germany gave a soul-stirring object-lesson of what American "service to humanity" meant in practice. The magnificent achievements of Mr. Hoover and his American Staff in Belgium, and the constant appeals for money sent out to support their organization, brought home, as nothing else could do, the crying need for the organization of the world so that such crimes as the obliteration of nations should be rendered impossible. The work of the Rockefeller Foundation and of the American Red Cross in Serbia, the attempted work of the Rockefeller Foundation in Poland, its activities on behalf of the Armenians and other oppressed peoples in Turkey, the untiring appeals of the Red Cross and countless other bodies for funds for general war relief, all increased the sense of American responsibility in the affairs of the world, slowly, perhaps, as is shown by the comparatively small contribution in money for which the United States was responsible, but steadily and with cumulative effect.

During 1916 the indignation of the average educated and thoughtfully inclined American with what he deemed the initial weakness and obscurantism of the President's attitude towards the war bore fruit, moreover, in two important directions, and in both cases the President, realizing that inconsistency is often the better part of statesmanship, took up the fruit and blessed it.

On June 17, 1915, there was founded at a meeting in Independence Hall at Philadelphia by a small band of thoughtful men an organization called the League to Enforce Peace. Its creation was mainly due to the feeling, created by the President's elusive handling of the Lusitania incident and the outrage involved upon the rights of humanity, that the time had come for the United States to see to it that never again should they allow their love for peace and isolation to obliterate their sense of responsibility when those rights were challenged by force. The object of the League was described by its President, Mr. Taft, as follows:

All the world is interested in preventing war in any part of the world. Neutrals are so subject to loss, to injury, and to violation of their rights, that they have a direct interest in preventing war, and so direct is their interest that we may well hope that international law may advance to the point of developing that interest into an international right to be consulted before war begins between neighbours. The central basis of the plan which we respectfully recommend to the authorities who shall represent our Government in any world conference that will necessarily follow the peace is that the Great Powers of the world be invited to form a League of Peace, which shall embody in the covenant that binds its members the principle just announced, to wit, that every member of that League has a right to be consulted before war shall be perpetrated between any two members of the League; or to put it in another way, that the whole League shall use its entire power to require any member of the League that wishes to fight any other member of the League, to submit the issue upon which that member desires to go to war to a machinery for its peaceful settlement before it does go to war.

It is not proposed, the League points out in its circular, finally to restrain nations from going to war, if they are determined to do so, nor to bind them to comply with any decision a judicial tribunal or a council of conciliation may make; but merely that before they resort to arms, thereby disturbing the social fabric and the order of the whole world, and inflicting irreparable injury upon neutrals, they shall state their case before an impartial body and before the world, and give time to have it considered on its merits.

If the controversy is of a nature which can be settled by the principles of law and equity, it is proposed that it shall go before a bench of judges. If it is one which can be adjusted only by mediation and compromise, it is suggested that it shall be referred to a mediation board. In comparison with projects for a world state, it is a short step in advance that is urged; but it is one which is believed to be attainable, and which, if adopted, would make war extremely improbable.

During 1916 the membership and influence of the League to Enforce Peace grew by leaps and bounds. Few, perhaps, expected that its ideals would be realized, but it was hoped that it would afford a nucleus for an agitation which the President would be unable to ignore. The expectation was justified. On January 6, 1916, the American Institute of International Law

PRESIDENT WILSON (WITH MRS. WILSON) REVIEWING THE "PREPAREDNESS PARADE."
After marching from the Peace Monument to the Capitol at its head.

adopted five resolutions which were at the time taken as a direct animadversion by the leading lawyers of the country upon the President's official indifference to the rape of Belgium and other German assaults upon international right. The resolutions follow :

1. Every nation has the right to exist, to protect and to conserve its existence ; but this right neither implies the right nor justifies the act of the State to protect itself or to conserve its existence by the commission of unlawful acts against innocent and unoffending States.

2. Every nation has the right to independence in the sense that it has a right to the pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itself without interference or control from other States, provided that in so doing it does not interfere with or violate the just rights of other States.

3. Every nation is in law or before law the equal of every other State composing the society of nations, and all States have the right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the United States, to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them.

4. Every nation has the right to territory within defined boundaries and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over this territory and all persons, whether native or foreign, found therein.

5. Every nation entitled to a right by the law of nations is entitled to have that right respected and protected by all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the right of one is the duty of all to observe.

Stimulated presumably by such criticism and such a lead, the President in the spring of 1916 began to modify his attitude of studied aloofness. The United States, he proclaimed, in one of his campaign speeches, could never again afford to remain neutral in a war which threatened the pillars of civilization. In accordance with this view, he caused to be written into the platform of his party at its nominating convention at St. Louis a foreign policy plank which, after an allusion to the time-honoured American doctrine of *laissez-faire* isolation, continued :—

But the circumstances of the last two years have revealed necessities of international action which no former generation can have foreseen. We hold that it is the duty of the United States to use its power, not only to make itself safe at home, but also to make secure its just interests throughout the world, and, both for this end and in the interest of humanity, to assist the world in securing settled peace and justice. We believe that every people has the right to choose the sovereignty under which it shall live ; that the small States of the world have a right to enjoy from other nations the same respect for their sovereignty and for their territorial integrity that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon ; and that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of its peace that has its origin in aggression or disregard of the rights of peoples and nations ; and we believe that the time has come when it is the duty of the United States to join with the other nations of the world in any feasible association that will effectively serve those principles, and to maintain inviolate the complete security of the highway of the seas for the common and unhindered use of all nations.

MEN OF THE "AMERICAN LEGION" TRAINING AT THE CANADIAN CAMP AT VALCARTIER.

In his speech accepting renomination as the Democratic Presidential candidate, Mr. Wilson re-emphasized these aspirations. During the campaign he returned to them again and again, and six weeks after his re-election he took the first opportunity of offering them not as a personal or party doctrine but as a national policy.

The famous American Peace Note of December 18, 1916, while generally interpreted at home and abroad as an effort to prevail upon the Allies to consider the possibility of a "drawn war" such as the American pacifists were agitating for and German statesmen scheming for, was, as has been observed above, perhaps primarily intended as an official advertisement of the President's desire to have the world know that he was prepared after the war to try to throw American influence on the side of a lasting and just peace. After stating that the aims of the belligerents as expressed by the statesmen were confusingly similar, he affirmed that the United States had an intimate interest in the conclusion of the war lest it should "presently be too late to accomplish the greater thing that lies beyond its conclusion." He suggested an immediate opportunity for the comparison of the terms which must precede those "ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world which we all desire and in which the neutral nations as well as those at war are ready to play their responsible part."

A month later, on January 22, 1917, the President returned to the charge in his address to the Senate in which he urged the belligerents to make a "liberal peace," a "peace without victory," *i.e.*, a peace without the ruthless use of victory, the equitable results of which the United States would feel justified in joining with them to guarantee.

The project for participation in a Peace League evoked vehement opposition in Congress and without. There was much talk, some of it from authoritative quarters, about the folly of abandoning the old policy of avoidance of entangling alliances That, of course, reflected the Western and popular view, and its insistence indicated that the President would have a long fight to get his aspirations translated into national policy. Opposition in more stalwart and educated circles came from another angle. What, asked people like Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Root, was the use of the President proclaiming his readiness to share in the police responsibilities of the world when he had not even had the foresight to provide an army capable of policing Mexico?

GENERAL LEONARD WOOD,
Before the War, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.

Such criticism was partly factious, partly factitious and largely ignorant. Next to the growth of the Peace League idea the most notable domestic product of the anxious period between the sinking of the Lusitania and the challenge thereby given by a European Power to the rights of the United States, and the logical result of the President's treatment of that and subsequent incidents nearly two years later, was the growth of the "preparedness" movement, as the agitation for military efficiency was called. The first sign of this growth was the creation by General Leonard Wood, the Lord Roberts of the American movement for universal service, in the summer of 1915, of camps in New York State at which Americans of the upper and middle classes could obtain from officers of the regular army, and by working with real soldiers, some preliminary training as officers. In the summer of 1916 these camps were extended to the West and Middle West, where they also met with great success. Their extension was accompanied by the formation of various bodies, like the American Security League, dedicated to the popularization of the idea, which was supported with remarkable alacrity by representative commercial bodies like the United States Chamber of Commerce

Partly because he feared that his Republican opponents might make capital out of the movement in the campaign of that year, the President sloughed off during 1916 his original Liberal prejudices against military training and armaments. Besides making speeches in the interests of preparedness, he facilitated by his support the passage of a Navy law with a building programme calculated to give the United States, now the fourth naval power in the world, the second place in the list in three years, and providing for the building of swift battle cruisers, of which the fleet as yet had none, and a large fleet of submarines, with which it was inadequately supplied. Finally, just after the rupture with Germany, he allowed his Secretary of the Navy to send to Congress the draft of a bill providing for a year's service for all boys at the age of 19.

True, the whole movement, like the naval and other preparations which followed the departure of Count Bernstorff, was conceived in a defensive spirit; but studied in the light of the President's advocacy of the Peace League idea and the growing popular conviction that things like the tremendous rise in commodity prices caused by the war, like the tie-up of American shipping by the German submarine blockade in February and March, 1917, and even the inconveniences of our more humane blockade did prove that the United States could not, after all, for ever continue to turn the wrong end of the telescope upon Europe, it assumed an immense significance. Like ourselves, the Americans are not an easy race to move. In their own vernacular, they "require to be shown." But once they are "shown," it is not in their nature to hang back in the tackling of new problems. The importance of the opening years of the war was that they demonstrated the futility of an ostrich-like policy towards international law-breakers of the Teutonic type. They showed Americans that, in these days of swift communication and cosmopolitan trade and finance, policies that answered perfectly in the days of George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, and are still workable in peaceful times, become but snares and delusions during war. They showed that, if the Great Republic was to hold the high place she claimed in the moral judgment of mankind, she must quit the calm pursuit of a fugitive and cloistered virtue for the strenuous vindication of Justice and of Liberty, joining the great hosts who daily fought and died for the ideals she cherished, and, with them, sealing her testimony to righteousness in sacrifice, in anguish, and in blood.



CHAPTER CLXXVIII.

THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME (VI.).

POSITION AT END OF SEPTEMBER, 1916—OPERATIONS DURING OCTOBER—THE OFFENSIVE OF OCTOBER 7—SIR DOUGLAS HAIG'S DISPATCH—COMBINED FRANCO-BRITISH OPERATIONS—CAPTURE OF SAILLY—BAD WEATHER—NOVEMBER OFFENSIVE—BATTLE OF THE ANCRE—CAPTURE OF BEAUMONT HAMEL—LAST PHASE OF THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME—REASONS OF THE ALLIED SUCCESS—THE NEW CONDITIONS OF WARFARE—THE GERMAN DEFEAT.

FROM the line held by the British on September 30, 1916, the ground sloped gently downwards to a shallow valley which ran north-westward from near Sailly-Saillisel—the immediate objective of the French from Morval and Rancourt—past Le Transloy and Ligny-Thilloy, then westward south of Irles, where it narrowed into comparatively abrupt slopes; at Miraumont it joined the valley of the Ancre. From the Thiepval-Morval ridge a series of long well-marked spurs ran down into the first-named shallow depression. The most important of these was the hammer-headed one immediately west of Flers. At the end of it, just east of the Albert-Bapaume road and north-east of Le Sars was the ancient tumulus, some 50 feet high, known as the Butte de Warlencourt. Another spur ran from Morval north-north-westwards towards Ligny and Thilloy, villages north-east of the Butte de Warlencourt forming the southern slope of the depression just described, and on it lay the German fourth position. To get within assaulting distance of this it was necessary to carry Le Sars and the two spurs, which were held in strength, every advantage having been taken of sunken roads, buildings, and the undulating nature of the country. Le Sars itself was strongly fortified; to its east was an agglomeration of trenches round Eaucourt l'Abbaye: and to its north-west the ground to Pys and Miraumont contained numerous artificial obstacles. At Petit Miraumont, on the south bank of the Ancre, began the Regina trench, which ran from the neighbourhood of the Stuff Redoubt nearly to Le Sars. Destremont Farm was already in our hands. But before Bapaume could be reached this further formidable barrier had to be overcome.

During the night of September 30-October 1 the French were bombing south-east of Morval and along the banks of the Somme towards Péronne. At the other end of the battlefield, north of the river, the enemy was dislodged by Sir Hubert Gough's troops from ground near the Stuff Redoubt and we increased our gains at Schwaben Redoubt, only a minute fragment of which remained untaken.

Between Neuve Chapelle and Ypres no less than sixteen raids were successfully carried out, and a number of prisoners taken, and some progress was made in the area to be attacked the next day.

It was on Sunday, October 1, in rainy weather, while the French were moving out of Morval and Rancourt and capturing trenches in the direction of Sailly-Saillisel, and our guns were bombarding Le Transloy, that the Canadians from the Courcelette region attacked the Regina trench and Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops advanced on a front of some 3,000 yards from the Albert-Bapaume road, north-east of Destremont Farm, to a point east of Eaucourt l'Abbaye. The 1st and 2nd Marine Regiments of the 2nd German Division had been brought

[Official photograph.

THE BUTTE DE WARLENCOURT.

In the foreground a light railway for transporting ammunition and supplies

down from the Belgian coast, so hard put to it were the German leaders owing to the terrible losses which their troops had sustained in the Battle of the Somme. They replaced the 26th Regiment of the 7th (Magdeburg) Division in the Regina trench. From the Lille district the 17th Regiment of the 6th (Bavarian) Division had also been summoned to help defend the Bapaume region. After the customary intensive bombardment the attacks were delivered at 3.30 p.m. The sailors fought stubbornly, but the Canadians pushed up a German trench running north-westward nearly to its junction with the Regina trench, which itself was entered in several places. Fighting there went on well into the night, attack and counter-attack succeeding one another. The Canadians succeeded in establishing themselves at a point 1,200 yards north of Courcelette in the direction of the Hessian trench but were ejected from a section of the Regina trench. This operation was in the nature of a demonstration to protect the troops moving on Le Sars and Faucourt l'Abbaye from being attacked in flank; the serious business of the day consisted in the drive to be undertaken towards Bapaume.

The foremost line of trenches between Sir Henry Rawlinson's men and Le Sars and the ruined abbey was of old construction. It had been made before July 1, at a date when the whole system of defence of the region had been planned. A second trench, 50 yards or so behind the first, was of more recent construction. Both trenches were well-wired and furnished with dug-outs. A mill east of Le Sars and west of the abbey had been fortified. The chapel and the deep crypts and cellars of the monastery were alive with machine-gunners, and garrisoned by the 17th (Bavarian) Regiment. At 3.30 p.m. our men went over the parapets. In five minutes they had seized the first trench before Le Sars. The barrage lifted and, following in its wake, the British charged for the second entrenchment. Weakly defended, it was speedily taken, and patrols pushed forward into and beyond Le Sars. For a moment it looked as if the village would be carried with little loss, but as the evening drew on German reinforcements poured into it down the Bapaume-Albert road and the operation of reducing Le Sars had to be postponed.

Simultaneously with the movement on Le Sars, infantry had advanced from the north-east and south-east on Faucourt l'Abbaye. The Abbey was protected on the north-east by two lines of trenches, of which the outer one was known as Goose Alley. Neither offered any serious resistance, and by nightfall our men had established themselves on a line which ran from the northern end of the buildings due east and west, connecting with our positions to the north-west of Factory Corner, parallel with the German trench from the Butte de Warlencourt to the outskirts of

Gueudecourt. They even captured and held positions farther to the north on the country road to Le Barque and west of it. On this, the right of the attack, the gain was from 1,200 to 1,500 yards.

The assault on the trenches south of the Abbey was less successful. It was held up by barbed wire and machine-guns. Two Tanks, however, arrived on the scene. One of them stuck in the mud and became a stationary fortress. The crew left her later, and the Commander was wounded. Two of the crew remained with him in a crater and stayed there for a couple of days. The other Tank tore through the entanglements and went along the borders of the trenches, crushing or shooting down all who came in its way. Our troops, with the aid of the Tanks, were soon ensconced in the southern outskirts of the Abbey, where they remained, though drenched to the skin. They were now violently attacked from the direction of Warlencourt. Throughout the night the struggle went on, and by the morning of October 2 the Abbey was finally cleared out.

While these events were proceeding, cavalry patrols pressed on towards Pys and Warlencourt. They reported on their return that they had reached "fresh fields, green trees, and untouched villages" behind the enemy's lines. They had ridden over some empty trenches and had found open country between the Courcelette-Warlencourt road and Pys. "It is a very cheering thing," said an officer, "to find that you have got past the great network of trenches. Even the horses want to go on when they feel that once more they have firm ground underfoot."

On Monday, October 2, the enemy counter-attacked with great violence and succeeded in recovering Eaucourt l'Abbaye. We, in our turn, improved our positions north and east of Courcelette and south-west of Gueudecourt. The French, in the night of October 1–2, had carried a trench east of Bouchavesnes and taken some prisoners. During October 2, they made further progress in this direction, and south of the Somme repulsed a German attack between Vermandovillers and Chaulnes. In the night of October 2–3, their barrages and machine-gun fire drove back German columns attempting to debouch from the Wood of St. Pierre Vaast.

On the Sunday and Monday President Poincaré and the French Minister of War,

[Official photograph

A WASH IN A SOMME SWAMP.

141—2

General Roques, visited the Allied battle-front. On this occasion the President decorated Sir Hubert Gough with the insignia of Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour.

Rain had now been falling for two days, and the operations were almost brought to a standstill. Fighting for Eaucourt l'Abbaye, however, continued, and by the evening of October 3 it finally passed into our hands. The same day the French drew nearer to Sailly-Saillisel, capturing an important trench north of Rancourt, and took 120 prisoners, including three officers.

On Wednesday, October 4, in heavy rain, the Germans attempted a bombing attack between Eaucourt l'Abbaye and Gueudecourt. It was driven off, the enemy abandoning his wounded. The French completed the capture of the powerful lines of German trenches between Morval and the Wood of St. Pierre Vaast. They captured 200 prisoners, including 10 officers. At 8 a.m. three companies had bombed the enemy out of the Brunswick Trench, and one company had rushed over the double line of trenches west of the Morval-Frégicourt track. Nine 88 mm. guns had thus been secured. The way to the northern end of the St. Pierre Vaast woods, which covered nearly two miles of country, and acted as a centre from which German attacks radiated, was now open, and the western face of the woods could be assaulted from Rancourt. South of the Somme the Germans violently bombarded the French works in the region of Belloy-en-Santerre, and there was cannonading near Assevillers. The next day the enemy's artillery was particularly active south of the Somme, chiefly in the Barleux-Belloy-Deniécourt sector and about Quesnoy, which lay north-west of Roye. The French, in the course of the day, repulsed a counter-attack on the trenches captured north of Frégicourt, and we repulsed two enemy attacks in the Thiepval area. North of the Schwaben Redoubt our guns caught bodies of Germans on the move and inflicted heavy losses on them. The rain had now ceased, but the ground was so soft and muddy that operations on a large scale were impossible.

Friday, October 6, the day before another forward move on the part of the Allies, passed in comparative quietude, but we captured the

[Official photograph.

ARTILLERY OFFICER DIRECTING GUN-FIRE BY MEANS OF DATA RECEIVED BY WIRELESS TELEGRAPH.

[Official photograph.

A GERMAN HOWITZER LEFT BEHIND.

mill between Le Sars and Eaucourt l'Abbaye. During the previous night we had advanced north-east of the Abbey. East of Loos, where three raids were carried out, and east of Armentières, the British discharged gas. This diabolical invention of the enemy had reacted on him. It enabled the Allies with little effort to keep the Germans on the alert at almost any point of their long line of battle and so to disturb their calculations. Not having the command of the air, they could never be certain that a gas discharge would not be followed by an attack of infantry which had been secretly concentrated behind the cylinders.

The French on the 6th advanced slightly east of Bouchavesnes. Otherwise there was little to report from the Somme front. It was the lull before another determined advance by the Allies.

During this period our aeroplanes patrolled far behind the German lines, fought aerial duels, swooped down on trains and attacked German depots and troops The following incidents extracted from reports of the Royal Flying Corps are illuminating:

October 1.—On the evening of September 30 one of our patrols encountered many hostile machines. A formation of seven Rolands near Bapaume was dispersed, two of them being driven down out of control.

On October 1 Captain "A" drove down two patrolling machines out of control near Gommecourt. He afterwards waited and attacked three hostile machines which came up from a neighbouring aerodrome. He forced one to land and dispersed the remainder.

Lieutenant "B" and Lieutenant "C," when taking photographs, were attacked by seven Rolands. The attack was driven off with the assistance of two of our patrolling machines, who joined the fight. One of the Rolands fell in a nose dive and was seen to plunge to earth.

October 10.—Lieutenant "D" and Lieutenant "E" had six encounters between 7 a.m. and 8.45 a.m. while on artillery patrol. In an encounter with three L.V.G.'s one German machine dived emitting clouds of smoke, having been engaged at 20 yards range. The remaining machines declined close combat.

Second Lieutenant "F," in the course of an encounter with several hostile machines, had all the controls of his machine, with the exception of the rudder, shot away. His machine turned a somersault and was wrecked; the pilot was unhurt.

A highly successful bombing raid was carried out against railway trains and stations at Quéant, Cambrai, and Bapaume at about 11 p.m. on the night of the 10th inst. A train entering Cambrai was attacked and wrecked, a bomb being observed to hit the first carriage behind the engine. The second bomb hit the station buildings, whereupon all the lights were extinguished.

Second Lieutenant "G" fired a drum of ammunition from 1,400 feet at a closed touring car. The car immediately stopped and three people got out of it and ran away.

On Saturday, October 7, it was decided that Sir Henry Rawlinson's Army should move still farther forward between Destremont Farm and Lesboeufs, and that General Fayolle's left wing should advance from Morval through Rancourt to Bouchavesnes on Sailly-Saillisel. Le Sars, the last considerable village on the Albert-Bapaume Road, was to be stormed, the British salient between Destremont Farm and Lesboeufs

rendered less pronounced, while the ridges on the road from Lesboeufs to Le Transloy, and the approaches to Sailly-Saillisel astride the Péronne-Bapaume road, were to be gained. Le Sars was held by the 4th Ersatz and the



[Canadian official photograph.
A BURSTING SHRAPNEL SHELL.

ground behind Eaucourt l'Abbaye by the 6th (Bavarian) Divisions. So uncertain did the German commanders consider the outcome of another struggle with the victorious British that these two Divisions were deployed on a front of less than 3,000 yards. The succession of blows delivered by the Allies since July 1 had forced the enemy to resort to massed defence as well as massed attack.

The offensive had been fixed for a little before 2 p.m. Though the rain had ceased and the weather was comparatively fine, the ground in places resembled a morass and the craters were mostly filled to the brim with water. During the night the Germans had delivered an unsuccessful bombing attack north-east of Eaucourt l'Abbaye. The British advance was preceded by the customary violent bombardment which churned up the ruins of Le Sars and knocked the Butte de Warlencourt behind it into a shapeless mass. When the guns lifted the Canadians from the Courcelette-Destremont Farm line again attacked the points in the Regina trench not yet held by us and the quadrilateral formed by the junction of the Below and Gallwitz double line of trenches between Pys and Le Sars. The village of Le Sars itself was assaulted on two sides, from Destremont Farm and from Eaucourt l'Abbaye, which with its mill house had formerly been a strong German position. Le Sars consisted of a street of wrecked houses, crossed midway by the sunken road connecting it with Eaucourt l'Abbaye. A redoubt, the Tangle—walled and cemented—blocked the approach to Le Sars on the east; 1,200 yards north-west of the village were a strongly fortified quarry and chalk-pit.

The ground between Le Sars and the Abbey dipped into a hollow or gully running northward almost up to the Butte de Warlencourt. This gully was swept by machine-guns from the neighbourhood of the tumulus. In craters before and on the flanks of the village were German snipers, who held their ground despite the fact that some of them were up to their armpits in water. The whole area swarmed with hostile machine-gunners, riflemen and bombers. But to the troops who had stormed the Thiepval-Morval ridge the obstacles in the low-lying ground before Bapaume appeared almost insignificant. At two in the afternoon the British infantry went over the parapets and, undeterred by bullets, bombs, shells, and the huge projectiles lobbed at them by *minenwerfer*, advanced up the Albert-Bapaume road and to the left and right of it on the village and the strong points in its vicinity. At the first rush our men reached the sunken road, and waited till our guns had operated on the houses beyond it. The barrage again lifted and then, with grim determination, the British, supported by those attacking from Eaucourt l'Abbaye and its mill, burst through the village and dug themselves in 500 yards or so nearer Bapaume across the highway. "The British," said a captured sergeant of the German 361st Regiment, "fought like tigers."

Meanwhile a desperate struggle had gone on

between Le Sars and Eaucourt l'Abbaye. The machine-gunners in the Tangle mowed down our infantry, the survivors of which were forced to fling themselves face downwards on the muddy soil. Once more the Tanks justified their inventors. One of these huge machines made its appearance and splashed its way up to the redoubt. In vain the Germans flung bombs at it. From each flank its guns fired into the Tangle, which was speedily carried. Only in the hollow leading to the Butte de Warlencourt were the Bavarians able to resist the British onset. When night fell the enemy there were maintaining a precarious hold on this narrow salient. The quarry and chalk-pit north-west of Le Sars were gained the next morning and counter-attacks of the Germans during the night of the 7th and at 5 a.m. on the 8th on the Schwaben Redoubt above Thiepval were heavily repulsed. The troops employed by the enemy were drawn from the 110th and 111th Regiments.

Thus the operations on the 7th between the Schwaben Redoubt and Le Sars had been brilliantly successful. East of the Butte de Warlencourt we had pushed forward on Le Barque and Ligny-Thilloy; to the right of Gueudecourt we had penetrated the enemy's trenches to a depth of 2,000 yards; and north-east of Lesboeufs we had gained a footing on the crest of the long spur which screened the defences of Le Transloy. Nearly 1,000 prisoners had been captured in the fighting and the enemy's losses in killed and wounded had been very heavy. Unfortunately rain fell on the evening of the 7th and prevented us from pursuing our onward progress.

Simultaneously with the advance of Sir Henry Rawlinson's infantry the French, after a devastating bombardment, moved on Sailly-Saillisel from the west and south. They had in front of them the Karlsbad, Teplitz and Berlin trenches and the well-organized fringe of the eastern end of the St. Pierre Vaast Woods. Beyond these trenches the enemy had constructed a very strong fortress on the western edge of Sailly-Saillisel Château, and close to the Péronne-Bapaume road was a redoubt known as "The Bluff" which had to be taken. At 2 p.m. the French left their

[Official photograph.

PRISONERS FROM THE LESBOEUFS DISTRICT.
A Tank is seen in the distance.

trenches. A company recruited from the Parisian districts of the Temple and Belleville, and known as the "Belleville Boys," had been deputed to storm "The Bluff." They crossed 300 yards of destroyed trenches and shelters and came under machine-gun fire. The moment for assaulting "The Bluff" had come. A non-commissioned officer described what followed:

The Lieutenant called me, saying: "Now is the time for us to use our wits. Take your section to turn the Bluff. Crawl within 20 yards of the first trench, and as soon as you are ready to attack I will fall upon the Boches with the remainder of the company." So I, with 40 men, made for the spot selected, going forward by six-foot bounds, and, thanks to the craters, only losing two comrades. Then I gave the agreed signal and we leapt into the trench. A fierce fusillade on my right told me that the Lieutenant also was busy. I wish you could have seen my little "Belleville Boys" bayoneting the Boches. Then they rushed on to help their comrades, who were engaged in a hot struggle with a Silesian battalion. They were fighting like lions blowing a path through the enemy's ranks with grenades. At 10 minutes past 3 Sailly Bluff was ours and the blue and white colours of the "Belleville Boys" were fluttering joyfully on the summit

Elsewhere the Germans, taken by surprise, offered little resistance, and soon after 3 p.m. the French had reached all their objectives. They were within a couple of hundred yards of the twin villages.

Fearing that Sailly-Saillisel would be at once attacked, the German commanders packed into automobiles of every description troops hastily withdrawn from other parts of their line and sent them post haste to the north of the village. Their presence was at once reported by observers in aeroplanes, and the French heavy guns discharged on them a hurricane of shells with great effect. By nightfall the troops of General Fayolle had carried their line forward over 1,300 yards north-east of Morval; they crowned the western slopes of the Sailly-Saillisel ridge, and, as mentioned, were on the Péronne-Bapaume road within 200 yards of the southern entrance of Sailly. East of the road they were ensconced in the western and south-western fringes of the St. Pierre Vaast Wood. Over 400 prisoners, including 10 officers, with 15 machine-guns, had been captured.

The next day (Sunday, October 9) the German reinforcements sent to support the garrison of Sailly-Saillisel were flung against the French positions in front of Morval. Wave after wave advanced to the attack, only to be shattered by the *rafales* from the "75" guns. Not a single living German reached the French

[*Official photograph.*

WOUNDED GERMAN PRISONERS AT A BRITISH DRESSING STATION.



[French official photograph.

A GERMAN SNIPER'S POST OCCUPIED BY A FRENCH MARKSMAN.

trenches. Meanwhile the aerial squadrons of our Allies were particularly active. They bombed the Bois des Vaux, due east of the Bois St. Pierre Vaast and the village of Moislains to the south of it.

On the British front, besides the fighting round the Schwaben Redoubt already referred to, there was an engagement north of the Courcelette-Warlencourt road where we gained ground, and we also advanced south-west of Gueudecourt. North of the Ancre-Somme battlefield Irish, Midland, and Yorkshire troops had during the night executed successful raids in the Loos, Givenchy and Fauquissart (north of Neuve Chapelle) areas. Against these achievements the Germans could only set the recovery on the evening of the 8th of a small portion of their lost trenches north of Lesboeufs.

On Monday, October 9, in somewhat drier weather, while raids were being carried out in the regions of Loos and Neuville St. Vaast, we successfully discharged gas at different points north of the Ancre, and our patrols were able to enter the enemy trenches and secure prisoners. During the night our troops had progressed east of Le Sars in the direction of the Butte de Warlencourt, and in the course of the afternoon of the 9th we attacked 1,000 yards east of the Schwaben and north of the Stuff Redoubt. Round "The Mound," a redoubt on the edge of the ridge descending towards the Ancre Valley, there were some fierce encounters, ending in our taking 200 prisoners, including six officers. In the Le Transloy region our artillery dispersed a party of the enemy which had ventured into the open. The French the same day repulsed an enemy attack starting from a salient of the St. Pierre Vaast Wood to the east of Rancourt, and shortly afterwards a reconnaissance debouching from a small wood to the north-east of Bouchavesnes was dispersed by machine-gun fire.

At this point it will be well to consider the tactical situation between the Ancre and the Somme created by the series of victories gained by the Allies since July 1. It was well explained in Sir Douglas Haig's dispatch of December 23 as follows:

With the exception of his positions in the neighbourhood of Sailly-Saillisel, and his scanty foothold on the northern crest of the high ground above Thiepval, the enemy had now been driven from the whole of the ridge lying between the Tortille and the Ancre.

Possession of the north-western portion of the ridge north of the latter village carried with it observation over the valley of the Ancre between Miraumont and Hamel and the spurs and valleys held by the enemy on the right bank of the river. The Germans, therefore, made desperate efforts to cling to their last remaining



[French official photograph.

FRENCH CATERPILLAR TRACTORS.

trenches in this area, and in the course of the three weeks following our advance made repeated counter-attacks at heavy cost in the vain hope of recovering the ground they had lost. During this period our gains in the neighbourhood of Stuff and Schwaben Redoubts were gradually increased and secured in readiness for future operations; and I was quite confident of the ability of our troops, not only to repulse the enemy's attacks, but to clear him entirely from his last positions on the ridge whenever it should suit my plans to do so. I was, therefore, well content with the situation on this flank.

Along the centre of our line from Gueudecourt to the west of Le Sars similar considerations applied. As we were already well down the forward slopes of the ridge on this front, it was for the time being inadvisable to make any serious advance. Pending developments elsewhere all that was necessary or indeed desirable was to carry on local operations to improve our positions and to keep the enemy fully employed.

On our eastern flank, on the other hand, it was important to gain ground. Here the enemy still possessed a strong system of trenches covering the villages of Le Transloy and Beaulencourt and the town of Bapaume; but, although he was digging with feverish haste, he had not yet been able to create any very formidable defences behind this line. In this direction, in fact, we had at last reached a stage at which a successful attack might reasonably be expected to yield much greater results than anything we had yet attained. The resistance of the troops opposed to us had seriously weakened in the course of our recent operations, and there was no reason to suppose that the effort required would not be within our powers.

This last completed system of defence, before Le Transloy, was flanked to the south by the enemy's positions at Sailly-Saillisel, and screened to the west by the spur lying between Le Transloy and Lesboeufs. A necessary preliminary, therefore, to an assault upon it was to secure the spur and the Sailly-Saillisel heights. Possession of the high ground at this latter village would at once give a far better command over the ground to the north and north-west, secure the flank of our operations towards Le Transloy, and deprive the enemy of observation over the Allied communications in the Combles Valley. In view of the enemy's efforts to construct new systems of defence behind the Le Transloy line, it was desirable to lose no time in dealing with the situation.

Unfortunately, at this juncture, very unfavourable weather set in and continued with scarcely a break during the remainder of October and the early part of November. Poor visibility seriously interfered with the work of our artillery, and constant rain turned the mass of hastily dug trenches for which we were fighting into channels of deep mud.

The country roads, broken by countless shell craters, that cross the deep stretch of ground we had lately won, rapidly became almost impassable, making the supply of food, stores, and ammunition a serious problem. These conditions multiplied the difficulties of attack to such an extent that it was found impossible to exploit the situation with the rapidity necessary to enable us to reap the full benefits of the advantages we had gained.

None the less, my right flank continued to assist the operations of our Allies against Saillisel, and attacks were made to this end, whenever a slight improvement in the weather made the co-operation of artillery and infantry at all possible. The delay in our advance, however, though unavoidable, had given the enemy time to reorganise and rally his troops. His resistance again became stubborn, and he seized every favourable opportunity for counter-attacks. Trenches changed hands with great frequency, the conditions of ground making it difficult to renew exhausted supplies of bombs and ammunition, or to consolidate the ground won, and so rendering it an easier matter to take a battered trench than to hold it.

Such, in short, were the considerations which determined the future Allied movements between the Ancre and the Somme. It remains to be seen how Sir Douglas Haig's plans were eventually carried out.

By Tuesday, October 10, the advance beyond the Stuff Redoubt had enabled us to push our line forward east of that point and to carry it eastward and a little to the north to about half-way between Le Sars and Warlencourt. In the vicinity of Grandcourt, west of Le Sars, German infantry in the open were dispersed by our artillery on the 10th. Otherwise the day was uneventful for the British. It was very different with the French. South of the Somme between Berny-en-Santerre and Chaulnes on a front of over three miles they advanced to the attack. Their line ran from Berny southwards to Hill 91 and thence in a westerly direction towards Deniécourt. A few hundred yards east of Deniécourt it swerved to the

south-west in front of Soyécourt and Vermandovillers and then proceeded to a point a few hundred yards west of Chaulnes. The German position in the area formed a salient and the object of General Micheler was to expel the Germans from it. They were strongly entrenched in the hamlet of Bovent, the villages of Ablaincourt and Pressoire and in the woods round Chaulnes. General von Kothen, defending the salient, had been strongly reinforced and believed that his Silesian "shock" troops were capable of resisting any attack. The 44th Reserve Division and a Division of Wurtembergers had been sent to his assistance, and the 23rd Saxon Division was held in readiness against unexpected eventualities.

During Monday the French artillery bombarded the selected sector with their usual thoroughness. Among other targets which had been in the last week struck by the French guns was an observation-post in an orchard at Bovent, six feet high and constructed of great blocks of reinforced concrete. It resembled the conning-tower of a battleship, and at its top there were two narrow slits, through which observers could watch the French lines or machine-guns could fire. Eight rooms, 30 feet deep, with numerous concealed exits surrounded the tower. So long as the summer lasted this observation post was hidden by the foliage of the trees and undergrowth. But in October it had become visible and a French artillery lieutenant had noticed that the orchard contained some structure unusual in orchards. He promptly directed the "75" guns to clear away the surrounding trees and bushes and the naked grey concrete of the tower was revealed. The attention of the big guns was then drawn to this formidable obstacle. Projectile after projectile burst on it. Still the tower, although becoming more and more ragged, resisted. A salvo of gas shells was next discharged. The gas being heavier than air descended into the subterranean shelters. Finally a huge shell burst a few yards to the left of the tower, opened a hole in the ground about 15 feet deep, hurled great masses of concrete into the air, which fell and blocked the exits. When Bovent on Tuesday was captured a French soldier squeezed his way down into the cavern below the tower and found 30 Germans, including two colonels, lying dead

[*Official photograph*

A GERMAN PRISONER LENDS A HELPING HAND TO A BRITISH DISPATCH RIDER.



[Canadian official photograph.

LOADING AMMUNITION ON A MOTOR LIGHT RAILWAY BEHIND THE FIRING LINE.

with their gas-masks on and apparently unwounded. Two of them had been playing chess when the gas caught them, and the table was laid for dinner.

The effect of the French bombardment was to shake the nerves of the Germans, who on Monday evening, in anticipation of an offensive, replied with copious *barrages* and tear shells. It was not, however, till Tuesday that the attack was really delivered. One column, starting from the woods outside Deniécourt, carried the hamlet of Bovent after a short and fierce struggle. A second column from Vermandovillers assaulted Ablaincourt. Five times they carried the village and five times it was recovered by the enemy, to whose aid the 23rd Saxon Division had been rushed up in motor lorries. At the end of the day the northern and western outskirts of Ablaincourt were in the possession of the French. Farther to the south our Allies progressed to within 200 yards of Pressoire. A third column from Lihons deployed and attacked the Chaulnes Woods, bristling with entanglements and machine-guns and garrisoned by a brigade of Wurtembergers, who were finally chased away. The prisoners taken in the fighting amounted to over 1,700.

During the day bivouacs and cantonments in the vicinity of Péronne, the Tergnier aviation sheds, the railway stations of St. Quentin and Guiscard and the Wood of Porquericourt, had been bombed by French aeronauts and there had been 14 aerial duels between French and German airmen south of the Somme, and 44 north of it. Four German machines were brought down and six others injured. A train running between Offoy and Ham was attacked with machine-gun fire. The British aeroplanes destroyed two gun emplacements and damaged others. They penetrated well behind the German lines and bombed with good effect railway stations, trains and billets. Two of our machines engaged seven hostile aeroplanes, destroyed one, damaged two, and dispersed the rest. Four British machines were lost.

The next day (Wednesday, October 11) the enemy attempted to retake the Chaulnes Wood and was repulsed after violent hand-to-hand fighting. The struggle still went on in Ablaincourt and began round the sugar refinery of Genermont, east of Bovent. North of the Somme, in the evening and throughout the night, bombing encounters took place along the Morval-Bouchavesnes front, especially on the edge of the St. Pierre Vaast Wood. The German 68th Infantry Regiment and 76th Reserve Infantry Regiment put up a fierce resistance. North of Courcelette the British artillery stopped an attack and elsewhere dealt effectively with hostile infantry mustering in the background.

In dull weather on Thursday afternoon, October 12, Sir Henry Rawlinson and General

[*French official photograph.*

ARMY TELEPHONE STATION ON THE SOMME.

Fayolle launched an offensive between Le Sars and Bouchavesnes against the troops of General Sixt von Armin, General von Boehn and General von Garnier. No progress was made in the vicinity of the Butte de Warlencourt, but south of Ligny-Thilloy, east of Gueudecourt and Lesboeufs, our line was advanced. Between Lesboeufs and Le Transloy the gain was about 1,000 yards and we approached to within 500 yards of the cemetery of the last-named village. The enemy appeared to have been

about to advance when our offensive began, for there had been a considerable accumulation of troops in their trenches, as was shown in some of them north-east of Gueudecourt, which were found to be packed with the dead and dying. Two hundred prisoners besides numerous machine-guns were secured. During the night a German attack north of the Stuff Redoubt was repulsed. Meanwhile the French scored some small successes west of Sailly-Saillisel, and Sir Hubert Gough pushed forward

GENERAL VON BOEHN.
A German Commander on the Somme.

round the Schwaben Redoubt, capturing 300 prisoners, belonging to the German 110th Regiment.

Apart from a skirmish north of the Stuff Redoubt little that was noteworthy occurred on the British front during Friday, October 13, but there was considerable activity in the Morval, Bouchavesnes, Ablaincourt and Chaulnes sectors. A German attack with *flammenwerfer* resulted in the capture of some parts of trenches at the outskirts of the St. Pierre Vaast Wood.

On Saturday, October 14, Sir Hubert Gough's troops advanced their line well to the north and west of the Schwaben Redoubt and cleared two German communication trenches north of the Stuff Redoubt for a distance of nearly 200 yards, capturing two officers and 303 privates. The French bombarded the Sailly-Saillisel position and south of the Somme again joined battle with the enemy.

On October 14 our Ally, who had progressed on the Malassise Ridge between Bouchavesnes and Moislains, beat back after desperate fighting masses of Germans counter-attacking in Ablaincourt. At the close of the day the French line ran through the ruins of the village. Between Ablaincourt and Barleux, which lies in a hollow, our Allies had dug deep into the German lines. The sugar refinery on the Ablaincourt-Genermont road had been pulverized by 15-inch and 16-inch howitzers and it was carried with little loss, and from Bovent the French entered Genermont, which fell after an hour's fighting, 250 Germans of the 150th Prussian Regiment being captured. When the sun set the French were only a few hundred yards from the villages of Fresnes and Mazancourt. Farther to the north, starting from the Berny-Barleux road, the Colonial Division, commanded by the heroic General Marchand, who with Kitchener had prevented France and Great Britain from playing into the German hands over the Fashoda affair, brought the French line nearer to the heights of Villers-Carbonnel, the batteries on which covered the Barleux-Chaulnes road. A Silesian detachment in a ruined work barred the way. It was submerged by the waves of the Colonial infantry.

GENERAL VON GARNIER.
A German Commander on the Somme.

In places five lines of trenches had to be carried. They were crammed with German corpses, among which surviving bombers, riflemen and machine-gunners, rendered desperate by the fact that they were fighting with their backs

to the marshy Somme, fought with great courage. After a terrible struggle, reminiscent of the scenes in Charleroi when the Colonial troops had at the opening of the war crossed bayonets with the Prussian Guardsmen, the position was taken and the French front extended in depth from six to eight hundred yards. It now overlapped Barleux, and turned the heights of Villers-Carbonnel.

Unwounded German prisoners to the number of 1,100, including 19 officers, had been taken in the Belloy-Ablaincourt sector. The counter-attacks of the enemy in the evening were all beaten off. The French aeroplanes splendidly cooperated in the fighting. The clouds were but 600 feet from the ground, and they had flown close to the enemy's barrages. One machine returned riddled with over 200 bullets. North of the Somme two pilots had attacked the enemy in his trenches with machine-guns.

The next day (Sunday, October 15), while the Colonials repulsed a German attack at the St. Eloi Wood, south-east of Belloy, and the British in the morning advanced slightly north-east of Gueudecourt, the attack on Sailly-Saillisel was delivered. For forty hours the villages and their outworks had been systematically pounded. The cemented trenches east of the Tripot work had been obliterated; the redoubt on the Morval road had been wrecked and its defenders buried in the ruins. Afterwards the French counted, in a vast underground chamber there, the corpses of 200 asphyxiated Germans. On the evening of Sunday the bombardment ceased and Sailly was assaulted.

This village is traversed by the Péronne-Bapaume highway, on the west side of which lie the château, a chapel, and half of the village. The road from Morval crosses the highway just south of the château. East of Sailly, through Saillisel, runs a road branching off from the highway to the village of Rocquigny, due east of Le Transloy. One French column, starting from north-east of Rancourt up the highway, attacked the château from the south. A second column entered the park of the château from the north-west and stormed the ruined chapel, which was stubbornly defended by a machine-gun section. A third column, after passing two lines of trenches, descended on the village from the north and isolated it from the garrison of Le Transloy. Long and terrible was the fighting for the chapel and château. The Germans disputed every inch of the ground, but were finally driven helter-skelter through the underground passages connecting these buildings with the houses along the Péronne-Bapaume highway.

GENERAL MARCHAND.
In command of the Colonial Division of the French Army of the West.

After the chapel and château had fallen the contest continued in the western half of the village, which ran for 800 yards north and south. In the meantime the British had during the night repulsed with heavy loss a strong *flammenwerfer* attack at the Schwaben Redoubt delivered after heavy artillery preparation, and a small hostile bombing attack north of Courcelette.

[French official photograph.

BRITISH GUNNERS, WEARING GAS MASKS, LOADING A FIELD GUN.

On Monday, October 16, the French consolidated the position gained by them in Sailly, repulsed a violent counter-attack east of Berny-en-Santerre, carried a small wood and captured two guns of 210 mm. and one of 77 mm. between Genermont and Ablaincourt.

During the next day (October 17) the French, whose aeroplanes fought 65 duels, in the course of which five German machines were put out of action, heavily repulsed counter-attacks east of Berny and Belloy and bombarded the portion of Sailly-Saillisel still in the possession of the Germans. In the morning the enemy forced his way into the ruins between the chapel and the central cross-roads. He was promptly expelled, and towards sunset three more counter-attacks from the north and east were repulsed. In thick and murky weather on October 18 the clearing out of the Germans from the rest of Sailly was undertaken. An enormous concentration of guns had been ordered by General Fayolle. "It seemed incredible," said *The Times* correspondent, "that there could be so many guns and so much ammunition in the world, and still more impossible to believe that any sort of defence could possibly stand up against the hurricane of shell for more than a few minutes." The German artillery was completely outclassed. Faintly, through the mist, about 11.45 a.m., red balls of fiery light announced to the German gunners that the French infantry was leaving its trenches and dug-outs. The garrison, composed of mixed elements of the 1st Bavarians, the 16th Division, and the 2nd Bavarians, received but little assistance in the nature of barrages. By noon the action was over, and the enemy, leaving behind him masses of dead and wounded, had been ejected from the whole of Sailly, and from the ridges north-west and north-east of the village. Again and again, accompanied by waves of asphyxiating gas and the fire-spouting *flammenwerfer*, the frantic Germans were hurled at their relentless foe. No fewer than 20 attacks in mass formation were delivered and repulsed. Across a fiercely disputed outbuilding German corpses formed a rampart three feet high.

The completion of the conquest of Sailly was not the only memorable event of October 18. South of the Somme the French, under Generals Lacapelle and Cugnac, rushed the whole of the

German front-line trenches between La Maisonnette and Biaches, defended by troops of the 11th Reserve Division. Five officers, 245 privates, and several machine-guns were captured, and the German batteries across the Somme, near Doingt and Bussu, were silenced. A German advance at 5 a.m. against a French trench east of Berny-en-Santerre had also failed to achieve its object. Some enemy parties entered the French lines and were promptly bayoneted. The waves of men following on behind them were caught in barrages, and fell back in disorder, leaving numbers of their comrades dead on the ground.

The same day at 3 a.m. Sir Henry Rawlinson had pushed forward on the Butte de Warlencourt, to the north-east of Gueudecourt and beyond Lesboeufs. Aided by a Tank the British secured a further section of the Grid and Grid Support trenches. Some 150 prisoners were captured. A counter-attack in the Butte de Warlencourt region was repulsed.

On Thursday, October 19, the French attacked and captured the village of Saillisel, which straggled 1,400 yards on either side of the Sailly-Moislains road. The eastern half of the village was secured after half an hour's fighting, and a struggle then began for a ridge 400 feet high flanking the village between the Péronne-Bapaume road and the road to Rocquigny. By the end of the day the French line before the St. Pierre Vaast Wood formed a semi-circle from Sailly to between Rancourt and Bouchavesnes. East of the wood the Germans still held the Vaux Wood, behind which ran the Tortille. But the enemy's batteries on the ridges north-west and north-east of Sailly-Saillisel which had raked our troops advancing from Lesboeufs on Le Transloy had been dislodged, and his batteries on the high ground towards Le Mesnil were under the direct fire of the French guns. But for the abominable weather it is probable that Bapaume would have been speedily captured by the Allies in 1916. Unfortunately, in the words of Sir Douglas Haig, "the moment for decisive action was rapidly passing away, while the weather showed no signs of improvement. By this time," he added, "the ground had already become so bad that nothing less than a prolonged period of drying weather, which at that season of the year was most unlikely to occur, would suit our purpose."

For the moment, indeed, it seemed that fortune would favour the Allies. A spell of fine, hard weather set in on Friday, October 20.

SAILLY: RUINS OF A HOUSE FORTIFIED BY THE GERMANS.
INSET: REMAINS OF THE CHÂTEAU.

Advantage of the changed conditions was promptly taken by our airmen.

The number of combats in the air on October 20 exceeded 80. Seven enemy machines were seen to crash down or to fall out of control, and there can be no doubt that some which were driven down by our airmen were wrecked in landing. Three of our airmen were killed, three reported missing, and five wounded.

The *communiqués* record at least two instances of conspicuous pluck and endurance. Second Lieutenant "S," though mortally wounded by gun fire, brought his machine and observer safely back to his own aerodrome. He died of his wounds next day. Lieutenant "S," though wounded in the head at the beginning of a combat in which he and Second Lieutenant "G" were opposed to six German machines, continued to fight for a considerable time and drove down one of the enemy machines out of control. Six of our machines, while taking photographs, were heavily attacked by anti-aircraft guns, and, soon after, by twelve hostile fighting machines. One of our machines was brought down by the enemy to his lines, and another brought to land behind our lines, with the pilot severely wounded. The enemy machines having withdrawn, Captain "D," the leader of our formation, tried to complete his reconnaissance, accompanied by only two escorting machines. He was again attacked, and another of our machines retired, with engine and propellor damaged. Captain "D" then fought his way homeward, surrounded by hostile machines, and landed safely.

Nor were the French aviators inactive. Seven German machines were brought down, Lieutenant Herteaux increasing his "bag" to ten. During the night 41 bombs of 120 mm. were dropped on the stations of Noyon and Chauny, and later a train between Appilly and Chauny was bombed. The enemy cantonments and the bivouacs in the region of Nesle and Ham, and the aviation grounds at Matigny and Slez were also hit.



[Official photograph.

SHELLS FOR THE 15-IN. HOWITZERS.

Saturday, October 21, was another day of battle. On the 20th the Germans had delivered an ineffectual attack against the Schwaben Redoubt. Another in the early morning of the 21st was repulsed, five officers and 79 privates being captured. Shortly after noon, preceded by a tremendous bombardment, Sir Hubert Gough's Army advanced on a line of some 5,000 yards between Schwaben Redoubt and

Le Sars. Our line towards the Ancre was pushed forward from 300 to 500 yards; advanced posts to the north and north-east of the redoubt were secured and most of the Stuff and Regina trenches captured. Over 1,000 prisoners were taken, a figure only slightly exceeded by our casualties.

In the meantime the Germans renewed their desperate efforts to recover Sailly-Saillisel. Three regiments of the 2nd Bavarian Division were flung at the ruins after artillery preparations of an extremely violent character. Barrages and machine-gun fire broke the waves of the assaulting infantry. Thrice they came forward and thrice were they driven back. South of the Somme at 2 p.m. the Germans with *flammenwerfer* attacked the positions recently lost by them between Biaches and La Maisonnette. The struggle was peculiarly bitter in the Blaise Wood, in some trenches north of which the enemy obtained a footing. At all other points they met with a bloody reverse. Near Belloy that day General Marchand, who had been badly wounded at the Battle of the Champagne Pouilleuse, was slightly injured. He refused to relinquish his command.

Finally, on the 21st, the French mastered the Bois Etoile north of Chaulnes from its western edge to the central cross-roads. They captured 250 prisoners and beat off an attack of part of the Chaulnes garrison which had issued from the village to support the Saxons garrisoning the wood.

On Sunday, October 22, the French extended their gains west of Sailly-Saillisel, south of the Somme. The Germans attacked the French positions in the wood north of Chaulnes. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses. At 1 p.m. the Germans again advanced on the French trenches on the southern end of the wood, but only to be driven back, leaving behind them a litter of dead and wounded, and losing numerous prisoners; in the previous attack alone 150 had been captured.



[*Official photograph.*

LOADING A HEAVY BRITISH HOWITZER.

The next day (October 23) the Germans, who before dawn had attempted to raid our trenches in the Gommecourt region, massed south of Grandcourt, on the Ancre, as if they intended to commence a counter-attack on the Regina trench. This movement was at once notified to our artillery, and the British gunners hurled high explosives and shrapnel at the enemy, who speedily dispersed. About the same time Sir Henry Rawlinson's troops, in conjunction with the French, pushed forward east of Gueudecourt and Lesboeufs. The rain had increased during the night, and numerous German trenches—Dewdrop, Rainbow, Hazy, Misty, Sleet, Frosty, Zenith, Orion, Spectrum—and the craters were full of water.

The object of this minor operation was to straighten the British front before Le Transloy. The Germans had dug two lines of trenches in front of the village embracing the cemetery on the Lesboeufs road. Behind them were many machine-gun emplacements, giving a wide field of fire against the British and against any French troops moving on Le Transloy down the Péronne-Bapaume road, who had to pass over an average distance of 1,200 yards of No-

BRITISH TROOPS REPELLING A STRONG COUNTER-ATTACK.

[Official photograph.

OFFICERS OBSERVING FROM A CAPTURED TRENCH.

Man's Land. The fighting which ensued was of a confused character. One strip of trench changed hands no less than five times, and a group of gun pits, in which the guns had been replaced by machine-guns, was obstinately attacked and obstinately defended.

Details of the 64th Brandenburg Regiment, the regiment which took Douaumont in February, 1916, and of the 24th Bavarian Regiment, which had carried Fort Vaux, with Hamburgers and Hanoverians, strove desperately to keep the British from approaching nearer to Le Transloy, the most formidable of the village fortresses still blocking the road to Bapaume. Nevertheless, at nightfall, we had captured over 1,000 yards of trenches, while the French had made appreciable progress north-east of Morval in the direction of Le Transloy.

Nothing occurred worth recording on October 24 and 25. The rain continued to pour down, converting low-lying portions of the battlefield into a quagmire. But on Thursday the 26th there was a sudden liveliness. The British raided enemy trenches north-east and south of Arras, and in the morning, after a preliminary bombardment, the Germans attacked the Stuff Trench. They were driven off with considerable loss, leaving 41 prisoners in our hands. An attempt of the enemy to recover the Abbé Wood, south of Bouchavesnes, was unavailing.

Heavy rain once more fell on Friday, October 27, and the operations on both sides were, apart from the never-ceasing artillery duels, suspended.

On Saturday, October 28, our artillery shelled the Germans out of some strong points north-east of Lesboeufs. As the enemy emerged from his hiding places he came under a murderous fire from our infantry. Several important trenches passed into our hands, and about 100 prisoners were captured.

On Sunday, October 29, we made a further forward movement in the same region, and the French by advancing 300 yards north-west of Sailly, parallel with the Bapaume Road, brought their front into line of our new positions. But in the afternoon they suffered a somewhat serious reverse to the south of the Somme. Their progress between Biaches and La Maisonnette had seriously alarmed the German commanders, for our Allies were almost in the outskirts of Péronne, and threatened Barleux from the north. Accordingly, at 3 p.m., the 360th Regiment, composed of Berlin and Brandenburg men, whose advance had been preceded



[Official photograph.

PACKMULES CARRYING AMMUNITION TO THE TRENCHES.

by an unusually severe bombardment, was launched at the farm of La Maisonnette. Other troops attacked on both sides of the farm, and the assaulting masses were accompanied by a liberal supply of *flammenwerfer*. For a time the French, supported by their artillery, held their own, but during the night the enemy was once more in the farm. It was claimed by him that he captured 412 men and 15 officers. All efforts, however, to drive the French from Hill 97 failed. The next day the French as an offset to this reverse carried a system of trenches north-west of Sailly-Saillisel.

On Wednesday, November 1, the Germans, after a vigorous bombardment and discharges of poisonous gas, attacked Sailly-Saillisel. Seven battalions drawn from different divisions were launched against the village on the north and east. No fewer than six attempts were made by the enemy's columns to force their way in; but apart from a small success the German efforts were abortive In the after-

[Official photograph.

WATERING HORSES BEHIND THE BATTLE-FRONT

noon the Allies took the offensive in this region. North-east of Lesboeufs the French captured two trenches and made 125 prisoners, while the British gained some ground between Lesboeufs and Le Transloy. Another attack, made by the French to the south-east of Saillisel, secured them a strongly organized system of trenches on the western outskirts of the wood of St. Pierre Vaast.

On November 2, in despite of heavy rain, more ground was gained by the French between Lesboeufs and Sailly-Saillisel; the total prisoners captured on the 1st and 2nd amounted to 736, including 20 officers, and a dozen machine-guns were also taken. The net result of the fighting was that the British were within 200 yards of Le Transloy, which was also threatened by the French from the south.

On Friday, November 3, the enemy counter-attacked the British east of Gueudecourt and were beaten back, suffering heavy losses and losing four machine-guns. The Germans left behind them over 100 dead and 30 prisoners.

On November 4 the Germans vainly endeavoured to expel the French from the trenches on the western edge of St. Pierre Vaast Wood. The attack was shattered by curtain and machine-gun fire.

On Sunday, November 5, according to the German Higher Command, the British and French "began a gigantic blow against the Army front of General von Below." According to the same veracious account, "the troops of the various German tribes, under Generals von Marschall, von Deimling, and von Garnier, tenaciously resisting, inflicted on the enemy a severe defeat." The real facts were as follows:

[French official photograph.

GERMAN GUNS AND FLAME-THROWERS CAPTURED BY THE FRENCH.

In the morning of the 5th the troops of Sir Henry Rawlinson moved towards the Butte de Warlencourt and seized the heights east of Le Sars and north-east of Gueudecourt on a front of 1,000 yards, approaching some 400 yards nearer to the Butte. For a short time the Butte passed into our power; but during the night the Germans drove us back. In the Lesboeufs region we captured what was known as the Hazy Trench, and reached a point almost at the further edge of the minor ridge running northwards before Le Transloy. In the meantime the French, from the south of Le Transloy to the south of St. Pierre Vaast Wood, took the offensive. Between Lesboeufs

and Sailly-Saillisel they progressed in the direction of Le Transloy. Issuing from Sailly they reconquered the greater part of Saillisel and works to the south of it; then attacking on three sides at once the St. Pierre Vaast Wood, they captured three trenches defending the northern corner of the wood, and the whole of the hostile position on the south-western

GENERAL MAISTRE.
A French Commander under General Micheler.

outskirts. All through the afternoon German reinforcements from Moislains struggled hard to regain the lost ground; but by 4 p.m. they were beaten, and another attempt in the evening made by them was also driven back. Over 600 prisoners, including 15 officers, were taken by the French.

On November 7, in an almost incessant deluge of rain, the French scored another brilliant success, this time south of the Somme. Bretons and Parisians of General Micheler's Army, under the command of Generals Anthoine and Maistre, issued at 9.45 a.m. from Genermont sugar refinery, from the Serpentine Trench south-east of Vermandovillers, and from the northern spur of Chaulnes Wood. The two lines of concreted trenches, forming the outwork of the long Germania trench which ran as far south as Hyencourt-le-Grand, were at once captured. all the occupants being either killed or taken prisoners. Similarly, the Germans between the south of Pressoire and Chaulnes Wood received short shrift. Only in Ablaincourt and Pressoire itself did the Germans put up a good fight. During the preliminary bombardment they had taken refuge in their subterranean chambers, and as soon as the attack began they came to the surface and played their machine-guns on the French attacking waves. In the southern portion of Ablaincourt a severe struggle took place. A stack of houses defended by Bavarians were thrice taken and retaken. In the church a Bavarian company fought almost to the last man. The cemetery, 500 yards east of the village, was also the scene of fierce encounters: it was carried at the point of the bayonet. Between Ablaincourt and Pressoire a single French company routed a whole Prussian battalion. By nightfall the French had secured Pressoire and were on the outskirts of Omiécourt. They had captured hundreds of prisoners and a position from which their guns could command the plateau of Villers Carbonnel, the batteries on which prevented the French from taking Barleux.

The weather had now somewhat moderated; it remained dry and cold, with frosty nights and misty mornings. Final preparations were pushed on by Sir Douglas Haig for the attack which he proposed to deliver on the Ancre. On November 9, while fighting continued round Saillisel and south of Pressoire, the British remained quiescent—at least so far as their infantry was concerned. The day was, however, rendered memorable by a great aerial battle, in which a squadron of 30 British aeroplanes engaged from 36 to 40 German machines. The action took place between 9 a.m. and 10 a.m. north-east of Bapaume. Near the Villa of Mory close to Vaulx-Vraucourt, the British, who were on a bombing expedition, sighted the enemy's squadron. Some of our machines were at a higher level than the enemy. They plunged down to join their comrades in the engagement which was fought some 5,000 feet above the ground. For twenty minutes among the clouds there was an inextricable tangle of darting, swirling machines. Four of ours were lost, six of the enemy were sent to earth, and the whole enemy formation broke and scattered. Our airmen bombed Vaulx-Vraucourt and returned home unmolested.

On the 10th the French captured more trenches north-east of Lesboeufs, and in Saillisel repulsed a counter-attack.

The next day, in the early hours of the

morning, the Canadians attacked troops of the Prussian Guard and Saxon Regiments holding the Farmers Road, an easterly extension of Regina Trench, on a front of 1,000 yards; 60 prisoners, including four officers were taken. An unpleasant interruption to our line had been removed, and we were close upon the strong German position running immediately in front of Pys and Warlencourt. On the same day the French seized the north-eastern and south-eastern outskirts of Saillisel, but the Germans still maintained themselves in the easternmost houses of the village. South of the Somme, at 2.30 p.m. the enemy with *flammenwerfer* attacked in the neighbourhood of Denié-court. He was beaten back with heavy losses.

On November 12 there was a lull on the British front, but the fighting went on in Saillisel, which finally passed into the possession of our Allies, who captured 220 men and seven officers, with eight machine-guns. South of the Somme the Germans, attacking south-east of Berny, succeeded in entering some advanced trenches but were immediately driven out by a counter-attack.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR E. A. FANSHAWE, K.C.B.
In command of the Fifth Army Corps.

Before the winter set in Sir Douglas Haig determined to strike a last blow at the almost shattered line of the Germans now running from the east of Arras to Péronne. The main ridge between the Schwaben Redoubt and Sailly-Saillisel being now in the hands of the Allies, it was possible to attack successfully from the west and south the enemy's salient on both sides of the Ancre Since the ineffectual assault by the British on July 1, Sir Hubert Gough's troops had step by step crept towards the hamlet of St. Pierre Divion on the left and the village of Beaucourt-sur-Ancre on the right bank of the river. They were well within assaulting distance of the maze of vast dug-outs, caverns and trenches which were all that was left of Beaumont Hamel; Beaucourt, higher up the Ancre, was situated in a hollow. North of Beaumont Hamel the plateau up to the village of Serre was also strongly organized. Before the western edge of Beaumont Hamel, down to and across the low ground before our lines, ran successive lines of trenches. So thick were the rusty wire entanglements—in places five tiers deep, each often 8 feet high and 90 to 120 feet wide—that from a distance they looked like a belt of brown ploughed land. Behind the trenches and entanglements the face of the slope beyond in the crease of the hills and the banks of the Ancre was pierced everywhere with the entrances to the caverns and dug-outs. From the road through Beaumont Hamel to the Ancre a deep forked ravine descended to the enemy's front line trench, where the extremities of the prongs, as it were, of the ravine ended. It was known to us from its shape as the "Y" ravine and was 1,000 yards or so long. At these western points the prongs were 30 feet and more in depth, with precipitous sides that in places almost overhung. Below the bottom of these gullies in the ground, caves, some of them large enough to hold a battalion and a half of men, had been constructed, and a tunnel ran back to the fourth line trenches. In caves and tunnels the enemy lay absolutely safe from shell-fire. The ruins of the village of Beaucourt on the right bank of the Ancre were not furnished with underground works com-

[Official photograph.

BRINGING IN RIFLES AND EQUIPMENT FROM NO-MAN'S LAND.

parable with those of Beaumont Hamel and its vicinity, but deep dug-outs there provided accommodation for the masses held in reserve.

Equally formidable were the defences of the hamlet of St. Pierre Divion on the south bank of the river. Starting from four recessed and sheltered entrances on the river level a great gulley ran back some 300 yards into the hill. Then it branched and from the ends of the branches passages and steps led up to the communication and other trenches on the Thiepval ridge west of the Schwaben Redoubt. This network of tunnels and caverns, some of which were used as hospitals, formed perhaps the largest collection of underground casemates yet discovered. These works formed one immense fortress with a front of nearly five miles lying astride the Ancre from the Schwaben Redoubt to Serre. At the end of October an additional Division—the 223rd, one of Hindenburg's newly constructed divisions—had been added to the garrison. The 2nd Guard Reserve Division was on the north of the Ancre; it was supported by troops of the 12th, 55th, 58th, 62nd, and 144th Divisions. For the attack on the 3,000 yards of entrenchments and burrows south of the Ancre and of the 5,000 yards north of the river only troops recruited in the British Isles were employed. It was a good trial of strength between them and the inhabitants of Germany.

At 5 a.m. on the morning of November 11, the preliminary bombardment of the Ancre fortress had begun. It continued with bursts of great intensity until the morning of November 13. The acres of barbed wire entanglements by then had melted away, and the surface works had been knocked to pieces. The assault was fixed for 6 a.m. It was preceded by a sudden and very effective barrage fire. A dense fog covered the ground, and the fog coupled with the darkness prevented the Germans from perceiving that our men were concentrating before their positions in unusually large numbers. Consequently the operation partook largely of the nature of a surprise. South of the Ancre our troops between the western end of the Regina Trench, 700 yards north of the Stuff Redoubt and the Schwaben Redoubt, attacked the formidable enemy trench known as "the Hansa line," which ran unevenly north-westward down to the Ancre just opposite Beaucourt and descended on St. Pierre Divion. By 7.20 a.m our objectives east of the hamlet had been reached and the garrison hemmed in between our troops and the river were isolated. At 7 a.m. the number of prisoners captured was greater than that of the attacking force. Soon after St. Pierre Divion and its caverns and tunnels fell. In this area alone nearly 1,400 prisoners were taken by a single Division at the expense of less than 600 casualties. A Tank had rendered considerable assistance preceding the infantry. The new ground won was a wedge-shaped piece 3,000 yards in

extreme length tapering to an acute angle where it reached Regina Trench.

North of the river the enemy offered a more stubborn resistance. The British Naval Division had been allotted the task of storming the enemy's position from the Ancre to the "Y" Ravine. The extreme right of the Division went with a rush across the level of the valley bottom. The centre had to attack diagonally along the slope of the hill and the extreme left to mount the highest point of the crest. At the top of the slope, some 500 yards from the Ancre, and invisible owing to being hidden in a recess, was a redoubt comprised of three deep pits with concrete emplacements for machine-guns, which could fire almost flush with the surface of the ground in all directions. This redoubt was situated between the first and second trenches. While the extreme right of the Naval Division swept up the valley, the right centre was hung up round the redoubt. The left of the Division, however, stormed the ridge, joined hands with the extreme right and formed up on the Beaumont Hamel-Beaucourt road. There they remained for the rest of the day and during the night, while the redoubt and other strong points were being reduced. At 3 a.m. on November 14, a Tank arrived near the redoubt. Unable to reach it, the crew got out and trained their machine guns on it. The survivors of the garrison—360 unwounded men—surrendered, and the advance on Beaucourt of the men of the Naval Division proceeded, the same Tank or another accompanying our infantry. After a quarter of an hour's fighting the village was captured, and at daylight our men were digging themselves in on its further side. The Division in the two days' fighting had taken 1,725 prisoners and advanced 2,000 yards on a front of 1,200.

Meanwhile a Scottish Division had been busy in the "Y" Ravine and at Beaumont Hamel. At all points except at the entrances to the prongs of the ravine, the Scottish infantry broke over the German defences without a check. Some of them descended into Beaumont Hamel, and before midday were over the site of the village and the entrances of the caverns beneath it. The "Y" Ravine was the theatre of a long and bloody contest. It was attacked from the north and south. At a point just beyond the fork of the "Y" the Scots tumbled down the precipitous sides, bombing and bayoneting the Germans in this

BRITISH AND FRENCH SOLDIERS CLEANING UP CAPTURED TRENCHES AT ST. PIERRE DIVION.

open cutting. Simultaneously the western entrances of the ravine were attacked and farther up towards the Beaumont Hamel-Beaucourt road other parties of Scots flung themselves into the chasm. The surviving Germans fled over the crest of the ridge or took refuge in their subterranean lairs, from which they were gradually evicted. The Scots, as a whole, took 1,400 prisoners and 54 machine-guns. Farther north the enemy's first-line system for a distance of half a mile beyond Beaumont Hamel was also in our hands. Opposite Serre the attack was not pressed

[By permission, from the Official Ancre Film.

SCOTTISH TROOPS ADVANCING TO THE ATTACK.

owing to the morass-like character of the ground to be traversed. On the morning of November 14 our line was extended from Beaucourt to the north-west along the road across the southern end of the Beaumont Hamel spur. We had now secured the command of the Ancre on both banks of the river at the point where it entered the enemy's lines. On the evening of the 14th, Sir Douglas Haig was able to report that he had captured over 5,000 prisoners in the battle of the Ancre. The serious reverse which we had suffered on July 1 at this part of the field had been wiped out.

On the 14th a successful advance had also been made east of the Butte de Warlencourt, 400 or 500 yards of the "Grid Trench" being taken from details of the Prussian 1st Guard Reserve Division.

Active operations practically came to an end in the middle of November, being brought to a termination by the bad weather, and henceforward to the end of the year there was no really important fighting, although of minor skirmishing there was no cessation, and we still continued to make some little but continuous progress. On November 15 the gains of the two previous days on the Ancre were consolidated and further gains made. One division advanced a mile on the north side of the river and took a thousand prisoners at the cost of only 450 casualties. South of the Ancre the ground captured east of the Butte de Warlencourt was secured, and the enemy massing for a counter-attack was dispersed by our artillery fire. The next day there was considerable fire from the German artillery north and south of the Ancre, but without any appreciable result: and the same was the case between Le Sars and Gueudecourt. On the other hand our guns caused several explosions in the German positions. The British front was also extended to the east from Beaucourt along the north bank of the Ancre. The enemy, however, managed to regain a part of the ground near the Butte de Warlencourt, which had been captured from him on the 14th.

Our airmen assumed active operations against the Germans. Two important junctions on their lines of communication, places on their railways, billets and aerodromes, were attacked

with bombs and machine-gun fire both by night and day. It must be admitted that the enemy displayed more enterprise than usual, but he lost three machines on the British side of No Man's Land and two on his own, while five more were compelled to descend to earth in a damaged condition. Our own loss was three aeroplanes. By this time (since September 13) we had taken 6,190 prisoners, against which he had no appreciable offset.

On Saturday, November 18, further progress was made on both sides of the Ancre, but mostly on the south, where we gained some 500 yards on a front of about 2½ miles and reached the outskirts of Grandcourt. On the right bank of the river we advanced about three-quarters of a mile to the north-east of Beaucourt, capturing the Bois de Hollande. Altogether 258 prisoners were taken.

During these days the French had also been heavily engaged. On November 7 they had captured the important points of Ablaincourt and Pressoir to the north of Chaulnes. It was not till the 15th, after a two days' bombardment, that the Germans made any attempt to recapture this portion of their lost position. A very serious fight then ensued, and at one time they managed to gain a footing in the eastern part of Pressoir, but they were repulsed at all other points with great loss. A like fate befel them north of the Somme. Here regiments of the Prussian Guards attacked from Lesboeufs to the south of Bouchavesnes. They managed to capture the northern corner and western fringe of the St. Pierre Vaast Wood, but were beaten back all along the rest of the front attacked. On the other hand, the French progressed on the northern spur of the St. Pierre Vaast Wood. On the 16th the Germans claimed to have entered Saillisel in the morning, but by the evening they lost it again, and were also turned out of Pressoir. It was a severe repulse for three German Divisions in which they suffered very heavy losses. On the 16th French airmen fought 54 engagements with German aeroplanes, and during the night they dropped a ton and a half of bombs on a railway station and aviation park.

General Headquarters reported that on the 22nd the enemy's aeroplanes showed more enterprise, and some of them crossed the British lines. Three fell into our hands, and a

[By permission, from the Official Ancre Film.

PRISONERS FROM BEAUMONT HAMEL.

[Official photograph.

RUINS OF BEAUMONT HAMEL CHURCH.

fourth was driven down behind the German line—one of ours was missing. On the 23rd twelve of our machines attacked an enemy formation of twenty, and dispersed it. One of them was destroyed and several driven down damaged; all of ours returned safely. But in other fights, where our men destroyed four of the enemy's, we lost three.

The weather was now very bad, and the struggle was confined to the artillery with a few spasmodic efforts in the shape of trench raids and a little work by the airmen.

Thus the struggle went on till the end of the month. Nor did December bring any increase in military enterprise on either side, although on the 12th the German report was that the artillery activity again temporarily increased. It was backed up by an infantry attack on the French line south of Roye. 'A few small parties managed to enter our Ally's trenches,

[Official photograph.

BEAUMONT HAMEL.

but they were driven out by a bomb attack, and the position was completely re-established.

Our trench raids were continued along the whole line held by the French and ourselves. They produced a certain tale of prisoners, and many of the German dug-outs were injured.

The end of 1916 found the Allies in the Western Theatre of War in a position far different from that which they had held twelve months before. Above all, the progress made in the last half of the year had been great.

[Official photograph

A QUIET RESTING-PLACE BEHIND THE TRENCHES.

It is true that the Germans in February, 1916, had begun their attack on Verdun, and they had continued their assaults with sometimes varying success, but, on the whole, with substantial progress, and it became evident in the days of late spring that some counter blow must be delivered by the Allies to relieve the pressure on this important point. Moreover, it was necessary not to look upon the different campaigns in Europe as isolated efforts without relation to one another, but rather as forming parts of one scheme for the destruction of the military forces of the Central Powers. Thus the war, both on the Eastern and Western Fronts, formed part of the general plan for the defeat of the Germans. Nor could the Austro-Italian Front be left out of the Allied Commanders' calculations. In this theatre by the beginning of June the Austrians had made considerable impression on the Italian line. Plainly, therefore, the situation required fresh, determined, and united efforts on the part of the Allies.

The Russians, for their part, in the campaign which they opened at the beginning of June won most decided successes over the Austrians, and led to the transfer of considerable German forces from the Western to the Eastern Theatre of War. This was advantageous, but more was needed. The British and French leaders therefore determined on a combined offensive at the end of the month to pin the Germans to that part of the front of operations and prevent them from aiding the Austrians with troops whether against the Russians or Italians. The Macedonian operations were at this time only a minor consideration.

The Allied offensive would fulfil two other

objects. It would relieve the pressure on Verdun, and, at the same time, inflict such losses, both in men and material, on the Germans in France as to diminish their strength, while the moral effect of driving them from positions which they had fortified in the past twenty months and believed to be impregnable could not fail to be great. No systematic and combined effort had yet been made against them on a large scale, extending over a considerable stretch of country, but now the time had come when it could be undertaken with considerable prospect of success. When, with inferior numbers, both of men and guns, the Allies had held their own against their opponents, they had still contrived to win isolated successes, and the attacks of the Germans had been without a lasting or striking result. But, by the middle of 1916 both British and French had equipped themselves with an adequate artillery, and the preponderance in guns no longer lay with their opponents. The supplies of ammunition were large and allowed the continuous bombardment of the German lines, while the British Infantry had been enormously increased. France, too, had strengthened her armies, and both Allies were now capable of carrying out a definite and continuous offensive against the German positions. Their preparations during the last months had put, indeed, a very different complexion on the situation. No longer were they in any inferiority with regard to weapons: on the contrary, both in numbers and efficiency they were better off than were Germans. This has been clearly shown in the previous chapters dealing with the operations on the Western Front. It seems probable that the Germans had some idea of a limited offensive in the early summer, for on May 21 an attack had been made by the Germans on our positions on the Vimy Ridge and south and south-east of Souchez, and they had gained some ground. But as their success was of no strategic or tactical value, Sir Douglas Haig came to the conclusion that it was better to take up a fresh position a little to the rear of the original line rather than use up troops in a counter-attack who could be better employed in the larger operation he had in view.

On June 2 the enemy made a determined attack on a front of over a mile and a half from Mount Sorrell to Hooge, and succeeded in penetrating our line to a depth which, at its

[Official photograph.

A MEAL AMONGST THE WRECKAGE.

[Official photograph.

MOVING A FIELD-GUN TO A NEW POSITION.

greatest, measured some 700 yards. As the Germans in the southern part of the captured position commanded the British trenches more to the rear, it was therefore necessary to expel them from it. This was done on June 13 by a well-planned and well-executed counter-stroke and the original trenches were recovered. The Germans showed no further symptoms of passing to the offensive, and neither one nor other of these affairs in any way delayed the preparations for the grand attack shortly to be undertaken.

It has been seen how successful the Somme operations were. The pressure on Verdun had been relieved, the main German Army had been pinned to the Western front of operations and its strength had been considerably worn down. The sketch annexed shows graphically the gain of ground made, but this was not the only gauge by which success was to be estimated; rather was it to be found in the captures of prisoners and in the large number of weapons won. From July 1 to November 18, when active operations practically ceased, 38,000 officers and men had been taken besides 29 heavy guns, 96 field guns and howitzers. 136 trench mortars and 514 machine guns.

Still more important was the great damage which had been inflicted on the German *moral*. The evidence as to this point was indubitable. Time after time in the various encounters it had been noticed that the Germans no longer fought as well as they had done earlier in the war. It is certain that this is to be attributed to the fact that in hand-to-hand encounters they found they were opposed by better men. No soldiers can go on for any considerable time recognizing this fact without suffering deterioration.

But there were other reasons for the Allies' great success. In the contest of nations



SKETCH MAP SHOWING THE GROUND GAINED BY THE BRITISH AND FRENCH IN THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME.

which began in 1914 the destructive power of fire had been enormously developed. It had been remarked in former wars of recent date that they had become less bloody. For this the main reason was that, while improved weapons had increased losses at the actual points of contact, the same intensity along the whole line of battle which characterized the encounters of earlier time was no longer

seen. Moreover, the great sources of loss, disease and hardship, due to want of food and exposure, were better in hand. But in this titanic struggle, although medical science had practically abolished epidemic disease from the armies and largely diminished the loss from exposure, the unprecedented progress in the power of weapons had enormously increased the destruction of life on the battlefield. Moreover, there was another contributing factor—the continuous nature of the struggle. Before the supply of food and ammunition had been rendered so much easier by the increased facility of locomotion due to liberal construction of railways, good roads and the introduction of the automobile, there were constantly occurring pauses in the fighting, and battles were comparatively infrequent. In this war, whether during the time the operations took place in the open country or during those which were made up of the attack and defence of a fortified position, there was hardly any intermission. Day after day, unless the weather entirely stopped operations, there were encounters of a more or less ardent nature, and always there was some artillery work.

The struggle on the ground was supplemented by the struggle in the air, which had a very important influence on the conduct of war. If two large armies are in juxtaposition with one another, both sides have great difficulty in concealing their strategic movements from one another. For the aeroplanes, with their long range, can ascertain easily what movements of troops are going on behind the enemy's front, provided they are not stopped by the enemy's machines. The reconnoitring duties in front of the army had been largely transferred from the cavalry to the aviators, and it is just as important in the employment of airmen as formerly in the employment of horsemen to ensure the predominance of the reconnoitring arm—*i.e.*, the resistance of the other side must be disposed of just as, formerly,

THE STOKES BOMB-THROWER.



FITTING FUSES TO STOKES BOMBS.

the enemy's cavalry had to be torn away before the duties of reconnaissance could be properly carried out. It is plain that under modern conditions the difficulty of executing strategical movements such as Napoleon employed in the Marengo campaign, or Wellington in 1813, must be very much greater, besides which the size of armies, when whole nations are in arms, makes such brilliant movements still more difficult. Fortunately for the Allies both British and French airmen at the time of the Battle of the Somme proved themselves superior on the whole to those of Germany.

When we entered on the scene of action in the year 1914 our soldiers were necessarily armed and trained on the ideas then in vogue. They had a good rifle, a moderate equipment of machine-guns, possessed in their guns weapons which were more powerful than those of other field artilleries, and rather more numerous than the officially published endowment of the German Army. But hardly had the war begun when it was seen that Germany had given to her army far more machine-guns, and had brought far heavier guns into the field and in greater numbers than we had expected to meet. This put us at first at a great disadvantage, but the almost superhuman exertions we made in order to overcome it brought about in due time a complete change. Our heavy guns were more numerous and more copiously provided with ammunition; we had brought the factory on to the battlefield to take part in the struggle. The number of machine-guns had been enormously increased, and the infantry had been provided with the Lewis gun, technically a machine-gun, but in reality an automatic rifle which one man can carry and manipulate, and which yet gives a fire equal to that of 25 rifles. This weapon was also largely used in our aeroplanes, for which its light weight rendered it peculiarly suitable. The cavalry, too, was provided with machine-guns, because so much of its fighting had to be done on foot. Great use had been made of grenades in the trench warfare, and our trench mortars—*i.e.*, the weapons which hurl bombs of various sizes at a very high angle of fire for a comparatively short distance—were distinctly superior to those of the enemy. Grenadiers had been revived, and formed an integral part of every company. The special form known as the Stokes mortar or howitzer had undoubtedly, by its rapid fire, produced a great impression on the Germans. All these inventions and improvements enormously increased the amount of fire on the modern battlefield. The old doctrine of husbanding ammunition had given way to the more rational view—expend as much as you can, provided a reasonable effect is obtained from it. This, of course, involved enormous supplies, such as in 1914 were undreamt of. War had become largely a question of material. No soldiers, however good, could succeed without it.

THE STOKES BOMB-THROWER AND ITS INVENTOR.

This illustration shows how easily the arm can be carried.

FIG. 1.
Company Column.



FIG. 2.
Broad Column.



GERMAN INFANTRY COLUMNS.

In the Company Column the three sections are one behind the other at nine paces distance. The Broad Column consists of the four Company Columns of the Battalion with intervals of five paces between them.

[Official photograph.

TROOPS RESTING BEHIND A SHELTERED BANK.

It is a curious thing that just when fire had been rendered more intense, when the great object of rationally manœuvred infantry was to use formations which offered as little target as possible, compatible with a proper development of fire power, without which it would have been impossible to advance against a well-defended position, the Germans should have harked back to the worst type of French tactics of a hundred years before. Large and dense columns were then found impossible on the battlefield, but they were seen once more in the German Army. There had always been a certain school in it which believed in them, and they were employed fairly frequently on the battlefields in France, causing frightful losses, and never succeeding unless the troops attacked were on the point of going back, and so were unable to bring sufficient fire to bear on them.

The narrative has shown that the Allies really obtained the results they sought for in the Battle of the Somme. But it was scarcely to be expected that the Germans would in any way admit this. On the contrary, the newspapers, the General Headquarters and the German people claimed that they had won the battle.

The German Headquarter Staff at the end of December declared that "the great battle of the Somme was actually ended. Since the last infantry attacks failed lamentably over four weeks ago the fire of the French and British artillery had also diminished to such an extent that it became possible for the defenders to rebuild their defences, which at places only consisted of shattered trenches and shell craters. These four weeks of relative calm, which the exhausted assailants were forced to allow the defenders, have, once and for all, sealed the fate of the Somme Battle!" A few months later the Germans were scuttling back as hard as they could from a position which, according to their own statements, had been restored to its pristine strength!

CHAPTER CLXXIX.

THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1916: (II.) TO FALL OF BUKAREST.

THE STRATEGIC POSITION IN OCTOBER, 1916—THE PASSES LEADING INTO RUMANIA—FIGHTING IN THE TÖRZBURG AND PREDEAL PASSES—ENEMY OFFENSIVE ON THE MOLDAVIAN FRONTIER—RUSSIAN REINFORCEMENTS—KRAFFT VON DELMENSINGEN ATTACKS THE RED TOWER PASS—ENEMY ADVANCE IN THE VULCAN PASS—RUMANIAN VICTORY AT TARGUL-JIU—FIGHTING IN THE DOBRUDJA—GENERAL SAKHAROFF IN COMMAND—GERMAN ADVANCE IN THE JIU VALLEY—FALL OF CRAIOVA—MACKENSEN CROSSES THE DANUBE—CONCENTRIC ADVANCE AGAINST THE ARGESH LINE—BATTLE OF NEAJLOVU—RUMANIAN DEFEAT—EVACUATION OF BUKAREST—GERMANS ENTER THE CITY.

THE Austro-German counter-offensive against Rumania falls into four marked stages. Its first task was to clear Transylvania and regain control of the semi-circle of railway in the Upper Maros and Aluta valleys which runs in eastern and southern Transylvania almost parallel to the Rumanian frontier and at a short distance from it. As was pointed out in Chapter CLXXIII., this railway gave to an Austrian offensive against the Rumanian frontier a very considerable strategic advantage, because a Rumanian army attempting to defend the frontier of its country did not dispose of any similar convenient lateral communications.*

The Austro-German offensive began about the middle of September and succeeded in recapturing the whole of Transylvania by October 14. Thenceforth, the Rumanians had to fight at the gates of their own country, in the Carpathian passes. The enemy offensive against Rumania was opened by a simultaneous attack practically along all the roads and passes which lead across the frontier range; it was in the interest of the German Command to force our Allies to disperse their forces along the entire line. The German Command with the help of its much superior system of lateral railways could then shift the main weight of its offensive with incomparably greater speed than the Rumanians could achieve in readjusting their dispositions to the movements of the enemy.

Three distinct sectors may be distinguished within the battle-line along the frontier range, each of them based on one railway connecting Transylvania with Rumania. The Moldavian sector centring round the Gyimes pass with minor ramifications in the Tölgyes, the Békás, the Uz and the Oitoz passes, had been assigned during the Rumanian offensive of September, 1916, to the Fourth Rumanian Army under General Presan. The region of the six passes south of Kronstadt, between the Busau river in the east and the Fogaras mountain range in the west, which may be described as the central group of passes, constituted the main front of the Second Rumanian Army; its most important artery of communication was the road and railway which run from Bukarest and Ploeshti over the Predeal Pass. The Second Rumanian Army, which at the outbreak of the War was commanded by General

* Cf. p. 201.

Averescu, had for about a month remained under the leadership of General Crainiceanu, whilst General Averescu was in charge of the Rumanian operations in the Dobrudja; by the middle of October, when the position on the Transylvanian front had become most critical, he was transferred back to his old command, and a short time afterwards was entrusted with the supreme command of all the Rumanian armies. The third sector within the Carpathian front, the northern border of Wallachia, was the field within which operated the First Rumanian Army under General Culcer. Its centre lay round the Red Tower Pass in the Aluta Valley, where the railway from Hermannstadt to Rimnic and Slatina crosses the frontier; its secondary centres lay in the Vulcan and Szurduk passes at the head-waters of the Jiu river, and near Orsova on the Danube at the meeting-point of Rumania, Serbia and Hungary. The disposition of the Rumanian armies along this front remained in its main outlines, even after the retreat from Transylvania, what it had been at the outbreak of the war. But the Rumanians, having lost considerably during the first seven weeks of the campaign and being faced by an enemy much superior in numbers and still more in artillery and other war material, were in sore need of help. This they were soon to receive from Russia. Whilst the battle was still proceeding along the frontier range the Russians gradually took over the northern part of the Moldavian sector, thereby enabling the Rumanians to concentrate the Fourth and Second Armies for the defence of the angle between Moldavia and Wallachia. Also the defence of the Dobrudja front was gradually taken over by the Russians.

The German counter-offensive under General von Falkenhayn in Transylvania had proceeded from west to east, starting about the middle of September in the Streiu Valley south of Hatszeg, then proceeding to Hermannstadt and the Red Tower Pass (which it reached towards the end of September), and finishing in the battle of Kronstadt (about October 10). Concurrently with it the Austro-Hungarian armies under General von Arz advanced from central and northern Transylvania against the western frontier of Moldavia. Important forces had, of course, been left behind by the Germans in front of the Red Tower Pass in order to guard against a possible Rumanian counter-



AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN FOOD CONVOY IN THE TRANSYLVANIAN ALPS.

RUMANIAN TROOPS ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT.

stroke which might have cut Falkenhayn's connexions with his base in the Hungarian plain. Yet it was natural that the first attack against the Rumanian defences in the passes should have been delivered in the direction in which the main armies of Falkenhayn and Arz were moving—*i.e.*, against the central group of passes south of Kronstadt and against the Moldavian frontier. After these attacks had met with failure, but the enemy offensive which followed against western Wallachia had succeeded, the German semi-official comment tried to make out that it had never been the intention of their Supreme Command to break through in the south-eastern passes, but that this had always been a mere manœuvre which aimed at attracting and binding Rumanian forces in an area other than that singled out for the main attack. The truth of the matter was probably this: that the German Supreme Command acted on a plan which, if successful, would have given them an overwhelming victory, but which, even if only partially carried out, yet gave them the means of achieving remarkable though less overwhelming successes. Falkenhayn's attack south of Kronstadt opened about October 12; by October 15 it attained its full development. Concurrently with it Mackensen reopened his offensive in the Dobrudja, taking the crossings of the Danube at Cernavoda and Hirshova for his objective. These two combined movements threatened to pierce Rumania through the middle, somewhere along the line of the river Jalomitsa or of the Busau. It would have cut off practically the whole of Wallachia with the capital of Bukarest from all connexion with Moldavia and Russia. In fact, if fully successful it would probably have proved the greatest feat of arms of the war. These attempts, though they failed to achieve their major objective, yet proved of pre-eminent strategic value. Mackensen, even after having been driven back for some distance by the Russian counter-offensive in the first half of November, still retained command of the central belt in the Dobrudja and of the Cernavoda-Constanza railway, thus depriving the Rumanians of an important line of communi cation whereby supplies could be brought up from Russia by way of the Black Sea; he further lengthened considerably his front along the Danube, and every lengthening of the battle-line was to the disadvantage of the Rumanians, who were now entirely on the defensive. Finally, by forcing the Russians to undertake a counter-offensive in the northern Dobrudja and at the Wallachian end of the Cernavoda bridges, he compelled them to direct into that theatre of war reinforcements which might otherwise have been used on the Transylvanian border. In the passes south of Kronstadt Falkenhayn forced his way to a distance varying from 5 to 15 miles; it is clear that a further advance at that rate could not have yielded any decisive results within the short time which the Germans had for their operations against Rumania. Yet the

DEFENDING THE MAIN ROAD FROM KRONSTADT TO BUKAREST IN THE PREDEAL PASS.

advance was sufficient to bind considerable Rumanian forces in these passes. When, towards the beginning of November, the main weight of the German offensive was shifted to Western Wallachia, our Allies found it impossible to detach any troops from southern Moldavia or from the central passes for the defence of the Jiu and Aluta valleys. Had they done so, the German Command might have resumed its original attempt at piercing Rumania in the district where the salient of south-eastern Transylvania protrudes towards the Central Dobrudja, and in view of their inferiority in communications the Rumanians would probably not have been able to follow up the movement with sufficient speed to avert disaster. The First Rumanian Army, was therefore told that it could not expect help from the other groups, but must battle exclusively with its own forces. So it did for a while with remarkable success. The first battle of Targul-Jiu (October 24 to October 30), in which unfortunately General Dragalina lost his life, was one of the most brilliant victories won by the Rumanians during the second stage of the enemy's counter-offensive. But a fortnight later the German attempt at debouching from the Vulcan Pass into the Wallachian plain was repeated with infinitely stronger forces by the Army Group of General von Kühne. On November 18, after more than a month of fighting in the passes, the Germans forced a gate into Rumania and by November 21 reached the town of Craiova in the centre of the Wallachian plain.

With the breakdown of the Rumanian defences along the frontier ridge begins the third and shortest stage of the German offensive, the conquest of Wallachia up to Bukarest. Any attempt to stop the invasion east of the Bukarest-Ploeshti line would have been doomed to failure. The position in the enormous salient of Wallachia, sandwiched in between Transylvania and Bulgaria, had always been one of considerable difficulty. Now that the Germans had forced their way into its centre, and were advancing along the line which forms the backbone of the railway system in Wallachia, the position became untenable. For a large part of the Rumanian forces which held the two parallel flanks along the Carpathian range and along the Danube, the roads and railway in the centre of the Wallachian

plain were both the purveyors of supplies and the only convenient line of retreat. No considerable forces could now be placed on the flanks to maintain their defences intact at any cost, because a reverse in the centre might easily have cut them off in their isolated advanced positions. On the other hand none of the many river lines which traverse the Wallachian plain from north to south could have been held if the flanks were not sufficiently covered. The problem of holding Wallachia west of the Argesh was thus a vicious circle, and the Rumanians had to think of how to effect their retreat from the salient of which the defences were crumbling rather than of arresting the invasion of their country by the enemy. From the west the Army Group of General von Kühne, supported by the Cavalry Corps under General Count Schmettow, was pressing its advance, whilst on the Transylvanian frontier the Army Group of General Krafft von Delmensingen was debouching from the Red Tower Pass, and that of General von Morgen from the Törzburg and the Predeal. Meantime, in the last week of November, on the southern front Field-Marshal von Mackensen had thrown his left wing across the Danube, effecting a junction with the armies of General von Falkenhayn. The so-called Danube Army under General von Kosch crossed round Sistovo and Zimnicea, leaving the Dobrudja front in charge of the Third Bulgarian Army under General Nerizoff. On November 30 Mackensen himself took over the supreme command of the vast array of generals and armies which were approaching the base of the Wallachian salient. There, on the Argesh, the first serious resistance was offered by our Allies to the enemy advance. Help from Russia was forthcoming; Russian troops were arriving in considerable force; it seemed that successful resistance had now become possible. Had it not been for the indolence, in one case even the criminal indolence, of some subordinate commanders, maybe the German offensive would have been arrested on that line. With the loss of the battle and the line of the Argesh and the enemy occupation of Bukarest on December 6 opens the fourth stage of the Austro-German offensive against Rumania during which the evacuation of Wallachia and of the Dobrudja was completed and the battle-front was withdrawn to the Sereth line. The enemy advance was finally brought to a stop about the middle of January, 1917, on a line running close to the frontier of Moldavia from the north down to the Gyimes Pass, and then from about Agas in the Trotus Valley to Vadeni, south of Galatz, the town of Okna remaining in the hands of the Rumanians, but Focshani coming just within the lines of the enemy.

South of Kronstadt six important passes open into Rumania within a sector which, as the crow flies, measures only about 45 miles. Across the most westerly of them, the Törzburg, runs the high road to Dragoslavele and Campolung. South-west of the old-Saxon colony of Rosenau and its "Peasants' Stronghold"—wherein in past ages the settlers used to take refuge at the approach of Turkish armies—the road leaves the wide, open fields of the Burzenland, and rises towards the Carpathian Alps. From the Knights' Castle, which crowns the high ledge of rock above Törzbach, one catches a last clear

LIEUT.-GENERAL KRAFFT VON DELMENSINGEN.
In command of the German Aluta-Group.

view of the plain; then the road recedes between the dark mountains and climbs by winding serpentines on to higher and higher levels. In between a maze of heights, above deep ravines and their rumbling waters, through primeval forests of firs and pines the narrow road runs towards the continually receding sombre mass of the main ridge. One might almost despair of reaching it, but the mountain tops which have been left behind sink one by one to lower levels, clouds fill the ravines, the forests recede, and over open mountain-sides one approaches the rocky summits which surround the Törzburg Pass. Having crossed the main ridge the wanderer sees stretching before him several heavy, parallel mountain walls, the spurs of the Fogaras Mountains, of which the main part extends due east and west, but which in this region bend towards the south-east. Far away, beyond the valleys in which the villages of Rucar and Dragoslavele lie hidden from him, his eye may catch at sunset the distant gilded cupolas of the stately Byzantine churches of Campolung.

MAP OF THE EAST WALLACHIAN PASSES.
The scene of the German attempts to cut off the Wallachian salient.

The road across the Törzburg is one of the best which lead into Rumania, and is equal in quality to that of the Predeal. At Dragoslavele it divides, one branch following to the south the River Dambovitsa, on whose banks lies Bukarest, the other continuing to the south-west, towards Campolung, the terminus of the railway from Piteshti. Besides this railway four other lines meet at Piteshti, the most important railway junction in Rumania west of Ploeshti and Bukarest. Some minor mountain roads which, near the town of Törzburg on the northern slope of the pass, branch off from the main highway rejoin it between Dragoslavele and Targovishte, but south of Rosenau not a single convenient lateral track connects it with the neighbouring road and pass of the Predeal. The wild, pathless Butzegi Mountains, which rise to a height of about 8,000 feet, intervene between the two.

Through the Predeal or Tömös Pass leads the shortest and most direct road from Kronstadt to Ploeshti and Bukarest, and the only railway which crosses the frontier within the central groups of passes. Near Bacsfalu the road and railway leave the long-drawn street of the Seven Villages and turn off into the narrow valley of the Tömös, a tributary of the Aluta. They repeatedly cross and recross the narrow gorge of the river in search of even ground between the steep, wooded slopes of the Schuler Mountain (6,000 feet high) in the west, and the slightly higher Hohenstein in the east. Beyond the village of Tömös the frontier ridge bars the

THE PRINCIPAL STREET IN PREDEAL.
Showing effects of the German bombardment.

southern entrance of the defile, extending like a high causeway between the mountains on both sides. The level of the ridge slowly drops from the east across the wide open top of the Csaplyat towards the depression, where in the midst of magnificent, old pine forests the road and railway cross the Predeal Pass at a height of about 3,300 feet. At the end of the last serpentine the silhouette of a building rises against the sky-line—the last, most northerly house of Predeal, the well-known Rumanian health-resort. Placed in the midst of beautiful pine-forests, on the southern slope of the frontier ridge, Predeal consisted almost entirely of villas, owned by rich or well-to-do Bukarest families who used to retire there in the summer to escape the heat and dust of the Wallachian plain. It was to be now the first object on Rumanian soil on which the *furor Teutonicus* could vent itself; although an open town of little strategic importance—the main Rumanian defences were placed on the hills which dominate the pass, and not across the road—it was day after day bombarded by the enemy artillery. Dr. Blasel, as an eye-witness, put on record in the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* of December 20, 1916, a description of Predeal after the Rumanian forces had been withdrawn to the second line of heights and the Germans and Magyars had entered the town. "In the course of the war I have seen in Galicia and in Poland many towns which had suffered complete destruction," writes Dr. Blasel in his admiring commemoration of frightfulness, "but these had suffered mainly from conflagration, whilst Predeal has been completely shot to pieces. There is not a single house which does not show the results of a few well-aimed shots. The roofs of the turrets slant sharply, other roofs which had been covered with tiles are changed into skeletons—the tiles broken by shrapnel have fallen down and only the rafters remain. Half of the railway station is destroyed, and also the villa of Bratianu (the Rumanian Prime Minister) has been hit several times. The intensity of the bombardment can be seen also in the forest in front of Predeal—its trees are changed into match-wood, not a single branch remains unscarred."

"The northern part of Predeal has been demolished," wrote the correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* under date of October 25, in an even more outspoken strain of jubilation, "the villas and summer residences of Bukarest society—some of them very elegant indeed—are desolate ruins. The villa of Bratianu has been turned into mere wreckage and rubbish."

The second and main defensive position of the Rumanians in the pass ran south of the

town of Predeal. The road and railway descend from the frontier ridge into the narrow gorge of the Prahova Valley, enclosed on both sides by the massif of the Clabucetu mountains, which overtower by far the pass and its heights. The Baiu (4,600 feet) in the west and the Taur (5,000 feet) east of the Prahova were like guarding bastions which



THE KING OF RUMANIA AND M. BRATIANU.

barred the road to an enemy advance to the south. Nor could this position have been turned, as its flanks were fully protected by the Omul ("The Man") mountain group (8,100 feet) and the Rus (6,600 feet). Beyond it, south of the Clabucetu range, where the Prahova River is joined from the east by the Azuga, and a short distance above its junction with its western tributary, Cerbul, lies the industrial settlement of Azuga. Whilst the battle still raged for the frontier ridge its railway station, in its central position near the junction of the valleys, served as the terminal depôt for the Rumanian troops in the Predeal sector. The spacious buildings of its factories, their yards and storehouses contributed to make it a suitable military base. A very considerable number of the factories at Azuga, which used the wood of the surrounding forests (sawmills, paper-mills, etc.), were owned by Austro-Hungarian firms, whose employees had thus been able before the war to traverse the frontier range in all directions, to record or even map out convenient tracks, to mark

trees, etc.—all, of course, "exclusively with a view to business." It would be instructive to know how many of them in October, 1916, returned as army officers to their familiar haunts.

Seven miles south of Azuga, in the shadow of Mount Sinai, with its old Greek-Orthodox monastery (founded in 1683) and its magnificent Byzantine church, lies Sinaia, the summer capital of Rumania. A modern town had grown up there since about 1880, when the Royal Palace was built on the hill below the monastery; the foreign legations, members of the Rumanian Government and the society of Bukarest used to gather here in summer. The exterior of the Palace itself is sumptuous rather than beautiful; it is one of those structures which imitate mediæval German castles and which, fashionable some thirty years before the war, disfigure many a European town even beyond the frontiers of Germany. The interior, however, contained most magnificent halls filled with treasures of art, both Oriental and European (the picture gallery included works of some of the best-known old masters). In the hope of loot the Germans, when they reached Sinaia towards the end of November, refrained from bombarding the castle.

Following from Kronstadt and Bacsfalu the main street of the Seven Villages—the home of a quaint, isolated, mongrel tribe, the so-called Csángo-Magyars—one approaches the village of Altschanz where the road forks, one branch



M. BRATIANU'S VILLA AT PREDEAL.

running to the Predelus or Altschanz, the other to the Bratocea Pass. The roads are bad, the hills covered with moors, the valleys narrow and marshy. These two passes, as well as the Tetar and the Busau Pass, never assumed in the operations of the autumn of 1916 the importance which attached to the Törzburg and the Predeal, although even they were the

PREDEAL STATION AFTER THE BOMBARDMENT.

THE MONASTERY OF TISMANA.
In the Jiu Valley.

scene of many a lively contest, of enemy attempts to advance and Rumanian counter-movements.

The first attack against Rumanian territory south of Kronstadt was delivered in the Törzburg Pass. On October 8 the enemy had reached the town of Törzburg, and on the 10th the frontier ridge. After engagements fought round Giuvala the Rumanians were obliged to withdraw on Rucar, some six miles beyond the frontier. The enemy had thus got well below the highest level of the pass and was threatening to debouch into the high, rolling country round Campolung. The central of the three mountain walls which intervene between the Pass and Campolung became now the scene of daily battles. Soon the Germans recognized that they would not be able to break through by frontal attacks, and attempts were, therefore, made to turn from the flanks the Rumanian defences astride the Dambovitsa Valley. These attempts led to an extension of the front on both sides of the pass—the usual development of mountain warfare whenever it tends to assume a more or less stationary character. West of the road to Campolung the enemy had reached by the end of October the village of Lireshti, but by a brilliant counter-attack it was recaptured by the Rumanians on October 28. The fighting in this region continued without slackening throughout the first half of November, but in spite of the most strenuous efforts made during the week November 11–17, on the day when the gate into Western Wallachia was forced by the enemy at Targul-Jiu (November 18), below the Törzburg Pass his most advanced outposts stood only a few miles south of the Dragoslavele-Lireshti line. It was only under the pressure of the German advance from the west that General Averescu's troops evacuated in the last days of November the hotly contested positions in front of Campolung.

In the Predeal Pass the Rumanian troops belonging to the Second Bukarest Army Corps had slowly withdrawn on to the frontier range, which they reached on October 12–13. The Germans and Magyars followed up their retreat and on October 12 began to bombard the bare heights of the Csaplyat. The bombardment was followed up on October 14 by infantry fighting, but in spite of heavy sacrifices the enemy achieved very little. By capturing the Csaplyat he gained part of the frontier ridge, only to find himself under cross fire from the Rumanian lines which extended on the adjoining wooded heights in the west and from their positions on the Clabucetu mountain-range. Even three days later the Germans had not yet entered the town of Predeal, and merely continued from a distance their work of destruction. On October 20 an

attempt was made by them to turn the positions west of the pass by pushing forward from the Csaplyat against the mountain-group of the Taur; it failed completely. Then the enemy resumed his slow and steady operations against the town of Predeal. On October 23, after an entire day of fighting, the Germans and Magyars entered it and captured the railway station, but it was not until two days later, and after some more severe fighting with the bayonet and hand grenades, that the last Rumanian detachment withdrew from the southern outskirts of Predeal. Meantime the battle was steadily developing in the eastern sector of the Clabucetu mountains. This also was fighting after having reached the frontier range—his main forces had advanced for a distance of only about four miles beyond it. The following week witnessed further fighting in the mountains west of Azuga and Busteni, but hardly any progress by the enemy. As an attempt to break through into the Wallachian plain, the operations in the Predeal district had thus proved a failure. It was admitted from semi-official German sources that "the Rumanian defends his country with unsparing energy."

More varied, though by no means more encouraging for the enemy, were the results of his offensive against the western frontier of

AUSTRIAN MACHINE-GUN POSITION ON THE WALLACHIAN BORDER.

in detail—for particular ravines, woods, slopes or summits. The enemy was straining his forces to the utmost, as it was from here that he aimed the chief blow or threat against Rumania. Yet his progress was extremely slow. It was not until October 26 that the Magyar Honveds had captured the Taur; on the next day the German troops extended their line to the southern slopes of the Clabucetu Azugii, thus outflanking from the east the central Rumanian positions round the town of Azuga. Another four days of fighting, several sore reverses and even more costly advances were the price which the enemy had to pay for the conquest of the western bastion on the Predeal-Azuga road, the mountain group of the Baiu. By November 4—*i.e.*, fully three weeks Moldavia. When the Fourth Rumanian Army under General Presan, conforming with the general retirement, withdrew to the Rumanian frontier, its forces divided into two main groups. The northern retreated into the mountains round the Tölgyes and the Békás Pass, thus covering the access to the Upper Bistritza and to the town of Bicaz, the terminus of the railway line which at Bacau branches off from the main railway in the Sereth Valley; the southern group had to protect in its retreat the line which connects the Transylvanian with the Moldavian railway system. This railway runs through the Trotus Valley and crosses the frontier range by the Gyimes Pass; on the Rumanian side down to the town of Oneshti it continues for more than 30 miles in the proximity of the frontier,



RUMANIANS AND COSSACKS FRATERNISING.

receding hardly anywhere to a distance of more than 10 miles. A number of valleys and roads from Transylvania open into the Trotus Valley above Oneshti, thus giving access to the chief Rumanian lines of communication in the rear of the Gyimes Pass; hence the strategic importance which attached to the minor passes south of the Gyimes, most of all to those of the Uz and the Oitoz.

Violent fighting began in these two passes on October 14. Positions were lost and gained, but in the main the Rumanians maintained themselves in close proximity to the frontier range, or even on the range itself, inflicting reverses and serious losses on the enemy, who continued his attacks. In the Gyimes Pass the enemy was more successful at first. After severe fighting round Palanka (October 13–15) he reached on the 17th the village of Agas, thus penetrating the Trotus Valley for about seven miles from the frontier. The next day he attempted a farther advance, but soon found himself in serious straits. Whilst one Rumanian detachment counter-attacked from the direction of Goioasa, another, having crossed Mount Lampris, took near Agas his forces in the flank. The Austrian troops had to retire hurriedly, losing almost 1,000 prisoners, 12 guns and numerous machine-guns. Having then failed to force his way through the Trotus Valley, the enemy resumed the offensive in the Uz and Oitoz Passes, but wherever he succeeded in advancing he was soon again thrown back by the Rumanian troops under the brilliant leadership of General Presan. The Bukarest *communiqué* of October 26 thus sums up the results of that fortnight of battle on the western frontier of Moldavia: "After violent combats, the enemy has everywhere been repulsed beyond the frontier. He now occupies but a small portion of territory between the Sultza and Trotus valleys and a small insignificant portion of the Uz Valley. His losses are very heavy."

Meantime both sides were bringing up reinforcements. Towards the end of October Bavarian troops made their appearance north of Oitoz, and in the course of the following month the group of divisions under the German General von Gerok, which in September had defended in Galician Podolia the line of the River Narayovka (south of Bzhezhany) was transferred to Transylvania, taking up positions on the right wing of the First Austro-Hungarian Army under General von Arz. On the side of our Allies a steady concentration of the Rumanian forces to the south was proceeding, the northern group of passes on the Moldavian frontier being taken over by the Russians.

The Austro-Hungarian troops followed up by three main roads the retreat of the right wing of General Presan's Army. Their most northerly group advanced through the Maros Valley to Toplitsa, and then by Borszek and Hollo against the Tölgyes Pass; the central group marched from Libanfalva on Putna, joining from there in the attack against the Tölgyes; the third group followed the road from Parajd to Gyergö St. Miklos, and then advanced down the Békás Valley against the Békás Pass. Throughout the second half of October the Rumanian troops, much inferior in numbers, had to defend their positions on the frontier range against the steadily increasing pressure of the enemy; a piercing of the Rumanian line in this sector would have seriously compromised the cooperation with the adjoining Russian forces. But gradually reinforcements were arriving from General Lechitsky's Army, and in the first days of November the Rumanian troops completely withdrew from the north-western corner of Moldavia. The Russian regiments which took over the defence of the Tölgyes and the Békás Passes were under the command of General Count Keller, who, after many famous feats in the earlier stages of the war, had specially distinguished himself during the Russian invasion of the Bukovina and south-eastern Galicia in the summer of 1916. His army corps included some of the best-known regiments of Orenburg and Terek Cossacks, and also some Circassian horse. The use of cavalry regiments in mountain warfare might seem at first surprising, but then these were riders and horses whose homes were in the mountains of the Ural and the Caucasus. "Minor encounters with them have repeatedly proved the impetuosity and daring of these Cossacks," wrote the correspondent of the *Pester Lloyd* from the Headquarters of the First Austro-Hungarian Army under date of November 16. "There are no deserters among them. They fight for life and death." Again and again these unique horsemen from the mountains succeeded in slipping through the Austrian line, carrying on their disconcerting activities in the rear of the enemy forces. On November 5 the Russians, partly in order to cover the regrouping of forces which was then proceeding, delivered a short offensive stroke across the Tölgyes Pass

against Hollo and Putna. The Austrian formations broke up, leaving 15 officers, 800 men and seven machine-guns in the hands of our Allies. But again the excellent system of railways and roads in his rear saved the enemy from serious disaster. German reinforcements were hurried up in hot haste by train and by motor lorries; artillery was moved along the roads at the speed of 12 miles an hour. On November 8 the fresh forces came into action



MAP OF THE ALUTA DEFILE.

both on the Hollo and the Putna front, and our Allies withdrew to the frontier heights. The Tölgyes Pass remained in the hands of the Russians.

Although with a view to the disposition of forces the Red Tower Pass was included in the area of the western Wallachian army, strategically it stood in close connection with the central group of passes south of Kronstadt. From Piteshti two railway lines extend against the Transylvanian frontier, one to the north-east with its terminus at Campolung, at the foot of the Törzburg Pass, the other to the north-west with its terminus at Curtea de Argesh. The distance from Curtea de Argesh to Rimnic Valcea, the southern mouth of the Aluta defile, of which the Red Tower Pass marks the northern end, amounts to only about 15 miles. But there was as yet in the autumn of 1916 no direct railway connexion either from the Red Tower Pass or the Törzburg to Piteshti, only the roundabout route by way of the centre of the Wallachian plain—the projected railway line from Calimaneshti to Curtea de Argesh had not been carried out. It seems that a concentric movement against Piteshti from the Aluta Valley by way of Salatrucul and Curtea de Argesh, and from the Törzburg by way of Campolung, had been schemed by the German Supreme Command as the first blow against Rumania. The capture of Piteshti, the junction of all the main railways of western Wallachia, would have been a victory only second in greatness to a successful piercing of Rumania along the Busau line. This, however, could have been achieved only by a lightning blow, as the pre-eminent importance of the objective, the facilities which the Rumanians possessed for concentrating forces on Piteshti, and lastly the great difficulties in an advance from either pass rendered the chance of systematic operations against Piteshti, resulting in a conquest of Wallachia during the autumn of 1916, as slender as was that of the advance due south of Kronstadt. But whilst the pressure in the Predeal region bound the main Rumanian forces in a district from which transfers to the west required considerable time, an offensive against Piteshti would have left them in a central position between the Jiu sector in the west and the Predeal in the east. Attempting a surprise, Falkenhayn pushed forward the group which marched against the Törzburg across the Persan Mountains even before he had fought at Kronstadt the main battle against the Second Rumanian Army, and as soon as the pass had been forced by the troops under General von Morgen, General Krafft von Delmensingen threw his main forces into an advance from the Red Tower Pass across the mountains against Curtea de Argesh.

Anyhow, an advance south of the Red Tower Pass could not have been attempted along the Aluta. The gorge through which the river breaks its way for some 30 miles south of Caineni is impregnable to a frontal attack. Most of it can hardly be called a valley; it is much rather an enormous rift in the mountains filled by the stream which, insignificant in the dry season, swells to the size of a wild torrential river in spring and autumn. The road and railway cling to the rocky walls of the defile, and at many places have to pierce them by tunnels or by grooves blasted out in their side. Only where other streams join the Aluta does

its bed open out into small basins yielding space for villages or towns. At such junctions lie Caineni, Racovitsa, Golotreni (at the confluence with the Lotru) and Calimaneshti. It was only across the mountains on both sides and then down the valleys of the confluents of the Aluta that the consecutive sectors of the defile could be captured by the enemy.

When, after the battle of Hermannstadt, in the last days of September, 1916, General von Falkenhayn continued with his main



THE ALUTA VALLEY AND MONASTERY OF COZIA.

force the advance to the east, he left in front of the Red Tower Pass a group of divisions under the command of General Krafft von Delmensingen to protect his right flank in the Sibin and Fogaras Mountains. During the first half of October their task consisted in holding the frontier range and preparing the ground for a farther advance. On October 15, the day on which, in the district south of Kronstadt, Rucar was entered and the attack against the town of Predeal begun, General von Krafft, having received reinforcements, resumed the offensive. The attacking force consisted of the German Alpine Corps—mainly Bavarians—and of two Austro-Hungarian mountain brigades. On the left flank the second Austro-Hungarian Mountain Brigade was ordered to advance by the mountain-track which crosses the Moscovul Pass at a height of almost 7,000 feet, and then down the Topologu Valley against Salatrucul. In the centre the Alpine Corps advanced between the Aluta and the Topologu south of Mount Surul, ready to press forward along the road from Caineni to Salatrucul as soon as the Austrians should have outflanked from the east the Rumanian forces in that district. West of the Aluta the 10th Austrian Mountain Brigade was to press forward across the Pietroasa and the Veverita Mountains into the valley of the Lotru, thus covering the right flank of the Army Group which had Curtea de Argesh for its objective. The Austrian troops to whom the most difficult and most risky task had been assigned—namely, to force their way across the Fogaras range into the Topologu Valley—succeeded in advancing in two days across the pass and in capturing Hill 2313 to the west of it. By the night of October 18 their advance had carried them across the mountain pass of

A FIELD TELEPHONE.

the Poiana Lunga and Frunto (about 5,000 feet high) and they reached the slopes facing Salatrucul. Here, however, they were met by Rumanian forces advancing both from the Aluta and the Argesh valleys. By this converging movement, carried out with great skill and determination, our Allies almost succeeded in encircling and cutting off the Austrian brigade. It was only owing to the arrival of considerable German reinforcements from the north, and to the fact that a very heavy snowfall and intense cold had hampered the development of the Rumanian operations in their last stages, that the Second Austrian Mountain Brigade escaped capture. Similarly, the attempt of the other Austrian Mountain Brigade on the western bank of the Aluta failed to achieve its purpose. Having crossed Mount Robu, the enemy was met on the Pietroasa range by infantry detachments from the 13th Rumanian Division, and thrown back with considerable losses. The German Alpine Corps, which was to have advanced in the centre after the Rumanian positions on both sides of the Aluta had been outflanked by the two Austrian Mountain Brigades, does not seem to have come into serious action during this first unsuccessful offensive south of the Red Tower Pass.

In the last days of October the offensive was resumed, and this time the Germans opened their operations across the mountains bordering on the eastern side of the Aluta defile. By October 28 a German detachment consisting of Mecklenburg and Hanoverian troops had turned by way of the Boia Mare Valley the Mormonta Mountain east of Caineni and then by a concentric attack had conquered the mountain itself. From the captured positions on the Mormonta they continued their offensive against the chain of heights north of the valley which extends between the villages of

OFFICERS OF THE KING OF RUMANIA'S BODYGUARD.

A WALLACHIAN VINEYARD.

Racovitsa and Titeshti, and reached that valley by the end of October.

A period of incessant fighting ensued. The First Rumanian Army Corps, which from the beginning of the war had formed the so-called Aluta Group, had been reinforced by part of the Fourth Army Corps, which had previously been included in the Fourth Army but had now been released from the Moldavian frontier by the Russians having taken over its northern sectors. Towards the end of October the first German attack from the Vulcan Pass into the Jiu Valley had been defeated, and the second and even more serious attempt was being prepared during the first fortnight of November. Under these circumstances it was essential for the Germans to pin the Rumanian forces in the Aluta region to the defence of their own sector and to prevent, or at least delay, the dispatch of reinforcements from there to the Jiu. Moreover, in case the forces which were to attack again in the Jiu Valley succeeded in reaching the plain, it was of the greatest importance for the further development of the operations that the group attacking in the Aluta district should have reached positions from which it could soon establish effective cooperation with the forces invading Wallachia from the west. During the first fortnight of November the battle south of the Red Tower Pass was raging on a wide front from the Upper Argesh and Mount Poiana Lunga in the east to Mount Pietroasa and the Upper Lotru in the west. Between November 6 and November 9 the Germans conquered the heights of Sate and Fruntu, and lastly the highly important mountain group of the Cozia, which from the west overtowers the Aluta defile and faces the entrance into the Lotru Valley. Our Allies counter-attacked at once and by November 11 had reconquered the position on Mount Fruntu, but it proved impossible to develop any farther this initial success. Whilst the Germans under General von Krafft had received reinforcements exceeding a division, the Rumanian Command, faced by disaster in the Jiu Valley, saw itself compelled at the last moment to detach a considerable force, which was sent to the west across the mountains in the hope that by attacking the left flank of the enemy, who was debouching into the Jiu Valley, it might yet save the position at the western end of Wallachia. Thus weakened, the Aluta group had to give ground; its retreat was hastened still more after the defeat on the Jiu had proved

decisive. By November 18 the Germans had reached the valley and road which run from Suitsi to Calimaneshti.

GENERAL VON KNEUSSL.
In Command of the 11th Bavarian Division.

The joy of success was no doubt marred for General von Krafft's Army Group by the fact that in an encounter fought on November 7, the Bavarian Life Guards, which formed part of the brigade of General von Epp in the Alpine Corps, had lost a highborn officer, Prince Henry of Bavaria, a nephew of the King. In the moment of death, fully conscious that the death of a prince was more important than that of thousands of ordinary men, he was reported to have murmured the words *noblesse oblige*. The quotation was considered by all loyal Germans so appropriate to the greatness of the moment that they readily overlooked the fact that a member of a German Royal House used an enemy language to the last.

During the month which followed on the battles fought in the Streiu Valley and in the Hatszeg Mountains only minor encounters took place on the frontier range west of the Szurduk Pass. About the middle of October the 11th Bavarian Division, under General von Kneussl, which at the beginning of the month had still stood on the Stokhod in northern Volhynia, was moved to Transylvania and assigned positions on the frontier range south of the valley of the Silu Romanesca. On October 23 General von Kneussl's force, supported by an Austrian mounted brigade and one division of German cavalry, began its advance to the south, the extreme left wing advancing from the Vulcan Pass through the Jiu Valley, whilst the farthest westerly detachment followed the Bistritza. In the centre four groups were advancing on Sambotinul, Rugii, Valarii and Dobritza with a view to an ultimate concentration in the Jiu Valley between Bumbeshti and Targul-Jiu. During the first few days the German plan seemed to develop with considerable success. General Dragalina, who had hitherto led the First Rumanian Division at Orsova and who succeeded General Culcer in

AN AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN FIELD-GUN IN THE CARPATHIANS.

the command of the entire First Army * on the very day on which the Germans opened their offensive in the Jiu districts, had only inferior numbers with which to meet the enemy attack. The Rumanian forces in that sector consisted of the 21st Mixed Brigade, under Colonel Jippa, composed of 7½ battalions of infantry and four batteries, and of two other minor detachments which comprised together six battalions of infantry and three batteries; one of them was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Obogeanu, the other by Lieutenant-Colonel Trusculescu.

RUMANIANS CROSSING A PONTOON BRIDGE.

Aware of the supreme danger with which a successful German offensive in this district threatened the entire Wallachian front, and in view of the fact that the First Rumanian Army had no reserves at its disposal, General Dragalina at once ordered a detachment of four battalions, one squadron and two batteries to be sent from the Orsova Division, and the Danube detachment, composed of 5½ battalions, to be brought up from the Aluta Group. These forces were then distributed in the following manner: the 21st brigade had to guard the mouth of the Szurduk defile at Bumbeshti and, deploying on the Jiu line to south of Sambotinul, to attack the left flank of the German troops which were advancing in the centre. The other two detachments of the original Jiu Group were to hold the centre from Turcinesti to Rashovitsa. The forces brought up from the Aluta were formed into a general reserve north-east of Targul-Jiu. The detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Dejoianu which by forced marches was coming up from Orsova was ordered to counter-attack vigorously with part of its effectives the German troops which were advancing on the extreme right of the enemy line, and at the same time to attack with its remaining strength the thus uncovered flank of the central German group. The leading idea of this disposition was to form a kind of semi-circle round the advancing forces of the enemy and to counter-attack him in front and fall upon his flanks before his different detachments which were moving along separate mountain roads and tracks had effected a junction. The events of the next few

* General Dragalina was succeeded in the command of the First Division at Orsova by Colonel Anastasiu, who in the succeeding operations was fully to justify this choice.



GERMAN GUNS IN BUKAREST BEFORE ITS CAPTURE

days brilliantly justified the plan, but it was not given to General Dragalina to carry out the operations on the Jiu. On the first day of the German advance, after having inspected the most exposed positions of his troops, he urhried back to the rear to make further dispositions. Although the quickest way passed very close to the German lines he decided to take this and drove through the fire of the German machine-guns. Two bullets hit him in the arm, which had finally to be amputated; the operation was performed too late and General Dragalina died on November 9. The command on the Jiu passed immediately to General Vasilescu, and in the command of the First Army Dragalina was succeeded by General Petala.

By October 27 the Germans had reached almost on the entire length between Dobritza and Bumbeshti the road at the foot of the Vulcan Range, and had even crossed it in the east and in the centre. On the morning of October 27, to forestall the Rumanian attack from the east, they attempted a descent across the Jiu Valley in the rear of the Rumanian detachments which guarded the southern mouth of the Szurduk Pass. The attempt was defeated, and the Germans, having been thrown back beyond the Jiu, withdrew in disorder on to Sambotinul and the hill to the north of it. During that action Sub-Lieutenant Patrascoiu, from the 7th Company of the 18th Regiment, advanced at the head of his unit to the village of Arsuri, driving out the enemy and capturing two 4-inch howitzer batteries which belonged to the 21st Regiment of Bavarian artillery. The guns were immediately put into action against the enemy, rendering excellent service. On the same day the Rumanians had to encounter an even more determined enemy attack in front of Turcinesti. At 7 a.m. the Germans began their descent into the Jiu Valley, and 2½ hours later they reached the river. Here they were met by a counter-attack from the Rumanian right centre, driven back with considerable losses in men and material, and pursued until 5 p.m., when torrential rains and darkness prevented further operations. Meantime, near Rashovitsa the left Rumanian centre was engaged in a fierce battle which remained doubtful till about 1.30 p.m.; it was then decided in favour of our Allies by the appearance of troops from the Orsova detachments in the flank and rear of the German forces. Their positions were captured about 2 p.m., and 400 prisoners and 12 machine-guns were taken. The remaining German troops in that district withdrew in haste. On the extreme left flank, in the valley of the Bistritsa, the Rumanians were not able to make any considerable headway, but had to remain satisfied with containing the enemy forces. Meantime an enemy unit had succeeded in penetrating in the centre and in throwing themselves over the bridge on the road which approaches Targul-Jiu from the west. A battalion of militia from Gorj which was posted near the bridge was taken by surprise, yet supported by a scratch force from Targul-Jiu, held out till 4.30 p.m., when help sent up from



MAP ILLUSTRATING THE FIGHTING NORTH OF TARGUL-JIU ON OCTOBER 27.

the left centre and from the Orsova Group enabled them finally to defeat the German move. The enemy had to retire, leaving prisoners in the hands of the Rumanians. An order was found on them to "take possession of Targul-Jiu on October 27 at two o'clock in the afternoon."

On the next day, October 28, the Rumanian advance continued along the entire front; the enemy columns had been attacked before they had effected a junction, the cooperation between them was as yet weak, and no general reserve was in existence to intervene at the points of danger. On this day the most violent fighting took place on the hill south of Horez; towards the close of the day the Bavarians were forced to retire, leaving in the hands of our Allies eight guns, two machine-guns, considerable stores of munitions and supplies and nine Rumanian guns which had been lost on October 24. On October 29 the work of the preceding two days was continued, the Rumanians driving back the Germans into the mountain defiles. The pursuit continued till November 1; the total number of enemy dead buried by the

Rumanians amounted to more than 1,500, while the number of prisoners exceeded 1,600. "The battlefield which I visited to-day," wrote the special correspondent of *The Times* under date of November 8, "presents a remarkable spectacle. Burnt motor-cars, rifles, bayonets and saddles are spread over the field, and hundreds of crosses mark the places where the Bavarians are buried." On the very eve of



MAP OF THE NORTHERN DOBRUDJA.

the defeat the German Emperor had congratulated General von Kneussl's "gallant troops on their success."

About the middle of October the positions of the armies which faced each other in the Dobrudja were still approximately the same which had been taken up by them towards the end of September, after Mackensen's forces had been defeated in their attack against the Rashova-Tuzla line. It seems that originally our Allies planned to follow up the rout of the enemy by a counter-offensive on a large scale. In the first days of October fighting developed along the entire Dobrudja front, and several marked successes were won by the Rumanians, especially in the district south of Toprosari. On October 3 they took the enemy positions at Amzacea, capturing seven guns, more than 1,000 prisoners and much war material. In connexion with these operations a few Rumanian battalions had on October 1 crossed the Danube at Rahovo, between Tutrakan and Rustchuk. But in view of the increasing enemy pressure in Transylvania, the offensive in the Dobrudja was abandoned, the troops which had crossed the Danube were withdrawn, and no further serious fighting developed in that theatre of war, until simultaneously with Falkenhayn's attack against the central passes, Mackensen resumed his offensive against the Cernavoda-Constanza line.

During the first half of October reinforcements consisting of two Turkish and one North German division had reached Mackensen. The German division, which included some crack regiments of Pomeranian infantry, and was supported by Bulgarian cavalry and a very powerful concentration of heavy artillery, was directed against the district of Toprosari, in the eastern half of the Dobrudja front. The Turks stood on the extreme right enemy wing near the sea; the Bulgarian infantry was distributed all along the line. On the side of our Allies, whose effectives south of the Danube had been weakened by recent withdrawals for the Transylvanian front, the Russians stood in the centre, the Rumanians on the two wings; the district round Toprosari was held by Rumanian forces and by the Serbian division under General Zhivkovitch. After a prolonged bombardment the enemy opened his offensive on October 19, capturing on that day some hills south-west of Tuzla and south of Toprosari. Here, however, his attacks met with a most dogged resistance. Although Tuzla was lost on October 20, and the enemy, under the personal direction of Field-Marshal von Mackensen and his Chief of Staff, General von Tappen, was attacking incessantly with much superior forces, the Rumanians and Serbs at Toprosari maintained their positions for another 24 hours, fighting on two fronts, and inflicting very severe losses on the enemy. They evacuated Toprosari on October 21, about mid-day, having been completely outflanked from the east; on the same day the enemy got within six miles of Constanza. Simultaneously with the fighting round Toprosari another battle was fought in the centre, near Copadinu on the railway leading to Dobritch. Here also our Allies had to give ground and withdrew

CONSTANZA.

The Rumanian Port on the Black Sea.

on Megidia. On the same day (October 21) the enemy reached the trans-Dobrudja railway at a point east of Murfatlar, about 20 miles west of the coast. The connexion between Cernavoda and Constanza was cut, and the latter, Rumania's largest port, had to be abandoned. From October 21 the town was under gunfire, and on October 22 the last refugees left Constanza. But the authorities gallantly stuck to the work of getting stores away by railway, road, and sea. The grain elevators and the stores of cereals, flour, naphtha, kerosene, and benzine, which there was no time to remove, were burnt. Finally, on October 23, the troops began to retire, fighting rearguard actions against an enemy of superior force. They were well supported by the Russian flotilla, which did not leave the bay until the harbour, with everything useful to the enemy, was in flames. On Sunday night (October 23) Bulgarian cavalry and infantry, supported by German troops, entered Constanza, but in that seaport, with docks covering an area of 150 acres and with a trade amounting to 1,250,000 tons a year, all the booty they could boast of was 500 (presumably empty) railway trucks and several locomotives.

On the same day (October 23) the Fourth Bulgarian Division occupied Megidia, half-way between Cernavoda and Constanza; on the left wing, close to the Danube, our Allies had to abandon their lines in front of Rashova, thus conforming to the withdrawal in the centre and on the right wing. The position round Cernavoda was becoming untenable. The Rumanians withdrew after having de-



GRAIN WAREHOUSES AT CONSTANZA.

GENERAL COUNT SCHMETTOW.
In command of the German Cavalry Corps.

stroyed the bridge, and on October 25 the First Bulgarian Infantry Division entered the town of Cernavoda. During the next few days our Allies continued their retreat. On October 26 they had retired beyond Hirshova and Casapkioi, about 25 miles north of the Cernavoda-Constanza railway, and by the 29th had reached a front extending from Ostrov to Babadag. Here, in the broken hills of the Northern Dobrudja, our Allies rallied their forces and arrested the advance of the enemy. He had failed to reach in time the northern crossings of the Danube at Machin, Isaccea and Tulcea, and was thus unable to prevent the Russians from sending reinforcements to the hard-pressed troops in the Dobrudja. The reinforcements were coming, and were soon to turn the tide of events.

On November 1, General Sakharoff, the victor of Berestechko and Brody, hitherto commander of the Eleventh Russian Army, was appointed Chief Commander of the Allied forces in the Dobrudja. About a week later he opened his counter-offensive, which to the enemy came like a bolt from the blue. "Russian reinforcements, composed of excellent troops," wired *The Times* correspondent from Bukarest under date of November 8, "are fighting with great energy, ably supported by Rumanian forces. General Sakharoff, in a stirring address, exhorted his men to advance always, and never to retire." "On the front of the Army Group of Marshal von Mackensen, in the Northern Dobrudja," reads the German official *communiqué* of November 9, "advanced reconnoitring detachments, in accordance with their instructions, avoided all engagements with the enemy infantry"—a most eloquent description of a hurried retreat. Our Allies were at their heels, and the Danube Squadron was harassing their flank. Yet even so the Germans and Bulgarians found time for their usual work of destruction; in their retreat they were setting fire to towns and villages. On November 9 the Russians regained the important Danube crossing of Hirshova, and in the centre of the Dobrudja they reached the villages of Muslu and Casimcea. On the same day a vigorous attack from Feteshti, the Wallachian end of the Cernavoda bridge, carried the Russian forces to Dunarea (the Danube station) in the inundation belt of the Danube, about two miles west of Cernavoda. The Russian advance to the south, towards the centre of the Dobrudja, still continued for a few days. By November 23 it attained a line extending from Boascic, on the Danube, some seven miles north of Cernavoda, to Lake Tashavlu on the coast of the Black Sea, some 15 miles north of Constanza. The enemy had lost his hold on the convenient crossing of Hirshova, and of the Cernavoda bridge he retained merely the farthest eastern end. These two gates into Rumania, through which he threatened a flank attack against eastern Wallachia at the very time when its defences were being breached in the west, were closed to him. But our Allies failed to regain the Cernavoda-Constanza railway. Before they had been able to break through the lines which the enemy had begun to construct north of it immediately after having captured the railway, the fateful decision was reached in the west, in the second battle of Targul-Jiu. Whatever forces could be spared from the Dobrudja



BUCOVETICH, IN THE JIU VALLEY.

had to be hurried to Wallachia in an attempt yet to arrest the enemy advance against Bukarest.

The Germans had not given up the game for lost when defeated south of the Vulcan Range in the last days of October. At Targul-Jiu they decided to make their greatest and final attempt at forcing a gate into Rumania at the only time when they could spare considerable forces for their operations in that theatre of war. The 41st Prussian division, under General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, was brought up from Volhynia, where about the middle of October it had taken part in the battle of Korytnitsa. Further, the 109th Prussian division, a cavalry division and a Magyar Honved brigade were included in the group of General von Kühne, which assumed the offensive in the Vulcan Mountains. The defeated 11th Bavarian Division under General von Kneussl was left as a reserve to the troops which had now taken over its task in the Jiu Valley. Lastly an independent cavalry corps, consisting of the 6th and 7th German cavalry divisions, was added to the enemy forces in that region, and the Austrian brigade under Colonel von Szivo, which had hitherto held the positions on the Cerna west of Orsova, was ordered to co-operate with the attacking German forces. The German cavalry corps, which was to play a considerable part in the invasion of Rumania, stood under the command of General Eberhard Count Schmettow, one of the best-known Prussian cavalry commanders. member of a family in which army service has been a tradition, he had served in different cavalry regiments of the Guard and Cuirassiers, and from 1901 to 1903 had been first aide-de-camp to the famous chief of the German General Staff, Field-Marsha von Schlieffen. General von Falkenhayn came down himself to Petroseny on November 10 to watch the development of the operations. Meantime General Krafft von Delmensingen, late Chief of the Bavarian General Staff and now Commander of the German Aluta Group, and General von Morgen, commanding in the central group of passes south of Kronstadt, were ordered to resume with all force their attacks against Wallachia. In short, the German Army Command concentrated all its best forces and its best leaders for the new attack against Rumania. To the vast array of forces gathered west of the Vulcan Pass the Rumanians could oppose only the very much depleted First Division at Orsova and the Army Group at Targul-Jiu, whose effectives were even weaker than they had been during the first German attack.

LIEUT.-GENERAL VON MORGEN.
In command of the German forces south of Kronstadt.



FETCHING WOOD IN THE CARPATHIANS.

The fortnight following on the defeat of the Bavarian Division was used by the Germans for improving still further the roads and paths across the Vulcan mountains, and especially in devising contrivances which would enable them to move heavy artillery across the frontier ridge. The front singled out for attack was very much enlarged, and extended from the Moldevisu Mountain in the east for some 20 miles to the Upper Motru Valley in the west. The plan of operations was as follows: Two German divisions opened on November 10 the attack in the Jiu district, one between the Vulcan and the Szurduk Pass, the other east of the Szurduk. The smaller groups which were to advance through the mountains farther west were not pushed forward far toward the plain until the issue was decided by the main concentration of forces on the Jiu. The Germans were careful not to repeat the ill-starred experiment of General von Kneussl. Only farthest to the west an Austro-Hungarian group advancing into the Upper Mortu Valley, where the Rumanians had hardly any troops, pressed forward at a quick pace with a view to outflanking the Rumanian positions round Targul-Jiu.

On November 10 the mountains Garnicelui, Plesa, and the Moldevisu on both sides of the Jiu were occupied by the Germans. On the next day the advance on the German right wing was pressed still farther with fair success; but in the east, north of Bumbeshti, our Allies were able to arrest for a while the enemy advance on positions provided with armoured forts. These, which, as a matter of fact, were obsolete in their structure, were captured by the Germans on November 13 after they had brought into action their heavy howitzers. At Bumbeshti the Germans gained the terminus of the railway from Craiova; this line did not originally lead beyond Targul-Jiu, but had been recently extended. By the night of November 13 the enemy had reached the position which, astride the Jiu Valley, extended from Valari past Sambotinul to Borcaciu. This line lay only some six miles north of the town of Targul-Jiu, which was entered by the enemy on November 15. The Rumanian forces withdrew to positions which ran from Copaceni, south-west of Targul-Jiu, to the river Gilort in the east. Meantime a Rumanian relief force was coming up, by forced marches from the Aluta Valley along the road from Rimnic Valcea. But before this column could reach the hard-pressed forces in the Jiu Valley, the battle was fought, and on November 17 the positions between the Jiu and the Gilort were forced by the enemy. The Rumanian front in western Wallachia had been left without any reserves, and now that these last defences had been broken through there was no sufficient force to resist the enemy, who on a wide front was advancing to the south and to the east. By November 19 the Germans reached, in the centre Filiasa, the junction of the railways

from Targul-Jiu and Orsova; in the west Strehaia, on the River Motru; in the east Baleshti, on the Oltetz; whilst farther north another detachment advanced by Candalesti against the Aluta, thus covering the left flank of the troops which were advancing to the south. As soon as the road to Targul-Jiu had been opened the cavalry corps of Count Schmettow was pushed forward to the south to turn the flank and get into the rear of the Rumanian forces which were still resisting east of the Jiu Valley, and also to clear of Rumanian troops the district between the Jiu and the river Motru. It subsequently rejoined the Army-Group of General von Kühne in the region of Craiova.

About the same time the brigade of Colonel von Szivo was reinforced by German cyclists and infantry and ordered to advance along the Danube. But the small Rumanian Orsova Group under Colonel Anastasiu stubbornly maintained its positions at the Iron Gates and its hold on the river traffic. It was not until November 25 that it evacuated the town of Orsova and began its retreat in a south-easterly direction, a real, new Anabasis. Cut off from the main Rumanian forces, this detachment, about 7,000 men strong, tried to escape the grip of the overwhelming German forces and to regain connexion with its own armies, whilst all the time harrying the enemy rear. The retreat lasted more than three weeks, and carried them as far as the Aluta Valley. It was not until December 7, the day after the fall of Bukarest, that they surrendered at Caracalu, having by their courage and determination earned the esteem and praise even of the enemy. "Amidst continuous fighting and delivering repeated counter-attacks," says the German official report, "the Orsova Group withdrew slowly towards the south-east." "It resisted and fought for the honour of its arms," says another passage of the account; for indeed its enterprise, in so far as it aimed at rejoining the main Rumanian forces, was from the very outset doomed to failure.

On November 21 East and West Prussian infantry from the 41st Division and a Cuirassier Regiment from Count Schmettow's Corps entered the town of Craiova; the Rumanians had evacuated it, carrying away all their artillery material, including several heavy guns. The enemy forces had now emerged from the belt of wooded hills which extend at the foot of the Carpathian range and reached the lowlands of Wallachia. The rich wide plain stretched before them; only here and there small, unimportant undulations of the ground rise in

A COMMUNICATION TRENCH.



MAP OF WALLACHIA.

the open country, which gently, almost inappreciably, slopes from west to east. Its level above the sea, which round Craiova amounts to an average of about 400 feet, falls to 200 feet in the east, and by a more sudden drop to the south, to only 40-100 feet in the marshy valley of the Danube. Craiova, in the centre of Western or Little Wallachia, is its capital and in peace-time the headquarters of the First Rumanian Army Corps. It is the junction of eight high-roads and of four railways leading to Slatina, Targul-Jiu, Turnu Severin and Calafat (on the left bank of the Danube, opposite the Bulgarian town of Vidin), and is the centre of the grain trade of one of the richest agricultural districts n Europe. Fifty millionaires (in francs) are reported to have resided at Craiova before the war, a fact of which the Germans now quickly availed themselves to impose on the town a contribution of about two million pounds sterling. The numerous old "Boyar" palaces and the rich residences of merchant families testify to the length of Craiova's history, whilst their names, derived from various regions of Europe and Asia, speak of its varied character. Also in recent years foreign immigrants came in large numbers to Craiova and the surrounding district; of unnaturalised Austrians and Hungarians alone Little Wallachia counted before the war no less than 30,000, a valuable asset for the enemy when he invaded the country.

LIEUT.-GENERAL VON KÜHNE.
In command of the German Army in Western Wallachia.

From Craiova the enemy offensive continued against the Aluta Valley. The Army Group of General von Kühne was ordered to advance against the sector Dragashani-Slatina, the Cavalry Corps of Count Schmettow against the front between Slatina and Caracalu. Their movements were naturally quick, as they advanced where there was no serious force to resist them; the weak detachments which had not been able to hold the mountain passes against the array of German armies, and the few reinforcements which the Rumanian Command was able to throw into the Wallachian plain, could fight only rearguard actions covering a regrouping farther east. By November 23 the cavalry of Count Schmettow had reached Caracalu and the bridgehead of Stonoeshti, a few miles east of it, the troops of von Kühne had crossed the Pesteana River and were approaching Dragashani, whilst in the centre both groups were converging towards Slatina and the railway bridge whereby the railway from Piteshti to Craiova crosses the Aluta. A group of small hills on the eastern bank of the Aluta favoured the defence. Here the Rumanians put up a determined resistance, repelling repeatedly with heavy losses the German attempts at forcing the river passage. But their forces were not sufficient to hold the river line in its entire length, and the enemy, not being able to break through at Slatina,

A STREET IN CRAIOVA.

transferred the weight of his attack to Caracalu and Stonoeshti. Having crossed the Aluta at that point, Count Schmettow's forces pressed forward to the east against Rosiori de Vede, whilst General von Kühne advanced to the north against the flank of the Rumanian forces which held the bridgehead of Slatina. They had no choice but to withdraw, having first

GENERAL VON KOSCH.
In command of the German Danube Army in Wallachia.

blown up the railway bridge and destroyed all the stores of cereals at Slatina; by November 27 the entire Aluta line was abandoned by our Allies. In the ten days following on the second battle of Targul-Jiu the enemy columns had traversed distances varying from 60 to 140 miles. The advance was executed with such a speed and with such a disregard of precautions, as was but natural in a movement of that kind, that had there been but a few divisions in reserve in Central Wallachia capable of counter-attacking vigorously the flank of the Germans whilst they were descending into the plain near Craiova or whilst they were wheeling towards the Aluta, the position might yet have been saved. Once the two groups which advanced through the plain had reached a front facing due east, their position became strategically very much superior to that of the Rumanian forces. The flanks of the German forces in the plain now rested on Transylvania and Bulgaria, whilst the northern flank of our Allies in Wallachia was threatened by the Group of General Krafft von Delmensingen from the Red Tower Pass, and their left flank was exposed to attacks of a new enemy, the Army Group of General von Kosch, which Mackensen had thrown across the Danube.

During the night and early morning of November 23 the army of Field-Marshal von Mackensen began to cross the Danube in the neighbourhood of Sistovo. About the same time minor attempts were carried out at other points, largely in order to mislead the Rumanians concerning the point chosen for the main crossing. The Germans had command practically of the entire river-line. Their artillery by far outranged that of the Rumanians, and dominated the Danube, seriously hampering the activities of the Rumanian river monitors and protecting those of the Austrian flotilla and the auxiliary German craft. Further, the supremacy in the air, which the small number of Rumanian and of Allied aviators, brought up to Rumania since the outbreak of the war, could not dispute with the Germans, enabled the enemy to keep close observation on the movements of the Rumanian troops in the open lowlands north of the Danube, whilst the Rumanians remained in the dark concerning the enemy preparations for the crossing of the river. These preparations had, as a matter of fact, been carried on for a very considerable time. The many branches and lakes also into which the Danube divides on its southern bank and which on that bank form Bulgarian territorial waters offered favourable conditions for the work. The islands and banks are covered by dense shrubbery, an effective screen against observation from the low northern bank. Whilst yet at peace with Rumania the Austrians and Germans had, in sight of the Rumanian river guards, in July, 1916, sent bridging material down the Danube to sectors of the Bulgarian shore, which had been singled out as favourable for an offensive against Rumania. The Austrian Danube flotilla, which in the summer of 1916 was hovering close to the Bulgarian banks of the Danube, was not removed to the north of the Iron Gate, as was stated at the time, but lay hidden in the Blene Channel near Sistovo. Here the work on the construction of pontoons, ferries, of different parts of a bridge, which could subsequently be constructed within a day, was going on incessantly. As soon as the German invasion of western Wallachia had materialised and their forces begun their advance to the west, Field-Marshal von Mackensen was to throw a considerable part of his army across the Danube. The time when the German armies were approaching the line of the Aluta was considered most appropriate

RUMANIAN CAVALRY ON THE NORTH BANK OF THE DANUBE.

for a crossing in force at Sistovo. This town, the terminus of a Bulgarian railway, lies about 25 miles east of the line of the lower Aluta, which Count Schmettow's forces were just approaching. It was so advanced that a crossing of the river by the enemy seriously threatened the flank and lines of retreat of any forces which the Rumanians might gather on the eastern bank of the Aluta, but was yet sufficiently near to the district reached by the German forces which advanced from the west, to secure a safe and speedy junction between the two armies.

On November 19 the German long-range batteries opened a bombardment across the river. During the night of November 22-23, after the enemy artillery had silenced the much weaker Rumanian guns, the Danube was suddenly covered with enemy craft which had hitherto lain hidden in the channels and lakes on the Bulgarian bank. Steam ferries carried the first German detachments across the river, and as soon as they had gained a firm foothold on the opposite side a pontoon bridge was thrown across it and then strengthened by the Austrian engineers according to the so-called "Herbert" system. Its structure was such as to admit the transport even of heavy artillery. The passage was effected at the same place at which the Russians had crossed the river in 1877, but whilst 40 years earlier technical resources were as yet so little



A BRIDGE OVER THE ARGESH.

developed that the work had taken fully 33 days, in 1916 a river about 1,000 yards wide was bridged in 18 hours. The enemy operations were very much favoured by the weather prevailing in the Danube region towards the end of November. It had been thawing for a few days and the air was mild, almost warm, but the water of the Danube was cold with melted snow; the warm air over the cold water was naturally filled with dense fog. The first crossings of the river could thus be effected under cover.

By November 26 an entire army-group composed of German, Bulgarian and Turkish troops had reached the Rumanian bank of the river and deployed fan-like towards the north. It was led by General von Kosch, who, at the outbreak of the war, had been in command of the 10th Prussian Division at Posen. By November 26 his troops stood before the gates of Alexandria. Meantime the landing operations were extended in both directions; in the west, detachments of inferior troops used only for service behind the lines were moved across the Danube into the occupied parts of Wallachia to relieve the invading armies of the care of the districts in their rear. At Corabia, in the centre, Bulgarian cavalry was thrown across the Danube to co-operate with Count Schmettow's forces. At Samovita, at the terminus of the railway from Sofia, a crossing had been effected on the same day as at Sistovo. Finally, some 30 miles east of Sistovo, opposite the town of Rustchuk, the terminus of Bulgarian railways from Tirnova and from Varna, artillery preparations were begun for crossing the Danube only some 30 miles due south of Bukarest. On November 27 the Bulgarians crossed the river and occupied the town of Giurgevo. Soon nothing was left of the once prosperous town. "The view of the gaping ruins of Giurgevo is simply gruesome," wrote the special correspondent of the Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung* under date of December 16, 1916—his name was Hugo Schulz, and his feelings Bulgaro-German. "Giurgevo had first become the target of heavy artillery during the artillery duel which had been proceeding from bank to bank, and whatever had survived it perished during the capture and the street fighting which took place in the town. The Bulgarians, who take the war against Rumania as an entirely personal matter, gave way to their bitter hatred and did the work whole-heartedly. Whatever had been spared by the flames, the

OLTENITZA ON THE ARGESH.



A WAR CORRESPONDENT'S CAR FORDING A STREAM DURING THE RETREAT OF THE RUMANIANS.

Bulgarians utterly destroyed in their wrath." In the further invasion of the country they vied with the Germans in looting and devastations. Indeed, "requisitioning" was done under the highest auspices and based on a definite theory that "Rumania should pay in full the expenses of its own invasion." German military correspondents, in their utter absence of all moral sense, have left in many dispatches plentiful testimony of the way in which their armies exploited the country; no less interesting is the complacency with which these authorised eye-witnesses watched their procedure. Even Herr Schulz of the Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, whom his Socialist views might have endowed with sympathies extending beyond the borders of his own country, watched the spoliation and misery of the Rumanian peasant with the higher philosophical calm. "Our troops could not possibly have marched at this rate had not Rumania so much cattle, so many geese, pigs and poultry. The Wallachian plain is covered with thriving villages very different from the poor hamlets in the mountains on the northern border of the country. The invading forces live here in great style . . ." As to the feelings of the Rumanian peasant, Herr Schulz consoles himself and his Socialist leaders in another dispatch by saying that "after all the war is not a philanthropic institution and least of all in enemy country"—especially when the Germans and Bulgarians are the invaders, he might have added with good justification.

November 25 approximately marks the beginning of the concentric enemy advance in the direction of the river Argesh, which extends in front of Bukarest across the Wallachian plain. The army-group under General von Morgen, on the extreme left of the German line, finding it impossible to break through along the road from Predeal to Ploeshti—it did not reach even Sinaia until December 5—directed its main forces towards Campolung and entered it on November 29. Their success in that region was due not to any superiority over the opposing Rumanian forces, but to the pressure exercised by the neighbouring German army-group from the direction of the Red Tower Pass. In view of the enemy advance in the district of Dragashani, Slatina, and Caracalu, the Rumanian Aluta Group had had to retire from its position in the mountains,

AUSTRIAN HUSSAR CAMP IN RUMANIA.

and on November 25 the troops of General Krafft von Delmensingen had reached Rimnic Valcea and Tigveni (in the valley of the Topologu). In front of Curtea de Argesh the rearguards of the Rumanian First Army offered a determined resistance, and it was not until November 27 that the Germans captured this important railhead at the foot of the main Carpathian range. By the night of November 27 the enemy line extended from Darmaneshti, in the valley of the Domna, past Dragani, on the road from Rimnic to Piteshti, past Vatasesti to Isvoru, south-east of Slatina and some 75 miles west of Bukarest. On November 29 the enemy entered Piteshti, in the rear of the Campolung Group, which had now to retreat through the Dambovitsa Valley towards Targovishte. Meantime, in the centre, the army-groups of General von Kühne and Count Schmettow continued their advance to the west, whilst south-west of Bukarest the growing forces of Germans, Bulgarians, and Turks under General von Kosch had reached, on November 27, a line which extended from Giurgevo past Draganesti towards the upper course of the Vedea river.

To meet the attack of the enemy the Rumanians had re-distributed their forces, concentrating them in two main groups north-west and south-west of Bukarest. They had been enabled to do so by the plentiful help which they were now receiving from Russia. The entire Moldavian front had been taken over by the Russian armies so as to enable the Rumanians to fill the gap which had opened up between the Carpathians and the Danube after the Germans had broken through at Targul-Jiu and invaded the Wallachian plain. The armies of General Lechitsky and General Kaledin, of Lutsk fame, were now covering the western frontier of Moldavia, and by assuming the offensive against the Austrian forces in the beginning of December deprived them of the initiative in that sector of the front. For the enemy also had concentrated troops in that region, evidently intending to debouch from the mountains into Moldavia; had he succeeded in reaching the Sereth line, his movement would have seriously compromised, if not completely cut off, the retreat of our Allies from Wallachia. Besides the First Austro-Hungarian Army under General von Arz, which had been concentrated mainly in the southern parts of the Moldavian plain, our Allies had to face in the northern sectors the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army under General von Kövess. The Russians had also taken over practically the entire defence of the Dobrudja, which now rested in the hands of General Sakharoff. Finally, Russian troops were beginning to appear even in the plain south of Bukarest. The Rumanian armies, now under the supreme command of General Averescu, were distributed in the following manner: the Second Army continued to hold the passes south of Kronstadt, whilst the

First Army was holding the region of Piteshti, west-north-west of Bukarest. South and south-west of Bukarest a new group of divisions, including parts of what had previously been the 3rd and 4th Armies, was constituted under the leadership of General Presan, who had previously highly distinguished himself as Commander of the 4th Army. Whilst on the northern and north-western front it was the intention of the Rumanians merely to contain the enemy forces, south-west of Bukarest our Allies proposed to assume the offensive, to outflank from the north the German Army of the Danube under General von Kosch and to press it back against the Danube.

RUMANIAN FIELD KITCHENS NEAR PLOESHTI.

By November 29 the Army of General von Kosch, composed of North-German, Bavarian, Bulgarian, Turkish, and Austro-Hungarian troops had reached a line extending from Gumantzi, past Calugareni to Comana on the river Neajlovu, a railway station about halfway between Giurgevo and Bukarest—i.e., only some 16 miles from that city. About the same time its left wing crossed the Piteshti-Giurgevo railway in the valley of the river Glavaciocul. On November 30 the enemy forced a crossing of the Neajlovu near Mihaleshti. It was on this line that General Presan had decided to meet the enemy advance, and the next day saw the opening of his counter-offensive. The forces under his command were grouped in the following way: south-east of Bukarest, between the town and the Danube the 40th Russian Division was advancing to the west; due south of Bukarest stood a Rumanian detachment under the command of General Jancovescu; next to it, south-west of Bukarest, the 21st Division; the right wing of General Presan's forces was formed of two groups, one consisting of the 9th and 19th Divisions previously employed in the Dobrudja, the other of the 2nd and 5th Divisions. It seems to have been the intention of the Rumanian Command to advance on the extreme right wing a strong force which would have pushed its way in between the Danube Army and the German centre. The plan was perfectly sound, and came very near being realised. If fully successful, it would have resulted in a veritable disaster for the German right wing. On December 1 the Rumanian troops threw the advanced enemy forces back across the river Neajlovu, defeated on the Glavaciocul the Turkish division which moved



RUSSIANS MARCHING THROUGH A RUMANIAN TOWN.

on the extreme left wing of the army-group of General von Kosch and also the main body of the Germano-Bulgarian forces in the region of Ghimpati and Mihalesti, driving them towards the south and capturing 30 guns and a few thousand prisoners. Following up this initial victory our Allies succeeded in encircling part of the German forces and the position of the enemy seemed already hopeless when at the last moment a Turkish division appeared in the rear of General Presan's troops instead of a Rumanian division—this failed to come in time. For a second time Mackensen, by his impetuous tactics, had come very near suffering defeat, and again, as in the Battle of Lodz in 1914, he was saved by the fact that a subordinate commander on the side of our Allies failed to play his part in the battle. Following on the arrival of the Turkish division further German reinforcements made their appearance and the situation changed completely. The Rumanians found themselves surrounded in the district north of Calugareni, the group composed of the 2nd and 5th Divisions broke and retired in disorder in the direction of Bukarest; of the 9th and 19th, two of the best Rumanian Divisions, only remnants succeeded in fighting their way through to the rear. General Presan's right wing, which only on the previous day had won such a signal success, now suffered a crushing defeat. Many of the details of the battle are bound to remain for ever moot points of history. Even the reports given out from the best-informed quarters seem to contradict one another on certain points, and much of the confusion which surrounds the actions of December 2 and December 3 is not likely ever to be unravelled. The Germans claim to have found in possession of two staff officers belonging to the 8th Rumanian Division, whom they captured on December 1 at Ratesti (on the Piteshti-Bukarest road), orders which disclosed to them the nature of the Rumanian strategic plan. They further claim that, having thus found out that the Rumanian forces were all concentrated in two groups and that no serious counter-attacks or resistance need have been expected in the centre, their Command immediately decided to break up the army-group of General von Kühne which operated in that region; its left wing, including the 41st Division under General Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, wheeled towards the north against the left flank of the Rumanian armies which were holding the region of Piteshti and Targovishte. The right wing of the group, including the 11th Bavarian Division and also Austro-Hungarian troops, wheeled in the opposite direction, turning its face to the south, and thus came up on the right flank of General Presan's forces. Meantime the cavalry of Count Schmettow drew a screen across the German centre. This may or may not be part of the true history of the double battle fought on the river Argesh north-west and south-west of Bukarest. One thing, however, is certain—that even so it would not have resulted in a decisive defeat had it not been for the indolence of certain Rumanian subordinate commanders and the downright negligence of one of them, a certain General Sosescu who was a naturalized German, and whose original name had been Sosek. He was subsequently court-martialled, cashiered, and condemned to imprisonment. The Rumanian chief commander, in the battle south-west of Bukarest—also called the battle of the Neajlovu—General Presan, conducted the battle in a way which did him honour and no blame for the defeat attached to him. In acknowledgment of the distinguished work done by him he was soon after the battle of Neajlovu appointed Chief of the Rumanian General Staff.

Meantime, on the north-western front the enemy forces were advancing down the Argesh, the Dambovitsa and the Upper Ialomitsa valleys against a line extending from Gaeshti past Targovishte to Valea Lunga. The Rumanian troops under Generals Petala and Lombru were holding out bravely, but, overwhelmed by the superior German forces, had to give way, and withdrew in the direction of Titu, the junction of the railways from Piteshti and Targovishte. Also here our Allies suffered much from defects in their organization. At one time during the retreat a situation arose from which considerable gain might have accrued to the Rumanians. One of their divisions succeeded in getting into the rear of the enemy, but this information did not reach the commanding general until it was too late, when the main army had already withdrawn across a river and blown up the bridge. The Germans continued advancing on the entire front. With the capture of Targovishte they reached the edge of the Rumanian oilfields and the lateral road which leads to the east in the direction of Ploeshti. They had hopes of rich booty and great captures. Neither was to materialize



RUMANIANS RETIRING ACROSS THE RIVER ARGESH.

By December 4 all hope of holding Bukarest was entirely abandoned, and the Rumanian troops were withdrawing towards the east through the whole width of Eastern Wallachia. There had never been any intention of holding Bukarest itself as a fortress. It is true the city is surrounded by an impressive girdle of detached works composed of 18 large forts and an equal number of smaller forts and batteries. These are situated at distances from the centre varying between three and seven miles and are separated by intervals not exceeding three miles. Even the principal line of resistance, therefore, amounted to a length of about 50 miles, and it was calculated that at least 120,000 men would have been required to hold the fortress. But the most important of these defences had been organized so far back as 1886 and were completely obsolete. Even the experiences of the Austrians

THE RUMANIAN RETREAT: AN IMPROVISED BRIDGE.

in Przemysl, where they had an immense superiority of artillery over the besieging Russian forces, can hardly have encouraged the Rumanians to try to hold Bukarest. It would have been sheer folly to shut up an army of such size in a fortress of an obsolete type, insufficiently supplied with artillery. If the Germans were spreading news for a fortnight before the fall of Bukarest about the greatness of the fortress and its importance, this was partly due to a desire to make the most of the expected capture, and partly in order to enable the German command to indulge in the destruction of an open town. On December 3 the Rumanian Government promptly counteracted that propaganda by declaring officially that "well before the commencement of the war, as is known to our enemies, Bukarest was deprived of the character of a fortress, and when the danger of occupation presented itself steps were taken for the evacuation of the city by the military elements, but not by the civil population, which has been enjoined to remain in the city."

The evacuation of Bukarest began on the day when the news of the enemy having crossed the Danube at Sistovo reached the city. This news had fallen like a thunderbolt on the capital, and the authorities received the order to evacuate it as soon as possible. "The first few days which followed after the evacuation of the town," wrote an eye-witness, "will remain deeply engraved in the memory of the inhabitants. The cry 'The Germans are coming!' filled the population with terror, and everybody tried to escape. The word 'overcrowded' only inadequately describes the state of the trains. Prices like £80 were offered for carriages to Ploeshti, which is distant some 30 miles from Bukarest." The Ministers, the Allied Legations and the banks were transferred to Jassy, and by a Royal Decree the meeting of the Rumanian Parliament was postponed and Parliament was ordered to reassemble at Jassy. On December 1 the last members of the Cabinet left Bukarest. The thunder of the invaders' guns could be already distinctly heard in the city, but the panic which had at first broken out in the town gave place to a feeling of depression and resignation. The streets were patrolled by troops for the purpose of maintaining order.



THE OILFIELD AT MORENI.

As a matter of fact this was not necessary, as life seemed to have become completely paralysed in the gay and busy city. On Monday, December 4, a terrific report awoke the capital. The arsenal had been blown up by the authorities. With the destruction of this establishment the last hopes of the Bukarest population were gone. There could be no doubt regarding the future.

On December 5 Field-Marshal von Mackensen sent an officer under the flag of truce into Bukarest, calling upon it to surrender. He came back in the early morning of the following day with the report that there was no fortress of Bukarest and no commander, and that the impressive ceremony for which the Field-Marshal had been preparing could not be enacted. On the same day the Germans entered the city, Mackensen with his staff taking up headquarters in the Royal Palace. But the day on which they entered the capital was dark with smoke and the night which followed was illuminated; the flames and the smoke were rising from the burning oil-tanks and wells in the district of Ploeshti. One of the richest regions of the world was being destroyed in order to prevent the enemy from getting the much-coveted oil. This was the work of Colonel Norton Griffiths, M.P., who acted with extraordinary speed, energy and courage.

On December 4 General Tülff von Tschepe und Weidenbach, at the outbreak of the war Commander of the 8th Rhenish Army Corps at Koblenz, was appointed military Governor-General of the occupied districts of Rumania. Austrian and Bulgarian Vice-Governors were placed under him. He was instructed by German headquarters to use Rumanian land in the same way as Belgium and Poland had been used. To him these words contained a very material meaning, for at the head of the 8th Army Corps he had taken part in that first invasion of Belgium which will for ever remain a stain on the honour of the German nation. He was now explicitly instructed to try to provide from Rumania the needs of the Central Powers which were "illegally cut off" from the High Seas by Great Britain. That he should not be able to do so had, however, been seen to by the Allied Commanders. On the fall of Bukarest, General von Heinrich, previously Governor of Lille—hence, also an experienced man—was appointed Military Governor of Bukarest. One of the first acts of the German administration was an ingenious edict whereby a heavy war tax was levied from the capital. The circulation of paper money was forbidden, unless marked as German, for which 30 per cent. of the value of the notes was demanded.

Meantime, the German and Austrian Press was busy spreading throughout the world allegations to the effect that enemy troops had been welcomed in the capital of Rumania. The true explanation of whatever facts there were for that allegation can be found in a despatch from Dr. Koester published in the Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung* and dated December, 1916. Bukarest, he says, is really judged by its main street, and what happens in this half-mile, with its theatres, cinemas and cafés, is described as representing its public opinion. "It is natural that the Germans, Austrians and Hungarians resident in the town are now pushing forward in this half-mile and that many who had hitherto kept silent now suddenly have rediscovered their German hearts."



CHAPTER CLXXX.

THE GERMAN PEACE CAMPAIGN OF DECEMBER, 1916.

SITUATION IN GERMANY, AUGUST, 1916—STOCK-TAKING IN BERLIN—MILITARY DISAPPOINTMENTS AND NEW POLICY—DISMISSAL OF FALKENHAYN AND APPOINTMENT OF HINDENBURG—BELGIAN DEPORTATIONS—"FREEDOM" AND CONSCRIPTION FOR THE POLES—THE AUXILIARY SERVICE LAW—PEACE OR "RUTHLESS" SUBMARINE WARFARE—ORIGINS OF THE PEACE CAMPAIGN—THE GERMAN NOTES OF DECEMBER 12—BOASTS OF VICTORY—THE AMERICAN PEACE NOTE—SCANDINAVIAN AND SWISS NOTES—GERMAN REPLY TO UNITED STATES—ALLIES' REPLY TO ENEMY POWERS—GERMANY AND NEUTRALS—ALLIES' REPLY TO UNITED STATES—THE BELGIAN NOTE—MR. BALFOUR'S DISPATCH TO WASHINGTON—GERMANY AND THE ALLIES' TERMS—MR. WILSON'S SPEECH TO THE SENATE—GERMAN ANNOUNCEMENT OF "UNRESTRICTED" SUBMARINE WARFARE—PERFECT PIRACY—GERMANY DEFIES THE WORLD.

ON several occasions during the first two years of war German diplomacy tested the firmness, now of one and now of another, of the Entente Powers by suggestions of peace which were conveyed through neutral channels with varying degrees of definiteness. While, however, there were periods in 1915 and at the beginning of 1916 when both the German Government and the German public seriously believed in the possibility of a separate peace with one or other of the Allies, the year 1916 was a year of dwindling hope. As has already been observed, the German peace talk merely strengthened the determination of the Allies.* The assault on Verdun was a costly military failure; it was also a political disaster. As the distinguished German historian, Professor Meinecke, explained in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* on December 31, 1916, the political origin of the undertaking against Verdun was the belief that it would "prove to the French that they could no longer win, and that they would do better to end a war which had lost all prospects for them." The collapse of the German "politico-military idea" was followed by the tremendous Battle of the Somme, which deprived Germany of the initiative and taught her, in particular, that she no longer held the superiority in organization and material. Germany was compelled to review the whole situation afresh, and to prepare for greater efforts than any she had yet made, and to do so in full recognition of the fact—to quote Professor Meinecke's lucid statement—that she could no longer look for military decisions "in the full peace-compelling sense," and that she must fall back upon "the idea that the sacrifices demanded by the continuation of the war no longer bear any relation to the military results which can still be expected, and that it is statesmanlike, intelligent and wise to abandon the intention of destruction, which after all does not lead to destruction, and to seek a reasonable compromise."

At the end of August German anxieties were increased by the intervention of Rumania and

* Vol. IX., p. 361 foll.

the Italian declaration of war on Germany, and Berlin at once set about a general military and political stock-taking. The results were only gradually disclosed, and the sequence of events was calculated to obscure the character and purpose of the German decisions. They were, first, to reorganize the supreme command, especially by making Marshal von Hindenburg, in name at least, military dictator; secondly, to increase German man-power, especially for the purposes of the munitions industry, by a new

HERR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG ON HIS 60th BIRTHDAY (NOV. 29, 1916).
He is seen walking in the Garden of the Reichskanzlerpalais with his Under-Secretary, Herr Wahnschaffe.

form of industrial conscription in Germany, by the deportation of the able-bodied civilian population of Belgium, and by the proclamation of a sham kingdom in Russian Poland as a step to conscription of the Poles; thirdly, to prepare by the speediest possible construction of submarines and training of crews for the introduction of "ruthless" submarine warfare against England; and, fourthly, to initiate proposals of peace, which, if they did not achieve direct success, might serve as justification—certainly in German eyes, and conceivably in neutral, and especially American, eyes—for the new submarine campaign. It has already been seen (Chapter CLXXVII.) how the efforts to entangle the United States in the peace intrigue led speedily, as soon as Germany proceeded to disavow her pledges regarding submarine warfare, to the American rupture of diplomatic relations, and then to the American declaration of war. It is now necessary to review the peace campaign itself, to sketch the developments in Germany of which the peace campaign formed an essential part, and to record the important and far-reaching declarations of policy which it produced.

The first move in the new direction was the announcement on August 30, 1916, that General von Falkenhayn, who had supplanted Count Moltke at the end of 1914, had been removed from the office of Chief of the Great General Staff, that Field-Marshal von Hindenburg had been appointed "Chief of the General Staff of the Field Army," and that Hindenburg's chief supporter and adviser, General von Ludendorff, had been given the new appointment of "First Quartermaster-General." The disgrace of Falkenhayn was ostentatious punishment for the disastrous Western Campaign of 1916, and Falkenhayn was promptly sent away to deal with Rumania, for whose intervention his strategy was held responsible; politically, Falkenhayn's fall was a triumph for the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, against whom he had intrigued almost as persistently as had Admiral von Tirpitz. Henceforward the Hindenburg-Ludendorff combination was to be supreme. It was notorious, in all circles that knew anything of the truth, that Ludendorff was the brain of the partnership, and that Hindenburg's "genius" was mainly the creation of the Berlin Press Bureau. But Hindenburg—"the victorious protector of the Eastern front," as the Kaiser called him in the Order announcing his appointment—was the idol of the people, and his name was as sure to justify fresh sacrifices as to cover a multitude of failures. As *The Times* observed, the Hindenburg legend had endured more persistently than anything else in German public opinion; it had developed a veritable Hindenburg mania, and the Government rightly calculated that the country would accept almost anything that was proposed on Hindenburg's authority.

The first task of the new régime was to reorganize and expand all possible resources in men and munitions. It was decided to initiate legislation which would give the military authorities effective control of labour outside the limits of the obligation to perform

military service, and plans were made to secure special rations for the labour employed in war industries. As the economic pressure on Germany increased, the idea of the military authorities was to feed the army first and the war workers second, and to leave the "useless" civil population what remained. On September 27 Hindenburg, in a letter which was not published until nearly two months later, wrote to the Imperial Chancellor:

> Your Excellency knows what tremendous tasks face our munition industry if a successful result of the war is to be attained. The decisive factor is the solution of the labour problem, not only as regards the numbers of workpeople, but specially as regards the provision of ample food to enable each individual to put forth his maximum effort. . . . It does not seem to me to be sufficiently recognized everywhere among the officials that the existence or non-existence of our people and Empire is at stake. . . . It is impossible for our working people to maintain their full strength if they do not succeed in obtaining a sufficient supply of fat, allotted to them on a proper basis. . . .
>
> I beg your Excellency most urgently to impress upon all Federal Governments, administrative and communal authorities, the seriousness of the situation, and to demand that they shall use every means to provide sufficient nourishment for our munition workers, and unite all the leading men of all parties as leaders of the Army at home behind the plough and the lathe to work together and arouse the *furor Teutonicus* among the tillers of the soil as well as among the townspeople and munition workers.

While Hindenburg and his subordinates were working out their schemes of reorganization, the Imperial Chancellor was educating the Reichstag and, as afterwards appeared, plotting peace schemes with the Kaiser. In the middle of October there was an outburst of vague peace talk in the Reichstag, which was informed by the Chancellor that the military

THE KAISER, HINDENBURG AND LUDENDORFF IN CONFERENCE.



[By special permission from "Punch" of January 24, 1917.

"I AM THE MAN!"

situation was "grave and difficult," but that Hindenburg and Ludendorff were full of confidence. As for the peace scheme it was announced in Berlin on January 15, 1917, after the peace campaign had failed, that the Kaiser had on October 31 written the following letter from the Neues Palais, Potsdam, to the Imperial Chancellor:—

MY DEAR BETHMANN,—I have since been turning our conversation thoroughly over in my mind. It

is clear that the peoples of the enemy countries, kept in a morbid war atmosphere, and labouring under lies and frauds, and deluded by fighting and hatred, possess no men who might be able, or who might have the moral courage, to speak the liberating word.

To make the proposal for peace is a moral deed, which is necessary, in order to free the world, including neutrals, from the pressure which weighs upon all. Such a deed requires a ruler who has a conscience, who feels that he is responsible to God, who has a heart for his own people and for those of his enemies, who, indifferent as to any possible wilful misinterpretation of his action, possesses the will to free the world from its sufferings. I have the courage. Trusting in God, I shall dare to take this step. Lay the Notes before me soon and prepare everything.

(Signed) WILLIAM I.R.

When this characteristic document was published, doubts were expressed as to its authenticity, or, at any rate, as to its date. In reality the letter of October 31 shows how nicely calculated was the whole German operation. Six weeks elapsed before the Chancellor was ready, in the light of the Emperor's "conscience" and "responsibility to God," to produce the "deed" which was "to free the world from its sufferings." There was much to be done in the interval—much that was worthy of the heart that had "bled for Louvain" and was now moved by the sufferings both of the German people and of enemy peoples. At precisely the same moment when he was ordering the Chancellor to prepare peace proposals the Kaiser had sanctioned the new man-power scheme, the Belgian deportations, and the cunning proclamation of the "freeing of Poland." The period between the end of October and the middle of December was occupied in carrying out this "Hindenburg programme."

On October 29, two days before the Kaiser wrote his "peace" instructions to the Chancellor, it was announced that General von Stein had been brought home from the Somme to be Prussian Minister of War, in place of General Wild von Hohenborn; it was openly stated that Stein's appointment was due to the necessity of overhauling the Berlin organization in the light of the new experiences to which the German Army had been introduced in the West. Secondly, there was established within the Ministry of War an entirely new War Bureau (*Kriegsamt*), under a Wurtemberg general, Gröner, who had hitherto been Director of Field Railways. The War Bureau was to deal with "all matters connected with the general conduct of the war, the provision, employment, and feeding of the workmen, and the provision of raw materials, arms, and munitions," and to be responsible for all matters connected with the supply of drafts to the Army. It was, in fact, a belated imitation of the British Ministry of Munitions, but at the same time a Man-Power Office, and, under the stress of the economic situation, it had to concern itself with the feeding of the munition workers and their families as well as with the supply of raw materials.

GENERAL GRÖNER,
Chief of the "War Bureau" of the Prussian Ministry of War.

The new War Bureau at once began a campaign on behalf of industrial conscription, the proclamation at Warsaw was taken to herald the raising of a "Polish Army" on the side of the Central Powers, and the Belgian deportations were carried on with extreme energy and brutality. As the Berlin *Tägliche Rundschau* candidly observed on November 23:

In everything which has been done and initiated in the way of organization since Hindenburg's appointment we feel a single will. The solution of the Belgian unemployment problem (*sic*), the creation of a Polish army, the reorganization of our munitions system, and the proclamation of a compulsory Labour Law, are things proceeding from a single root and a single will.

The German Government was, indeed, in all things—whether in Belgium, Poland, or Germany—entirely under Prussian military orders.

The German man-power scheme ultimately took shape in a Patriotic Auxiliary Service Bill, as it was called, which was introduced on November 24 and rapidly passed by the Reichstag. The new law provided that "every



As a proof of "democracy" the Inscription "DEM DEUTSCHEN VOLK" ("To the German People") was placed on the front of the Reichstag in 1916.

male German, from the completion of his seventeenth to the completion of his sixtieth year, is, in so far as he has not been summoned to service with the armed forces, liable to patriotic auxiliary service during the period of the war." Patriotic auxiliary service was defined as consisting, "apart from service in Government offices and official institutions, in particular in service in war industry, in agriculture, in the nursing of the sick, and in organizations of every kind of an economic character connected with the war, as well as in other undertakings which are immediately or indirectly of importance for purposes of the conduct of the war or the provision of the requirements of the people." The control of the scheme was entrusted in Prussia to the War Bureau, and in the States—Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg—which still enjoyed a measure of military independence, to organizations established on the lines of the Prussian War Bureau. Thus, at the beginning of December, there had been imposed upon the thorough system of military service a thorough system of compulsory labour in Germany and of slavery in the occupied territories. At the same time the construction of submarines was proceeding apace, and every effort had been made to beguile American and other neutral opinion. Germany was now ready to offer the world the blessings of a German peace. As a preliminary to the operations the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow, resigned office at the end of November, and was succeeded by the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, Herr Zimmermann. According to some accounts, Herr von Jagow was unable to stomach the Belgian deportations and the proposed defiance of the whole civilized world; according to others he was dismissed as unfit for the work in hand.

On December 12 the Kaiser issued the following order to the German Army:

Under the influence of the victory which you have gained by your bravery, I and the Monarchs of the three States in alliance with me have made an offer of peace to the enemy. It is uncertain whether the object to which this offer is aimed will be reached. You will have meanwhile, with God's help, to continue to resist and defeat the enemy.

The Kaiser addressed the same order "to my Navy, which in the common fight has loyally and effectively staked all its strength."

On the same day the Imperial Chancellor appeared in the Reichstag, which had been specially summoned, and announced that the following Note had that morning been transmitted by Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey to all the enemy Powers:

The most formidable war known to history has been ravaging for two and a half years a great part of the world. That catastrophe, which the bonds of a common civilization more than a thousand years old could not stop, strikes mankind in its most precious patrimony; it threatens to bury under its ruins the moral and physical progress on which Europe prided itself at the dawn of the twentieth century. *In that strife Germany and her Allies, Austria-Hungary and Turkey, have given proof of their indestructible strength in winning considerable successes at war.* Their unshakable lines resist ceaseless attacks of their enemies' arms. The recent diversion in the Balkans was speedily and victoriously thwarted. The latest events have demonstrated that a continuation of the war cannot break their resisting power. The general situation much rather justified their hope of fresh successes. It was for the defence of their existence and freedom of their national development that the four Allied Powers were constrained to take up arms. The exploits of their armies have brought no change therein. Not for an instant have they swerved from the conviction that the respect of the rights of other nations is not in any degree incompatible with their own rights and legitimate interests. They do not seek to crush or annihilate their adversaries. Conscious of their military and economic strength and ready to carry on to the end, if they must, the struggle that is forced upon them, but animated at the same time by the desire to stem the flood of blood and to bring the horrors of war to an end, the *four allied Powers propose to enter even now into peace negotiations.* They feel sure that the propositions which they would bring forward, and which would aim to assure the existence, honour, and free development of their peoples, would be such as to serve as a basis for the restoration of a lasting peace.

If, notwithstanding this offer of peace and conciliation, the struggle should continue, the four allied Powers are

resolved to carry it on to an end, while solemnly disclaiming any responsibility before mankind and history.*

The German Note to enemy Powers was also communicated to the Vatican, together with the following appeal to the Pope:

The reasons which prompted Germany and her allies to this step are manifest. For two years and a half

* The text quoted is that of the Note actually delivered to the British Government by the American Ambassador in London. It was an inaccurate and incomplete translation, for which the German Foreign Office was responsible, of the original French. The passages printed in italics were as follows in the original:—

"Dans cette lutte l'Autriche-Hongrie et ses alliés: l'Allemagne, la Bulgarie et la Turquie, ont fait preuve de leur force indestructible en remportant des succès considérables *sur des adversaires supérieurs en nombre et en matériel de guerre.*"

"Les quatre Puissances alliées proposent d'entrer, *dès-à-present*, en négociations de paix."

"Si, malgré cette offre de paix et de conciliation, la lutte devait continuer, les quatre Puissances alliées sont déterminées à la conduire jusqu'à *une fin victorieuse.*"



HERR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG'S SPEECH IN THE REICHSTAG ON DECEMBER 12, 1916.

(1) The Imperial Chancellor. (2) Admiral von Capelle, Secretary of State for the Navy. (3) Herr Helfferich, Minister of the Interior. (4) Herr Zimmermann, Foreign Secretary. (5) Herr Kaempf, President of the Reichstag.

a terrible war has been devastating the European Continent. Unlimited treasures of civilization have been destroyed, extensive areas have been soaked with blood, millions of brave soldiers have fallen in battle, and millions have returned home as invalids. Grief and sorrow fill almost every house. Not only upon belligerent nations, but also upon neutrals the destructive consequences of the gigantic struggle weigh heavily. Trade and commerce carefully built up in years of peace have been depressed. The best forces of the nations have been withdrawn from the production of useful objects. Europe, which was formerly devoted to the propagation of religion and civilization, which was trying to find a solution for social problems, and was the home of science and art and all peaceful labour, now resembles an immense war camp in which the achievements and works of many decades are doomed to annihilation.

Germany is carrying on a war of defence against the enemies who aim at her destruction. She fights in order to assure the integrity of her frontiers and the liberty of the German nation in the right which she claims to develop freely her intellectual and economic energies in peaceful competition and on an equal footing with other nations. All the enemies' efforts are unable to shatter the heroic armies of the allies that protect the frontiers of their countries. Strengthened by the certainty that the enemy shall never pierce the iron wall, those fighting on the front know that they are supported by the whole nation, which is inspired by love for its country, ready for the greatest sacrifices, and determined to defend to the last extremity the inherited treasure of intellectual and economic work and social organization and the sacred soil of the country. Sure of our own strength, but realizing Europe's sad future if this war continues, seized with pity in the face of the unspeakable misery of humanity, the German Empire, in accord with her allies, solemnly repeats what the Chancellor already declared one year ago, that Germany is ready to give peace to the world by setting before the whole world the question whether or no it is possible to find a basis for an understanding.

Since the first day of his Pontifical reign his Holiness the Pope has unswervingly demonstrated in a most generous fashion his solicitude for the innumerable victims of this war, has alleviated the sufferings and ameliorated the fate of thousands of men injured by this catastrophe. Inspired by the exalted ideas of his ministry, his Holiness seized every opportunity in humanity's interest in order to bring to an end so sanguinary a war. The Imperial Government is firmly confident that the initiative of the four Powers will find a friendly welcome on the part of his Holiness and that the work of peace can count upon the precious support of the Holy See.

In his speech the Imperial Chancellor boasted of the military situation, of the overthrow of Rumania, of the "heroic deeds" of the German submarines which were threatening the enemy with "the spectre of famine," and finally of the Auxiliary Service Law which had given Germany "a new offensive and defensive bulwark." Germany, he said, went steadily forward, always "ready to fight for the nation's existence, for its free and safe future," and "always ready to stretch out her hand for peace." He enlarged especially upon the Kaiser's "deep moral and religious sense of duty towards the nation and beyond it towards humanity." They would await the reply of their enemies "with the calm which is given to us by our exterior and interior strength and clear conscience." And he concluded:—

In a fateful hour we have taken the fateful decision; it is drenched with the blood of hundreds of thousands of our sons and brothers who have given their lives for the security of home. In this struggle of the peoples, which has unveiled all the terrors of earthly life and at the same time all the greatness of human courage in a fashion never yet seen, the wit of man and the hand of man cannot avail to the very end. God will help. Fearless and upright we will follow our path, determined for war, ready for peace.

HERR ZIMMERMANN.
Appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 1916.

The German Note was immediately hailed in all parts of the world as an attempt to place the Allies in a false position with regard to neutral opinion. In all the Allied countries it was considered that the German "offer" was insincere, and the only fear was that Germany might in some way profit by the appearance of readiness to end the war. "I have not the right," said the French Premier, M. Briand, in the Chamber on December 13, "to express myself with regard to the German proposals except in full accord with our Allies, but I have the right to warn the country against the possible poison of such attempts. The proposal is that we should negotiate a peace.

Yes, but Serbia, Belgium, and Rumania are invaded, and the crime is unchastized. It is a step designed to trouble our consciences. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg says: 'It is not we who wanted this horrible war. It was forced upon us.' To that I reply for the hundredth time: 'You were the aggressors, and whatever you may say the facts prove it, and the blood-shed is on your heads, not on ours.' It is my right to denounce this trap." From Russia came the most emphatic denunciations of the German manœuvre, and the Duma on December 15 unanimously passed a resolution in favour of "a categorical refusal by the Allied Governments to enter under present conditions into any peace negotiations whatever." The Duma declared that "a lasting peace will be possible only after a decisive victory over the military power of the enemy, and after the definite renunciation by Germany of the aspirations which render her responsible for the world war and for the horrors by which it is accompanied."

Meanwhile all the German diplomatists, and especially Count Bernstorff in Washington, were busily pretending that Germany meant even more than she said; that, if only the belligerents could be brought together at a conference, it would be found that Germany's

HERR VON STUMM,
Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office.

"terms" were extremely reasonable; and, in particular, that the only real obstacle would be British pretensions in regard to sea power. The truth, of course, was that Germany was not proposing peace, but a conference in which she hoped that the general desire for peace would enable her to achieve her aims.

In England Mr. Lloyd George had become Prime Minister on December 7. Owing to illness he did not meet the House of Commons until December 19. He then said that the Allies had "each of them separately and independently arrived at identical conclusions." It was well that France and Russia should have given the first answer: "The enemy is still on their soil · their sacrifices have been greater."

BARON VON DEM BUSSCHE-HADDEN-HAUSEN,
Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, formerly German Minister in Bukarest.

The Prime Minister then quoted the famous words of Abraham Lincoln spoken under similar conditions: "We accepted this war for an object, and a worthy object, and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God I hope it will never end until that time." Mr. Lloyd George proceeded:—

> There has been some talk about proposals of peace. What are the proposals? There are none. To enter at the invitation of Germany, proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals she proposes to make, into a conference, is to put our heads into a noose with the rope end in the hands of Germany.

The Prime Minister recalled the Napoleonic wars, and the way Napoleon used to appear "in the garb of the angel of peace"—especially when he needed time and his subjects showed symptoms of fatigue and war weariness. "Invariably the appeal was made in the name of humanity; and he demanded an end to bloodshed at which he professed himself to be horrified, but for which he himself was mainly responsible. Our ancestors were taken in once, and bitterly they and Europe rued it." Mr. Lloyd George reaffirmed the terms of the Allies as "restitution, reparation, guarantee against repetition," and went on to expose

THE GERMAN PROCLAMATION OF THE KINGDOM OF POLAND: STUDENTS' PROCESSION AT WARSAW.

the hollowness of the German pretence. Finally he declared :—

Now that this great war has been forced by the Prussian military leaders upon France, Russia, Italy, and ourselves, it would be folly, it would be cruel folly, not to see to it that this "swash-buckling" through the streets of Europe to the disturbance of all harmless and peaceful citizens shall be dealt with now as an offence against the law of nations. The mere word that led Belgium to her own destruction will not satisfy Europe any more. We all believed it. We all trusted it. It gave way at the first pressure of temptation, and Europe has been plunged into this vortex of blood. We will, therefore, wait until we hear what terms and guarantees the German Government offer other than those, better than those, surer than those which she so lightly broke, and meanwhile we shall put our trust in an unbroken army rather than in a broken faith.

Forty-eight hours after Mr. Lloyd George had spoken the whole world was astonished by the publication of a Note addressed to all the belligerent Powers by the President of the United States, and suggesting that an early occasion should be sought for an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded. The Note as communicated by the American Ambassador in London was dated December 20, and ran as follows :—

The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest to the Government of his Britannic Majesty a course of action with regard to the present war which he hopes that his Majesty's Government will take under consideration, as suggested in the most friendly spirit and as coming not only from a friend, but also as coming from the representative of a neutral nation, whose interests have been most seriously affected by the war, and whose concern for its early conclusion arises out of a manifest necessity to determine how best to safeguard those interests if the war is to continue.

The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time, because it may now seem to have been prompted by the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It is in fact in no way associated with them in its origin, and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connexion with other proposals which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been made in other circumstances.

The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guarantee against its renewal or the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible frankly to compare them. He is indifferent as to the means taken to accomplish this. He would be happy himself to serve, or even to take the initiative in its accomplishment, in any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. One way will be as acceptable to him as another if only the great object he has in mind be attained.

He takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually

the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful States now at war. Each wishes itself to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this, and against aggression or selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power amidst multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world. Before that final step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary first to settle the issues of the present war upon terms which will certainly safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity, and the political and commercial freedom of the nations involved.

In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the people and the Government of the United States are as vitally and as directly interested as the Governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent as that of any other people or Government. They stand ready, and even eager, to co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends when the war is over with every influence and resource at their command. But the war must first be concluded. The terms upon which it is to be concluded they are not at liberty to suggest; but the President does feel that it is his right and his duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should presently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its conclusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, be rendered altogether intolerable, and lest, more than all, an injury be done civilization itself which can never be atoned or repaired.

The President, therefore, feels altogether justified in suggesting an immediate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must precede those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world which all desire, and in which the neutral nations as well as those at war are ready to play their full responsible part. If the contest must continue to proceed towards undefined ends by slow attrition until one group of belligerents or the other is exhausted, if million after million of human lives must continue to be offered up until on the one side or the other there are no more to offer, if resentments must be kindled that can never cool and despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle.

The life of the entire world has been profoundly affected. Every part of the great family of mankind has felt the burden and terror of this unprecedented contest of arms. No nation in the civilized world can be said in truth to stand outside its influence or to be safe against its disturbing effects. And yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitely stated.

The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said, stated those objects in general terms. But, stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definite results, what actual exchange of guarantees, what political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military success even, would bring the war to an end.

It may be that peace is nearer than we know; that the terms which the belligerents on the one side and

PROCLAMATION OF THE KINGDOM OF POLAND: ORGANIZED STREET SCENES IN WARSAW.

on the other would deem it necessary to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared: that an interchange of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert of nations immediately practicable.

The President is not proposing peace: he is not even offering mediation. He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, the neutral nations with the belligerents, how near the haven of peace may be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing. He believes that the spirit in which he speaks and the objects which he seeks will be understood by all concerned, and he confidently hopes for a response which will bring a new light into the affairs of the world.

M. CAMILLE DECOPPET,
President of the Swiss Republic in 1916.



M. EDMOND SCHULTHESS,
President of the Swiss Republic in 1917.

The place of this remarkable Note in the evolution of American policy has already been defined, and it has been seen why Mr. Wilson suggested peace. He did so partly because he thought it his duty to make a powerful effort at this stage to avert the consequences to the United States which he already foresaw, if the war were continued—submarine "ruthlessness" of a still more complete kind on the part of Germany, followed inevitably by rupture of relations with Germany by the United States, and probably by war. He also desired to give the Allies emphatic assurance that, if peace could be obtained, he would do everything possible to guarantee American support of that peace against future assaults.* Mr. Wilson's attitude was in some respects very like that of Sir Edward Grey when, on the very eve of war with Germany, he was pleading for Utopian ideals which might be realized if only "this present crisis" were "safely passed," and urging upon the German Imperial Chancellor (dispatch to Sir Edward Goschen, July 30, 1914) that "the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe." Germany was as certain to defeat the one hope as the other, and the United States acted as Great Britain had acted; but seen in retrospect the effort of the American President in 1916 was, perhaps, not less defensible than the effort of the British Foreign Secretary in 1914.

When, however, Mr. Wilson's Note surprised the world it was impossible for the enemies of Germany to see it in that calm light. What could be better calculated to assist German diplomacy? How could the peoples of all the countries that were staking their all for liberty fail to be shocked by the apparent belief of the President that the objects on both sides were "virtually the same"? What could seem to them more unjust than Mr. Wilson's cold "impartiality"? Little wonder that all

* See Chapter CLXXVII., page 378.

the peoples of the Entente countries endorsed the phrases of Mr. Bonar Law: "What President Wilson is longing for we are fighting for. Our sons and brothers are dying for it, and we mean to secure it. The heart of the people of our country is longing for peace. We are praying for peace, a peace that will bring back in safety those who are dear to us, but a peace which will mean this—that those who will never come back shall not have laid down their lives in vain."

The American Note was followed almost immediately by two other communications to the belligerents—a Note from Switzerland, presented on December 22, and a Note from the three Scandinavian Governments, presented on December 29. The Scandinavian representations were little but a formal reminder that Denmark, Norway and Sweden were, as they said, not wanting in "their duty to their own people, as well as to humanity," and an expression of their "warmest sympathy with any efforts tending to end all the sufferings and losses, moral as well as material, which are being continually incurred"

The Swiss Note was, perhaps, more significant. In the first place it stated that the Swiss Federal Council, "inspired by the ardent desire to see an early cessation of hostilities," had "got into touch" with President Wilson "five weeks" before and the Note said:—

> The generous personal initiative of President Wilson will not fail to awaken in Switzerland a deep echo. Faithful to the duties which the strictest observation of neutrality imposes upon her, united by the same friendship to the two groups of Powers at present at war, isolated in the middle of the frightful struggle of peoples, seriously threatened and struck in her spiritual and material interests, our country longs for peace.
>
> Switzerland is ready to aid with all her feeble strength in putting an end to the sufferings of the war which she sees going on every day—the interned, the seriously wounded, and the repatriated. She is also desirous to assist in the fruitful collaboration of the peoples. . . . She would consider it a happy duty to work even in the most modest measure towards the *rapprochement* of the nations at war and the establishment of a lasting peace.

The Swiss Note gave the Allies at least a welcome opportunity to declare (January 17, 1917) that "the whole world knows Switzerland's generous efforts to lighten the sufferings of the interned, the severely wounded, the people ejected from their homes, to all of whom the most devoted care has been given."

Thus, to return to the main issues, the Allies were in presence of proposals from their

SWITZERLAND PROVIDES AN ASYLUM FOR BRITISH PRISONERS OF WAR.
The illustration shows the mixed German-Swiss Commission before which the prisoners about to be exchanged were brought for a second and final examination. The standing figure marked with an X is Prince Max of Baden.

enemies and recommendations from the United States. Before they could reply to their enemies Germany hastened (December 25) to register her reply to Mr. Wilson :—

The high-minded suggestion made by the President of the United States of America in order to create a basis for the establishment of lasting peace has been received and considered by the Imperial Government in the friendly spirit in which it is expressed.

In the President's communication the President points out that which he has at heart and leaves open the choice of the road. To the Imperial Government an immediate exchange of views seems to be the most appropriate road in order to reach the desired result. It begs, therefore, in the sense of the declaration made on December 12, which held out a hand for peace negotiations, to propose an immediate meeting of delegates of the belligerent States at some neutral place.

The Imperial Government is also of opinion that the great work of preventing future wars can be begun only after the end of the present struggle of nations. It will, when the moment shall have come, be ready with pleasure to collaborate fully with the United States in this exalted task.

The insolence of this communication was clear enough. "Coolly, skilfully and completely," observed the *New York Times*, "the Germans have turned the Wilson Note to their own ends." They had totally evaded the issue, and could hardly have stated more plainly that for Germany the neutral Powers

[*From the Vienna "Muskete."*

PEACE AND JOHN BULL.

Peace: "This year I will not allow myself to be put off any longer, Mister John."

were tools, whose only acceptable service was to assist Germany in bringing her enemies to conference. The German plan was to refuse to state terms, and, as the *New York Tribune* put it, to "blackmail President Wilson by the threat of a German submarine campaign into an endorsement of the German proposals of a conference of the belligerents." Henceforward, at any rate, it was certain that the whole German manœuvre was doomed to failure. It remains to describe the momentous pronouncements to which it gave rise—pronouncements which reflected the whole truth of the situation after two and a half years of war, and marked out in clear lines the road along which the civilized world had still to travel to its goal of liberty and peace.

The Allies' reply to the enemy Powers was communicated by the French Government on December 30, 1916, to the American Ambassador in Paris. The following was the official English translation, with the insertion in some passages of the original French and a more faithful English rendering:—

The Allied Governments of Russia, France, Great Britain, Japan, Italy, Serbia, Belgium, Montenegro, Portugal, and Rumania, united for the defence of the freedom of nations and faithful to their undertakings not to lay down their arms except in common accord, have decided to return a joint answer to the illusory peace proposals which have been addressed to them by the Governments of the enemy Powers through the intermediary of the United States, Spain, Switzerland, and the Netherlands.

As a prelude to any reply, the Allied Powers feel bound to protest strongly against the two material assertions made in the Note from the enemy Powers, the one professing to throw upon the Allies the responsibility of the war, and the other proclaiming the victory of the Central Powers.

The Allies cannot admit a claim which is thus untrue in each particular, and is sufficient alone to render sterile all attempt at negotiations.

The Allied nations have for 30 months been engaged in [*subissent*—have had to endure] a war which they had done everything to avoid. They have shown by their actions their devotion to peace. This devotion is as strong to-day as it was in 1914; and after the violation by Germany of her solemn engagements, Germany's promise is no sufficient foundation on which to re-establish the peace which she broke.

A mere suggestion, without statement of terms, that negotiations should be opened, is not an offer of peace. The putting forward by the Imperial Government of a sham [*prétendue*—pretended] proposal, lacking all substance and precision, would appear to be less an offer of peace than a war manœuvre.

It is founded on a calculated misinterpretation of the character of the struggle in the past, the present, and the future.

As for the past, the German Note takes no account of the facts, dates, and figures which establish that the war was desired, provoked, and declared by Germany and Austria-Hungary.

At the Hague Conference it was the German delegate who refused all proposals for disarmament. In July, 1914, it was Austria-Hungary who, after having addressed to Serbia an unprecedented ultimatum, declared war upon her in spite of the satisfaction which had at once been accorded. The Central Empires then rejected all attempts made by the Entente to bring about a pacific solution of a purely local conflict. Great Britain suggested a Conference, France proposed an International Commission, the Emperor of Russia asked the German Emperor to go to arbitration, and Russia and Austria-Hungary came to an understanding on the eve of the conflict; but to all these efforts Germany gave neither answer nor effect. Belgium was invaded by an Empire which had guaranteed her neutrality and which has had the assurance to proclaim that treaties were "scraps of paper" and that "necessity knows no law."

MR. W. G. SHARP,
United States Ambassador in Paris.

At the present moment these sham [*prétendues*—pretended] offers on the part of Germany rest on a "War Map" of Europe alone, which represents nothing more than a superficial and passing phase of the situation, and not the real strength of the belligerents. A peace concluded upon these terms would be only to the advantage of the aggressors, who, after imagining that they would reach their goal in two months, discovered after two years that they could never attain it.

As for the future, the disasters caused by the German declaration of war and the innumerable outrages committed by Germany and her Allies against both belligerents and neutrals demand penalities [*sanctions*—retribution], reparation, and guarantees; Germany avoids the mention of any of these.

In reality these overtures made by the Central Powers are nothing more than a calculated attempt to influence

the future course of the war, and to end it by imposing a German peace.

The object of these overtures is to create dissension in public opinion [*troubler l'opinion*—disturb opinion] in Allied countries. But that public opinion has, in spite of all the sacrifices endured by the Allies, already given its answer with admirable firmness, and has denounced the empty pretence [*vide*—emptiness] of the declaration of the Enemy Powers.

They have the further object of stiffening public opinion in Germany and in the countries allied to her; one and all, already severely tried by their losses, worn out by economic pressure and crushed by the supreme effort which has been imposed upon their inhabitants.

BARON BEYENS,
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

They endeavour to deceive and intimidate public opinion in neutral countries whose inhabitants have long since made up their minds where the initial responsibility rests, have recognized existing responsibilities, and are far too enlightened to favour the designs of Germany by abandoning the defence of human freedom.

Finally, these overtures attempt to justify in advance in the eyes of the world a new series of crimes—submarine warfare, deportations, forced labour and forced enlistment of inhabitants against their own countries, and violations of neutrality.

Fully conscious of the gravity of this moment, but equally conscious of its requirements, the Allied Governments, closely united to one another and in perfect sympathy with their peoples, refuse to consider a proposal which is empty and insincere.

Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible so long as they have not secured reparation of violated rights and liberties, recognition of the principle of nationalities, and of the free existence of small states; so long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end, once and for all, forces [*causes*—causes] which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations [*qui depuis si longtemps ont menacé les nations*—which have so long threatened the nations] and to afford the only effective guarantees for the future security of the world.

In conclusion, the Allied Powers think it necessary to put forward the following considerations, which show the special situation of Belgium after two and a half years of war.

In virtue of international treaties signed by five great European Powers, of whom Germany was one, Belgium enjoyed, before the war, a special status, rendering her territory inviolable and placing her, under the guarantee of the Powers, outside all European conflicts. She was, however, in spite of these treaties the first to suffer the aggression of Germany. For this reason the Belgian Government think it necessary to define the aims which Belgium has never ceased to pursue, while fighting side by side with the Entente Powers for right and justice.

Belgium has always scrupulously fulfilled the duties which her neutrality imposed upon her. She has taken up arms to defend her independence and her neutrality violated by Germany, and to show that she remains faithful [*et pour rester fidele*—and to be true] to her international obligations. On August 4, 1914, in the Reichstag, the German Chancellor admitted that this aggression constituted an injustice contrary to the laws of nations and pledged himself in the name of Germany to repair it.

During two and a half years this injustice has been cruelly aggravated by the proceedings of the occupying forces, which have exhausted the resources of the country, ruined its industries, devastated its towns and villages, and have been responsible for innumerable massacres, executions, and imprisonments. At this very moment, while Germany is proclaiming peace and humanity to the world, she is deporting Belgian citizens by thousands and reducing them to slavery.

Belgium before the war asked for nothing but to live in harmony with all her neighbours. Her King and her Government have but one aim—the re-establishment of peace and justice [*droit*—right). But they only desire [desire only] a peace which would assure to their country legitimate reparation, guarantees, and safeguards for the future.

The reply of the Allies was received in Germany with a great exhibition of indignation. The Government organs were shocked by its "shallowness," "levity," "mendacity," and so on, and declared in a shrill chorus that proud and injured Germany could answer such insults only with the sword. "We have done what we could," said the German Imperial Chancellor to the Berlin correspondent of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, "to spare the world further bloodshed. If the New Year has not brought us nearer to peace, that is the fault of our enemies." Ultimately (January 11) Germany sent out a fresh Note to the United States, Spain and Switzerland, saying that in view of the form in which the Allies had couched their rejection of the peace proposal a reply to them was "impossible," but that the German Government "thinks it important to communicate to the neutral Powers its view of the state of affairs."

This time the German Government declared that "history" should be left to judge the origins of the war. Germany and her Allies,

"who were obliged to take up arms to defend their freedom," now regarded this aim as "attained." On the other hand, the enemy Powers were aiming, "among other things," at "the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine and several Prussian provinces, the humiliation and diminution of Austria-Hungary, the disintegration of Turkey, and the mutilation of Bulgaria." The Note proceeded:

Our enemies describe the peace offer of the four allied Powers as a war manœuvre. Germany and her allies most emphatically protest against such a falsification of their motives, which they openly stated. Their conviction was that a just peace acceptable to all belligerents was possible, that it could be brought about, and that further bloodshed could not be justified. Their readiness to make known their peace conditions without reservation at the opening of negotiations disproves any doubt of their sincerity.

Our enemies, in whose power it was to examine the real value of our offer, neither made any examination nor made counter-proposals. Instead of that, they declared that peace was impossible so long as the



M. BRIAND PRESENTING TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, IN THE PRESENCE OF THE BELGIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE REPLY OF THE ALLIES TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S PEACE NOTE.

THE DEPORTATION OF BELGIANS TO WORK FOR GERMANY.

restoration of violated rights and liberties, the acknowledgment of the principle of nationalities, and the free existence of small States were not guaranteed. The sincerity which our enemies deny to the proposal of the four allied Powers cannot be allowed by the world to these demands if it recalls the fate of the Irish people, the destruction of the freedom and independence of the Boer Republics, the subjection of Northern Africa by England, France, and Italy, the suppression of foreign nationalities in Russia, and, finally, the oppression of Greece, which is unexampled in history.

There was then a long dissertation on the abandonment of the Declaration of London, the "starvation campaign against Germany," the wickedness of "the extension of the war to Africa," and finally an insolent attack on Belgium, on the ground especially that she did not accept the German proposal that the German armies should march through Belgium unopposed.

A similar Note was sent out from Vienna, the chief difference being that Austria-Hungary slandered Serbia as Germany slandered Belgium.

These Teutonic protestations made little or no impression in foreign countries; they were, indeed, only intended to divert attention in the Central Empires themselves from the detailed statements of the policy and aims of the Allies which were now forthcoming. On January 10, 1917, M. Briand handed to Mr. Sharp, the American Ambassador in Paris, the following reply from the Allies to Mr. Wilson's Note:

1. The Allied Governments have received the Note delivered to them on November 19 in the name of the United States Government. They have studied it with the care enjoined upon them both by their accurate sense of the gravity of the moment and by their sincere friendship for the American people.

2. In general, they make a point of declaring that they pay homage to the loftiness of the sentiments inspiring the American Note, and that they associate themselves wholeheartedly with the plan of creating a League of the Nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world. They recognize all the advantages that would accrue to the cause of humanity and civilization by the establishment of international settlements designed to avoid violent conflicts between the nations—settlements which ought to be attended by the sanctions necessary to assure their execution, and thus to prevent fresh aggressions from being made easier by an apparent security.

3. But a discussion of future arrangements designed to ensure a lasting peace presupposes a satisfactory settlement of the present conflict. The Allies feel a desire as deep as that of the United States Government to see ended, at the earliest possible moment, the war for which the Central Empires are responsible, and which inflicts sufferings so cruel upon humanity. But they judge it impossible to-day to bring about a peace that shall assure to them the reparation, the restitution, and the guarantees to which they are entitled by the aggression for which the responsibility lies upon the Central Powers—and of which the very principle tended to undermine the safety of Europe—a peace that shall also permit the establishment upon firm foundations of the future of the nations of Europe. The Allied nations are conscious that they are fighting not for selfish interests, but, above all, to safeguard the independence of peoples, right, and humanity.

4. The Allies are fully alive to and deplore the losses and sufferings which the war causes neutrals, as well as belligerents, to endure; but they do not hold themselves responsible, since in no way did they desire or provoke this war; and they make every effort to lessen such damage to the full extent compatible with the inexorable requirements of their defence against the violence and the pitfalls of the foe.

5. Hence they note with satisfaction the declaration that as regards its origin the American communication was in no wise associated with that of the Central Powers, transmitted on December 18 by the United States Government; neither do they doubt the resolve of that Government to avoid even the appearance of giving any, albeit, only moral, support to the responsible authors of the war.

6. The Allied Governments hold themselves bound to make a stand in the friendliest yet in the clearest way against the establishment in the American Note of a likeness between the two belligerent groups; this likeness, founded upon the public statements of the Central Powers, conflicts directly with the evidence, both as regards the responsibilities for the past and the guarantees for the future. In mentioning this likeness President Wilson certainly did not mean to associate himself with it.

7. If at this moment there be an established historical fact, it is the aggressive will of Germany and Austria to ensure their mastery over Europe and their economic domination over the world. By her declaration of war, by the immediate violation of Belgium and Luxemburg, and by the way she has carried on the struggle, Germany has also proved her systematic contempt of every principle of humanity and of all respect for small States; in proportion as the conflict has developed, the attitude of the Central Powers and of their Allies has been a continual challenge to humanity and to civilization. Need we recall the horrors that accompanied the invasion of Belgium and of Serbia, the atrocious rule laid upon the invaded countries, the massacre of hundreds of thousands of inoffensive Armenians, the barbarities committed against the inhabitants of Syria, the Zeppelin raids upon open towns, the destruction by submarines of passenger steamers and merchantmen, even under neutral flags, the cruel treatment inflicted upon prisoners of war, the judicial murders of Miss Cavell and of Captain Fryatt, the deportation and the reduction to slavery of civil populations? The accomplishment of such a series of crimes, perpetrated without any regard for the universal reprobation they aroused, amply explains to President Wilson the protest of the Allies.

8. They consider that the Note they handed to the United States in reply to the German Note answers the question put by the American Government, and forms, according to the words of that Government, "an avowal of their respective views as to the terms on which the war might be concluded." Mr. Wilson wishes for more: he desires that the belligerent Powers should define, in the full light of day, their aims in prosecuting the war. The Allies find no difficulty in answering this request. Their war aims are well known; they have been repeatedly defined by the heads of their various Governments. These war aims will only be set forth in detail, with all the compensations and equitable indemnities for harm suffered, at the moment of negotiation. But the civilized world knows that they imply, necessarily and first of all, the restoration of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, with the compensations due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, in Russia, in Rumania, with just reparation; the reorganiza-

tion of Europe, guaranteed by a stable régime and based at once on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples, small and great, and at the same time upon territorial conventions and international settlements such as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attack; the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of their inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumanes, and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the setting free of the populations

GENERAL VON STEIN,
Prussian Minister of War.

subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilization.

9. The intentions of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia in regard to Poland have been clearly indicated by the manifesto he has just addressed to his Armies.

10. There is no need to say that, if the Allies desire to shield Europe from the covetous brutality of Prussian militarism, the extermination and the political disappearance of the German peoples have never, as has been pretended, formed part of their designs. They desire above all to ensure peace on the principles of liberty and justice, and upon the inviolable fidelity to international engagements by which the Government of the United States have ever been inspired.

11. United in the pursuit of this lofty aim, the Allies are determined, severally and jointly, to act with all their power and to make all sacrifices to carry to a victorious end a conflict upon which, they are convinced, depend not only their own welfare and prosperity but the future of civilization itself.

Together with the joint Reply of the Allies to President Wilson, an additional Note from Belgium was, in the presence of Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, delivered to the American Ambassador. The principal passages ran as follows:

As much as Mr. Woodrow Wilson, the Royal Government would wish to see this war come to an end as soon as possible.

But the President seems to think that the statesmen in the two hostile camps are pursuing the same war aims. The example of Belgium unhappily demonstrates that this is not the case. Unlike the Central Powers, Belgium has never aimed at conquest. The barbarous manner in which the German Government has treated and still treats the Belgian nation does not admit of any supposition that Germany will make it her care to guarantee for the future the rights of weak peoples which she has not ceased to trample under foot ever since the war that she let loose began to ravage Europe.

On the other hand, the Royal Government notes with pleasure and with confidence the assurance that the United States impatiently await the moment to cooperate in the measures which will be taken, after peace, to protect and guarantee small nations against violence and oppression.

Until Germany delivered her ultimatum, Belgium's sole aspiration was to live on good terms with all her neighbours; towards each of them she discharged with scrupulous loyalty the obligations imposed on her by her neutrality. How was she rewarded by Germany for the confidence she showed? Overnight, without plausible warrant, her neutrality was violated, her territory was invaded, and the Imperial Chancellor in announcing to the Reichstag this violation of right and of treaty, was compelled to admit the iniquity of such an act and to promise that reparation would be made. But the Germans, after occupying Belgian territory, showed themselves no more observant of the rules of international law or of the provisions of The Hague Conventions. They exhausted the resources of the country by exactions as heavy as they were arbitrary; they deliberately

ADMIRAL VON HOLTZENDORFF,
Chief of the German Admiralty Staff.

ruined its industries, destroyed whole towns, and put to death or imprisoned a considerable number of inhabitants. Even now, while they loudly proclaim their desire to put an end to the horrors of the war, they aggravate the rigours of the occupation by carrying Belgian workmen into slavery by thousands.

If there is a country that is entitled to say that it took up arms in order to defend its existence, that country assuredly is Belgium. Compelled by force to fight or to submit to dishonour, she passionately desires that an end may be set to the unheard-of sufferings of her population. But she could accept only a peace

that assures to her, together with equitable reparation, securities and guarantees for the future.

Finally, the Belgian Goverment expressed "the legitimate hope that, at the final settlement of this long war, the voice of the Entente Powers will find in the United States a unanimous echo to claim for Belgium, the innocent victim of German ambition and of German greed, the rank and position that are marked out for her among the civilized nations, by virtue of her blameless past, by the valour of her soldiers, by her fidelity to honour, and by her people's remarkable aptitude for work."

Reference has already been made to the attitude of Switzerland and the Scandinavian States towards Mr. Wilson's Note to the belligerents. The Spanish Government, for its part, published on December 30 a reply to the United States which disclosed the fact that on December 22, after communication of the American Note to the belligerents, the United States had directly invited Spain to make a *démarche* on her own account. Spain refused, and rather pointedly expressed "the opinion that, now that the President of the United States has taken this initiative and the different impressions which it has produced are already known, the *démarche* which the United States invites Spain to make would not be effective, all the more as the Central Empires have already expressed their firm intention that the conditions of peace should be concerted between the belligerent Powers alone." The Spanish Government "suspended its action and reserved it for a moment when the efforts of all those who desire peace can have greater utility and efficacy than they have now, supposing that at that moment there were reason to believe that its initiative or intervention might have good results."

So much for the official pronouncements of the various Governments. But no account of them would be complete without the inclusion of a dispatch which Mr. A. J. Balfour, now Foreign Secretary in Mr. Lloyd George's administration, addressed to the British Ambassador at Washington, in sending him a translation of the Allied Note to the United States. "This powerful and lucid development of the main points in the case of the Allies," observed *The Times*, "brings out the intimate logical connexion of the terms which they have laid down with impressive cogency and force. It possesses all the superiority in reasoning and in form which the product of a single intelligence, belonging to the first order, enjoys over a composite production, retouched to satisfy the criticisms of many different minds." Mr Balfour wrote:

I gather from the general tenor of the President's Note that, while he is animated by an intense desire that peace should come soon, and that when it comes it should be lasting, he does not, for the moment at least, concern himself with the terms on which it should be arranged. His Majesty's Government entirely share the President's ideals; but they feel strongly that the durability of the peace must largely depend on its character, and that

COUNT ROMANONES,
Spanish Prime Minister in 1916.

no stable system of international relations can be built on foundations which are essentially and hopelessly defective.

This becomes clearly apparent if we consider the main conditions which rendered possible the calamities from which the world is now suffering. These were the existence of a Great Power consumed with the lust of domination, in the midst of a community of nations ill prepared for defence, plentifully supplied, indeed, with international laws, but with no machinery for enforcing them, and weakened by the fact that neither the boundaries of the various States nor their internal constitution harmonized with the aspirations of their constituent races, or secured to them just and equal treatment.

That this last evil would be greatly mitigated if the Allies secured the changes in the map of Europe outlined in their joint Note is manifest, and I need not labour the point.

It has been argued, indeed, that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe forms no proper or logical part of this general scheme. The maintenance of the Turkish Empire was during many generations regarded by statesmen of world-wide authority as essential to the main-



GERMANY'S NATIONAL WAR EFFORT.

Above: Men at work in a gun-finishing shop at Essen.

Below: Women workers in a turning shop at Düsseldorf.

Inset: A hydraulic press for shell making.

tenance of European peace. Why, it is asked, should the cause of peace be now associated with a complete reversal of this traditional policy ?

The answer is that circumstances have completely changed. It is unnecessary to consider now whether the creation of a reformed Turkey mediating between hostile races in the Near East was a scheme which, had the Sultan been sincere and the Powers united, could ever have been realized. It certainly cannot be realized now. The Turkey of "Union and Progress" is at least as barbarous and is far more aggressive than the Turkey of Sultan Abdul Hamid. In the hands of Germany it has ceased even in appearance to be a bulwark of peace, and is openly used as an instrument of conquest. Under German officers Turkish soldiers are now fighting in lands from which they had long been expelled, and a Turkish Government, controlled, subsidized, and supported by Germany, has been guilty of massacres in Armenia and Syria more horrible than any recorded in the history even of those unhappy countries. Evidently the interests of peace and the claims of nationality alike require that Turkish rule over alien races shall, if possible, be brought to an end ; and we may hope that the expulsion of Turkey from Europe will contribute as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, of Italia Irredenta to Italy or any of the other territorial changes indicated in the Allied Note.

Evidently, however, such territorial rearrangements, though they may diminish the occasions of war, provide no sufficient security against its recurrence. If Germany, or, rather, those in Germany who mould its opinions and control its destinies, again set out to dominate the world, they may find that by the new order of things the adventure is made more difficult, but hardly that it is made impossible. They may still have ready to their hand a political system organized through and through on a military basis ; they may still accumulate vast stores of military equipment ; they may still perfect their methods of attack, so that their more pacific neighbours will be struck down before they can prepare themselves for defence. If so, Europe when the war is over will be far poorer in men, in money, and in mutual good will than it was when the war began, but it will not be safer ; and the hopes for the future of the world entertained by the President will be as far as ever from fulfilment.

There are those who think that, for this disease, international treaties and international laws may provide a sufficient cure. But such persons have ill learned the lessons so clearly taught by recent history. While other nations, notably the United States of America and Britain, were striving by treaties of arbitration to make sure that no chance quarrel should mar the peace they desired to make perpetual, Germany stood aloof. Her historians and philosophers preached the splendours of war : power was proclaimed as the true end of the State ; the General Staff forged with untiring industry the weapons by which, at the appointed moment, power might be achieved. These facts proved clearly enough that treaty arrangements for maintaining peace were not likely to find much favour at Berlin ; they did not prove that such treaties, once made, would be utterly ineffectual. This became evident only when war had broken out ; though the demonstration, when it came, was overwhelming. So long as Germany remains the Germany which, without a shadow of justification, overran and barbarously ill-treated a country it was pledged to defend, no State can regard its rights as secure if they have no better protection than a solemn treaty.

The case is made worse by the reflection that these methods of calculated brutality were designed by the Central Powers not merely to crush to the dust those with whom they were at war, but to intimidate those with whom they were still at peace. Belgium was not only a victim—it was an example. Neutrals were intended to note the outrages which accompanied its conquest, the reign of terror which followed on its occupation, the deportation of a portion of its population, the cruel oppression of the remainder. And lest nations happily protected, either by British fleets or by their own, from German armies should suppose themselves safe from German methods, the submarine has (within its limits) assiduously imitated the barbaric practices of the sister service. The War Staffs of the Central Powers are well content to horrify the world if at the same time they can terrorize it.

If, then, the Central Powers succeed, it will be to methods like these that they will owe their success. How can any reform of international relations be based on a peace thus obtained ? Such a peace would represent the triumph of all the forces which make war certain and make it brutal. It would advertise the futility of all the methods on which civilization relies to eliminate the occasions of international dispute and to mitigate their ferocity.

COUNT CZERNIN,
Appointed Austrian Foreign Minister in 1916.

Germany and Austria made the present war inevitable by attacking the rights of one small State, and they gained their initial triumphs by violating the treaty-guarded territories of another. Are small States going to find in them their future protectors, or in treaties made by them a bulwark against aggression ? Terrorism by land and sea will have proved itself the instrument of victory. Are the victors likely to abandon it on the appeal of the neutrals ? If existing treaties are no more than scraps of paper can fresh treaties help us ? If the violation of the most fundamental canons of international law be crowned with success, will it not be in vain that the assembled nations labour to improve their code ? None will profit by their rules but the criminals who break them. It is those who keep them that will suffer.

Though, therefore, the people of this country share to the full the desire of the President for peace, they do not believe that peace can be durable if it be not based on the success of the Allied cause. For a durable peace can hardly be expected unless three conditions are fulfilled. The first is that the existing causes of international unrest should be, as far as possible, removed or weakened. The second is that the aggressive aims

and the unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute among their own peoples. The third is that behind international law, and behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities, some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor. These conditions may be difficult of fulfilment. But we believe them to be in general harmony with the President's ideals, and we are confident that none of them can be satisfied, even imperfectly, unless peace be secured on the general lines indicated (so far as Europe is concerned) in the Joint Note. Therefore it is that this country has made, is making, and is prepared to make sacrifices of blood and treasure unparalleled in its history. It bears these heavy burdens not merely that it may thus fulfil its treaty obligations, nor yet that it may secure a barren triumph of one group of nations over another. It bears them because it firmly believes that on the success of the Allies depend the prospects of peaceful civilization and of those international reforms which the best thinkers of the New World, as of the Old, dare to hope may follow on the cessation of our present calamities.

Immediately after the publication of the Reply of the Allies to President Wilson, the Kaiser addressed the following proclamation to the German people :—

Our enemies have dropped the mask. After refusing with scorn and hypocritical words of love for peace and humanity our honest peace offer they now, in their reply to the United States, have gone beyond that and admitted their lust for conquest, the baseness of which is further enhanced by their calumnious assertions. Their aim is the crushing of Germany, the dismemberment of the Powers allied to us, and the enslavement of the freedom of Europe and the seas under the same yoke that Greece, with gnashing teeth, is now enduring. But what they in thirty months of the bloodiest fighting and unscrupulous economic war could not achieve they will also in all the future not accomplish.

BARON VON FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN,
Deputy-Chief of the German General Staff, 1916.

Our glorious victories and our iron strength of will, with which our fighting people at the front and at home have born all hardship and distress, guarantee that also in the future our beloved Fatherland has nothing to fear. Burning indignation and holy wrath will redouble the strength of every German man and woman, whether it is devoted to fighting, work, or suffering. We are ready for all sacrifices. The God who planted His glorious spirit of freedom in our brave people's heart will also give us and our loyal allies, tested in battle, full victory over all the enemy lust for power and rage for destruction.

This proclamation, and the flood of similar utterances which were now emitted from Germany, were no doubt sincere enough in the sense that Germany was much disgusted by the Allies' frank definition of their aims in prosecuting the war. The statements of the Allies were, indeed, of the most damaging kind, and the German peace manœuvre as such had failed ignominiously. But although the failure was unpleasantly ignominious, German expectation of direct success had always been extremely faint. The main object was to clear the political decks for more "ruthless" prosecution of the war. Germany was about to throw out her final challenge to the world. She was aware that she was now staking everything. In view especially of the experiences of Belgium, Serbia and Rumania, it was improbable that any of the other European States would intervene at this stage. But, for the rest, it was "Central Europe" against the world, and Germany was risking the whole

FRL. LÜDERS,
Head of the Women's Department of the Prussian "War Bureau."

of the Germanic structures which she had so painfully built up in the United States, in South America, and in the Far East. There could be no better evidence of the German view than the astounding instructions sent from Berlin to Count Bernstorff in Washington for transmission to the German Minister in Mexico.* Herr Zimmermann, the new German Foreign Secretary, was writing, it must be remembered, on January 19, while Germany was nominally on the most friendly terms with the United States. He already announced that "unrestricted" submarine warfare would begin on February 1; he declared that Germany "intended to endeavour to keep neutral" the United States; and yet he was already prepared, "as soon as it is certain that there will be an outbreak of war with the United States," to make a definite alliance with Mexico, and to invite Japan to desert her Allies. Seldom in the history of diplomacy had there been such a combination of cynicism and folly; when Herr Zimmermann was criticised in the Reichstag, the National Liberals cited Frederick the Great and Napoleon in his defence—especially Napoleon's proposal of an alliance with Persia in 1807! As for the intended proposal to Japan, it could be appreciated only by the German Government which during the spring and summer of 1914 had been trying to prepare for its coming war by securing Japanese neutrality, and by the German people which had seriously believed at the beginning of August, 1914, that Japan had declared war on Russia.

Whether or not President Wilson was already aware of the true character of German policy, he continued calmly on his course. On January 22 he delivered a speech to the Senate which, in spite of its apparent irrelevance to the events that were immediately impending, must be recorded here as one of the most memorable State papers in the history of the time. Mr. Wilson said:—

FUNERAL OF THE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH OF AUSTRIA, KING OF HUNGARY.
He died on November 21, 1916.

On December 18 last I addressed an identic Note to the Governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace.

I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy.

The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace.

The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms indeed, but with

* For the text of the Note see Chapter CLXXVIII., p. 373.



CORONATION OF THE EMPEROR CARL AS KING OF HUNGARY AT BUDAPEST, DECEMBER 30, 1916.

sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement.

We are much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that peace must be followed by definite concert of the Powers which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man, must take that for granted.

I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind with regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come, when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honourable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honour withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged. They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.

That service is nothing less than this: To add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a league for peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

The present war must first be ended, but we owe it to candour and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that, so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended.

The treaties and agreements which bring it to an end must embody terms that will create a peace that is worth guaranteeing and preserving, a peace that will win the approval of mankind, not merely a peace that will serve the several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged.

We shall have no voice in determining what those terms shall be, but we shall, I feel sure, have a voice in determining whether they shall be made lasting or not by the guarantees of a universal covenant; and our judgment upon what is fundamental and essential as a condition precedent to permanency should be spoken now, not afterwards, when it may be too late.

No covenant of cooperative peace that does not include the peoples of the New World can suffice to keep the future safe against war; and yet there is only one sort of peace that the peoples of America could join in guaranteeing. The elements of that peace must be elements that engage the confidence and satisfy the principles of the American Government, elements consistent with the political faith and the practical convictions which the peoples of America have once for all embraced and undertaken to defend.

I do not mean to say that any American Government would throw any obstacle in the way of any terms of peace the Governments now at war might agree upon, or seek to upset them when made, whatever they might be. I only take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure.

It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole

CARL, EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA AND KING OF HUNGARY.

future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

Fortunately we have received very explicit assurances on this point.

The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

They imply, first of all, that it must be a peace without victory.

I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seek-

ing only to face realities, and to face them without soft concealments.

Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last—only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded, if it is to last, must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and small; between those that are powerful and those that are weak. Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend.

Equality of territory or of resources there, of course, cannot be; nor any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and legitimate development of the people themselves. But no one asks or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is looking now for freedom of life, not for equipoises of power.

And there is a deeper thing involved than even equality of right among organized nations.

No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from potentate to potentate as if they were property.

I take it for granted, for instance, if I may venture upon a single example, that statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent, and autonomous Poland, and that henceforth inviolable security of life, of worship, and of industrial and social development should be guaranteed to all peoples who have lived hitherto under the power of Governments devoted to a faith and purpose hostile to their own.

I speak of this, not because of any desire to exalt an abstract political principle which has always been held very dear by those who have sought to build up liberty in America, but for the same reason that I have spoken of the other conditions of peace which seem to me clearly indispensable—because I wish frankly to uncover realities.

Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the convictions of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize.

THE KAISER'S "PEACE" VISIT TO KING OF BAVARIA AT MUNICH, DECEMBER 12, 1916.

The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquillity of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea.

Where this cannot be done by the cession of territory, it no doubt can be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the world's commerce.

And the paths of the sea must alike in law and in fact be free. The freedom of the seas is the *sine quâ non* of peace, equality, and cooperation.

No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind; but the motive for such changes is convincing and compelling. There can be no trust or intimacy between the peoples of the world

without them. The free, constant, unthreatened intercourse of nations is an essential part of the process of peace and of development. It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the Governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with the limitation of naval armaments and the cooperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe, and the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programmes of military preparation. Difficult and delicate as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candour and decided in a spirit of real accommodation, if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice.

There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great and preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built up and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they have planned for war and made ready for pitiless contest and rivalry.

The question of armaments, whether on land or on sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind.

I have spoken upon these great matters without reserve and with the utmost explicitness, because it has seemed to me to be necessary if the world's yearning desire for peace was anywhere to find voice and free utterance.

Perhaps I am the only person in high authority amongst all the peoples of the world who is at liberty to speak and hold nothing back. I am speaking as an individual, and yet I am speaking also, of course, as the responsible head of a great Government, and I feel



[*From "Ulk," January 12, 1917.*

"THE EXTINGUISHED LAMP OF PEACE."

German soldiers are represented in pursuit of the Powers which have refused the German peace proposal, and as determined now to "thrash" them.

[*From "Lustige Blätter."*

"THE BLOCKADE OF THE CHANNEL."
"England is becoming more and more like a mouse-trap."

confident that I have said what the people of the United States would wish me to say.

May I not add that I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every programme of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

And in holding out the expectation that the people and Government of the United States will join the other civilized nations of the world in guaranteeing the permanence of peace upon such terms (as) I have named I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for.

I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

I am proposing that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose all act in common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

I am proposing government by the consent of the governed; that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the people of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and that moderation of armaments which makes of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence.

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. And yet they are the principles and policies of forward-looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

Meanwhile, Germany was completing her preparations. On the evening of January 31 the American Ambassador in Berlin, Mr. Gerard, was summoned to the Foreign Office, and was informed that at midnight—this was just three and a half hours' notice!—Germany would "abandon the limitations which she had hitherto imposed on herself in the employment of her fighting weapons at sea." Herr Zimmermann produced the Memorandum designating "barred zones (*sperrgebiete*) around Great Britain, France, and Italy, and in the Eastern Mediterranean," and a new Note to the United States. The Note began with a reference to Mr. Wilson's speech to the Senate, declaring cynically that "the guiding lines of this important declaration agree, to a large extent, with the principles and wishes which Germany professes." Germany would "sincerely rejoice if peoples like those of Ireland and India now obtained their freedom." The Note then referred to the German peace proposals, and declared that they had failed "owing to the lust of conquest of their opponents who desire to dictate peace." There was then a long denunciation of the

[*From "Simplicissimus."*

"Mister Neptune, the Germans are in the Atlantic!"



THE HOSPITAL SHIP "LANFRANC"
Torpedoed on the South Coast without warning, April 17, 1917. The hospital ship "Donegal" was sunk on the same day.

Allies, and especially of the British Empire, and the Note proceeded :—

Every day by which the terrible struggle is prolonged brings new devastations, new distress, new death. Every day by which the war is shortened preserves on both sides the lives of thousands of brave fighters, and is a blessing to tortured mankind. The Imperial Government would not be able to answer before its own conscience, before the German people, and before history, if it left any means whatever untried to hasten the end of the war.

With the President of the United States it had hoped to attain this aim by negotiations. After the attempt to reach an understanding was answered by the enemy with the announcement of intensified war, the Imperial Government, if it desires in the higher sense to serve humanity and not to do a wrong against its own country-



THE HOSPITAL SHIP "GLOUCESTER CASTLE"
Sunk without warning in the Channel on the night of March 30–31, 1917.

[By special permission from "Punch," January 3, 1917.

GRETCHEN: "Will it never end? Think of our awful responsibility before humanity."
HANS: "And these everlasting sardines for every meal."

men, must continue with all its weapons the battle forced on it anew for existence.

On February 1, 1917, the German Government completed its proclamation of piracy by an announcement, accompanied by all manner of lying allegations, that it would "henceforth tolerate no hospital ship" in defined areas, and would treat hospital ships in such areas as belligerents.

Thus Germany reached the inevitable results of the policy upon which she had embarked five months before, under stress of the campaign of 1916 and the decline in her fortunes which was marked especially by the Battle of the Somme. She had dragged her Allies along with her, but she had defied the world, and the world was not slow to take up the challenge. "If the peace offer," wrote Professor Delbrück, the Berlin historian, in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for February, 1917, "had brought us peace negotiations, I should have welcomed it very heartily, because I believe that, in view of the present war situation, we should have been able to achieve everything necessary for Germany. But of a truth we can welcome also the powerful stimulus to the war-will on our side, as well as the uncertainty and confusion which we have produced among our enemies." It was a very Prussian calculation, which only omitted the other side of the account—that, to use a phrase which Mr. Lloyd George subsequently applied to the intervention of America, the civilized world had come to learn that "it is no use waving a neutral flag in the teeth of a shark" and that it was necessary "to put down this pest once and for ever." There was no longer any remnant of doubt about Germany's utter insincerity. In announcing the new submarine policy to the Reichstag on January 31, the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who had hitherto posed as a defender of the principles of civilization against the doctrines of Pan-German "ruthlessness," avowed that he had never opposed "unrestricted" submarine warfare except on grounds of temporary expediency. When he had resisted, and defeated, the demands of Tirpitz in the spring and summer of 1916, he had done so only because the new submarine policy was not "ripe." Now Germany was ready, and "must, therefore, not wait any longer."

That was the real spirit underlying the German peace campaign, which was initiated in the name of the Kaiser's "conscience," "moral courage," and "responsibility to God." Germany, in the Kaiser's phrase, had "dropped the mask."

END OF VOLUME ELEVEN.

INDEX TO VOLUME XI.

A

Ablaincourt: fierce fighting in, 409, 420; French advance on, 293

Afghanistan, failure of German intrigue in, 352

Aircraft: Allied, on the Somme, October, 1916, 409, 414, 420, 424–426; on the Western Front, 120, 130, 131, 141, 146, 295–297; September, 1916, 291; October, 1916, 401; German prisoner's diary quoted on, 120; French aviator drops bombs on Essen, 296; German attacks on merchant ships, 174, 175, raids on Bukarest, 235, 236.

Aluta Valley: description of, 446; fighting in, 446–448

American Neutrality, The End of, 357–396: see "United States"

Amphitrite, trawler, shelled by German submarine, 180

Ancona, correspondence between America and Austria-Hungary on the, 359

Ancre: Battle of the, 421–427, Sir Douglas Haig on, 424; British feints on the, 132, 133; British preparations for the attack on, 420; Germans repulsed to the south of the, 291, 293

Ancre and Somme, British position between, Sir D. Haig's dispatch, 405

Anthoine, Gen., commander under Gen. Micheler, 420

Antiseptics: see "Medical Work"

Aosta, Duke of, in command of Italian Army in Carso Offensive, 240

Arabia, fishermen's work during sinking of, 193; heroism of crew and passengers on the, 172. 173

Arabic, German defence of sinking of, 358, 359.

Argesh, River: Bulgaro-German advance on, 465–469; fighting on, 469

Armin, Gen. Sixt von, 409

Armoured cars, description of various, 279; see also "Tanks"

Artist, torpedoed, 165

Arz, Gen. von, advance against Moldavia, 434, 466

Aslan, Gen.: in command of 3rd Rumanian Army, 205; replaced by Gen. Averescu, 218

Asquith, Mr. H. H., visits Somme Front, 141

Auchencrag, sunk, 167, 168

Australia, wheat crop, transport of, 110, 111

Averescu, Gen.: in command of Rumanian Armies, 203. 434, 466; relinquishes command, 209; recalled to command on Transylvanian Front, 233; transferred from Transylvania to the Dobrudja, 218

B

Balfour, Rt. Hon. Arthur J., dispatch to America *re* Peace proposals, 496; on the Admiralty Transport Department, 82, 83

Balkans, Italian co-operation in the, 274

Balto, Norwegian steamer, captain taken prisoner, 166

Basarabescu, Gen., attempt to reach Tutrakan, 215

Bavaria, Crown Prince of, attempts to pierce Gen. Fayolle's lines on Western Front, 294, 295

Bavaria, Prince Henry of, death, 450

Beauchamps, Capt. de, French aviator, exploits of, 296, 297

Beaumont Hamel, capture of, 424

Belgian Deportations, 36, sanctioned by the Kaiser, 474, 477

Belgium under German Rule, Sept., 1914–Oct., 1916, 1–40; Banking, German control of, 27–29; "Bulletin of Laws and Decrees for the Occupied Belgian Territory" published, 5; Censorship, 19, 21; decrees, various, 6–10, 13–17, 28–33; espionage, 9; "Flemish Movement," 21–23, 26; frontiers, security of, 17, escape of Belgians across, 18; German requisitions in, 32, 33, 35, 36; hostages, taking of, 10, 11; "Military Tribunals," introduction of, 7–10; priests, murder of, 2; proclamations issued in various districts, 36–40; refugees, return of, and German pledges to, 11–14; war contributions imposed on population, 30; Zones, division into, 3, 4.

Below, Gen. von, on the Somme, 419

Beresford, Lord, on the Mercantile Marine, 171

Bernstorff, Count: handed his passports, 371, 372; letter to Mr. Lansing on the *Arabic* quoted, 359; on the submarine warfare controversy in U.S.A., 362

Berny-en-Santerre, French carry, 140

Berthelot, Gen., arrives in Rumania with French military mission, 234

Beseler, Gen. von, pledges to returned Belgian refugees, 12

Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr von, peace schemes organization, 475–477; on unrestricted submarine warfare, 504; speech on peace proposals in the Reichstag, 480

"Bismuth Emetine," use of, 70

Bissing, Gen. von: succeeds Gen. von der Goltz in Belgium, 6; administration, 7; opens "Flemish University" at Ghent, 25; various decrees issued by, 6, 14, 16, 19, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36

"Black List," British, irritation in U.S.A., 337

Blaikie, Capt., taken prisoner from the *Caledonia*, Government action, 166

"Blockade," British, U.S.A. controversy, 386–388

Boehn, Gen. von, 409

"Bombarde," Italian, description of, 238

Boroevich, Gen., Army Order to Austrian troops on the Isonzo, 247

Bouchavesnes, French take, 149, 309; fighting in region of, 294

Bouleaux Wood: fighting in, 299; Germans evacuate, 300

Bovent, French capture, 407, 409

Briand, M., on German peace proposals, 480

Brioche, French take, 149

British Naval Division, on the Ancre, 423

British Navy, R.N.R. skippers and fishermen, *personnel*, 177

Brixham Fishing Fleet, submarine raid on, 180

Browning, Dr., research work on antiseptics, 50; discovery of "Flavine," 52

Bukarest, air attacks on, 235, 236; evacuation of, 471; Mackensen enters, 472; Rumanian redistribution round, 466

Bulgaria: declares war on Rumania, 213; Bulgarians in Dobrudja, 213–223

Bumbeshti, Germans enter, 458

Burghele, Brig.-Gen. G., appointed Secretary-General to Rumanian Ministry of War, 233

Busa Alta, Italians take first peak of, 271

Bushire, British established in, 355

Byng, Sir Julian, in command of Canadian Corps on Western Front, 290

C

Cadorna, Gen., plans in Italian offensive 1916, 239, 266

Caledonia, Anchor liner, sunk by German submarine, Captain taken prisoner, 166

California, heroism of crew, 172

Calvario, Monte, Italians storm, 245.

Campolung: Germans enter, 465; Rumanians evacuate positions at, 442

Caracalu: Count Schmettow's cavalry reach, 461; Rumanian Orsova group surrenders at, 459

Carranza, Gen., German proposal to for alliance with Mexico, 373

Carso, description of country, 252–255; Italian offensive in the, Aug.–Dec., 1916, 237–266; Italian push on the (Sept. 14, 1916), 255,

(Oct. and Nov. 1916), 257–266
Carson, Sir Edward: on arming ships, 170; on transport statistics, 159; tribute to the Merchant Service, 161
Cavallazza, Italians occupy, 269
Cavell, Nurse Edith, execution of, 19
Cerebro-Spinal Meningitis: see "Spotted Fever."
Cernavoda, Bulgarians enter, 456
Cernavoda Bridge, strategic importance of, 216, 221
Chaulnes Wood: French enter, 139; French attacks in, 409
Chenung, attacked by German submarine, 369
Chilly, French take, 139
Christescu, Gen., succeeds Gen. Averescu in the Dobrudja, 233
City of Birmingham, torpedoed, 162, 163, 165
Clan MacLeod, sunk by German submarine, 171
Clery-sur-Somme, French take, 136
Coal, export problem to Italy and France, 95, 96
Columbian, sunk, 166
Combles: Allies advance on, 139, bombard, 150; close in on, 298, take, 302; French advance on, 293, 295
Combles Valley, French attack on, 136
Constanza: Bulgaro-German advance on, 454; Rumanians abandon and Germans enter, 455
Cosmagnon, Italians take trenches on the, 272
Courcelette: Canadians attack, 283, take, 290; fighting near, 295; "Tanks" at, 289, 290
Crainiceanu, Gen., in command of Rumanian Second Army, 223, 434
Craiova, Germans enter, 459
Crni Hrib (the Black Hill), Italians occupy, 251
Cugnac, Gen., on the Somme, 412
Culcer, Gen., in command of Rumanian First Army, 203, 434; replaced by Gen. Ion Dragalina, 233
Curtea de Argesh, Germans capture, 466
Curtis, Capt., description of life in German submarine, 166
Curzon, Lord: appointed Chairman of Shipping Control Committee, 91; on Government's Shipbuilding efforts, 103; on requisitioning of ships, 82; on shipping losses during the War, 85
Cymric, sunk, 173

D

Dakin's solution: introduction of, 45; use of, 46, 47, 50, 51
Danube: Mackensen's forces cross at Sistovo, 462–465; Rumanians cross at Rahovo, 454.
Deimling, Gen. von, on the Somme, 419
Delbrück, Professor, on German Peace Note, 504
Delville Wood: British attack on "Mystery Corner" in, 284; fighting in, 124, 125, 128, 130
Denicécourt, French take, 293
Director, Harrison liner, pursued by German submarine, 170
Doberdo, Italians in, 251
Dobritch, Bulgarians enter, 214
Dobrudja: description and history of, 219–221; Allied counter-offensive in the, 223; enemy defeated in, 223; Mackensen's offensive in, 435, 454–457; Rumanian resistance at Lipnitsa and Kara Orman, 217; Sakharoff's counter-offensive, 456; strategical position, 199
Dorme, Adjutant, German aeroplanes brought down by, 120, 121, 131, 146
Dragalina, Gen. Ion: advances against the Cerna Line, 213; in the Jiu Valley, 450–452; succeeds Gen. Culcer as commander of Rumanian First Army, 233; death from wounds at Targul-Jiu, 436, 453
Duport, Gen., Chief of French General Staff, 294
Dysentery: research on problem of carriers, 67–71; use of "Bismuth Emetine," 70

E

Eaucourt l'Abbaye: British gain foothold at, 303, take and lose, 398, 399, recapture, 400
Eckhardt, Herr von, instructed to attempt Alliance between Germany and Mexico, 373, 374
Epp, Gen. von, in Rumania, 450
Espionage, in U.S.A., 374–376
Essen, French drop bombs on, 296

F

Fajti Ridge, Italians take, 263
Falfemont Farm: British attack on, 133; reoccupied by the Germans, 136
Falkenhayn, Gen. von, German counter-offensive in Rumania, 434; in command in Jiu Valley, 457; in Transylvania, 226, 231; dismissal of, 474
Farman Farma, Prince, Prime Minister of Persia, loyalty to Allies, 353
Fassa Alps: description of Passes in the, 268; Italian advance on the, 267–272
Fayolle, Gen.: advance on Sailly-Saillisel, 401, 403–404; at Maurepas, 136; attack on St. Pierre Vaast Wood, 293; dispositions in attack on Combles and Sailly-Saillisel, 152–155
Filiasa, Germans enter, 458
Fishermen and the War (II.), 177–196; acts of heroism by, 187; prisoners of war, care of, 194; Roll of Honour, 187; services rendered to *Arabic* passengers, 193; special funds and agencies for, 194–196
Flammenwerfer, on the Somme, 146
"Flavine," discovery of, 52
Flers: British advance on, 283, 286, take, 286, 287; New Zealanders in Fighting at, 286, 287; "Tanks" in advance on, 281, 282, 285, 286
Fogaras: Austro-Hungarian frightfulness in, 235; Rumanians enter, 223; Rumanians evacuate, 231
Franz Fischer, coasting collier, sunk by Zeppelin, 175
Frégicourt, French storm, 298

G

Gaeta, sunk, 168
Garnier, Gen. von, 409; on the Somme, 419
Gas attacks, British, on the Somme, 401
Gavanescu, Lt.-Col. C., 233
Genermont: fighting at, 409; French capture, 410
George, King, tribute to the Merchant Service, 161
Gerard, Mr. James W., informed of Germany's submarine policy, 502; leaves Berlin, 372
Gerda, used by Germans as a decoy, sunk, 168
German Army: Divisions employed at Battle of the Somme, 316; reorganisation, effects in Transylvania, 224
Germany: announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare, 502, 504; controversy with United States—see "United States"; Industrial reorganization, 474, 475; Man Power scheme, Patriotic Auxiliary Service Bill introduced and passed, 478; situation in 1916 reviewed, 473, 474
Gerok, Gen. von, in Rumania, 445
Ghent University, reopened by Gen. von Bissing, 24, 25
Ginchy: British bombard, capture, and lose, 135, again assault, 136, take, 141–144; fighting at, 125, 127; Officer's letter on, 125; German counter-attacks, 146; Irish at, 142–145; prisoners taken at, 144, 145
Giurgevo, Bulgarians occupy, 464
Glavaciocul, River, fighting on the, 467
Goltz, Field-Marshal von der, first German Governor-General in Belgium, various decrees, 4, 6, 19, 27, 36
Gorizia, Italians enter, 248

Gorizia Line, positions on the, 242
Gough, Gen. Sir Hubert: attack on Thiepval, Courcelette and Martinpuich, 150–152, 283; advance on Thiepval, 121, 304; insignia of Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour conferred on, 400
Grahame, Mr., British Consul-General at Ispahan, attacked and wounded, 352
Grandcourt, British reach outskirts of, 425
Great Britain: history of connexion with Persia, 324–335; Shipping, see "Shipping."
Grey, Sir Edward, on Persia, 353.
Griffiths, Col. Norton, destroys oil wells at Ploeshti, 472
Gröner, General, Chief of "War Bureau" of Prussian Ministry of War, 477
Gueudecourt: British advance and entry into, 300, 302
Guillemont: British take, 134, 135; Prussian Guard defeated at, 134, 135
Guynemer, Lieut., French aviator, exploits on Western Front, 296
Gyimes Pass, fighting in the, 445

H

Haig, Gen. Sir Douglas: dispositions in advance on Morval, 152, 153; dispatches on the position between the Ancre and Somme quoted, 405, 406; on the fighting, Sept. 15–16, 1916, 291; replies to Gen. Joffre's congratulations, 292
Hallbjorg, sunk, 176
Hamadan, Russians take, 355
Hatszeg, Rumanian advance on, 213
Heinrich, General von, appointed Military Governor of Bukarest, 472
Hermada Ridge, Austrian defences on the, 265, 266
Hermannstadt: Austro-Hungarians evacuate, 211; Battle of, 226; Gen. Manolescu defeated at, 226; German captures at, 230
High Wood: fighting at, 141, 289; German attack at, 129; Sir Hubert Gough's attack on, 283
Hill 76, French take, 149
Hill 120, French take, 297
Hill 121, French take, 127, 128.
Hill 130, French take, 297
Hill 145, French take, 148
Hindenburg, General von, appointed Chief of General Staff, 474; letter on munitions industry quoted, 475
Hoboken, British bomb shipbuilding yards at, 131
Hopfer, General, proclamation in Tournai, 37, 29
Hopital Farm, French capture, 136
Hospital ships, Germans announce war on, 504
Hughes, Mr., difficulties of Australian wheat transport, 110, 111

I

Iancovescu, General, appointed to Rumanian General Staff, 233, 467
Igel, Herr von, arrested in New York, 376
Inchcape, Lord, appointed Chairman of Ports Congestion Committee, 87
Isonzo: Austrian retreat on the, 248; Italian advance on the, 240–257; preparations for offensive on the, 239
Ispahan, British and Russian community leave, 353
Italian Army: force arrives in Salonica, 274; strength, increase at end of 1916, 273
Italian offensive in the Carso, Aug.–Dec., 1916, war with Germany, 237–276; captures in Aug., 247, 251; preparations for, 238, 239
Italy: declares War on Germany, 274–276; Government, Balkan muddle, criticism, 273, 274; munitions, supply organization, 273

J

Jagow, Herr von, resigns office as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 478
Japan, German attempt to embroil with U.S.A., 374, 497
Jassy, Rumanian Government transferred to, 471
Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John, tribute to Merchant Service, 161
Jiu Valley: German advance in, 457–459; fighting in the, 450–454
Joffre, General, congratulations to General Haig on the victories of Sept. 15 and 16, 1916, 292
Jostoff, General, death, 213
Jugo-Slav Division, in the Dobrudja, 218

K

Kaiser, The: letter to Bethmann-Hollweg on Peace schemes quoted, 476, 477; order to Army and Navy on Peace quoted, 478; proclamation to German people after refusal of peace proposals, 496
Kaledin, General, on the Moldavian frontier, 466
Keller, General Count, in command of Russian armies in Moldavia, 445
Keogh, Sir Alfred: organizes campaign against spotted fever, 53; on typhoid fever, 72
Kerind, Russians at, 356
Kermanshah, Turks retake, 355, 356
Kezdi-Vasarhely, Rumanians capture, 211
Kilpurney, sunk, 167
King Stephen, trawler, finds *L*19 in North Sea, 175
Kirchbach, General von, on the Somme, 146
Kiseloff, General, in command of Bulgarian Divisions in attack on Tutrakan, 214
Kneussl, General von, attacks in Jiu Valley, 450–454, 457
Kosch, General von, in command of German Danube Army, 437; crosses Danube, 462–464; on the Neajlovu line, 467
Kothen, General von, in command of German defence round Chaulnes, 407
Kövess, General von, on the Moldavian Frontier, 466
Krafft von Delmensingen, Gen., in command of Alpine Corps at Hermannstadt, 227; in Rumania, 437; advance on Red Tower Pass, 446–450; in the Aluta Valley, 457, 462; reaches Rimnic Valcea, 466
Kronstadt: Battle of, 232; Falkenhayn's attack on, 435; German Magyar Army enters, 232; Rumanians take, 211
Kühne, Gen. von, in Rumania, 436; advance in Wallachia, 437; on Slatina, 461; offensive in Vulcan Pass, 457
Kum, Russians take, 355

L

*L*19 (Zeppelin) found in North Sea, 175
Lacapelle, Gen., on the Somme, 412
La Maisonette, Germans recapture, 418
Lansing, Mr.: correspondence with Count Bernstorff on the *Arabic*, 359; Note concerning sinking of the *Ancona* quoted, 359; Note to Allies deprecating the arming of merchant ships, 361
Law, Mr. Bonar, on President Wilson's Note of Dec. 20, 1916, 484
Lechitsky, Gen., in command of 9th Russian Army, 205; on the Moldavian Frontier, 466
Le Forest, French storm, 136
Le Priez Farm, French take, 149
Le Sars, British attack and take, 398, 402
Lesbœufs: British enter village of, 300, 302
Le Transloy, fighting in front of, 416, 417
Leuze Wood: bombardment of, 135; British take, 136
Ligny-Tilloy, British advance on, 403
Lloyd George, Rt. Hon. David: further import restrictions, 92; visits the Somme, 148; on German Peace proposals, 481
Lokvica: Austrian resistance in, 259; Italians occupy, 260
Lombru, Gen., on the Argesh, 459

Ludendorff, Gen. von, appointed First Quartermaster General, 474
Lupesco, Gen. A., 233
Lusitania, controversy between Germany and U.S.A. concerning, 360
Lüttwitz, Baron von, Military Governor of Brussels, 6
Lynx, trawler, shelled by German submarine, 180
Lytton, Lord, on submarine warfare, 169

M

Mackensen, Field-Marshal von: in the Dobrudja, 213, 435, 454–456; defeated, 223; enters Bukarest, 472
Maclay, Sir Joseph: appointed Shipping Controller, 96; forms Committee to advise on shipbuilding programme, 103
Macnamara, Dr.: on policy of Admiralty in losses from submarines, 182; on the Merchant Service, 173
Maistre, Gen., Commander under Gen. Micheler, 420
Maloja, mined off Dover, 174
Manolescu, Gen., in Command of Rumanian Army advancing against Hermannstadt, 209, defeated at, 226
Marchand, Gen.: in command of French Colonial troops on the Somme, 410; wounded, 415
Marina, torpedoed, 173, 369
Marrières Wood, French enter, 136
Marschall, Gen. Baron von, on the Somme, 146, 419
Martinpuich: British take, 289; fighting near, 295; Sir Hubert Gough's attack on, 283
Maurepas, French take, 127, 128
Max, Burgomaster, deported to a Silesian fortress, 36
Medical Research Committee's work on antiseptics, 50; on dysentery, 68; on spotted fever, 54
Medical Work and the Health of Armies (II.), 41–76: Antiseptics, research work on, 41–52; dysentery carriers, research upon, 67–71; epidemic jaundice, 73, 75, 76; "Flavine," discovery of, 52; "Spotted Fever," research work on, 52-67; typhoid fever, 71; typhus in Siberia, 73
Meinecke, Prof., on the situation in Germany at end of 1916, 473
Mercantile Marine, the Work of the (II.), 157–176: air attacks on the, 174; arming of ships increased, 169, 170; awards granted for heroism, 158; Germans seize captains of the, 166; importance of, 158; King George and Sir J. Jellicoe, tribute to, 161; Dr. Macnamara on, 173; Lord Beresford on, 171; transport statistics, 159
Merchant ships: arming of, Mr. Lansing's Note to Allies deprecating, 361; German Note to U.S.A. on arming of, 362; unarmed, Germany's pledge not to sink, 360
Mercier, Cardinal: German pledges to *re* returned Belgian refugees, 12; pastoral letter, 39, 40
Merisor, Austro-Hungarians repulsed at, 213
Mexico, German proposal of Alliance, document quoted, 373, 374, 497
Micheler, Gen.: at the battle of the Somme, 139; attack on Bovent, Ablaincourt, and Pressoire, 407; dispositions south of the Somme, 155, 156
Mines and mine-laying by German submarines, 173, 174; mine-sweeping in the North Sea, 179
Moldavia: defence of, 466; German offensive against, 443–446; Russian reinforcements on, 445
Money, Sir Leo: appointed Parliamentary Secretary to Ministry of Shipping Control, 97; on functions of Shipping Controller, 98; on requisitioning of shipping, 82; statement on shipbuilding programme, quoted, 105, 106
Monfalcone: Italian feint at, 240; Italians take Hill 85, 245
Morgen, Gen. von, 437, 446; commanding south of Kronstadt, 457; enters Campolung, 465
Morval: British storm, 298, 302; fighting in front of, 404; Sir Douglas Haig's dispositions, 152
Mouquet Farm: Anzacs capture, 133; Canadians take trenches (Sept., 1916), 289; fight for defences round, 128, 291, 292; Prussian Guard defeated at, 132, 133
Möwe, German raider, 175

N

Nad Logem, Italians storm, 251
Neajlovu, River, Rumanian offensive on, 467, victory, 468, defeat, 469
Nerizoff, Gen., in command of Third Bulgarian Army, 437
North Wales, torpedoed, 162
Nova Vas: fighting near, 256; Italians take, 257

O

O'Connor, Col., taken prisoner by the Germans at Shiraz, 355
Oitoz Pass, fighting in, 445
Omiécourt: French on the outskirts of, 420; French take, 136
Omsk, sunk, 167
Oppacchiasella, Italians take, 251
Orsova, Rumanians enter, 213; evacuate, 459
Orsova Group (Rumanian), resistance and surrender of, 459
Oslavia, Italian attack on, 244, 245

P

Panama Canal, closing of, effect on shipping, 85
Paneveggio, Italians occupy, 269
Paper Imports, reduction, 92
Pasubio, Italian local offensive on the, 271
Peace Campaign of Dec., 1916, German, 473–504; Allies' refusal to enter into negotiations, 481, 482; Kaiser's Order to Army and Navy quoted, 478; Mr. Balfour's dispatch to Washington, 493–496; Notes: see "Peace Notes."
Peace Notes: American: Mr. Lansing's Note of Dec., 1916, quoted, 371, 395, President Wilson's, Dec., 1916, 482–484, Note, criticism on, 378–380, Allies' reply, 491, Belgian additional reply, 492, 493, German reply, 485, 486, Neutral attitude towards, 493; German: Dec. 12, 1916, quoted, 478; Allies' reply, 487, 488; German indignation at reply and further Note, 488, 491; Prof. Delbrück on, 504; German appeal to Vatican, 479, 480; Scandinavian, 485; Swiss, 485.
Pecinka, Italians push towards summit of, 258; take, 260
Péronne, position of, at end of Sept., 1916, 315
Persia and the War, 317–356: after two years of war, 356; Anglo-Russian Convention (1907), 341–347; geography and topography, 317–320; German intrigue in, 349–355; history, 321–324; history of British connexion with, 324–335; neutrality of (1914), 350; operations in 1915–16, 355, 356; Shah of, German attempt to induce him to leave Teheran, 353; Turkish invasion of, 352
Petala, Gen., succeeds Gen. Dragalina, 453; on the Argesh, 469
Petrosény, Rumanians occupy, 213; evacuate, 225
Piteshti, Germans enter, 466
Pettitti, Gen., in command of Italian force in Salonika, 274
Ploeshti, oil wells destroyed at, 472
Podgora, Austrian defences on, 242, 243; fall of, 245
Poincaré, President, visit to Allied Front, 399; confers honours on Sir Hubert Gough, 400
Poland, Russian, German at-

tempt to conscript Poles, 474, 477
Pope, The: German Peace Note, 479–480
Predeal, Germano-Magyar entry into, 443.
Predeal Pass, Battle of the, 439–443
Presan, Gen., appointed Chief of Rumanian General Staff, 469; in command of Fourth Rumanian Army, 205, 433, 443; in Eastern Transylvania, 223; opens offensive on River Neajlovu, 467; defeated, 469
Pressoir: fighting in, 425; French advance on, 409; take, 420
Priez Farm, fighting at, 294
Provident, trawler, attacked by German submarine, 180
Prussia, Prince Eitel Friedrich in command of 1st Division of Prussian Guard on Western Front, 121
Prussian Guard, defeated at Thiepval, 123; at Guillemont and Mouquet Farm, 132–135
Putman, Mr. George H., 380
Pys, Canadians in, 309

Q

Quast, Gen. von, on the Somme, 146

R

Rancourt, French take, 298
Rappahannock, torpedoed, 161
Rawlinson, Gen. Sir Henry: advance on Flers, 283; on Ginchy and Guillemont, 133; on Morval, 154; on Le Sars, 398, 401–403; attack on Flers, 127; on Ginchy, 127, 141; on Lesbœufs, Gueudecourt and Morval, 299; takes and loses Butte de Warlencourt, 419
Red Tower Pass, Germans attack the, 228, 446–450
Refugees, Belgian, return to Belgium, German treatment of, 11–14
Regina Trench, Canadians attack, 397, 398
Reuss, Prince of, Austrian Minister in Persia, 351
Rimnic Valcea, Germans reach, 466
Roosevelt, Mr., on President Wilson's Peace Note, 378–380
Root, Mr. Elihu, on American neutrality, 378
Roques, Gen., visits Western Front, 400
Rowanmore, torpedoed, 369
Rumania: French Military Mission under Government transferred to Jassy, 471; Gen. Berthelot, arrival in, 234, 437–439; passes and communications, 201; strategical position on entry into war, 197
Rumania, Queen of, article on Dobrudja quoted, 220
Rumanian Army: commands, changes, 233; equipment, insufficiency of, 203; regrouping of, 466, 467; strength, 202; weakened on the Transylvanian Front, 211
Rumanian Campaign of 1916 (I.) Transylvania, 197–236; (II.) To Fall of Bukarest, 433–472; retreat of First Rumanian Army from Hermannstadt, 226; Rumanian captures, 233; Russian help in the, 434, 437; strategic position in Oct., 1916, 433; Transylvania, invasion of, weakness of Rumanian plans, 205, 208, 209
Rumanian Front: description of, 199; Austro-Hungarian forces on the, strength, 207, 208
Runciman, Mr. Walter, handling of the shipping problem, 78, 91; limitation scheme of prices and freights, 96; restriction of imports, 92; on shipbuilding, 104; on the work of the Merchant Service, 158, 159
Runciman, Sir Walter on shipping profits, 95
Russian, sunk, 369
Russian Army, in Rumanian campaign, 218, 219, 434, 437, 445, 454–456, 466
Russian Navy, cooperation with land forces at Constanza, 455

S

Sabotino Ridge: description of, 242; Italians storm (Aug. 6, 1916), 244
Saillisel, French capture, 413, 420, 421
Sailly, Germans driven from, 412
Sailly - Saillisel: French advance on, 403; attack, 411, 412; on the outskirts of, 315; Gen. Fayolle's dispositions, 152; Sir D. Haig on tactical importance of, 406
Sailly-Saillisel Ridge, French take western slope of, 404
St. Pierre Divion, fall of, 422
St. Pierre Vaast Wood: capture of trenches on outskirts of, 410; French advance on, 293; German fortification of, 155
St. Quentin, Mont, strategic position of, 150
Sakharoff, Gen., appointed Chief Commander of Allied Forces in the Dobrudja, 456
Salonika, arrival of Italian troops in, 274
San Grado di Merna, Italians reach and take, 256
San Mauro, Italians take, 244
San Michele Ridge, Italians take, 245
San Valentino, Italians take, 244
Saxons in Rumania, 234
Schacht, Dr. Hjalmar, in Belgium, 28
Schellenberg: Germans attack, 228; Rumanians enter, 211
Schmettow, Gen. Count, 437; at Caracalu, 461; in the Jiu Valley, 457, 459; on the Argesh, 469
Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, Gen. in command of 41st Prussian Division in Rumania, 457; on the Argesh, 469
Schünemann, Herr, German agent in Persia, 351, 352; captured and sent to Teheran, 356
Schwaben Redoubt, British fighting round, 410
Science and the Health of Armies (II.), 41–76
Sepsi-St. György, Rumanians capture, 211
Serbian Division in the Dobrudja, 218
Setonia, British steamer, sunk by German submarine and captain taken prisoner, 166
Shipping: Archangel, ice conditions, 85; Australia, wheat crop transport, 110, 111; building programme, Committee formed to advise Shipping Controller, 102; Canada, construction in, 107, 108; changes in the load-line, 98; control of frozen meat industry, 86; Controller of Shipping appointed, 96; cooperation of Controller and Shipbuilding Employers' Federation, 102; freights, advance of Italian and French coal, 95, 96, 115, rise in, 80, 85, 91; insurance, new scheme, 116; Inter-Allied Chartering Executive formed, 115; Licensing Committee appointed, 87–89, work of, 89; Neutrals, question of British port facilities for, 114, 115; Panama Canal, effect of closing on, 85; Ports, congestion, 83–85, Committee appointed, 87; requisitioning by the Admiralty, 78–80; Requisitioning Committee for carriage of food stuffs, 89; standardized ships, 98–102; *The Times* article quoted, 99, 101; tonnage, increased production of, 104–106; United States, output, 106
Shipping Problem, Aug., 1914–Feb., 1917, 77–116
Silistria: Ninth Rumanian Division at, 215; Rumanians evacuate and Bulgarians enter, 216
Silius, torpedoed by German submarine, 362
Simonescu, Gen., in command of Fourth Rumanian Division, 223
Sinaia, Germans reach, 441
Slatina, Germans take, 462
Sober, Austrians repulsed at, 258
Somme, Battle of the (IV.), 117–156, Sept., 1916 (V.), 277–316, (VI.), 397–432: Allied line on Sept. 6.

1916, 136, 139; British advance on Sept. 21–22, 295; British and French captures to end of Sept., 1916, 296, 311; fighting on Sept. 15, 1916, 277, 282–287; French captures during, 314, 315, in Sept., 1916, 293–297; French officer's description of, 297; Gen. Micheler's new army at, 139; German Divisions employed at, 316; German fictitious reports on, 128, 419; German "moral" on the, 117, 129, 311, 312; German regimental orders on position on Sept. 15, 1916, 156; results at end of Sept., 1916, 312–316; review of Allies' achievements, 427–432; Sir D. Haig's dispatch quoted on bad weather, 406, on position between Ancre and Somme, 405, 406; "Tanks" at Eaucourt l'Abbaye, 399, 403

Sosescu, Gen., imprisoned for negligence in Rumanian Campaign, 469

Southport, incident, 176

Soyécourt, French capture, 139

Spain, attitude towards American Peace Note, 493

Spotted Fever: carrier problem, 65–67; research work on, 52–65

Staabs, Lieut.-Gen. von, in command of German and Magyar regiments in the Strein Valley, 225

Standard Ship Building Company, formation of, 101 (see Shipping)

Stein, Gen. von, appointed Prussian Minister of War, 477

Strathness, fight with German submarine described, 170

Straussenberg, Gen. Arz von, in command of Austro-Hungarian forces on Rumanian Front, 208; in Transylvania, 230

Strein Valley, German attack on Rumanian positions, 225

Stuff and Regina trenches, Sir Hubert Gough takes most of, 414

Submarines, German: *U*49, exploits of and description of life in, 166; *UC*5, capture of, 174; *UC*12 captured by Italians, 174

Submarine warfare; disputes between United States and Central Powers, 359–372; methods employed by the Germans, 167, 168; new German campaign announced (Jan. 31, 1917), 371, 504

Sussex, American threat to sever relations with Germany, Note quoted, 363, 364

Swedish Prince, sunk, 168

Sweveghem, Belgian resistance at, 36, 39

Switch Trench, British take, 284, 285

Sykes, Sir Percy, mission in Persia, march from Bunder Abbas to Ispahan, 356

Szekels: see "Magyars".

Szekely-Udvarhely, Rumanians evacuate, 233

Szivo, Col. von, in command of Austrian Brigade in the Jiu Valley, 457, 459

T

Taft, Mr., President of League to Enforce Peace organization, 393, 394

"Tanks": description of, 278–280; at Courcelette, 289, 290, Eaucourt l'Abbaye, 399, 403, Flers, 285, 287, Gueudecourt, 303; in the fighting on the Western Front, 280–282; on the Ancre, 423

Tappen, General von, Chief-of-Staff to Mackensen, 454

Targovishte, Germans capture, 469

Targul-Jiu: Rumanian victory at, 436, 453, 454; second Battle of, 458; Germans enter, 458

Tarnowski, Count, Austrian Ambassador in Washington, 372

Teal, German air attack on, 174, 175

Théodor, M., deported to Germany, 36

Thiepval: bombardment of Hindenburg, Koenigstrasse and Lemberg trenches, 122, 123; British assault on, 150–152; British feint at, 132; description of redoubts at, 304; fighting round, 119; letters of the German garrison quoted, 305; Prussian Guard defeated at, 123; struggle for, 306; taken by the British, 307, 310; *The Times* Correspondent on capture of, 307, 309; Wilts and Worcesters at, 121–123; "Wurderwerk" position at, 150; fighting in, 151, 152

Thiepval-Stufen Redoubt, British attack on, 283

Tisza, Count Stephen, on the unpreparedness of Rumania, 208

Tognola Ridge, Italians occupy, 268

Tömös Pass, fighting in, 210

Toprosari, fighting at, 454

Törzburg, Germans enter, 232

Törzburg Pass, Battle of the, 442

Tosheff, General, in command of Third Bulgarian Army, 214

Trade: imports restricted, 92; paper imports, Royal Commission appointed, 92

Transylvania: German counter offensive in, 224; passes and railways in, 206, 207; Rumanian invasion of, 197–236; Rumanian 1st, 2nd and 4th Armies retreat from, 231–234; strategical and political considerations, 201, 202; objectives, 205

Transylvanian Alps, Rumanians cross, 210

Trotus Pass, fighting in, 445

Tülff von Tschepe und Weidenbach, General, Military Governor-General of occupied districts of Rumania, 472

Tutrakan: Germano-Bulgarian attack on, 214; surrender of, 215

Tuzla, Rumanians lose, 454

Typhoid Fever, treatment of, 71

Typhus Fever, ridding Serbia of, 73

U

Unione, sunk, 169

United States: *Ancona* Note quoted, 359; commercial and financial effects of the War, 391, 392; declares War on Germany, 357; German agents and propagandists in, 373–376; President Wilson's address in Congress quoted (Nov. 7, 1915), 375; German intrigue in Mexico, effect on, 374; Great Britain, "Blockade" controversy, 386 – 388; Irish influence in, 385; irritation with British "Black List" 387; League to Enforce Peace, resolutions, 394; *Lusitania* controversy, Germany's surrender, 360; merchant ships, arming of, German Note, 362, Great Britain's attitude, 362, opinion on Mr. Lansing's Note on, 361; Monroe Doctrine and Foreign policy, 357; neutrality, end of, 357–396; Peace Notes (Dec. 18, 1916), Mr. Lansing's quoted, 371, 395, President Wilson's, 482–484, effect produced on Allies, 484; *Persia* sunk by submarine, 359; "preparedness" movement, 395; Presidential Election, 1916, 383; President Wilson's speech on International relations after the War (Jan. 22, 1917), 499–502, German reply, 502, severs relations with Germany, 371; submarine war, controversies with Germany, May 1915–Jan. 1917, 358–372; *Sussex* incident, Note to Germany threatening severance of relations, 363, 364, German reply, 364–366; *U*53 and action of American Navy, Mr. Franklin Roosevelt's Memorandum, 367 – 369; *U*53 arrives at Newport, 366–369, sinks six ships within sight of American coast, 367; Wilson's neutrality policy and American opinion, 377–383

United States Navy, action in case of *U*53, Mr. Franklin

Roosevelt's Memorandum, 337
Uz Pass, fighting in, 445.

V

Val Cismon, Italian move on the, 268
Vallarsa, Italians attack, 272
Vallone, Italians cross the (Aug. 10, 1916), 249, 251
Valona Zone, Italian advance in, 274
Val Pellegrino, Italian advance down, 269
Vasilescu, General, takes over command on the Jiu, 453
Veliki Hribach, Italians take, 260
Vermandovillers: fighting at, 139–141; French in fighting at, 293, progress at, 139
Vertojbica, Italians advance to the, 248
Vipacco, Italians occupy line of, 265
Vulcan Pass: German advance in the, 450; Germans reach, 225; Rumanian counter-attack in the, 226

W

Wallachia, German invasion of, 437–442
Warlencourt, Butte de: British advance on, 413; take and lose, 419; fighting round, 402, 405
Wedge Wood, British occupy, 136
Westminster, torpedoed, 161, 162
Wild von Hohenborn, Gen., dismissal of, 477
Wilson, President Woodrow: address to Congress on severence of relations with Germany, 371, 372; address in Congress (Nov. 7, 1915) on German agents quoted, 375; announces relations severed with Germany, 357; campaign speech quoted, 394; on America's neutrality, 358; Peace Note (text) 482–484; re-election of in 1916, 383; speech on international relations after the war (Jan. 22, 1917), 497–502, German reply, 502; warning to Count Bernstorff on *U*53 incident, 369
Wood, Gen. Leonard, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 395
Wounds, treatment of, 43–52
Wright, Sir Almroth, research on wounds, 41
"Wunderwerk" position, British take, 151, 152

Z

Zayonchkovski, Gen.: in command of Allied Forces in the Dobrudja, 219; opens counter-offensive, 223
Zeppelins: see *L*19
Zhivkovitch, Gen., in command of Serbian Division at Toprosari, 454
Zimmermann, Herr von, appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 478; attempted alliance of Germany and Mexico, 373, 374, 497
Zollern Redoubt, British take the, 306

ILLUSTRATIONS IN VOLUME XI.

PLACES.

	PAGE
Algiers, The Pasteur Institute at	63, 64, 65, 66
Aluta River, Rocks of Trajan	230
Aluta Valley	447
Antwerp	4, 12, 13
Argesh River, The	463, 464, 470
Baltic Exchange, London	105
Beaumont Hamel	426
Berlin	474, 479
Bistritz, The "Golden Valley"	208, 209
Bland-Sutton Institute, London	46, 51, 53
Bligny, Sanatorium at	68
Brussels, Palais de Justice	3, 9
Bucovetich	457
Budapest	498
Bukarest	452
Bunder Abbas	341
Bushire	326, 327, 331, 339
Cairo Railway Station	49
Carso Plateau	255, 256, 258, 266
Caspian Sea, View on the	328
Charleston Navy Yard	360
Château Davignon	26
Chaulnes Wood	142
Combles	295, 298, 299, 300, 302, 304
Constanza	455
Courcelette, Capture of the Sugar Refinery at	288
Cozia, Monastery of	447
Craiova	461
Curlu Cemetery	155
Dinant	5
Dorna Vatra	198
Düsseldorf	494
Essen	494
Fajti Ridge	264
Falfemont Farm	137
Fogaras Valley, The	232
Ghent	24
Gorizia	250, 252, 253, 254, 263
Gradisca and the Isonzo	255
Guillemont	135
Hermannstadt	211
Hospital ships *Gloucester Castle* and *Lanfranc*	503
Hull, Fish Dock	194
Ispahan	343
Karun River	319, 336
Kasvin	350
Koh-i-Kouadja, Seistan	320
Kotal Pass, The	339
Liverpool	110
Lloyd's Underwriters' Room, London	115
Lokvica, Ruins of	265
Lowestoft Quay	187
Maurepas	128, 129
Mohammerah	332
Monfalcone	241, 244, 248
Monte Calvario	247
Monte Sabotino	243
Moreni, The Oilfield at	471
Munich	500
Namur Citadel	25
Neuilly, American Hospital at	42
New York, Wall Street	390
North Shields, Fish Market	184
Oltenitza	464
Panama Canal	102
Pasubio, Summit of	273
Predeal	439, 441
Predeal Pass	436
Resht, Road to Teheran	330
Sailly	413
Shiraz, The Gate of Bagh Shah	324
Silistria	220
Somme, Cavalry Lines on the (Sept., 1916)	308
Somme Front	398, 399, 409, 423
Tabriz	350
Teheran	338, 344, 345
Thiepval	119, 120
Tismana, The Monastery	442
Turco-Persian Frontier	320
Tutrakan	214
Uskub	74
Valcartier, Canadian Camp	394
Valona	274, 275
Vermandovillers, Trenches at	293
Warsaw	482, 483
Washington, The Capitol	378
Washington, The German Embassy	368
Washington, The White House	388
Ypres	2

PORTRAITS.

	PAGE
Afghanistan, The Amir of	351
Aosta, The Duke of ...	240
Austria, Carl, Emperor of	498, 499
Averescu, Gen.	205
Baden, Prince Max of ...	485
Baker, Mr. Newton D.	367, 384
Baratoff, Gen.	345
Bavaria, The King of ...	500
Bernstorff, Count... ...	368
Bethmann-Hollweg, Herr von	474, 479
Beuxin, Lieut.	62
Beyens, Baron ...	488, 489
Bissing, Gen. von	... 7, 17
Blaikie, Capt. James ...	166
Boehn, Gen. von	410
Bratianu, M.	440
Briand, M.	489
Burleson, Mr. Albert S. ...	384
Bussche-Hadden-Hausen, Baron von dem ...	481
Capelle, Adm. von ...	479
Carranza, Gen.	373
Carrell, Dr. Alexis ...	46
Christescu, Gen.	235
Culcer, Gen.	206
Czernin, Count	495
Daniels, Mr. Josephus	367, 384
Decoppet, M. Camille ...	484
Delmensingen, Lieut.-Gen. Kraft von	437
Duport, Gen.	294
East, 2nd Eng. C.E. ...	188
Fanshawe, Lieut.-Gen. Sir E. A.	421
Fayolle, Gen. ...	141, 153
Freytag-Loringhoven, Baron von	496
Garnier, Gen. von ...	410
Gerard, Mr. James W.	369, 372
Goltz, Field-Marshal von der	4
Graham, Mr. Horace F. ...	383
Gregory, Mr. Thomas W.	384
Gröner, Gen.	477
Guynemer, Lieut. ...	297
Haig, Sir Douglas ...	147
Helfferich, Herr	479
Hindenburg, Field-Marshal von	475
Holcomb, Mr. Marcus H.	383
Holtzendorff, Admiral von	492
Houston, Mr. David F. ...	384
Hughes, Mr. Charles E. ...	382
Hungary, Carl, King of ...	499
Iancovescu, Gen.	234
Inchcape, Lord	78
Joffre, Gen.	147
Kaempf, Herr	479
Kaiser, The ...	475, 500
Kesson, Mr., of the *California*...	170
Keyes, Mr. Henry W. ...	383
Kirchbach, Gen. von ...	152
Kneussl, Gen. von ...	450
Kosch, Gen. von	462
Kühne, Lieut.-Gen. von...	461
Lane, Mr. Franklin K. ...	384
Lansing, Mr. Robert ...	384
Lewis, Mr. F. W.... ...	89
Lloyd George, Rt. Hon. D.	147
Ludendorff, Gen. von ...	475
Lüders, Frl.	496
McAdoo, Mr. William G....	384
McCall, Mr. Samuel W. ...	383
Mackay, Mr. Clarence H.	372
Maistre, Gen.	420
Marchand, Gen.	411
Marling, Sir Charles ...	355
Marschall, Gen. Baron von	149
Mercier, Cardinal...	14, 15
Micheler, Gen.	154
Milliken, Mr. Carl E. ...	383
Monroe, Mr. James ...	358
Morgen, Lieut.-Gen. von...	457
Nicholls, Mr. Edward F....	114
O'Connor, Col. W. F. ...	352
Persia, Sultan Ahmed, Shah of	322, 346
The Shah and his Ministers ...	342
Abdul Kassim, Nasir-ul-Mulk	341
Mirza Hassan Khan, Mohtasham-es-Saltaneh ...	349
Mirza Hassan Khan, Mushir-ed-Dowleh	348
Mirza Mehdi Khan ...	323
Mirza Mohamed Ali...	340
Mirza Mohamed Ali Khan, Ala-es-Saltaneh ...	349
Muzaffer-ud-Din ...	340
Nadir Shah	325
Nasir-ud-Din ...	333
Zil-es-Sultan, The ...	348
Pillar, Capt.	180
Polk, Mr. Frank L. ...	366
Raemaekers' Cartoons, Reproductions of	20, 34, 40
Redfield, Mr. William C....	384
Reuss, Prince Henry XXXI of	353
Romanones, Count ...	493
Roosevelt, Mr. Franklin D.	366
Root, Mr. Elihu	376
Rumania, King Ferdinand of ...	217, 440
Rumania, The Queen of ...	218
Rumania, The Crown Prince of	217
Schmettow, Gen. Count ...	456
Schulthess, M. Edmond ...	484
Sharp, Mr. W. G. ...	487, 489
Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil ...	359
Stanchfield, Mr. John B....	372
Stein, Gen. von	492
Stokes, Mr. Wilfred ...	431
Stumm, Herr von ...	481
Sykes, Sir Percy	337
Thomas, M.	147
Wahnschaffe, Herr ...	474
Wilson, Chief Eng. F. P. ...	188
Wilson, Mr. William B. ...	384
Wilson, President Woodrow	370, 379, 380, 389, 392, 393
Wilson, President Woodrow, and his Cabinet	384
Wilson, Mrs. Woodrow	389, 393
Wood, Gen. Leonard ...	395
Zayonchkovski, Gen. ...	221
Zimmermann, Herr	479, 480

MAPS AND PLANS.

	PAGE
Aluta Defile, The... ...	446
Austro-Italian Frontier, Key Map	238
Belgium, Territory occupied by Germans ...	16
Courcelette and Flers, Capture of	282
Distinguished Service Cross	158
Distinguished Service Medal	158
Dobrudja, The	216
Dobrudja, The Northern...	454
Fassa Alps, Fighting in...	268
German Infantry Columns	431
Gorizia and the Carso ...	246
Gorizia, Austrian Defences of	242
Guillemont and Ginchy, Operations around ...	134
Medical Diagrams, 50, 54, 56, 57, 67, 70, 75	
Péronne District	138
Persia	318
Rumania, Fighting North of Targul-Jiu (Oct. 27, 1916)	453
Somme, Battle of the, Ground Gained ...	429
Transylvania	204
Tutrakan, Approaches to	213
Wallachia	460
Wallachian Passes, The East	438
"Wunderwerk" (near Thiepval), Plan of The	151

00107243

Digitized with financial assistance from
Shri Brihad Bhartiya Samaj
on 31 October, 2019